One document matched: draft-pierce-ieprep-assured-service-arch-02.txt
Differences from draft-pierce-ieprep-assured-service-arch-01.txt
Internet Engineering Task Force Mike Pierce
Internet Draft Artel
draft-pierce-ieprep-assured-service-arch-02.txt Don Choi
January 2004 DISA
Expires July 2004
Architecture for Assured Service Capabilities in Voice over IP
draft-pierce-ieprep-assured-service-arch-02.txt
Status of this memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Copyright
Copyright (C) Internet Society 2004. All rights reserved.
Reproduction or translation of the complete document, but not of
extracts, including this notice, is freely permitted.
Abstract
Assured Service refers to the set of capabilities used to ensure
that mission critical communications are setup and remain connected.
This memo describes the architecture required to meet the
requirements detailed in [Pierce1].
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Table of Contents
0. History..........................................................2
1. Introduction.....................................................2
2. Architectures....................................................3
2.1. End-to-end Architecture.......................................3
2.2. Service Provider Network Architecture.........................3
3. Required Architecture............................................4
4. Required Procedures..............................................6
4.1. Authentication................................................6
4.2. Function of Proxy.............................................6
4.3. Function of the Access Router.................................7
4.4. Session Control...............................................7
5. Security Considerations..........................................7
6. References.......................................................8
7. Authors' Addresses...............................................8
0. History
This draft was originally submitted under SIPPING. This revision is
being submitted under IEPREP to be included in the discussions for
related services such as IEPS.
(SIPPING) -00: Original
(IEPREP) -00: Added Access Router to architecture required to
support Assured Service.
-01 Updated references
-02 Updated references and minor editorial changes.
1. Introduction
The requirements for Assured Service are given in [Pierce1]. Many
other drafts and RFCs have addressed the assumed architecture for
the provision of SIP-based services. A lot of consideration has been
given to continued reliance on the pure peer-to-peer model on which
the Internet (and especially HTTP) has been based vs. migration to
centralized control models in which dedicated proxies perform
specific functions for the control of telephony services. This would
include, possibly, full knowledge of the state of each call.
While there is an wide-spread desire expressed in various IETF
discussions to maintain (or return to) the pure peer-to-peer
architecture, there has been increasing admissions in various drafts
that centralized control or intelligent "middleboxes" are required
in many cases. Some examples are:
1. RFC 3261 defines the notion of a "Call Stateful proxy", which
"retains state for a dialog from the initiating INVITE to the
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terminating BYE request", i.e., for the duration of a call. However,
no use of this state has been included in the current version of SIP
[RFC3261].
2. Draft-ietf-sipping-cc-framework-02 included the concept of a
"central control" signaling model.
3. The abstract for draft-ietf-sipping-service-examples-05
recognizes that "some [services] require the assistance of a SIP
Proxy", and it states that the flows shown assume "a network of
proxies, registrars, PSTN gateways, and other SIP servers that have
a pre-established trust relationship with each other... User agents
wishing to use the services in this network are required to
authenticate themselves with an edge proxy...".
4. RFC 3325 for identity and privacy is based fully on use of a
network of trusted SIP servers. It states that "these mechanisms
provide no means by which end users can securely share identity
information end-to-end without a trusted service provider."
2. Architectures
Various discussions and memos have identified two potential network
architectures for the provision of SIP services. They are briefly:
2.1. End-to-end Architecture
All service provision is between and under control of the calling
and called party, referred to as "User Agent Client (UAC)" and "User
Agent Server (UAS)", respectively. This terminology of "client" and
"server" are based on the HTTP model from which this model is
derived and have no real significance to this model. Either end can
initiate a transaction. There is no device in-between which provides
service support, only routers for packets. Other required devices
(address translation, etc.) which the calling user must access are
simply additional UAS's.
There is no "Service Provider" for the voice service, only a
provider of the packet switched infrastructure.
2.2. Service Provider Network Architecture
A Service Provider maintains and controls network elements which
play an active role in the provision of services to end users. These
network elements may be referred to as back-to-back user agents
(B2BUA), proxies, servers, middleboxes, or intermediaries but they
all have the common characteristic of being provided by a trusted
Service Provider and they provide an important logical function
between the end users. These elements terminate SIP messages,
perform service control, and send new or modified SIP messages to
other network elements or to the other user. The result is that no
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SIP message goes directly from one UA to the other (unless
specifically authorized by the control element).
The "Service Provider" may be the same company or entity which
provides part or all of the packet switched infrastructure.
3. Required Architecture
In order to provide the security and feature control required for
Assured Service as defined in [Pierce1], it is necessary to utilize
the Service Provider Network Architecture in which proxies are used
to support call origination and termination for each user involved
in the service. The architecture is the "trapezoid" described in SIP
[RFC3261] as follows (figure actually copied from RFC 3263):
............................ ..............................
. . . .
. +-------+ . . +-------+ .
. | | . . | | .
. | Proxy |------------- | Proxy | .
. | 1 | . . | 2 | .
. | | . . | | .
. / +-------+ . . +-------+ \ .
. / . . \ .
. / . . \ .
. / . . \ .
. / . . \ .
. / . . \ .
. / . . \ .
. / . . \ .
. +-------+ . . +-------+ .
. | | . . | | .
. | | . . | | .
. | UA 1 | . . | UA 2 | .
. | | . . | | .
. +-------+ . . +-------+ .
. Domain A . . Domain B .
............................ ..............................
Interfaces:
(1) Originating UA 1 to Proxy 1: Authentication and all SIP messages
to/from UA 1
(2) Proxy 1 to Proxy 2 (and to other devices such as policy
servers): SIP messages and policy actions
(3) Proxy 2 to terminating UA 2: Authentication and all SIP messages
to/from U 2
(4) Originating UA 1 to terminating UA 2: Voice packets, no
signaling messages
However, the above architecture requires the addition of another
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component to provide control of the user's data packets (voice) in
the Assured Service case. This is important since the packets
themselves need to be marked for preferential treatment, including
the ability to get "priority" over the packet transfer of another
user.
There must be an access router, generally at the boundary between
the local network and the core network. This may be between the
Ethernet LAN and the IP "cloud" or it may be between the locally
controlled IP network and the global IP network. In any case, its
function is to regulate the transport of priority marked packets
into the core.
The following figure depicts this architecture:
............................. ..............................
. . . .
. +-------+ . . +-------+ .
. | | . (2) . | | .
. | Proxy |------------------------ | Proxy | .
. | 1 | . . | 2 | .
. | | . . | | .
. +-------+ . . +-------+ .
. / \ . . / \ .
. (1) / \ (1a) . . (3a) / \ (3) .
. / \ . . / \ .
. / \ . . / \ .
. +-------+ +----+ . . +----+ +-------+ .
. | | (4a) | AR | . (4b) . | AR | (4c) | | .
. | UA 1 |------>| 1 |---------------->| 2 |------>| UA 2 | .
. | | | | . . | | | | .
. +-------+ +----+ . . +----+ +-------+ .
. Domain A . . Domain B .
............................. ..............................
Interfaces:
(1) Originating UA 1 to Proxy 1: Authentication and all SIP
messages to/from UA 1
(1a and 3a) Proxy to AR: instructions to allow voice packet
transport
(2) Proxy 1 to Proxy 2 (and to other devices such as policy
servers): SIP messages and policy actions
(3) Proxy 2 to terminating UA 2: Authentication and all SIP
messages to/from U 2
(4a) Originating UA 1 to AR 1: attempted voice packets
(4b) AR 1 to AR 2: authorized voice packets
(4c) AR 2 to UA 2: authorized voice packets
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4. Required Procedures
4.1. Authentication
Each UA which might use the Assured Service capability must
authenticate with a designated proxy before any service activation
is attempted. Normally, this would be at the time the device is
powered on, connected to the network, or is initialized, or it might
be done at pre-determined time intervals. Whether or not this
authentication requires a user interaction (human entry of a
password, retina scan, etc.) is not important and depends on the
application. Such an authentication may be very time consuming, with
password verification and policy data-base look-ups. After this
authentication, this proxy must handle all session establishments,
both to and from this UA.
This authentication function may be performed when the user attempts
the first session setup, for example, when an individual is allowed
to use a common device by first "logging on" with their identity and
password. In fact, this is still an "authentication" function
performed before the session setup is attempted. However, in this
case, it must be understood that there may be an additional delay
due to the authentication process before a call can be placed.
This authentication process is not unique to the provision of the
Assured Service capability. It is also required for many other
services which are to be provided by the service provider's proxy
based on pre-established authorizations.
4.2. Function of Proxy
Besides the processing of the authentication, each proxy is
responsible for a number of functions important to the provision of
Assured Service (as well as other services) and the handling of
interactions, where required, between different services. This
includes (for Assured Service):
. maintaining state of all existing sessions, including their
priority, which exist on all UAs under its control (both
proxies).
. maintaining knowledge of other services being used by the UA
which might need to be taken into consideration when applying
the Assured Service capabilities (both proxies).
. verifying that the originating UA is allowed to establish the
session at the precedence level requested (originating proxy).
. establish permission at the access router for it to handle the
precedence marked packets from the UA (both proxies).
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. performing the timing function to control the diversion service
(terminating proxy).
. deciding when to preempt the end user and sending the
appropriate preempt messages to the other party (both proxies).
. maintaining records of the use of the service, whether for
accounting or auditing purposes (both proxies).
4.3. Function of the Access Router
The access router, under control of the proxy, decides which packets
are to be transported between networks or domains. If authorization
has not been granted for the transport of a specific packet flow at
the precedence level indicated in the packets, the access router
must discard the packets.
Additionally, there may be cases in which a currently transported
packet stream must be stopped. Since the Assured Service may not be
able to rely on the UA to stop the flow, it may be necessary for the
access router, again under control of the proxy, to stop
transporting a particular flow.
4.4. Session Control
Session establishment and release should follow the same message
sequence as defined in SIP and its extensions for non-Assured
Service calls. There should not be any additional messages for an
Assured Service call. The only additional requirements are the
inclusion of:
. the priority level as defined in [Resource] in the INVITE
. security related information in every message which might
consist of an authentication header (AH) using cryptographic
techniques to allow the receiving end (user or proxy) to
validate the authenticity of the message before acting on it.
(This requirement is not unique to Assured Service, but is also
required to secure other capabilities.)
5. Security Considerations
This memo mostly deals with the architecture required to support the
necessary security. While it does not attempt to define the actual
security mechanisms used for authentication and authorization, it
establishes the service architecture required as a basis for
security.
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6. References
[RFC3261] RFC 3261, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", J.
Rosenberg, et al, June 2002.
[RFC3313] RFC 3313, "Private SIP Extensions for Media
Authorization", W. Marshall, May 2002.
[RFC3323] RFC 3323 "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP)", J. Peterson, November 2002.
[RFC3325] RFC 3325, "SIP extensions for Network-asserted Caller
Identity and Privacy within Trusted Networks", C. Jennings, et al,
February 2002.
[Pierce1] draft-pierce-ieprep-assured-service-req-02, "Requirements
for Assured Service Capabilities in Voice over IP", Jan 2004.
[Resource] draft-ietf-sip-resource-priority-00, "SIP Communications
Resource Priority Header", Henning Schulzrinne and James Polk, June
2003.
7. Authors' Addresses
Michael Pierce
Artel
1893 Preston White Drive
Reston, VA 20191
Phone: +1 410.817.4795
Email: pierce1m@ncr.disa.mil
Don Choi
DISA
5600 Columbia Pike
Falls Church, VA 22041-2717
Phone: +1 703.681.2312
Email: choid@ncr.disa.mil
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