One document matched: draft-nordmark-multi6-threats-00.txt
INTERNET-DRAFT Erik Nordmark
Oct 20, 2003 Sun Microsystems
Tony Li
Procket Networks
Threats relating to IPv6 multihoming solutions
<draft-nordmark-multi6-threats-00.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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This Internet Draft expires April 20, 2004.
Abstract
This document lists security threats related to IPv6 multihoming.
Multihoming can introduce new opportunities to redirect packets to
different, unintended IP addresses.
The intent is to look at how IPv6 multihoming solutions might make
the Internet less secure than the current Internet, without studying
any proposed solution but instead looking at threats that are
inherent in the problem itself. The threats in this document build
upon the threats discovered and discussed as part of the Mobile IPv6
work.
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Contents
1. INTRODUCTION............................................. 2
2. TERMINOLOGY.............................................. 3
3. TODAY'S ASSUMPTIONS...................................... 4
3.1. Application Assumptions............................. 4
3.2. Redirection Attacks Today........................... 6
3.3. Flooding Attacks Today.............................. 6
4. POTENTIAL NEW REDIRECTION ATTACKS........................ 8
4.1. Cause Packets to be Sent to the Attacker............ 8
4.1.1. Once Packets are Flowing....................... 8
4.1.2. Premeditated Redirection....................... 9
4.1.3. Using Replay Attacks........................... 9
4.2. Cause Packets to be Sent to a Black Hole............ 10
4.3. Third Party Denial-of-Service Attacks............... 10
4.3.1. Basic Third Party DoS.......................... 11
4.3.2. Third Party DoS with On-Path Help.............. 12
4.4. Accepting Packets from Unknown Locators............. 13
5. OTHER SECURITY CONCERNS.................................. 14
6. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS.................................. 15
7. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.......................................... 16
8. REFERENCES............................................... 16
8.1. Normative References................................ 16
8.2. Informative References.............................. 16
AUTHORS' ADDRESSES........................................... 17
1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of the IPv6 multihoming work is to allow a site to take
advantage of multiple attachments to the global Internet without
having a specific entry for the site visible in the global routing
table. Specifically, a solution should allow hosts to use multiple
attachments in parallel, or to switch between these attachment points
dynamically in the case of failures, without an impact on the upper
layer protocols.
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At the highest level the concerns about allowing such "rehoming" of
packet flows can be called "redirection attacks"; the ability to
cause packets to be sent to a place that isn't tied to the upper
layer protocol's notion of the peer. These attacks pose threats
against confidentiality, integrity, and availability. That is, an
attacker might learn the contents of a particular flow by redirecting
it to a location where the attacker has a packet recorder. If,
instead of a recorder, the attacker changes the packets and then
forwards them to the ultimate destination, the integrity of the data
stream would be compromised. Finally, the attacker can simply use
the redirection of a flow as a denial of service attack.
This document has been developed while considering multihoming
solutions architected around a separation of network identity and
network location. However, this separation is not a requirement for
all threats, so this taxonomy may also apply to other approaches.
This document is not intended to examine any single proposed
solution. Rather, it is intended as an aid to discussion and
evaluation of proposed solutions. By cataloging known threats, we
can help to ensure that all proposals deal with all of the available
threats.
2. TERMINOLOGY
upper layer protocol (ULP)
- a protocol layer immediately above IP. Examples are
transport protocols such as TCP and UDP, control
protocols such as ICMP, routing protocols such as
OSPF, and Internet or lower-layer protocols being
"tunneled" over (i.e., encapsulated in) IP such as
IPX, AppleTalk, or IP itself.
interface - a node's attachment to a link.
address - an IP layer name that contains both topological
significance and acts as a unique identifier for an
interface.
locator - an IP layer topological name for an interface or a
set of interfaces.
identifier - an IP layer identifier for an IP layer endpoint
(stack name in [NSRG]). The transport endpoint is a
function of the transport protocol and would
typically include the IP identifier plus a port
number.
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address field
- the source and destination address fields in the
IPv6 header. As IPv6 is currently specified this
fields carry "addresses". If identifiers and
locators are separated these fields will contain
locators.
FQDN - Fully Qualified Domain Name
3. TODAY'S ASSUMPTIONS
The two interesting aspects of security for multihoming solutions are
the assumptions made by the applications and upper layer protocols
about the identifiers that they see on one hand, and the existing
abilities to perform redirection attacks today, on the other hand.
3.1. Application Assumptions
In the Internet today, the initiating part of applications either
starts with a FQDN, which it looks up in the DNS, or already has an
IP address from somewhere. For the FQDN to IP address lookup the
application effectively places trust in the DNS. Once it has the IP
address, the application places trust in the routing system
delivering packets to that address. Applications that use security
mechanisms, such as IPsec or TLS, with mutual authentication have the
ability to "bind" the FQDN to the cryptographic keying material thus
compromising the DNS and/or the routing system can at worst cause the
packets to be dropped or delivered to an entity which does not posses
the keying material.
At the responding (non-initiating) end of communication today, we
find applications that fall into approximately five classes with
respect to their security requirements.
The first class is the set of public content servers. These systems
provide data to any and all systems and are not particularly
concerned with confidentiality, as they make their content available
to all. However, they are interested in data integrity and denial of
service attacks. Having someone manipulate the results of a search
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engine, for example, or prevent certain systems from reaching a
search engine would be a serious security issue.
The second class of applications use existing IP source addresses
from outside of their immediate local site as a means of
authentication without any form of verification. Today, with source
IP address spoofing and TCP sequence number guessing as rampant
attacks, such applications are effectively opening themselves for
public connectivity and are reliant on other systems, such as
firewalls, for overall security. We do not consider this class of
systems in this document.
The third class of applications receive existing IP source addresses,
but attempt some verification using the DNS, effectively using the
FQDN for access control. (This is typically done by performing a
reverse lookup from the IP address followed by a forward lookup and
verifying that the IP address matches one of the addresses returned
from the forward lookup.) These applications are already subject to
a number of attacks using techniques like source address spoofing and
TCP sequence number guessing since an attacker, knowing this is the
case, can simply create a DoS attack using a forged source address
that has authentic DNS records. In general this class of
applications is strongly discouraged, but it is probably important
that a multihoming solution doesn't introduce any new and easier ways
to perform such attacks.
The fourth class of applications use cryptographic security
techniques to provide both a strong identity for the peer and data
integrity with or without confidentiality. Such systems are still
potentially vulnerable to denial of service attacks that could be
introduced by a multihoming solution.
Finally, the fifth class of applications use cryptographic security
techniques but without strong identity (such as opportunistic IPsec).
Thus data integrity with or without confidentiality is provided when
communicating with an unknown/unauthenticated principal. Just like
the first category above such applications can't perform access
control since they do not know the identity of the peer. [TBD: Does
one-way authentication, without mutual authentication, add a
different class of applications?]
The requirement for a multihoming solution is that security be no
worse than it is today in all situations. Thus, mechanisms that
provide confidentiality, integrity, or authentication today should
continue to provide these properties in a multihomed environment.
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3.2. Redirection Attacks Today
This section enumerates some of the redirection attacks that are
possible in today's Internet.
If routing can be compromised, packets for any destination can be
redirected to any location. This can be done by injecting a long
prefix into global routing, thereby causing the longest match
algorithm to deliver packets to the attacker.
Similarly, if DNS can be compromised, and a change can be made to an
advertised resource record to advertise a different IP address for a
hostname, effectively taking over that hostname.
Any system that is along the path from the source to the destination
host can be compromised and used to redirect traffic. Systems may be
added to the best path to accomplish this. Further, even systems
that are on multi-access links that do not provide security can also
be used to redirect traffic off of the normal path. For example, ARP
and ND spoofing can be used to attract all traffic for the legitimate
next hop across an Ethernet.
Finally, the hosts themselves that terminate the connection can also
be compromised and can perform functions that were not intended by
the end user.
All of the above protocol attacks are the subject of ongoing work to
secure them (DNSsec, security for BGP, Secure ND) and are not
considered further within this document. The goal for a multihoming
solution is not to solve these attacks. Rather, it is to avoid
adding to this list of attacks.
3.3. Flooding Attacks Today
In the Internet today there are several ways for an attacker to use a
redirection mechanism to launch DoS attacks that can not easily be
traced to the attacker. An example of this is to use protocols which
cause reflection with or without amplification [PAXSON01].
Reflection without amplification can be accomplished by an attacker
sending a TCP SYN packet to a well-known server with a spoofed source
address; the resulting TCP SYN ACK packet will be sent to the spoofed
source address.
Devices on the path between two communicating entities can also
launch DoS attacks. While such attacks might not be interesting
today, it is necessary to understand them better in order to
determine whether a multihoming solution might enables new types of
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DoS attacks.
For example, today if A is communicating with B, then A can try to
overload the path from B to A. If TCP is used A could do this by
sending ACK packets for data that it has not yet received (but it
suspects B has already sent) so that B would send at a rate that
would cause persistent congestion on the path towards A. Such an
attack would seem self-destructive since A would only make its own
corner of the network suffer by overloading the path from the
Internet towards A.
A more interesting case is if A is communicating with B and X is on
the path between A and B, then X might be able to fool B to send
packets towards A at a rate that is faster than A (and the path
between A and X) can handle. For instance, if TCP is used then X can
craft TCP ACK packets claiming to come from A to cause B to use a
congestion window that is large enough to potentially cause
persistent congestion towards A. Furthermore, if X can suppress the
packets from A to B it can also prevent A from sending any explicit
"slow down" packets to B. Similar attacks can presumably be launched
using protocols that carry streaming media by forging such a
protocol's notion of acknowledgment and feedback.
An attribute of this type of attack is that A will simply think that
B is faulty since its flow and congestion control mechanisms don't
seem to be working. Detecting that the stream of ACK packets is
generated from X and not from A might be challenging, since the rate
of ACK packets might be relatively low. This type of attack might
not be common today because it requires that X remain on the path in
order to sustain the DoS attack, but the addition of multihoming
redirection mechanisms might potentially remove that constraint. And
with the current, no-multihoming support, using end-to-end strong
security at a protocol level at (or below) this "ACK" processing
would prevent this type of attack. But if a multihoming solution is
provided underneath IPsec that prevention mechanism would not exist.
Thus the challenge for multihoming solutions is to not create
additional types of attacks in this area, or make existing types of
attacks significantly easier.
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4. POTENTIAL NEW REDIRECTION ATTACKS
This section documents the additional redirection attacks that have
been discovered that result from an architecture where hosts can
change their topological connection to the network in the middle of a
transport session without interruption. This discussion is again
framed in the context of independent host identifiers and topological
locators. Some of these attacks may not be applicable if traditional
addresses are used. This section assumes that each host has multiple
locators and that there is some mechanism for determining the
locators for a correspondent host. We do not assume anything about
the properties of these mechanisms. Instead, this list will serve to
help us derive the properties of these mechanisms that will be
necessary to prevent these redirection attacks.
Depending on the purpose of the redirection attack we separate the
attacks into several different types.
4.1. Cause Packets to be Sent to the Attacker
An attacker might want to receive the flow of packets, for instance
to be able to inspect and/or modify the payload or to be able to
apply cryptographic analysis to cryptographically protected payload,
using redirection attacks.
4.1.1. Once Packets are Flowing
This might be viewed as the "classic" redirection attack.
While A and B are communicating X might send packets to B and claim:
"Hi, I'm A, send my packets to my new location." where the location
is really X's location.
"Standard" solutions to this include requiring the node requesting
redirection somehow be verified to be the same node as the initial
node to establish communication. However, the burdens of such
verification must not be onerous, or the redirection requests
themselves can be used as a DoS attack.
To prevent this type of attack, a solution would need some mechanism
that B can use to verify whether a locator belongs to A before B
starts using that locator, and be able to do this when multiple
locators are assigned to A.
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4.1.2. Premeditated Redirection
This is a variant of the above where the attacker "installs" itself
before communication starts.
For example, if the attacker X can predict that A and B will
communicate in the (near) future, then the attacker can tell B: "Hi,
I'm A and I'm at this location". When A later tries to communicate
with B, will B believe it is really A?
If the solution to the classic redirection attack is based on "prove
you are the same as initially", then A will fail to prove this to B
since X initiated communication.
Depending on details that would be specific to a proposed solution,
this type of attack could either case redirection (so that the
packets intended for A will be sent to X) or they could cause DoS
(where A would fail to communicate with B since it can't prove it is
the same node as X).
To prevent this attack, the verification whether a locator belongs to
the peer can not simply be based on the first peer that made contact.
4.1.3. Using Replay Attacks
While the multihoming problem doesn't inherently imply any
topological movement it is useful to also consider the impact of site
renumbering in combination with multihoming. In that case the set of
locators for a node will change each time its site renumbers and at
some point in time after a renumbering event the old locator prefix
might be reassigned to some other site.
This potentially opens up the ability for an attacker to replay
whatever protocol mechanism was used to inform a node of a peer's
locators so that the node would incorrectly be lead to believe that
the old locator (set) should be used even long after a renumbering
event. This is similar to the risk of replay of Binding Updates in
[MIPv6] but the time constant is quite different; Mobile IPv6 might
see movements every second while site renumbering followed by
reassignment of the site locator prefix might be a matter of weeks or
months.
To prevent such replay attacks the protocol which is used to verify
which locators can be used with a particular identifier needs some
replay protection mechanism.
Also, in this space one needs to be concerned about potential
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interaction between such replay protection and the administrative act
of reassignment of a locator. If the identifier and locator
relationship is distributed across the network one would need to make
sure that the old information has been completely purged from the
network before any reassignment. Note that this does not require
explicit mechanism. This can instead be implemented by locator reuse
policy and careful timeouts of locator information.
4.2. Cause Packets to be Sent to a Black Hole
This is also a variant of the classic redirection attack. The
difference is that the new location is a locator that is nonexistent
or unreachable. Thus the effect is that sending packets to the new
locator causes the packets to be dropped by the network somewhere.
One would expect that solutions which prevent the previous
redirection attacks would prevent this attack as a side effect, but
it makes sense to include this attack here for completeness.
Mechanisms that prevented a redirection attack to the attacker should
also prevent redirection to a black hole.
4.3. Third Party Denial-of-Service Attacks
An attacker can use the ability to perform redirection to cause
overload on an unrelated third party. For instance, if A and B are
communicating then the attacker X might be able to convince A to send
the packets intended for B to some third node C. While this might
seem harmless at first, since X could just flood C with packets
directly, there are a few aspects of these attacks that cause
concern.
The first is that the attacker might be able to completely hide its
identity and location. It might suffice for X to send and receive a
few packets to A in order to perform the redirection, and A might not
retain any state on who asked for the redirection to C's location.
Even if A had retained such state, that state would probably not be
easily available to C, thus C can't determine who was the attacker
once C is being DoS'ed.
The second concern is that with a direct DoS attack from X to C, the
attacker is limited by the bandwidth of its own path towards C. If
the attacker can fool another node like A to redirect its traffic to
C then the bandwidth is limited by the path from A towards C. If A
is a high-capacity Internet service and X has slow (e.g., dialup)
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connectivity this difference could be substantial. Thus in effect
this could be similar to packet amplifying reflectors in [PAXSON01].
The third, and final concern, is that if an attacker only need a few
packets to convince one node to flood a third party, then it wouldn't
be hard for the attacker to convince lots of nodes to flood the same
third party. Thus this could be used for Distributed Denial-of-
Service attacks.
In today's Internet the ability to perform this type of attack is
quite limited. In order for the attacker to initiate communication
it will in most cases need to be able to receive some packets from
the peer (the potential exception being combining this with TCP
sequence number guessing type of techniques). Furthermore, to the
extent that parts of the Internet uses ingress filtering [INGRESS],
even if the communication could be initiated it wouldn't be possible
to sustain it by sending ACK packets with spoofed source addresses
from an off-path attacker.
If this type of attack can't be prevented there might be mitigation
techniques that can be employed. For instance, in the case of TCP it
would help if TCP slow-start was triggered when the destination
locator changes. (Folks might argue that, separately from security,
this would be the correct action for congestion control since TCP
might not have any congestion-relation information about the new path
implied by the new locator). Applying this technique to other ULPs
which perform different forms of (TCP friendly) congestion control
might be more difficult since the lower layers generally lack an API
to provide such information to the ULPs. Also, for other protocols,
this might be less beneficial, since other ULPs might not adapt
rapidly and could view the suggestion of congestion as being more
severe than a simple deficit of congestion information.
4.3.1. Basic Third Party DoS
Assume that X is on a slow link anywhere in the Internet. B is on a
fast link (gigabits; e.g. a media server) and A is the victim.
X could flood A directly but is limited by its low bandwidth. If X
can establish communication with B, ask B to send it a high-speed
media stream, then X can presumably fake out the
"acknowledgments/feedback" needed for B to blast out packets at full
speed. So far this only hurts X - and the path between X and the
Internet. But if X could also tell B "I'm at A's locator" then X has
effectively used this redirection capability in multihoming to
amplify its DoS capability, which would be a source of concern.
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One could envision rather simple techniques to prevent such attacks.
For instance, before sending to a new peer locator perform a clear
text exchange with the claimed new locator of the form "Are you X?"
resulting in "Yes, I'm X.". This would suffice for the simplest of
attacks. However, as we will see below, more sophisticated attacks
are possible.
4.3.2. Third Party DoS with On-Path Help
The scenario is as above but in addition the attacker X has a friend
Y on the path between A and B:
----- ----- -----
| A |--------| Y |--------| B |
----- ----- -----
/
/
/
/
/
/
-----
| X |
-----
With the simple solution suggested in the previous section, all Y
might need to do is to fake a response to the "Are you X?" packet,
and after that point in time Y might not be needed; X could
potentially sustain the data flow towards A by generating the ACK
packets. Thus it would be even harder to detect the existence of Y.
Furthermore, if X is not the actual end system but an attacker
between some node C and B, then X can claim to be C, and no finger
can be pointed at X either:
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----- ----- -----
| A |--------| Y |--------| B |
----- ----- -----
/
/
/
/
/
/
----- -----
| C |-------| X |
----- -----
Thus with two attackers on different paths, there might be no trace
of who did the redirection to the 3rd party once the redirection has
taken place.
A specific case of this is when X=Y, and X is located on the same LAN
as B.
A potential way to make such attacks harder would be to use the last
received (and verified) source locator as the destination locator.
That way when X sends the ACK packets (whether it claims to be X or
C) the result would be that the packet flow from B would switch back
towards X/C, which would result in an attack similar to what can be
performed in today's Internet.
Another way that a multihoming solution might address this is to
ensure that B will only accept locators that can be authenticated to
be synonymous with the original correspondent. It must be possible
to securely ensure that these locators form an equivalence class. So
in the first example, not only does X need to assert that it is A,
but A needs to assert that it is X.
4.4. Accepting Packets from Unknown Locators
The multihoming solution space does not only affect the destination
of packets; it also raises the question from which sources packets
should be accepted. It is possible to build a multihoming solution
that allows traffic to be recognized as coming from the same peer
even if there is a previously unknown locator present in the source
address field. The question is whether we want to allow packets from
unverified sources to be passed on to upper layer protocols.
In the current Internet, an attacker can't inject packets with
arbitrary source addresses into a session if there is ingress
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filtering present, so allowing packets with unverified sources in a
multihoming solution would fail our "no worse than what we have now"
litmus test. However, given that ingress filtering deployment is far
from universal and ingress filtering typically wouldn't prevent
spoofing of addresses in the same subnet, requiring rejecting packets
from unverified locators might be too stringent. A factor to take
into account to determine the "requirement level" for this is that
when IPsec is used on top of the multihoming solution, then IPsec
will reject such spoofed packets. (Note that this is different than
in the redirection attack cases where even with IPsec an attacker
could potentially cause a DoS attack.)
There might also be a middle ground where arbitrary attackers are
prevented from injecting packets by using the SCTP verification tag
type of approach [SCTP]. (This is a clear-text tag which is sent to
the peer which the peer is expected to include in each subsequent
packet.) Such an approach doesn't prevent packet injection from on-
path attackers (since they can observe the verification tag), but
neither does ingress filtering.
5. OTHER SECURITY CONCERNS
The protocol mechanisms added as part of a multihoming solution
shouldn't introduce any new DoS in the mechanisms themselves. In
particular, care must be taken not to:
- create state on the first packet in an exchange, since that could
result in state consumption attacks similar to the TCP SYN
flooding attack.
- perform much work on the first packet in an exchange (such as
expensive verification)
There is a potential chicken-and-egg problem here, because
potentially one would want to avoid doing work or creating state
until the peer has been verified, but verification will probably need
some state and some work to be done.
A possible approach that solutions might investigate is to defer
verification until there appears to be two different nodes (or two
different locators for the same node) that want to use the same
identifier.
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Another possible approach is to first establish communications, and
then perform verification in parallel with normal data transfers.
Redirection would only be permitted after verification was complete,
but prior to that event, data could transfer in a normal, non-
multihomed manner.
Finally, the new protocol mechanisms should be protected against
spoofed packets, at least from off-path sources, and replayed
packets.
6. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
In section 3 we discussed existing protocol-based redirection
attacks. But there are also non-protocol redirection attacks. An
attacker which can gain physical access to one of
- The copper/fiber somewhere in the path.
- A router or L2 device in the path.
- One of the end systems
can also redirect packets. This could be possible for instance by
physical break-ins or by bribing staff that have access to the
physical infrastructure. Such attacks are out of scope for this
discussion, but are worth to keep in mind when looking at the cost
for an attacker to exploit any protocol-based attacks against
multihoming solutions; making protocol-based attacks much more
expensive to launch than break-ins/bribery type of attacks might be
overkill.
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7. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This document is a product of a MULTI6 design team consisting of (in
alphabetical order): Iljitsch van Beijnum, Steve Bellovin, Brian
Carpenter, Mike O'Dell, Sean Doran, Dave Katz, Tony Li, Erik
Nordmark, and Pekka Savola.
Much of the awareness of these threats come from the work on Mobile
IPv6 [MIPv6, NIKANDER03, AURA02].
8. REFERENCES
8.1. Normative References
8.2. Informative References
[NSRG] Lear, E., and R. Droms, "What's In A Name: Thoughts from the
NSRG", draft-irtf-nsrg-report-09.txt (work in progress),
March 2003.
[MIPv6] Johnson, D., C. Perkins, and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in
IPv6", draft-ietf-mobileip-ipv6-24.txt (work in progress),
June 2003.
[AURA02] Aura, T. and J. Arkko, "MIPv6 BU Attacks and Defenses",
draft-aura-mipv6-bu-attacks-01 (work in progress), March
2002.
[NIKANDER03] Nikander, P., T. Aura, J. Arkko, G. Montenegro, and E.
Nordmark, "Mobile IP version 6 Route Optimization Security
Design Background", draft-nikander-mobileip-v6-ro-sec-01
(work in progress), June 2003.
[PAXSON01] V. Paxson, "An Analysis of Using Reflectors for
Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks", Computer
Communication Review 31(3), July 2001.
[INGRESS] Ferguson P., and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", RFC 2827, May 2000.
[SCTP] R. Stewart, Q. Xie, K. Morneault, C. Sharp, H.
draft-nordmark-multi6-threats-00.txt [Page 16]
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Schwarzbauer, T. Taylor, I. Rytina, M. Kalla, L. Zhang, and
V. Paxson, "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC
2960, October 2000.
[ADDR-ARCH] S. Deering, R. Hinden, Editors, "IP Version 6
Addressing Architecture", RFC 3513, April 2003.
[IPv6] S. Deering, R. Hinden, Editors, "Internet Protocol, Version
6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2461.
[IPv6-SA] R. Atkinson. "Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol". RFC 2401, November 1998.
[IPv6-AUTH] R. Atkinson. "IP Authentication Header", RFC 2402,
November 1998.
[IPv6-ESP] R. Atkinson. "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 2406, November 1998.
AUTHORS' ADDRESSES
Erik Nordmark Tony Li
Sun Microsystems, Inc. Procket Networks, Inc.
17 Network Circle 1110 Cadillac Ct.
Mountain View, CA Milpitas, CA
USA USA
phone: +1 650 786 2921 phone: +1 408 635 7903
fax: +1 650 786 5896 fax: +1 408 635 7522
email: erik.nordmark@sun.com email: Tony.Li@procket.com
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INTERNET-DRAFT Threats to IPv6 multihoming solutions Oct 20, 2003
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Acknowledgment
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