One document matched: draft-saintandre-xmpp-tls-02.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd">
<?rfc compact="yes"?>
<?rfc iprnotified="no" ?>
<?rfc sortrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc strict="yes"?>
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc tocdepth="4"?>
<rfc category="std" docName="draft-saintandre-xmpp-tls-02" ipr="trust200902" updates="6120">
<?xml-stylesheet type='text/xsl' href='rfc2629.xslt' ?>
<front>
<title abbrev="XMPP TLS">Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization>Cisco Systems, Inc.</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>1899 Wynkoop Street, Suite 600</street>
<city>Denver</city>
<region>CO</region>
<code>80202</code>
<country>USA</country>
</postal>
<phone>+1-303-308-3282</phone>
<email>psaintan@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date/>
<abstract>
<t>This document provides recommendations for the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP). This document updates RFC 6120.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction" anchor='intro'>
<t>The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) <xref target='RFC6120'/> (along with its precursor, the so-called "Jabber protocol") has used Transport Layer Security (TLS) <xref target='RFC5246'/> (along with its precursor, Secure Sockets Layer or SSL) since 1999. Both <xref target='RFC6120'/> and its predecessor <xref target='RFC3920'/> provided recommendations regarding the use of TLS in XMPP. Given the evolving threat model on the Internet today (see, for example, <xref target='I-D.trammell-perpass-ppa'/>), it is necessary to provide stronger recommendations (see also <xref target='I-D.sheffer-tls-bcp'/>). This document updates <xref target='RFC6120'/>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Terminology" anchor="terms">
<t>Various security-related terms are to be understood in the sense defined in <xref target="RFC4949"/>.</t>
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in <xref target='RFC2119'/>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Discussion Venue" anchor="discuss">
<t>The discussion venue for this document is the mailing list of the XMPP Working Group, for which archives and subscription information can be found at <eref target='https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/xmpp'/>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Recommendations" anchor="rec">
<section title="Support for TLS" anchor="rec-support">
<t>Support for TLS (specifically, the XMPP profile of STARTTLS) is mandatory for XMPP implementations. If the server to which an XMPP client or peer server connects does not offer a stream feature of <starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/> as described in <xref target='RFC6120'/>, the initiating entity MUST NOT proceed with the stream negotiation and MUST instead abort the connection attempt. Although XMPP servers SHOULD include the <required/> child element to indicate that negotiation of TLS is mandatory, clients and peer servers MUST NOT depend on receiving the <required/> flag.</t>
</section>
<section title="Protocol Versions" anchor="rec-versions">
<t>It is important both to stop using old, insecure versions of SSL/TLS and to start using modern, more secure versions. Therefore:</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>XMPP implementations MUST NOT negotiate SSL version 2.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
Rationale: SSLv2 has serious security vulnerabilities <xref target='RFC6176'/>.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
</t>
<t>XMPP implementations MUST NOT negotiate SSL version 3.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
Rationale: SSLv3 <xref target='RFC6101'/> was an improvement over SSLv2, but did not support strong ciphersuites.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
</t>
<t>XMPP implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate TLS version 1.0 <xref target='RFC2246'/>.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
Rationale: TLS 1.0 (published in 1999) includes a way to downgrade the connection to SSLv3 and does not support more modern, strong ciphersuites.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
</t>
<t>XMPP implementations MAY negotiate TLS version 1.1 <xref target='RFC4346'/>.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
Rationale: TLS 1.1 (published in 2006) prevents downgrade attacks to SSL, but does not support certain stronger ciphersuites.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
</t>
<t>XMPP implementations MUST support, and prefer to negotiate, TLS version 1.2 <xref target='RFC5246'/>.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
Rationale: Several stronger ciphersuites are available only with TLS 1.2 (published in 2008).
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>As of the date of this writing, the latest version of TLS is 1.2. When TLS is updated to a newer version, this document will be updated to recommend support for the latest version. If this document is not updated in a timely manner, it can be assumed that support for the latest version of TLS is recommended.</t>
</section>
<section title="Ciphersuites" anchor="rec-cipher">
<t>It is important both to stop using old, insecure ciphersuites and to start using modern, more secure ciphersuites. Therefore:</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>XMPP implementations MUST NOT negotiate the NULL ciphersuites.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
Rationale: The NULL ciphersuites offer no encryption whatsoever and thus are completely insecure.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
</t>
<t>XMPP implementations MUST NOT negotiate RC4 ciphersuites
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
Rationale: The RC4 stream cipher has a variety of cryptographic weaknesses, documented in <xref target='I-D.popov-tls-prohibiting-rc4'/>.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
</t>
<t>XMPP implementations MUST NOT negotiate ciphersuites that use so-called "export-level" encryption (including algorithms with 40 bits or 56 bits of security).
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
Rationale: These ciphersuites are deliberately "dumbed down" and are very easy to break.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
</t>
<t>XMPP implementations MUST NOT negotiate ciphersuites that use algorithms that offer less than 128 bits of security (even if they advertise more bits, such as the 168-bit 3DES ciphersuites).
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
Rationale: Although these ciphersuites are not actively subject to breakage, their useful life is short enough that stronger ciphersuites are desirable.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
</t>
<t>XMPP implementations SHOULD prefer ciphersuites that use algorithms with at least 256 bits of security.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
Rationale: The useful life of such ciphersuites is probably at least 3-5 years.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
</t>
<t>XMPP implementations MUST support, and SHOULD prefer to negotiate, ciphersuites that offer authentication, such as the "AES-GCM" family.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
Rationale: Authenticated connections are better than unauthenticated connections (although, as explained under <xref target='rec-unauth'/>, unauthenticated connections are better than nothing).
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
</t>
<t>XMPP implementations MUST support, and SHOULD prefer to negotiate, ciphersuites that offer forward secrecy, such as those in the "EDH", "DHE", and "ECDHE" families.
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
Rationale: Forward secrecy (sometimes called "perfect forward secrecy") prevents the recovery of information that was encrypted with older keys, thus limiting the amount of time during which attack can be successful.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Given the foregoing considerations, implementation of the following ciphersuites is RECOMMENDED:</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256</t>
<t>TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256</t>
<t>TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384</t>
<t>TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Unfortunately, those ciphersuites are supported only in TLS 1.2. A future version of this document might recommend ciphersuites for earlier versions of TLS.</t>
</section>
<section title="Public Key Length" anchor="rec-keylength">
<t>Because Diffie-Hellman keys of 1024 bits are estimated to be roughly equivalent to 80-bit symmetric keys, it is better to use longer keys for the "DH" family of ciphersuites. Unfortunately, some existing software cannot handle (or cannot easily handle) key lengths greater than 1024 bits. The most common workaround for these systems is to prefer the "ECDHE" family of ciphersuites instead of the "DH" family, then use longer keys. Key lengths of at least 2048 bits are RECOMMENDED, since they are estimated to be roughly equivalent to 112-bit symmetric keys and might be sufficient for at least the next 10 years.</t>
<t>Note: The foregoing recommendations are preliminary and will likely be corrected and enhanced in a future version of this document.</t>
</section>
<section title="Certificate Validation" anchor="rec-certs">
<t>Both the core XMPP specification <xref target='RFC6120'/> and the "CertID" specification <xref target='RFC6125'/> provide recommendations and requirements for certificate checking. This document does not supersede those specifications.</t>
</section>
<section title="Unauthenticated Connections" anchor="rec-unauth">
<t>The core XMPP specification <xref target='RFC6120'/> states a preference for the use of TLS for encryption along with SASL <xref target='RFC4422'/> for authentication. In general, it is preferable for a connection to be authenticated, including proper identity checking as defined by the "CertID" specification <xref target='RFC6125'/>. However, given the pervasiveness of passive eavesdropping, even an unauthenticated connection might be better than an unencrypted connection (this is similar to the "better than nothing security" approach for IPsec <xref target='RFC5386'/>). In particular, given current deployment challenges for authenticated connections between XMPP servers <xref target='I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna'/>, it might be reasonable for XMPP server implementations to accept unauthenticated connections when the Server Dialback protocol <xref target='XEP-0220'/> is used for weak identity verification; this will at least enable encryption of server-to-server connections. Unauthenticated connections include connections negotiated using anonymous Diffie-Hellman algorithms or using self-signed certificates, among other scenarios.</t>
</section>
<section title="Server Name Indication" anchor="rec-sni">
<t>Although there is no harm in supporting the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) extension <xref target='RFC6066'/>, this is not necessary since the same function is served in XMPP by the 'to' address of the initial stream header as explained in Section 4.7.2 of <xref target='RFC6120'/>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Session Resumption" anchor="rec-resume">
<t>If TLS session resumption is used (e.g., in concert with the XMPP Stream Management extension <xref target='XEP-0198'/>), care ought to be taken to do so safely. In particular, the resumption information (either session IDs <xref target='RFC5246'/> or session tickets <xref target='RFC5077'/>) needs to be authenticated and encrypted to prevent modification or eavesdropping by an attacker. Use of session IDs <xref target='RFC5246'/> is RECOMMENDED instead of session tickets <xref target='RFC5077'/>, since session tickets require use of a relatively small key size and a relatively weak ciphersuite (AES_128_CBC_SHA256) that does not support forward secrecy.</t>
</section>
<section title="Compression" anchor="rec-compress">
<t>XMPP is not generally subject to attacks based on TLS-layer compression (e.g., the "CRIME" attack), since it is not typically used to communicate static strings of the kind communicated over HTTP, such as "cookies" <xref target='RFC6265'/>. However, because XMPP also supports an application-layer compression technology <xref target='XEP-0138'/>, implementers might wish to prefer XMPP compression over TLS compression.</t>
</section>
<section title="Human Factors" anchor="rec-user">
<t>It is RECOMMENDED that XMPP clients provide ways for end users (and that XMPP servers provide ways for administators) to complete the following tasks:</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>Determine if a client-to-server or server-to-server connection is encrypted and authenticated.</t>
<t>Determine the version of TLS used for a client-to-server or server-to-server connection.</t>
<t>Inspect the certificate offered by an XMPP server.</t>
<t>Determine the ciphersuite used to encrypt a connection.</t>
<t>Be warned if the certificate changes for a given server.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Implementation Notes" anchor="impl">
<t>Some governments enforce legislation prohibiting the export of strong cryptographic technologies. Nothing in this document ought to be taken as advice to violate such prohibitions.</t>
</section>
<section title="IANA Considerations" anchor="iana">
<t>This document requests no actions of the IANA.</t>
</section>
<section title="Security Considerations" anchor="security">
<t>This entire document discusses security.</t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<reference anchor="RFC2119">
<front>
<title abbrev='RFC Key Words'>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
<author initials='S.' surname='Bradner' fullname='Scott Bradner'>
<organization>Harvard University</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>1350 Mass. Ave.</street>
<street>Cambridge</street>
<street>MA 02138</street></postal>
<phone>- +1 617 495 3864</phone>
<email>sob@harvard.edu</email></address></author>
<date month='March' year='1997' />
<area>General</area>
<keyword>keyword</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>
In many standards track documents several words are used to signify
the requirements in the specification. These words are often
capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be
interpreted in IETF documents. Authors who follow these guidelines
should incorporate this phrase near the beginning of their document:
<list>
<t>
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
RFC 2119.
</t></list></t>
<t>
Note that the force of these words is modified by the requirement
level of the document in which they are used.
</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='BCP' value='14' />
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='2119' />
<format type='TXT' octets='4723' target='ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2119.txt' />
<format type='HTML' octets='14486' target='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc2119.html' />
<format type='XML' octets='5661' target='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc2119.xml' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC4949'>
<front>
<title>Internet Security Glossary, Version 2</title>
<author initials='R.' surname='Shirey' fullname='R. Shirey'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2007' month='August' />
<abstract>
<t>This Glossary provides definitions, abbreviations, and explanations of terminology for information system security. The 334 pages of entries offer recommendations to improve the comprehensibility of written material that is generated in the Internet Standards Process (RFC 2026). The recommendations follow the principles that such writing should (a) use the same term or definition whenever the same concept is mentioned; (b) use terms in their plainest, dictionary sense; (c) use terms that are already well-established in open publications; and (d) avoid terms that either favor a particular vendor or favor a particular technology or mechanism over other, competing techniques that already exist or could be developed. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4949' />
<format type='TXT' octets='867626' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4949.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC5077'>
<front>
<title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without Server-Side State</title>
<author initials='J.' surname='Salowey' fullname='J. Salowey'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='H.' surname='Zhou' fullname='H. Zhou'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='P.' surname='Eronen' fullname='P. Eronen'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='H.' surname='Tschofenig' fullname='H. Tschofenig'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2008' month='January' />
<abstract>
<t>This document describes a mechanism that enables the Transport Layer Security (TLS) server to resume sessions and avoid keeping per-client session state. The TLS server encapsulates the session state into a ticket and forwards it to the client. The client can subsequently resume a session using the obtained ticket. This document obsoletes RFC 4507. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='5077' />
<format type='TXT' octets='41989' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5077.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC5246'>
<front>
<title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2</title>
<author initials='T.' surname='Dierks' fullname='T. Dierks'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='E.' surname='Rescorla' fullname='E. Rescorla'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2008' month='August' />
<abstract>
<t>This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='5246' />
<format type='TXT' octets='222395' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC6120'>
<front>
<title>Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core</title>
<author initials='P.' surname='Saint-Andre' fullname='P. Saint-Andre'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2011' month='March' />
<abstract>
<t>The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is an application profile of the Extensible Markup Language (XML) that enables the near-real-time exchange of structured yet extensible data between any two or more network entities. This document defines XMPP's core protocol methods: setup and teardown of XML streams, channel encryption, authentication, error handling, and communication primitives for messaging, network availability ("presence"), and request-response interactions. This document obsoletes RFC 3920. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='6120' />
<format type='TXT' octets='451942' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6120.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC6125'>
<front>
<title>Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)</title>
<author initials='P.' surname='Saint-Andre' fullname='P. Saint-Andre'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='J.' surname='Hodges' fullname='J. Hodges'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2011' month='March' />
<abstract>
<t>Many application technologies enable secure communication between two entities by means of Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) certificates in the context of Transport Layer Security (TLS). This document specifies procedures for representing and verifying the identity of application services in such interactions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='6125' />
<format type='TXT' octets='136507' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6125.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC6176'>
<front>
<title>Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Version 2.0</title>
<author initials='S.' surname='Turner' fullname='S. Turner'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='T.' surname='Polk' fullname='T. Polk'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2011' month='March' />
<abstract>
<t>This document requires that when Transport Layer Security (TLS) clients and servers establish connections, they never negotiate the use of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) version 2.0. This document updates the backward compatibility sections found in the Transport Layer Security (TLS). [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='6176' />
<format type='TXT' octets='7642' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6176.txt' />
</reference>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<reference anchor='I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna'>
<front>
<title>Domain Name Associations (DNA) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)</title>
<author initials='P' surname='Saint-Andre' fullname='Peter Saint-Andre'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='M' surname='Miller' fullname='Matthew Miller'>
<organization />
</author>
<date month='September' day='6' year='2013' />
<abstract><t>This document improves the security of the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) in two ways. First, it specifies how "prooftypes" can establish a strong association between a domain name and an XML stream. Second, it describes how to securely delegate a source domain to a derived domain, which is especially important in virtual hosting environments.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-xmpp-dna-03' />
<format type='TXT'
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-xmpp-dna-03.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='I-D.popov-tls-prohibiting-rc4'>
<front>
<title>Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites</title>
<author initials='A' surname='Popov' fullname='Andrey Popov'>
<organization />
</author>
<date month='October' day='5' year='2013' />
<abstract><t>This document requires that Transport Layer Security (TLS) clients and servers never negotiate the use of RC4 cipher suites when they establish connections.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-popov-tls-prohibiting-rc4-01' />
<format type='TXT'
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-popov-tls-prohibiting-rc4-01.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='I-D.sheffer-tls-bcp'>
<front>
<title>Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS</title>
<author initials='Y' surname='Sheffer' fullname='Yaron Sheffer'>
<organization />
</author>
<date month='September' day='20' year='2013' />
<abstract><t>Over the last few years there have been several serious attacks on TLS, including attacks on its most commonly used ciphers and modes of operation. This document offers recommendations on securely using the TLS and DTLS protocols, given existing standards and implementations.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-01' />
<format type='TXT'
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-01.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='I-D.trammell-perpass-ppa'>
<front>
<title>The Perfect Passive Adversary: A Threat Model for the Evaluation of Protocols under Pervasive Surveillance</title>
<author initials='B' surname='Trammell' fullname='Brian Trammell'>
<organization />
</author>
<date month='September' day='4' year='2013' />
<abstract><t>This document elaborates a threat model for the Perfect Passive Adversary (PPA): an adversary with an interest in eavesdropping that can passively observe network traffic at every layer at every point in the network between the endpoints. It is intended to demonstrate to protocol designers and implementors the observability and inferability of information and metainformation transported over their respective protocols, to assist in the evaluation of the performance of these protocols and the effectiveness of their protection mechanisms under pervasive passive surveillance.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-trammell-perpass-ppa-00' />
<format type='TXT'
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-trammell-perpass-ppa-00.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC2246'>
<front>
<title>The TLS Protocol Version 1.0</title>
<author initials='T.' surname='Dierks' fullname='Tim Dierks'>
<organization>Certicom</organization>
<address>
<email>tdierks@certicom.com</email></address></author>
<author initials='C.' surname='Allen' fullname='Christopher Allen'>
<organization>Certicom</organization>
<address>
<email>callen@certicom.com</email></address></author>
<date year='1999' month='January' />
<abstract>
<t>This document specifies Version 1.0 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications privacy over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery.</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='2246' />
<format type='TXT' octets='170401' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC3920'>
<front>
<title abbrev='XMPP Core'>Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core</title>
<author initials='P.' surname='Saint-Andre' fullname='Peter Saint-Andre' role='editor'>
<organization>Jabber Software Foundation</organization>
<address>
<email>stpeter@jabber.org</email></address></author>
<date year='2004' month='October' />
<area>Applications</area>
<workgroup>XMPP Working Group</workgroup>
<keyword>RFC</keyword>
<keyword>Request for Comments</keyword>
<keyword>I-D</keyword>
<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
<keyword>XMPP</keyword>
<keyword>Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol</keyword>
<keyword>Jabber</keyword>
<keyword>IM</keyword>
<keyword>Instant Messaging</keyword>
<keyword>Presence</keyword>
<keyword>XML</keyword>
<keyword>Extensible Markup Language</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>This memo defines the core features of the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), a protocol for streaming Extensible Markup Language (XML) elements in order to exchange structured information in close to real time between any two network endpoints. While XMPP provides a generalized, extensible framework for exchanging XML data, it is used mainly for the purpose of building instant messaging and presence applications that meet the requirements of RFC 2779.</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='3920' />
<format type='TXT' octets='194313' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3920.txt' />
<format type='HTML' octets='281359' target='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc3920.html' />
<format type='XML' octets='234610' target='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc3920.xml' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC4346'>
<front>
<title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1</title>
<author initials='T.' surname='Dierks' fullname='T. Dierks'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='E.' surname='Rescorla' fullname='E. Rescorla'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2006' month='April' />
<abstract>
<t>This document specifies Version 1.1 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4346' />
<format type='TXT' octets='187041' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC4422'>
<front>
<title>Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)</title>
<author initials='A.' surname='Melnikov' fullname='A. Melnikov'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='K.' surname='Zeilenga' fullname='K. Zeilenga'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2006' month='June' />
<abstract>
<t>The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) is a framework for providing authentication and data security services in connection-oriented protocols via replaceable mechanisms. It provides a structured interface between protocols and mechanisms. The resulting framework allows new protocols to reuse existing mechanisms and allows old protocols to make use of new mechanisms. The framework also provides a protocol for securing subsequent protocol exchanges within a data security layer.</t><t> This document describes how a SASL mechanism is structured, describes how protocols include support for SASL, and defines the protocol for carrying a data security layer over a connection. In addition, this document defines one SASL mechanism, the EXTERNAL mechanism.</t><t> This document obsoletes RFC 2222. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4422' />
<format type='TXT' octets='73206' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4422.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC5386'>
<front>
<title>Better-Than-Nothing Security: An Unauthenticated Mode of IPsec</title>
<author initials='N.' surname='Williams' fullname='N. Williams'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='M.' surname='Richardson' fullname='M. Richardson'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2008' month='November' />
<abstract>
<t>This document specifies how to use the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocols, such as IKEv1 and IKEv2, to setup "unauthenticated" security associations (SAs) for use with the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and the IPsec Authentication Header (AH). No changes to IKEv2 bits-on-the-wire are required, but Peer Authorization Database (PAD) and Security Policy Database (SPD) extensions are specified. Unauthenticated IPsec is herein referred to by its popular acronym, "BTNS" (Better-Than-Nothing Security). [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='5386' />
<format type='TXT' octets='23103' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5386.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC6066'>
<front>
<title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions</title>
<author initials='D.' surname='Eastlake' fullname='D. Eastlake'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2011' month='January' />
<abstract>
<t>This document provides specifications for existing TLS extensions. It is a companion document for RFC 5246, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2". The extensions specified are server_name, max_fragment_length, client_certificate_url, trusted_ca_keys, truncated_hmac, and status_request. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='6066' />
<format type='TXT' octets='55079' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6066.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC6101'>
<front>
<title>The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Version 3.0</title>
<author initials='A.' surname='Freier' fullname='A. Freier'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='P.' surname='Karlton' fullname='P. Karlton'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='P.' surname='Kocher' fullname='P. Kocher'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2011' month='August' />
<abstract>
<t>This document is published as a historical record of the SSL 3.0 protocol. The original Abstract follows.</t><t> This document specifies version 3.0 of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL 3.0) protocol, a security protocol that provides communications privacy over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. This document defines a Historic Document for the Internet community.</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='6101' />
<format type='TXT' octets='142297' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6101.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC6265'>
<front>
<title>HTTP State Management Mechanism</title>
<author initials='A.' surname='Barth' fullname='A. Barth'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2011' month='April' />
<abstract>
<t>This document defines the HTTP Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields. These header fields can be used by HTTP servers to store state (called cookies) at HTTP user agents, letting the servers maintain a stateful session over the mostly stateless HTTP protocol. Although cookies have many historical infelicities that degrade their security and privacy, the Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields are widely used on the Internet. This document obsoletes RFC 2965. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='6265' />
<format type='TXT' octets='79724' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6265.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor="XEP-0138">
<front>
<title>Stream Compression</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Hildebrand" fullname="Joe Hildebrand">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>jhildebr@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>stpeter@jabber.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<date day="27" month="May" year="2009"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="XSF XEP" value="0138"/>
<format type="HTML" target="http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0138.html"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="XEP-0198">
<front>
<title>Stream Management</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Karneges" fullname="Justin Karneges">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>justin@affinix.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>stpeter@jabber.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Hildebrand" fullname="Joe Hildebrand">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>jhildebr@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="F." surname="Forno" fullname="Fabio Forno">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>fabio.forno@gmail.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="D." surname="Cridland" fullname="Dave Cridland">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>dave.cridland@isode.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="M." surname="Wild" fullname="Matthew Wild">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>mwild1@gmail.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date day="29" month="June" year="2011"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="XSF XEP" value="0198"/>
<format type="HTML" target="http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0198.html"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="XEP-0220">
<front>
<title>Server Dialback</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Miller" fullname="Jeremie Miller">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>jer@jabber.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>stpeter@jabber.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="P." surname="Hancke" fullname="Philipp Hancke">
<organization/>
<address>
<email/>
</address>
</author>
<date day="27" month="September" year="2013"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="XSF XEP" value="0220"/>
<format type="HTML" target="http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0220.html"/>
</reference>
</references>
<section title="Acknowledgements">
<t>Thanks to the following individuals for their input: Thijs Alkemade, Dave Cridland, Philipp Hancke, Olle Johansson, Steve Kille, Tobias Markmann, Matt Miller, and Rene Treffer.</t>
</section>
</back>
</rfc>
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