One document matched: draft-saintandre-xmpp-dna-01.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd">
<?rfc compact="yes"?>
<?rfc strict="yes"?>
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc tocdepth="2"?>
<rfc category="std" docName="draft-saintandre-xmpp-dna-01" ipr="trust200902">
<front>
<title abbrev="XMPP DNA">Domain Name Associations (DNA) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization>Cisco Systems, Inc.</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>1899 Wynkoop Street, Suite 600</street>
<city>Denver</city>
<region>CO</region>
<code>80202</code>
<country>USA</country>
</postal>
<email>psaintan@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="M." surname="Miller" fullname="Matthew Miller">
<organization>Cisco Systems, Inc.</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>1899 Wynkoop Street, Suite 600</street>
<city>Denver</city>
<region>CO</region>
<code>80202</code>
<country>USA</country>
</postal>
<email>mamille2@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date month="February" day="22" year="2013"/>
<area>RAI</area>
<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
<keyword>XMPP</keyword>
<keyword>Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol</keyword>
<keyword>Jabber</keyword>
<keyword>federation</keyword>
<keyword>delegation</keyword>
<keyword>security</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>This document improves the security of the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) in two ways. First, it specifies how "prooftypes" can establish a strong association between a domain name and an XML stream. Second, it describes how to securely delegate a source domain to a derived domain, which is especially important in virtual hosting environments.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction" anchor="intro">
<t>The need to establish a strong association between a domain name and an XML stream arises in both client-to-server and server-to-server communication using the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), because XMPP servers are typically identified by DNS domain names. However, a client or peer server needs to verify the identity of a server to which it connects. To date, such verification has been established based on information obtained from the Domain Name System (DNS), the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), or similar sources. This document (1) generalizes the model currently in use so that additional prooftypes can be defined, (2) provides a basis for modernizing some prooftypes to reflect progress in underlying technologies such as DNS Security <xref target="RFC4033"/>, and (3) describes the flow of operations for establishing a domain name association.</t>
<t>Furthermore, the process for resolving the domain name of an XMPP service into the IP address at which an XML stream will be negotiated (defined in <xref target='RFC6120'/>) can involve delegation of a source domain (say, example.com) to a derived domain (say, hosting.example.net). If such delegation is not done in a secure manner, then the domain name association cannot be authenticated. Therefore, this document provides guidelines for defining secure delegation methods.</t>
<t>This document does not define any DNA prooftypes or secure delegation methods; such technologies are defined in companion documents.</t>
</section>
<section title="Terminology" anchor="terms">
<t>This document inherits XMPP terminology from <xref target="RFC6120"/> and <xref target="XEP-0220"/>, DNS terminology from <xref target="RFC1034"/>, <xref target="RFC1035"/>, <xref target="RFC2782"/> and <xref target="RFC4033"/>, and security terminology from <xref target="RFC4949"/> and <xref target="RFC5280"/>. The terms "source domain", "derived domain", "reference identity", and "presented identity" are used as defined in the "CertID" specification <xref target="RFC6125"/>. The terms "permissive federation", "verified federation", and "encrypted federation" are derived from <xref target="XEP-0238"/>, although we substitute the term "authenticated federation" for the term "trusted federation" from that document.</t>
</section>
<section title="Flow Chart" anchor="flow">
<t>The following flow chart illustrates the protocol flow for establishing domain name associations between Server A and Server B, as described in the remaining sections of this document.</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
|
|
(Section 4: A Simple Scenario)
|
|
DNS RESOLUTION ETC.
|
+-------------STREAM HEADERS--------------------+
| |
| A: <stream from='a.example' to='b.example'> |
| |
| B: <stream from='b.example' to='a.example'> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+-------------TLS NEGOTIATION-------------------+
| |
| B: Server Certificate |
| [B: Certificate Request] |
| [A: Client Certificate] |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
(A establishes DNA for b.example!)
|
+-------------AUTHENTICATION--------------------+
| | |
| {client certificate?} ----+ |
| | | |
| | yes no | |
| v | |
| SASL EXTERNAL | |
| (mutual auth!) | |
+------------------------------------|----------+
|
+----------------+
| B needs to auth A
|
(Section 5: One-Way Authentication)
|
|
DNS RESOLUTION ETC.
|
+-------------STREAM HEADERS--------------------+
| |
| B: <stream from='b.example' to='a.example'> |
| |
| A: <stream from='a.example' to='b.example'> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+-------------TLS NEGOTIATION-------------------+
| |
| A: Server Certificate |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
(B establishes DNA for a.example!)
|
|
(Section 6.1: Piggybacking Assertion)
|
|
+----------DIALBACK IDENTITY ASSERTION----------+
| |
| B: <db:result from='c.example' |
| to='a.example'/> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+-----------DNA DANCE AS ABOVE------------------+
| |
| DNS RESOLUTION, STREAM HEADERS, |
| TLS NEGOTIATION, AUTHENTICATION |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+----------DIALBACK IDENTITY VERIFICATION-------+
| |
| A: <db:verify from='a.example' |
| to='c.example' |
| type='valid'/> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
|
(Section 6.2: Piggybacking Supposition)
|
|
+-----------SUBSEQUENT CONNECTION---------------+
| |
| B: <stream from='c.example' |
| to='chatrooms.a.example'> |
| |
| A: <stream from='chatrooms.a.example' |
| to='c.example'> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+-----------DNA DANCE AS ABOVE------------------+
| |
| DNS RESOLUTION, STREAM HEADERS, |
| TLS NEGOTIATION, AUTHENTICATION |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+-----------DIALBACK OPTIMIZATION---------------+
| |
| B: <db:result from='c.example' |
| to='chatrooms.a.example'/> |
| |
| B: <db:verify from='chatrooms.a.example' |
| to='c.example' |
| type='valid'/> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="A Simple Scenario" anchor="simple">
<t>To illustrate the problem, consider the simplified order of events (see <xref target='RFC6120'/> for details) in establishing an XML stream between Server A (a.example) and Server B (b.example):</t>
<t>
<list style='numbers'>
<t>Server A resolves the DNS domain name b.example.</t>
<t>Server A opens a TCP connection to the resolved IP address.</t>
<t>
Server A sends an initial stream header to Server B, asserting that it is a.example:
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
<stream:stream from='a.example' to='b.example'>
</t>
<t>
Server B sends a response stream header to Server A, asserting that it is b.example:
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
<stream:stream from='b.example' to='a.example'>
</t>
<t>The servers attempt TLS negotiation, during which Server B (acting as a TLS server) presents a PKIX certificate proving that it is b.example and Server A (acting as a TLS client) presents a PKIX certificate proving that it is a.example.</t>
<t>Server A checks the PKIX certificate that Server B provided and Server B checks the PKIX certificate that Server A provided; if these proofs are consistent with the XMPP profile of the matching rules from <xref target='RFC6125'/>, each server accepts that there is a strong domain name association between its stream to the other party and the DNS domain name of the other party.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Several simplifying assumptions underlie the happy scenario just outlined:</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>Server A presents a PKIX certificate during TLS negotiation, which enables the parties to complete mutual authentication.</t>
<t>There are no additional domains associated with Server A and Server B (say, a subdomain chatrooms.a.example on Server A or a second domain c.example on Server B).</t>
<t>The server administrators are able to obtain PKIX certificates in the first place.</t>
<t>The server administrators are running their own XMPP servers, rather than using hosting services.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Let's consider each of these "wrinkles" in turn.</t>
</section>
<section title="One-Way Authentication" anchor="oneway">
<t>If Server A does not present its PKIX certificate during TLS negotiation (perhaps because it wishes to verify the identity of Server B before presenting its own credentials), Server B is unable to mutually authenticate Server A. Therefore, Server B needs to negotiate and authenticate a stream to Server A, just as Server A has done:</t>
<t>
<list style='numbers'>
<t>Server B resolves the DNS domain name a.example.</t>
<t>Server B opens a TCP connection to the resolved IP address.</t>
<t>
Server B sends an initial stream header to Server A, asserting that it is b.example:
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
<stream:stream from='b.example' to='a.example'>
</t>
<t>
Server A sends a response stream header to Server B, asserting that it is a.example:
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
<stream:stream from='a.example' to='b.example'>
</t>
<t>The servers attempt TLS negotiation, during which Server A (acting as a TLS server) presents a PKIX certificate proving that it is a.example.</t>
<t>Server B checks the PKIX certificate that Server A provided; if it is consistent with the XMPP profile of the matching rules from <xref target='RFC6125'/>, Server B accepts that there is a strong domain name association between its stream to Server A and the DNS domain name a.example.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Unfortunately, now the servers are using two TCP connections instead of one, which is somewhat wasteful. However, there are ways to tie the authentication achieved on the second TCP connection to the first TCP connection; see <xref target='XEP-0288'/> for further discussion.</t>
</section>
<section title="Piggybacking" anchor="piggybacking">
<section title="Assertion" anchor="piggybacking-assertion">
<t>Consider the common scenario in which Server B hosts not only b.example but also a second domain c.example. If a user of Server B associated with c.example wishes to communicate with a friend at a.example, Server B needs to send XMPP stanzas from the domain c.example rather than b.example. Although Server B could open an new TCP connection and negotiate new XML streams for the domain pair of c.example and a.example, that too is wasteful. Server B already has a connection to a.example, so how can it assert that it would like to add a new domain pair to the existing connection?</t>
<t>The traditional method for doing so is the Server Dialback protocol, first specified in <xref target='RFC3920'/> and since moved to <xref target='XEP-0220'/>. Here, Server B can send a <db:result/> element for the new domain pair over the existing stream.</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<db:result from='c.example' to='a.example'>
some-dialback-key
</db:result>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>This element functions as Server B's assertion that it is (also) c.example, and thus is functionally equivalent to the 'from' address of an initial stream header as previously described.</t>
<t>In response to this assertion, Server A needs to obtain some kind of proof that Server B really is also c.example. It can do the same thing that it did before:</t>
<t>
<list style='numbers'>
<t>Server A resolves the DNS domain name c.example.</t>
<t>Server A opens a TCP connection to the resolved IP address (which might be the same IP address as for b.example).</t>
<t>
Server A sends an initial stream header to Server B, asserting that it is a.example:
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
<stream:stream from='a.example' to='c.example'>
</t>
<t>
Server B sends a response stream header to Server A, asserting that it is c.example:
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
<stream:stream from='c.example' to='a.example'>
</t>
<t>The servers attempt TLS negotiation, during which Server B (acting as a TLS server) presents a PKIX certificate proving that it is c.example.</t>
<t>Server A checks the PKIX certificate that Server B provided; if it is consistent with the XMPP profile of the matching rules from <xref target='RFC6125'/>, Server A accepts that there is a strong domain name association between its stream to Server B and the DNS domain name c.example.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Now that Server A accepts the domain name association, it informs Server B of that fact by sending verification of the Server Dialback key over the original connection:</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<db:verify from='a.example' to='c.example' type='valid'/>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>The parties can then terminate the second connection, since it was used only for Server A to associate a stream over the same IP:port combination with the domain name c.example (dialback key links the original stream to the new association).</t>
</section>
<section title="Supposition" anchor="piggybacking-supposition">
<t>Piggybacking can also occur in the other direction. Consider the common scenario in which Server A provides XMPP services not only for a.example but also for a subdomain such as a groupchat service at chatrooms.a.example (see <xref target='XEP-0045'/>). If a user from c.example at Server B wishes to join a room on the groupchat sevice, Server B needs to send XMPP stanzas from the domain c.example to the domain chatrooms.a.example rather than a.example. Therefore, Server B needs to negotiate and authenticate a stream to chatrooms.a.example:</t>
<t>
<list style='numbers'>
<t>Server B resolves the DNS domain name chatrooms.a.example.</t>
<t>Server B opens a TCP connection to the resolved IP address.</t>
<t>
Server B sends an initial stream header to Server A acting as chatrooms.a.example, asserting that it is b.example:
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
<stream:stream from='b.example' to='chatrooms.a.example'>
</t>
<t>
Server A sends a response stream header to Server B, asserting that it is chatrooms.a.example:
<vspace blankLines='1'/>
<stream:stream from='chatrooms.a.example' to='b.example'>
</t>
<t>The servers attempt TLS negotiation, during which Server A (acting as a TLS server) presents a PKIX certificate proving that it is chatrooms.a.example.</t>
<t>Server B checks the PKIX certificate that Server A provided; if it is consistent with the XMPP profile of the matching rules from <xref target='RFC6125'/>, Server B accepts that there is a strong domain name association between its stream to Server A and the DNS domain name chatrooms.a.example.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>As before, the parties now have two TCP connections open. So that they can close the now-redundant connection, Server B sends a dialback key to Server A over the new connection.</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<db:result from='c.example' to='chatrooms.a.example'>
some-dialback-key
</db:result>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>Server A then informs Server B that it accepts the domain name association by sending verification of the dialback key over the original connection:</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<db:verify from='chatrooms.a.example' to='c.example' type='valid'/>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>Server B can now close the connection over which it tested the domain name association for chatrooms.a.example.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Alternate Prooftypes" anchor="alternate">
<t>The foregoing protocol flows assumed that domain name associations were proved using the standard PKI prooftype specified in <xref target="RFC6120"/>: that is, the server's proof consists of a PKIX certificate that is checked according to a profile of the matching rules from <xref target="RFC6125"/>, the client's verification material is obtained out of band in the form of a trusted root, and secure DNS is not necessary.</t>
<t>However, sometimes XMPP server administrators are unable or unwilling to obtain valid PKIX certificates for their servers (e.g., the administrator of im.cs.podunk.example can't receive certification authority verification messages sent to mailto:hostmaster@podunk.example, or hosting.example.net does not want to take on the liability of holding the certificate and private key for example.com). In these circumstances, prooftypes other than PKIX are desirable. Two companion documents, <xref target='XMPP-DANE'/> and <xref target='XMPP-POSH'/>, define alternate prooftypes:</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>In the DANE prooftype, the server's proof consists of a PKIX certificate that is compared as an exact match or a hash of either the SubjectPublicKeyInfo or the full certificate, and the client's verification material is obtained via secure DNS. See the accompanying <xref target="XMPP-DANE"/> spec for discussion and examples.</t>
<t>In the POSH (PKIX Over Secure HTTP) prooftype, the server's proof consists of a PKIX certificate that is checked according to the rules from <xref target="RFC6120"/> and <xref target="RFC6125"/>, the client's verification material is obtained by retrieving the PKIK certificate over HTTPS at a well-known URI <xref target="RFC5785"/>, and secure DNS is not necessary since the HTTPS retrieval mechanism relies on the chain of trust from the public key infrastructure. See the accompanying <xref target="XMPP-POSH"/> spec for discussion and examples.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Virtual Hosting" anchor="hosting">
<t>One common method for deploying XMPP services is virtual hosting: e.g., the XMPP service for example.com is actually hosted at hosting.example.net. Such an arrangement is relatively convenient in XMPP given the use of DNS SRV records <xref target="RFC2782"/>, such as the following pointer from example.com to hosting.example.net:</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
_xmpp-server._tcp.example.com. 0 IN SRV 0 0 5269 hosting.example.net
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>To improve security and limit liability, in typical deployments the administrators of hosting.example.net do not wish to hold the certificate and private key for example.com and the owners of example.com do not wish to share their certificate and private key with the administrators of hosting.example.net. In practice this means that server-to-server communications to example.com go unencrypted or the communications are TLS-encrypted but the certificates are not checked (which is functionally equivalent to an unencrypted connection). This is also true of client-to-server communications, forcing end users to override certificate warnings or configure their clients to accept certificates for hosting.example.net instead of example.com. The fundamental problem here is that if DNSSEC is not used the act of delegation is inherently insecure.</t>
<t>This document does not describe how to achieve secure delegation. However, <xref target='XMPP-DANE'/> explains how to use DNSSEC for secure delegation in the PKI and DANE prooftypes and <xref target='XMPP-POSH'/> explains how to use HTTPS redirects for secure delegation in the POSH prooftype.</t>
</section>
<section title="Prooftype Model" anchor="model">
<t>In general, a DNA prooftype conforms to the following definition:</t>
<t>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="prooftype:">A mechanism for proving an association between a domain name and an XML stream, where the mechanism defines (1) the nature of the server's proof, (2) the matching rules for comparing the client's verification material against the server's proof, (3) how the client obtains its verification material, and (4) whether the mechanism depends on secure DNS.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>The PKI, DANE, and POSH prooftypes adhere to this model. In addition, other prooftypes are possible (examples might include PGP keys rather than PKIX certificates, or a token mechanism such as Kerberos or OAuth).</t>
<t>Some prooftypes depend on (or are enhanced by) secure DNS and therefore also need to describe how secure delegation occurs for that prooftype.</t>
</section>
<!--
<section title="Supported Prooftypes and Prooftype Ordering" anchor="support-and-order">
<t>The XMPP receiving entity (server) might have a preference order for asserting prooftypes (say, DANE then POSH) and the initiating entity (client or peer server) might have a preference order for checking prooftypes (say, PKIX then DANE then Server Dialback). Providing a way for the receiving entity to advertise its preference order ...</t>
</section>
-->
<section title="Security Considerations" anchor="security">
<t>This document supplements but does not supersede the security considerations provided in <xref target="RFC6120"/> and <xref target="RFC6125"/>.</t>
</section>
<section title="IANA Considerations" anchor="iana">
<t>This document has no actions for the IANA.</t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<reference anchor="RFC1034">
<front>
<title abbrev="Domain Concepts and Facilities">Domain names - concepts and facilities</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Mockapetris" fullname="P. Mockapetris">
<organization>Information Sciences Institute (ISI)</organization>
</author>
<date year="1987" day="1" month="November"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="STD" value="13"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1034"/>
<format type="TXT" octets="129180" target="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1034.txt"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC1035">
<front>
<title abbrev="Domain Implementation and Specification">Domain names - implementation and specification</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Mockapetris" fullname="P. Mockapetris">
<organization>USC/ISI</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>4676 Admiralty Way</street>
<city>Marina del Rey</city>
<region>CA</region>
<code>90291</code>
<country>US</country>
</postal>
<phone>+1 213 822 1511</phone>
</address>
</author>
<date year="1987" day="1" month="November"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="STD" value="13"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1035"/>
<format type="TXT" octets="125626" target="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2782">
<front>
<title abbrev="DNS SRV RR">A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)</title>
<author initials="A." surname="Gulbrandsen" fullname="Arnt Gulbrandsen">
<organization>Troll Tech</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>Waldemar Thranes gate 98B</street>
<city>Oslo</city>
<region/>
<code>N-0175</code>
<country>NO</country>
</postal>
<phone>+47 22 806390</phone>
<facsimile>+47 22 806380</facsimile>
<email>arnt@troll.no</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="P." surname="Vixie" fullname="Paul Vixie">
<organization>Internet Software Consortium</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>950 Charter Street</street>
<city>Redwood City</city>
<region>CA</region>
<code>94063</code>
<country>US</country>
</postal>
<phone>+1 650 779 7001</phone>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="L." surname="Esibov" fullname="Levon Esibov">
<organization>Microsoft Corporation</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>One Microsoft Way</street>
<city>Redmond</city>
<region>WA</region>
<code>98052</code>
<country>US</country>
</postal>
<email>levone@microsoft.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date year="2000" month="February"/>
<abstract>
<t>This document describes a DNS RR which specifies the location of the
server(s) for a specific protocol and domain.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2782"/>
<format type="TXT" octets="24013" target="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2782.txt"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC4033">
<front>
<title>DNS Security Introduction and Requirements</title>
<author initials="R." surname="Arends" fullname="Roy Arends">
<organization>Telematica Instituut</organization>
<address>
<email>roy.arends@telin.nl</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="R." surname="Austein" fullname="Rob Austein">
<organization>Internet Systems Consortium</organization>
<address>
<email>sra@isc.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="M." surname="Larson" fullname="Matt Larson">
<organization>VeriSign, Inc.</organization>
<address>
<email>mlarson@verisign.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="D." surname="Massey" fullname="Dan Massey">
<organization>Colorado State University</organization>
<address>
<email>massey@cs.colostate.edu</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="S." surname="Rose" fullname="Scott Rose">
<organization>National Institute for Standards and Technology</organization>
<address>
<email>scott.rose@nist.gov</email>
</address>
</author>
<date month="May" year="2005"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4033"/>
<format type="TXT" target="http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4033.txt"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC4949">
<front>
<title>Internet Security Glossary, Version 2</title>
<author initials="R." surname="Shirey" fullname="R. Shirey">
<organization/>
</author>
<date year="2007" month="August"/>
<abstract>
<t>This Glossary provides definitions, abbreviations, and explanations of terminology for information system security. The 334 pages of entries offer recommendations to improve the comprehensibility of written material that is generated in the Internet Standards Process (RFC 2026). The recommendations follow the principles that such writing should (a) use the same term or definition whenever the same concept is mentioned; (b) use terms in their plainest, dictionary sense; (c) use terms that are already well-established in open publications; and (d) avoid terms that either favor a particular vendor or favor a particular technology or mechanism over other, competing techniques that already exist or could be developed. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4949"/>
<format type="TXT" octets="867626" target="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc4949.txt"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC5280">
<front>
<title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
<author initials="D." surname="Cooper" fullname="D. Cooper">
<organization/>
</author>
<author initials="S." surname="Santesson" fullname="S. Santesson">
<organization/>
</author>
<author initials="S." surname="Farrell" fullname="S. Farrell">
<organization/>
</author>
<author initials="S." surname="Boeyen" fullname="S. Boeyen">
<organization/>
</author>
<author initials="R." surname="Housley" fullname="R. Housley">
<organization/>
</author>
<author initials="W." surname="Polk" fullname="W. Polk">
<organization/>
</author>
<date year="2008" month="May"/>
<abstract>
<t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
<format type="TXT" octets="352580" target="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc5280.txt"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC5785">
<front>
<title>Defining Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)</title>
<author initials="M." surname="Nottingham" fullname="M. Nottingham">
<organization/>
</author>
<author initials="E." surname="Hammer-Lahav" fullname="E. Hammer-Lahav">
<organization/>
</author>
<date year="2010" month="April"/>
<abstract>
<t>This memo defines a path prefix for "well-known locations", "/.well-known/", in selected Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5785"/>
<format type="TXT" octets="13779" target="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5785.txt"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6120">
<front>
<title>Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization>Cisco</organization>
<address>
<email>psaintan@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date month="March" year="2011"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6120"/>
<format type="TXT" target="http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6120.txt"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6125">
<front>
<title>Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization>Cisco</organization>
<address>
<email>psaintan@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Hodges" fullname="Jeff Hodges">
<organization>PayPal</organization>
<address>
<email>jeff.hodges@paypal.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date month="March" year="2011"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6125"/>
<format type="TXT" target="http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6125.txt"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="XEP-0220">
<front>
<title>Server Dialback</title>
<author initials="J" surname="Miller" fullname="Jeremie Miller">
<address>
<email>jer@jabber.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="P" surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization>Cisco</organization>
<address>
<email>psaintan@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="P" surname="Hancke" fullname="Philipp Hancke">
<address>
<email>fippo@goodadvice.pages.de</email>
</address>
</author>
<date month="August" year="2011"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="XSF XEP" value="0220"/>
<format type="HTML" target="http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0220.html#appendix-authorinfo"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="XMPP-DANE">
<front>
<title>Using DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) and DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) as a Prooftype for XMPP Domain Name Associations</title>
<author initials="M." surname="Miller" fullname="Matthew Miller">
<organization>Cisco</organization>
<address>
<email>mamille2@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization>Cisco</organization>
<address>
<email>psaintan@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date month="February" year="2013"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-miller-xmpp-dnssec-prooftype-04"/>
<format type="TXT" target="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-xmpp-prooftype-dnsssec-prooftype-04.txt"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="XMPP-POSH">
<front>
<title>Using PKIX over Secure HTTP (POSH) as a Prooftype for XMPP Domain Name Associations</title>
<author initials="M." surname="Miller" fullname="Matthew Miller">
<organization>Cisco</organization>
<address>
<email>mamille2@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization>Cisco</organization>
<address>
<email>psaintan@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date month="February" year="2013"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-miller-xmpp-posh-prooftype-03"/>
<format type="TXT" target="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-xmpp-posh-prooftype-03.txt"/>
</reference>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<reference anchor="RFC3920">
<front>
<title abbrev="XMPP Core">Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre" role="editor">
<organization>Jabber Software Foundation</organization>
<address>
<email>stpeter@jabber.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<date year="2004" month="October"/>
<area>Applications</area>
<workgroup>XMPP Working Group</workgroup>
<keyword>RFC</keyword>
<keyword>Request for Comments</keyword>
<keyword>I-D</keyword>
<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
<keyword>XMPP</keyword>
<keyword>Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol</keyword>
<keyword>Jabber</keyword>
<keyword>IM</keyword>
<keyword>Instant Messaging</keyword>
<keyword>Presence</keyword>
<keyword>XML</keyword>
<keyword>Extensible Markup Language</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>This memo defines the core features of the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), a protocol for streaming Extensible Markup Language (XML) elements in order to exchange structured information in close to real time between any two network endpoints. While XMPP provides a generalized, extensible framework for exchanging XML data, it is used mainly for the purpose of building instant messaging and presence applications that meet the requirements of RFC 2779.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3920"/>
<format type="TXT" octets="194313" target="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3920.txt"/>
<format type="HTML" octets="279912" target="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc3920.html"/>
<format type="XML" octets="234610" target="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc3920.xml"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="XEP-0045">
<front>
<title>Multi-User Chat</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>stpeter@jabber.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<date day="08" month="February" year="2012"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="XSF XEP" value="0045"/>
<format type="HTML" target="http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0045.html"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="XEP-0238">
<front>
<title>XMPP Protocol Flows for Inter-Domain Federation</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>stpeter@jabber.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<date day="31" month="March" year="2008"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="XSF XEP" value="0238"/>
<format type="HTML" target="http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0238.html"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="XEP-0288">
<front>
<title>Bidirectional Server-to-Server Connections</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Hancke" fullname="Philipp Hancke">
<organization/>
<address>
<email/>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="D." surname="Cridland" fullname="Dave Cridland">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>dave.cridland@isode.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date day="21" month="August" year="2012"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="XSF XEP" value="0288"/>
<format type="HTML" target="http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0288.html"/>
</reference>
</references>
</back>
</rfc>
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-24 02:39:44 |