One document matched: draft-nir-qcr-00.xml
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type='text/xsl' href='./rfc2629.xslt' ?>
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc symrefs="no"?>
<?rfc compact="yes" ?>
<?rfc sortrefs="yes" ?>
<?rfc strict="yes" ?>
<?rfc linkmailto="yes" ?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd" >
<?xml-stylesheet type='text/xsl' href='./rfc2629.xslt' ?>
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc compact="yes" ?>
<?rfc subcompact="yes" ?>
<?rfc sortrefs="yes" ?>
<rfc ipr="full3978" docName="draft-nir-qcr-00.txt" category="std">
<front>
<title abbrev="Quick Crash Recovery">A Quick Crash Recovery Method for IKE</title>
<author initials="Y." surname="Nir" fullname="Yoav Nir">
<organization abbrev="Check Point">Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>5 Hasolelim st.</street>
<city>Tel Aviv</city>
<code>67897</code>
<country>Israel</country>
</postal>
<email>ynir@checkpoint.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date year="2008"/>
<area>Security Area</area>
<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
<abstract>
<t> This document describes an extension to the IKEv2 protocol that allows for faster crash
recovery using a saved token method.</t>
<t> When an IPsec tunnel between two IKEv2 implementations is disconnected due to a restart
of one peer, it can take as much as several minutes to recover. In this text we propose an extension
to the protocol, that allows for recovery within a few seconds of the reboot.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<!-- ====================================================================== -->
<section anchor="introduction" title="Introduction">
<t> IKEv2, as described in <xref target="RFC4306"/> has a method for recovering from a reboot
of one peer. As long as traffic flows in both directions, the rebooted peer should
re-establish the tunnels immediately. However, in many cases the rebooted peer is a VPN
gateway that protects only servers, or else the non-rebooted peers have a dynamic IP address.
In such cases, the rebooted peer will not re-establish the tunnels.</t>
<t> <xref target="SCR"/> describes the current procedure, and explains why crash recovery can
take up to several minutes. The method proposed here, is to send a token in the IKE_AUTH
exchange that establishes the tunnel. That token can be maintained on the peer in some kind
of persistent storage such as a disk or a database, and can be used to delete the IKE SA
after a crash. Deleting the IKE SA results is a quick re-establishment of the IPsec
tunnel.</t>
<section anchor="mustshouldmay" title="Conventions Used in This Document">
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described
in <xref target="RFC2119"/>.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="SCR" title="RFC 4306 Crash Recovery">
<t> When one peer reboots, the other peer does not get any notification, so IPsec traffic
can still flow. The rebooted peer will not be able to decrypt it, however, and the only
remedy is to send an unprotected INFORMATIONAL exchange with an INVALID_SPI notification
as described in section 3.10.1 of <xref target="RFC4306"/>. That section also describes
the processing of such a notification: "If this Informational Message is sent outside the
context of an IKE_SA, it should be used by the recipient only as a "hint" that something
might be wrong (because it could easily be forged)."</t>
<t> Since the INVALID_SPI can only be used as a hint, the non-rebooted peer has to determine
whether the IPsec SA, and indeed the parent IKE SA are still valid. The method of doing
this is described in section 2.4 of <xref target="RFC4306"/>. This method, called
"liveness check" involves sending a protected empty INFORMATIONAL message, and awaiting a
response. This procedure is sometimes refered to as "Dead Peer Detection" or DPD.</t>
<t> Section 2.4 does not mandate how many times the INFORMATIONAL message should be
retransmitted, or for how long, but does recommend the following: "It is suggested that
messages be retransmitted at least a dozen times over a period of at least several minutes
before giving up on an SA". Clearly, implementations differ, but all will take a significant
amount of time.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="outline" title="Protocol Outline">
<t> Supporting implementations will send a notification, called a "QCR token", as described
in <xref target="format_notif"/> in the last packets of the IKE_AUTH exchange.
These are the final request and final response that contain the AUTH payloads. The
generation of these tokens is a local matter for implementations, but considerations are
described in <xref target="tokengen"/>.</t>
<t> A supporting implementation receiving such a token SHOULD store it in such a way, that
it will survive a reboot. When a supporting implementation receives a protected IKE
request message with unknown IKE SPIs, it should scan its saved token store. If a token
matching the IKE SPIs is found, it SHOULD send it to the requesting peer in an unprotected
IKE message as described in <xref target="format_info"/>.</t>
<t> When a supporting implementation receives the QCR notification token in an unprotected
INFORMATIONAL exchange, it MUST verify that the TOKEN_SECRET_DATA field is associated with
the IKE SPIs in the IKE_SPI fields of the IKE packet. If the verification fails, it SHOULD
log the event. If it succeeds, it MUST delete the IKE SA associated with the IKE_SPI fields,
and all dependant child SAs. This event MAY also be logged.</t>
<t> A supporting implementation MAY immediately create new SAs using an Initial exchange,
or it may wait for subsequent traffic to trigger the creation of new SAs.</t>
<t> There is ongoing work on IKEv2 Session Resumption <xref target="resumption"/>. The
current proposal is orthogonal to Session Resumption, and in fact using Session Resumption
instead of a regular IKE exchange, the new SA can be created with minimal overhead.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="format" title="Formats and Exchanges">
<section anchor="format_notif" title="Notification Format">
<t> The notification payload called "QCR token" is formatted as follows:<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Next Payload !C! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Protocol ID ! SPI Size ! QCR Token Notify Message Type !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! !
~ TOKEN_SECRET_DATA ~
! !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork>
</figure></t>
<t><list style="symbols">
<t>Protocol ID (1 octet) MUST contain 1, as this message is related to an IKE SA.</t>
<t>SPI Size (1 octet) MUST be zero, in conformance with <xref target="RFC4306"/>.</t>
<t>QCR Token Notify Message Type (2 octets) - Must be xxxxx, the value assigned for QCR
token notifications. TBA by IANA.</t>
<t>TOKEN_SECRET_DATA (16-256 octets) contains a generated token as described in
<xref target="tokengen"/>.</t>
</list></t>
</section>
<section anchor="format_auth" title="Authentication Exchange">
<t> For clarity, only the EAP version of an AUTH exchange will be presented here. The
non-EAP version is very similar. The figure below is based on appendix A.3 of
<xref target="RFC4718"/>.<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
first request --> IDi,
[N(INITIAL_CONTACT)],
[[N(HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED)], CERTREQ+],
[IDr],
[CP(CFG_REQUEST)],
[N(IPCOMP_SUPPORTED)+],
[N(USE_TRANSPORT_MODE)],
[N(ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED)],
[N(NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)],
SA, TSi, TSr,
[V+]
first response <-- IDr, [CERT+], AUTH,
EAP,
[V+]
/ --> EAP
repeat 1..N times |
\ <-- EAP
last request --> AUTH
[N(QCR_TOKEN)]
last response <-- AUTH,
[N(QCR_TOKEN)]
[CP(CFG_REPLY)],
[N(IPCOMP_SUPPORTED)],
[N(USE_TRANSPORT_MODE)],
[N(ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED)],
[N(NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)],
SA, TSi, TSr,
[N(ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE)],
[V+]
]]></artwork>
</figure></t>
<t> Note that the QCR_TOKEN notification is marked as optional because it is not required
by this specification that both sides send QCR tokens. If only one peer sends the QCR
token, then a reboot of the other peer will not be recoverable by this method. This may be
acceptable if traffic typically originates from the other peer.</t>
<t> In any case, the lack of a QCR_TOKEN notification MUST NOT be taken as an indication
that the peer does not support this standard. Conversely, if a peer does not understand
this notification, it will simply ignore it. Therefore a peer MAY send this notification
freely, even if it doesnŐt know whether the other side supports it.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="format_info" title="Informational Exchange">
<t> This informational exchange is non-protected, and is sent as a response to a protected
IKE request, which uses an IKE SA that is unknown. <figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
request --> N(QCR_TOKEN)
response <--
]]></artwork>
</figure></t>
<t> The QCR_TOKEN is the only notification in the request. Similar to the description
in section 2.21 of <xref target="RFC4306"/>, The IKE SPI and message ID fields in the
packet headers are taken from the protected IKE request.</t>
<t> If the QCR_TOKEN verifies OK, an empty response MUST be sent. If the QCR_TOKEN
cannot be validated, a response SHOULD NOT be sent. <xref target="tokengen"/>
defines token verification.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="tokengen" title="Token Generation and Verification">
<t> No token generation method is mandated by this document. Two methods are documented in
<xref target="tg1"/> and <xref target="tg2"/>, but they only serve as examples.</t>
<t> The following lists the requirements from a token generation mechanism:<list style="symbols">
<t> Tokens should be at least 16 octets log, and no more than 256 octets long, to
facilitate storage.</t>
<t> It should not be possible for an external attacker to guess the QCR token generated
by an implementation. Cryptographic mechanisms such as PRNG and hash functions are
RECOMMENDED.</t>
<t> The peer that generated the QCR token, should be able to immediately verify it,
provided that the IKE SPIs are given, and that the IKE SA has not expired or been
otherwise deleted.</t>
</list></t>
<section anchor="tg1" title="A Stateful Method of Token Generation">
<t> This describes a stateful method of generating a token:<list style="symbols">
<t> Before sending the QCR token, 32 random octets are generated using a secure random
number generator or a PRNG.</t>
<t> Those 32 bytes are used as the TOKEN_SECRET_DATA field, and stored as part of the
IKE SA.</t>
<t> For verification, the IKE implementation simply retrieves the IKE SA, and compares
the TOKEN_SECRET_DATA field from the notification to the TOKEN_SECRET_DATA field
stored with the SA.</t>
</list></t>
</section>
<section anchor="tg2" title="A Stateless Method of Token Generation">
<t> This describes a stateless method of generating a token.<list style="symbols">
<t> At startup, the IKE implementation generates a 32-octet random buffer using a
cryptographically secure PRNG. This buffer is called the QCR_SECRET.</t>
<t> For each QCR token, the TOKEN_SECRET_DATA field is generated by calculating a
SHA-256 hash over a concatenation of the QCR_SECRET and the IKE SPI as follows:<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
TOKEN_SECRET_DATA = HASH(QCR_SECRET | SPI-I | SPI-R)
]]></artwork>
</figure></t>
<t> Verification uses the same calculation, and works even if the IKE SA has been
deleted. Still, if the IKE SA is no longer valid, the notification MUST NOT be
acknowledged, as this could be used in an attempt to guess the QCR_SECRET.</t>
</list></t>
</section>
<section anchor="toklifetime" title="Token Lifetime">
<t> The token is associated with a single IKE SA, and SHOULD be deleted when the SA is
deleted or expires. More formally, the token is associated with the pair (SPI-I, SPI-R).</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="whynot" title="Alternative Solutions">
<section anchor="saveikesa" title="Why not Save the Entire IKE SA">
<t> IKEv2 does not assume the existence of a persistent storage module. If we are adding
such a module, why not use it to save the entire IKE SA across reboots, nullifying the
need for a crash recovery procedure?</t>
<t> There are several reasons why we believe that this is not a good idea:<list style="numbers">
<t> A token is only 16-256 octets, and is much more compact than all the data
needed to store an IKE SA.</t>
<t> A token is valid for the life of an IKE SA. An IKE SA state is updated whenever a message
is sent, becuase of the requirement to keep the sequence of message IDs. It may not
be acceptable to update the persistent storage whenever an IKE message is sent.</t>
<t> A reboot is usually an unpredictable event, and as such, we cannot know how long it
will last. By the time the machine has rebooted, the peer may have attempted some type
of protected exchange (liveness check, create-child-SA or delete), timed out, and deleted
the SA. It is far better to reboot without SAs and with only a token for quick
recovery.</t>
</list></t>
</section>
<section anchor="newikesa" title="Initiating a new IKE SA">
<t> Instead of sending a QCR token, we could have the rebooted implementation start an
Initial exchange with the peer, including the INITIAL_CONTACT notification. This would
have the same effect, instructing the peer to erase the old IKE SA, as well as establishing
a new IKE SA with fewer rounds.</t>
<t> The disadvantage here, is that in IKEv2 an authentication exchange MUST have
a piggy-backed Child SA set up. Since our use case is such that the rebooted implementation
does not have traffic flowing to the peer, there are no good selectors for such a child
SA.</t>
<t> Additionally, when authentication is assymetric, such as when EAP is used, it is not
possible for the rebooted implementation to initiate IKE.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="operation" title="Operational Considerations">
<t> To support this standard, an implementation needs to have access to a persistent
storage module. This could be an internal hard disk, a local or remote database
application, or any other method that persists across reboots. This storage module and
the data links between the storage module and the IKE module must meet the performance
requirements of the IKE module. The storage module MUST support insertion and deletion
rates equal to peek IKE SA setup rates and it SHOULD support query rates that are fast
enough.</t>
<t> See <xref target="security"/> for security considerations for this storage mechanism.</t>
<t> In order to limit the effects of DoS attacks, an implementation SHOULD limit the rate
of queries into the token storage so as not to overload it. If excessive amounts of IKE
requests protected with unknown IKE SPIs arrive, the IKE module SHOULD revert to the
behavior described in section 2.21 of <xref target="RFC4306"/> and either send an
INVALID_IKE_SPI notification, or ignore it entirely.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="security" title="Security Considerations">
<t> Tokens MUST be hard to guess. This is critical, because if an attacker can guess the
token associated with the IKE SA, she can tear down the IKE SA and associated tunnels at
will. When the token is delivered in the IKE_AUTH exchange, it is encrypted. When it is
sent back in an informational exchange it is not encrypted, but that is the last use
of that token.</t>
<t> An aggregation of some tokens generated by one peer together with the related IKE SPIs
MUST NOT give an attacker the ability to guess other tokens. Specifically, if one peer
does not properly secure the QCR tokens and an attacker gains access to them, this
attacker MUST NOT be able to guess other tokens generated by the same peer. This is the
reason that the QCR_SECRET in <xref target="tg2"/> needs to be long.</t>
<t> The persistent storage MUST be protected from access by other parties. Anyone gaining
access to the contents of the storage will be able to delete all the IKE SAs described
in it.</t>
<t> The tokens associated with expired and deleted IKE SAs MUST be deleted from the storage,
so that a future compromise of the storage does not reveal enough tokens to facilitate
an attack against the QCR tokens.</t>
<t> The QCR token is sent by the rebooted peer in an unprotected message. A message like
that is subject to modification, deletion and replay by an attacker. However, these
attacks will not compromise the security of either side. Modification is meaningless
because a modified token is simply an invalid token. Deletion will only cause the
protocol not to work, resulting in a delay in tunnel re-establishment as described in
<xref target="SCR"/>. Replay is also meaningless, because the IKE SA has been deleted
after the first transmission.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="iana" title="IANA Considerations">
<t> IANA is requested to assign a notify message type from the error types range
(43-8191) of the "IKEv2 Notify Message Types" registry with name
"QUICK_CRASH_RECOVERY".</t>
</section>
</middle>
<!-- ====================================================================== -->
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<reference anchor='RFC2119'>
<front>
<title abbrev='RFC Key Words'>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
<author initials='S.' surname='Bradner' fullname='Scott Bradner'>
<organization>Harvard University</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>1350 Mass. Ave.</street>
<street>Cambridge</street>
<street>MA 02138</street>
</postal>
<phone>- +1 617 495 3864</phone>
<email>sob@harvard.edu</email>
</address>
</author>
<date year='1997' month='March' />
<area>General</area>
<keyword>keyword</keyword>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='BCP' value='14' />
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='2119' />
<format type='TXT' octets='4723' target='ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2119.txt' />
<format type='HTML' octets='16553' target='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc2119.html' />
<format type='XML' octets='5703' target='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc2119.xml' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC4306'>
<front>
<title>Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol</title>
<author initials='C.' surname='Kaufman' fullname='C. Kaufman'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2005' month='December' />
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4306' />
<format type='TXT' target='http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4306.txt' />
<format type='HTML' target='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc4306.html' />
<format type='XML' target='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc4306.xml' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC4718'>
<front>
<title>IKEv2 Clarifications and Implementation Guidelines</title>
<author initials='P.' surname='Eronen' fullname='P. Eronen'>
<organization>Nokia</organization></author>
<author initials='P.' surname='Hoffman' fullname='P. Hoffman'>
<organization>VPN Consortium</organization></author>
<date year='2006' month='October' />
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4718' />
<format type='TXT' target='http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4718.txt' />
<format type='HTML' target='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc4718.html' />
<format type='XML' target='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc4718.xml' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='resumption'>
<front>
<title>IPsec Gateway Failover Protocol</title>
<author initials='Y.' surname='Sheffer' fullname='Y. Sheffer'>
<organization>Check Point</organization></author>
<author initials='H.' surname='Tschofenig' fullname='H. Tschofenig'>
<organization>Nokia Siemens Networks</organization></author>
<author initials='L.' surname='Dondeti' fullname='L. Dondeti'>
<organization>QUALCOMM, Inc.</organization></author>
<author initials='V.' surname='Narayanan' fullname='L. Narayanan'>
<organization>QUALCOMM, Inc.</organization></author>
<date year='2007' month='November' />
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-sheffer-ipsec-failover-02' />
<format type='TXT'
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-sheffer-ipsec-failover-02.txt' />
</reference>
</references>
<!-- ====================================================================== -->
</back>
</rfc>
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-24 03:29:41 |