One document matched: draft-niccolini-speermint-voipthreats-01.txt
Differences from draft-niccolini-speermint-voipthreats-00.txt
SPEERMINT Working Group S. Niccolini
Internet-Draft NEC
Intended status: Informational E. Chen
Expires: September 2, 2007 NTT
March 1, 2007
VoIP Security Threats relevant to SPEERMINT
draft-niccolini-speermint-voipthreats-01
Status of this Memo
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Abstract
This memo presents the different security threats related to
SPEERMINT classifying them into threats to the Location Function, to
the Signaling Function and to the Media Function. The different
instances of the threats are briefly introduced inside the
classification. Finally the existing security solutions in SIP and
RTP/RTCP are presented to describe the countermeasures currently
available for such threats. The objective of this document is to
identify and enumerate the SPEERMINT-specific threat vectors in order
to specify security-related requirements. Once the requirements are
identified, methods and solutions how to achieve such requirements
can be selected.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Security Threats relevant to SPEERMINT . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Threats to the Location Function (LF) . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Threats to the Signaling Function (SF) . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.1. Denial of Service Attacks to SF . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.2. Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.3. Federation Policy Violation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.4. Negotiation Modification/Interruption in Signaling . . 8
2.3. Threats to the Media Function (MF) . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.1. Denial of Service Attacks to MF . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.2. Privacy Infringement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4. Social Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Overview of SPEERMINT security requirements . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Overview of Security Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 19
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1. Introduction
With VoIP, the need for security is compounded because there is the
need to protect both the control plane and the data plane. In a
legacy telephone system, security is a more valid assumption.
Intercepting conversations requires either physical access to
telephone lines or to compromise the Public Switched Telephone
Network (PSTN) nodes or the office Private Branch eXchanges (PBXs).
Only particularly security-sensitive organizations bother to encrypt
voice traffic over traditional telephone lines. In contrast, the
risk of sending unencrypted data across the Internet is more
significant (e.g. DTMF tones corresponding to the credit card
number). An additional security threat to Internet Telephony comes
from the fact that the signaling is sent using the same network as
the multimedia data; traditional telephone systems have the signaling
network separated from the data network. This is an increased
security threat since a hacker could attack the signaling network and
its servers with increased damage potential (call hijacking, call
drop, DoS attacks, etc.). Therefore there is the need of
investigating the different security threats, to extract security-
related requirements and to highlight the solutions how to protect
from such threats.
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2. Security Threats relevant to SPEERMINT
This section enumerates potential security threats relevant to
SPEERMINT. A taxonomy of VoIP security threats is defined in [1].
Such a taxonomy is really comprehensive and takes into account also
non-VoIP-specific threats (e.g. loss of power, etc.). Threats
relevant to the boundaries of layer-5 SIP networks are extracted from
such a taxonomy and mapped to the classification relevant for the
SPEERMINT architecture as defined in [2], moreover additional threats
for the SPEERMINT architecture are listed and detailed under the same
classification:
o Location Function (LF);
o Signaling Function (SF);
o Media Function (MF).
An additional category is also included for completeness to address
social threats relevant to SPEERMINT even if they are currently out
of the scope of the SPEERMINT charter.
2.1. Threats to the Location Function (LF)
There are a number of potential security threats to the development
of call routing data (CRD) by discovering the Signaling Function (SF)
and end user's reachable host.
o routing directories modification - the attacker modifies routing
directories (e.g. DNS, ENUM tree, etc.) in an unauthorized way in
order to modify the call routing. The scope could be to reroute
the call inserting unauthorized nodes in the path, to exclude
authorized nodes from the path, to route the call towards a wrong
destination causing a Denial of Service (DoS), to route the call
towards a wrong destination causing annoyance for the callee;
o call routing modification by Man in the Middle (MitM) - the
attacker has already or inserts an unauthorized node in the
signaling path in order to modify the call routing. The scope
could be to reroute the call inserting other unauthorized nodes in
the path, to exclude authorized nodes from the path, to route the
call towards a wrong destination causing a Denial of Service
(DoS), to route the call towards a wrong destination causing
annoyance for the callee;
o DNS and ENUM hijacking - the attacker uses a technique called
cache poisoning that exploits a flaw in the DNS software and
tricks the server into receiving incorrect information. The
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compromised server would cache and serve the incorrect information
locally. This technique can be used to replace arbitrary NAPTR
records for a set of ENUM queries with NAPTR records of an
attacker's choosing. This allows the attacker to redirect all
calls to a malicious destination.
o proxy impersonation - the attacker tricks a SIP UA or proxy into
communicating with a rogue proxy. VoIP calls established among
different peering providers may introduce a number of new
opportunities for such attack as intermediate proxies are
discovered dynamically during call routing. A successful proxy
impersonation allows full access and control to all routed SIP
messages.
o Denial of Service Attacks to LF - A DoS attack to the location
function is possible by sending a large number of queries to the
associated ENUM gateways or DNS servers. This prevents a User
Agent to look up the NAPTR record of the intended recipient of the
call.
o identity theft - the attacker uses the identity of the owner
without the consent for the scope of masking his real identity
when committing fraud (e.g. when calling the attacker can charge
the bill of the identity owner, the attacker can use the identity
to bypass call blocking, etc.);
o numbers/identities harvesting - the attacker harvests numbers
and/or user identities by issuing a multitude of location requests
with the purpose of discovering the existent ones and their
identifiers/addresses for calling them, for using them as spoofed
identities or just for retrieving their location in the physical
topology;
o signaling entities harvesting - the attacker harvests signaling
entities (SIP Proxy Servers, etc.) addresses by issuing a specific
number of requests with the purpose of discovering their location
in the physical topology or for targeting them with subsequent
attacks.
2.2. Threats to the Signaling Function (SF)
Signaling function involves a great number of sensitive information.
Through signaling function, user agents (UA) assert identities and
VSP operators authorize billable resources. Correct and trusted
operations of signaling function is essential for service providers.
This section discusses potential security threats to the signaling
function to detail the possible attack vectors.
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2.2.1. Denial of Service Attacks to SF
There are a number of ways to conduct a Denial of Service attack to
the signaling function.
o SIP malformed requests and messages - the attacker tries to cause
a crash or a reboot of the proxy/endpoint by sending SIP malformed
requests and messages;
o SIP requests and messages flooding - the attacker tries to exhaust
the resources of the proxy/endpoint by sending many SIP requests
and messages;
o session black holing - the attacker intentionally drops essential
packets (e.g. INVITE) of the VoIP protocol resulting the call
initiation to fail, it is needed that the attacker controls (or
is) a node in the middle of the signaling path;
o session tear down - the attacker uses CANCEL/BYE messages in order
to tear down an existing call at SIP layer, it is needed that the
attacker replicates the proper SIP header for the hijacking to be
successful (To, From, Call-ID, CSeq);
o session hijacking - the attacker uses SIP messages (e.g. 301 Moved
Temporarily) in order to hijack an existing call towards non-
existing proxy/endpoint to make the session initiation fail, it is
needed that the attacker replicates the proper SIP header for the
hijacking to be successful (To, From, Call-ID, CSeq);
o SIP message spoofing - There are a number of ways to perform a DoS
attack by spoofing SIP messages. An attacker may directly send
initial INVITE messages to a User Agent that has no capability to
authenticate them. Such messages may cause the UA to ring non-
stop and effectively make it unusable. Moreover, if the INVITE
appears to come from a SIP server, the UA may keep responding to
the server with multiple messages. This may cause a DrDoS
(Distributed Reflection DoS) attack to the SIP server if enough
UAs are compromised.
In principle such attacks does not need interception of any packet in
order to be performed (could be done by simple guessing) but some of
these attacks (e.g. session hijacking, session tear down, etc.)
benefit from the retrieval of call-specific information as coming
from interception of SIP packets.
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2.2.2. Fraud
There are a number of ways to commit a fraud by exploiting
vulnerabilities in the signaling function:
o accounting fraud by media oversize - the attacker injects in the
network more traffic than declared in the session request in order
to avoid paying for the used resources;
o session replay - the attacker replays a past session of another
user in order to have access to the same resources (e.g. a bank
account, etc.). This attack can results in using resources
without paying for them, having access to sensitive information,
loss of money, etc.;
o call hijacking - the attacker uses SIP messages (e.g. 301 Moved
Temporarily) in order to hijack an existing call towards other
proxy/endpoint, it is needed that the attacker replicates the
proper SIP header for the hijacking to be successful (To, From,
Call-ID, CSeq);
o call pattern tracking - the attacker tracks the call patterns of
the users violating his/her privacy;
o caller ID spoofing - the attacker spoofs the caller identifier in
order to make calls avoiding paying for them.
o bypassing SF - the attacker sends the session initiation directly
to the endpoint (Ua, media gateway, etc.) bypassing signaling
entities in order to avoid paying for the used resources.
2.2.3. Federation Policy Violation
VoIP carriers that allow session peering through a federation are
expected to establish some form of explicit policies to be adhered by
all members. These policies may normally include terms such as
capacity controls and identity assertion. Members with lower
security level may bring new threats to the federation and thus
affect all participating carriers.
o weak caller ID assertion by peers - a carrier member fails to
achieve the level of identity assertion expected by the federation
may introduce an entry point for attackers to conduct CID (caller
ID) spoofing fraud. This would affect all members in the
federation, despite their efforts to strengthen the assertion
within their own domains.
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o overwhelming traffic from peers - a carrier member with a large
number of UAs infected by bots or worms may unintentionally
transmit traffic floods to other peers in the federation and
violate the capacity control policy of the federation.
o illegitimate transit peers - multimedia traffic may be unknowingly
delivered through an illegitimate transit peer. This introduces
opportunities for a variety of attacks by rough peers.
2.2.4. Negotiation Modification/Interruption in Signaling
The signaling function is used to perform, among the others, session
and protocol capabilities negotiation as well as key exchange among
parties involved in a call session. There are a variety of ways that
an attacker can compromise such negotiations.
o codec negotiation interruption/modification - signaling function
is used to perform handshake regarding the codec(s) to be used
during multimedia session. An attacker may intentionally drop or
modify only packets involved in the handshake. This attack could
interrupt the multimedia communication or degrade the quality
achievable in the case o lower quality codec is used.
o SIP protocol specification interruption/modification - signaling
function may use specific details of the signaling protocol.
Extensions and the signaling associated may vary. An attacker may
intentionally drop or modify only packets meant to give evidence
or declare such extensions tricking the peering party into wrong
assumptions. This attack could make the peering party wrongly
allocating protocol mediation function resulting in failure to
establish communications or parts of them. Moreover the peering
party would unnecessarily use resources in allocating such
protocol mediation function resulting in a DoS attack.
o bid-down attack to SF - a number of encryption key exchange
protocols performs handshake through the Signaling Function. An
attacker may intentionally drop or modify only packets involved in
the handshake. While this attack does not interrupt the voice
communication, calling parties are prevented from establishing an
SRTP session to secure privacy.
2.3. Threats to the Media Function (MF)
Media function is responsible for the actual delivery of multimedia
communication between the users and carries sensitive information.
Through media function, user agents (UA) can establish secure
communications and monitor quality of conversations. Correct and
trusted operations of media function is essential for privacy and
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service assurance issues. This section discusses potential security
threats to the media function to detail the possible attack vectors.
2.3.1. Denial of Service Attacks to MF
There are a number of ways to conduct a Denial of Service attack to
the media function.
o RTP/RTCP malformed messages - the attacker tries to cause a crash
or a reboot of the proxy/endpoint by sending RTP/RTCP malformed
messages;
o RTP/RTCP messages flooding - the attacker tries to exhaust the
resources of the proxy/endpoint by sending many RTP/RTCP messages;
o RTP/RTCP session tear down - the attacker uses RTCP messages (e.g.
BYE) in order to tear down an existing call at RTP layer, the SIP
layer will not notice that the RTP flow has been torn down and the
call will not result as released;
o RTP/RTCP QoS degradation - the attacker sends wrong RTCP reports
advertising more packet loss or more jitter than actually
experimented resulting in the usage of a poor quality codec
degrading the overall quality of the call experience.
In principle such attacks does not need interception of any packet in
order to be performed (could be done by simple guessing) but some of
these attacks (e.g. call hijacking, RTP/RTCP session tear down, etc.)
benefit from the retrieval of call-specific information as coming
from interception of SIP/RTP/RTCP packets.
2.3.2. Privacy Infringement
The media function is responsible for enabling private conversation
between parties involved in a call session. There are a variety of
ways that an attacker can compromise the privacy of VoIP
conversations.
o eavesdropping - the attacker reconstruct the conversation and/or
additional data delivered with it (e.g.numbers transmitted with
DTMF tones);
o media alteration - the attacker alters some RTP packets in order
to modify the conversation between two users;
o bid-down attack to MF - a number of encryption key exchange
protocols performs handshake through the Media Function. ZRTP [3]
is an example of such protocol that exchanges key information
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using RTP at the beginning before establishing an SRTP session.
An attacker may intentionally drop only RTP packets involved in
the handshake. While this attack does not interrupt the voice
communication, calling parties are prevented from establishing an
SRTP session to secure privacy.
2.4. Social Threats
False presentation of information together with unwanted contact are
the only social threats that can be reconducted to a technical
background in the case of VoIP. Examples are:
o VoIP phishing - VoIP phishing involves an attacker creating a
phone number that appears to represent a legitimate organization
such as a bank. VoIP allows an attacker to easily set up a
malicious IVR (Interactive Voice Response) system with a toll-free
number that is harder to trace than one set up on PSTN. This type
of fraud may be more effective than email-based phising since
victims tend to trust more a phone number than a URL;
o unwanted lawful/unlawful contact - the attacker contacts the
victim with the unlawful or lawful scopes (e.g. extortion,
telemarketing, etc.), please note that unwanted lawful contact in
the case of VoIP is also referred to as SPam over Internet
Telephony (SPIT), SPIT discussion is excluded by the SPEERMINT
working group per charter.
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3. Overview of SPEERMINT security requirements
This section will discuss the SPEERMINT security requirements as
outcome of the threat overview given in Section 2. The requirements
will be then enable the selection of the security solutions to be
adopted by SPEERMINT in order to meet the identified requirements.
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4. Overview of Security Solutions
This section presents the VoIP security features currently
standardized or under standardization in order to give an overview of
the building blocks needed to counter the VoIP Security threats
detailed in this draft. The technology to secure VoIP can be divided
in three main areas as follows:
o Authentication/Authorization;
o Encryption;
o Identity management.
Authentication is needed to understand who was the sender of a
specific packet. Authentication can take place between different
entities or end-to-end:
o from client to server - Digest authentication [4] or mutual
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [5];
o from server to server - mutual Transport Layer Security (TLS);
o from server to client - Transport Layer Security (TLS);
o end-to-end - S/MIME [6].
All solutions require some kind of trust relationship (i.e. shared
secret or certificates authorities).
Encryption is needed to protect the content of the packets from being
read by other parties than the ones which are supposed to be the
recipient of such packets. Encryption follows the same paradigm as
authentication and can be done either on a hop-by-hop or on a end-to-
end basis. On a hop-by-hop basis TLS is used (TLS creates an
authenticated, encrypted, integrity-checked channel). On a end-to-
end basis S/MIME is used to sign and encrypt portions of the SIP
body. At the media level a end-to-end encryption is possible using
SRTP [7] to protect RTP/RTCP media (audio, video). Currently there
is a discussion in the IETF about the requirements for SRTP media
keying which is still an open issue. Other solutions that provide
encryption and integrity are lower layer ones like IPsec which is
done hop-by-hop.
Identity management is also an important piece of security framework
in SIP [8]. The objective of the identity framework is to give
technical means to assess user identity in a secure manner. It
requires strong cryptographic assertions but it represents the most
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promising approach to enable further security solutions which need
the assumption of dealing with strong authenticated identities.
Please note that other techniques could also be used to counter VoIP
Security threats, the techniques that constitute stand-alone
solutions and that do not need standardization work are left out the
scope of this document. It is left open for discussion which other
security techniques to include in this section.
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5. Conclusions
This memo presented a the different SPEERMINT security threats
classified in groups related to the Location Function, Signaling
Function and Media Function respectively. The multiple instances of
the threats are presented with a brief explanation. Finally the
existing security solutions in VoIP were presented to describe the
countermeasures currently available for such threats. The objective
of this document is to identify and enumerate the VoIP threat vectors
in order to specify security-related requirements specific to
SPEERMINT (that will be included in section Section 3). Once the
requirements are identified, methods and solutions how to achieve
such requirements can be selected.
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6. Security Considerations
This memo is entirely focused on the security threats for SPEERMINT.
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7. Acknowledgements
This memo takes inspiration from VOIPSA VoIP Security and Privacy
Threat Taxonomy. The author would like to thank VOIPSA for having
produced such a comprehensive taxonomy which is the starting point of
this draft. The author would also like to thank Cullen Jennings for
the useful slides presented at the VoIP Management and Security
workshop in Vancouver.
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8. Informative References
[1] "VOIPSA VoIP Security and Privacy Threat Taxonomy",
October 2005.
[2] Penno, R., Hammer, M., Khan, S., Malas, D., and A. Uzelac,
"SPEERMINT Peering Architecture",
draft-ietf-speermint-architecture-02.txt (work in progress),
October 2006.
[3] Zimmermann, P., Johnston, A., and J. Callas, "ZRTP: Extensions
to RTP for Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement for SRTP",
draft-zimmermann-avt-zrtp-02.txt (work in progress),
October 2006.
[4] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP:
Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.
[5] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.2",
draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-02.txt (work in progress),
October 2006.
[6] Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
(S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification", RFC 3851,
July 2004.
[7] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
RFC 3711, March 2004.
[8] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for Authenticated
Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
RFC 4474, August 2006.
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Authors' Addresses
Saverio Niccolini
Network Laboratories, NEC Europe Ltd.
Kurfuersten-Anlage 36
Heidelberg 69115
Germany
Phone: +49 (0) 6221 4342 118
Email: saverio.niccolini@netlab.nec.de
URI: http://www.netlab.nec.de
Eric Chen
Information Sharing Platform Laboratories, NTT
3-9-11 Midori-cho
Musashino, Tokyo 180-8585
Japan
Email: eric.chen@lab.ntt.co.jp
URI: http://www.ntt.co.jp/index_e.html
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