One document matched: draft-laganier-mext-cga-01.txt
Differences from draft-laganier-mext-cga-00.txt
Network Working Group J. Laganier
Internet-Draft Qualcomm Inc.
Intended status: Experimental October 26, 2010
Expires: April 29, 2011
Authorizing Mobile IPv6 Binding Update with Cryptographically Generated
Addresses
draft-laganier-mext-cga-01
Abstract
The standard RFC 3775 mechanism to secure Mobile IPv6 Binding Updates
sent by a Mobile Node to its Home Agent relies on the use of a pair
of unidirectional IPsec security associations between these two
nodes. The standard mechanism to secure Mobile IPv6 Binding Updates
sent by a Mobile Node to one of its Correspondent Nodes relies on the
use of a return routability test that involves the Correspondent Node
verifying reachability of the Mobile Node at both its Home Address
and its Care-of Address. The mechanism also requires the
correspondent node to send keying material to both of these
addresses.
RFC 4866 specifies a standard track mecanism that allows a Mobile
Node that has configured a Cryptographically Generated Address (RFC
3972) as its Home Address to secure Mobile IPv6 Binding Updates sent
its Correspondent Nodes based on the properties of its
Cryptographically Generated Addresses. Note that Cryptographically
Generated Addresses have also been used to counter similar security
issues in the context of SHIM6 (RFC 5533) and Secure Neighbor
Discovery (RFC 3971.)
This memo proposes a mechanism that would let a Mobile Node use a
similar mechanism to secure Mobile IPv6 Binding Updates its sent to
its Home Agent with a similar technique based on the use of
Cryptographically Generated Addresses.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 29, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Disclaimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Requirement Levels Key Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Usage Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Mobile Node Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Home Agent Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. IPv4 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Introduction
The standard RFC 3775 [RFC3775] mechanism to secure Mobile IPv6
Binding Updates sent by a Mobile Node to its Home Agent relies on the
use of a pair of unidirectional IPsec security associations between
these two nodes [RFC4877]. The standard mechanism to secure Mobile
IPv6 Binding Updates sent by a Mobile Node to one of its
Correspondent Nodes relies on the use of a return routability test
that involves the Correspondent Node verifying reachability of the
Mobile Node at both its Home Address and its Care-of Address. The
mechanism also requires the correspondent node to send keying
material to both of these addresses.
RFC 4866 [RFC4866] specifies a standard track mecanism that allows a
Mobile Node that has configured a Cryptographically Generated Address
[RFC3972] as its Home Address to secure Mobile IPv6 Binding Updates
sent its Correspondent Nodes based on the properties of its
Cryptographically Generated Addresses. Note that Cryptographically
Generated Addresses have also been used to counter similar security
issues in the context of SHIM6 [RFC5533] and Secure Neighbor
Discovery [RFC3971].
This memo proposes a mechanism that would let a Mobile Node use a
similar mechanism to secure Mobile IPv6 Binding Updates its sent to
its Home Agent with a similar technique based on the use of
Cryptographically Generated Addresses.
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2. Disclaimer
This Internet Draft is still Work in Progress.
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3. Requirement Levels Key Words
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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4. Terminology
Other terms used throughout this document are defined in the relevant
documents: [RFC3775], [RFC4866], [RFC3972].
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5. Usage Scenario
The mechanism described herein is useful in situations where there is
a desire not to depend on IPsec for protection of the Mobile IPv6
signaling between the Mobile Node and the Home Agent.
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6. Mobile Node Operation
A Mobile Node sends a Binding Update message to its Home Agent when
any of the following applies:
o It is needs to establish a new binding because it is away from the
home link and first attaches to a foreign link.
o It attaches to a different foreign link and needs to update the
binding with its new care-of address.
o It needs to refresh a binding because it is about to expire.
o It needs to acquire a new permanent home keygen token for the
binding, either because it does not have one yet, or because the
current permanent home keygen token is going to become unusable
due to the sequence number being about to roll over since the
token was acquired.
o It needs to deregister an existing binding.
In any of these cases, the Mobile Node sends a Binding Update message
to the home agent. The Binding Update message is authenticated by
one of the following two authentication methods:
o If the Mobile Node does not have a usable permanent home keygen
token in its Binding Update List entry for the home agent, the
mobile node MUST authenticate the Binding Update message based on
the CGA property of its home address. The Binding Update message
MUST omit the Binding Authorization Data option and MUST include
the following options:
* a CGA Parameters option for the Cryptographically Generated
Home Address of the Mobile Node as per [RFC4866].
* a Timestamp option as per [RFC5213].
* a Signature option as per [RFC4866].
o If the Mobile Node has a usable permanent home keygen token in its
Binding Update List entry for the home agent, the mobile node MUST
authenticate the Binding Update message by a proof of its
knowledge of the permanent home keygen token. The Binding Update
message MUST omit the CGA Parameters, Timestamp, and Signature
options and MUST include the following option:
* a Binding Authorization Data option whose authenticator for the
Binding Update message is calculated based on the permanent
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home keygen token alone. The care-of keygen token is set to
zero while calculating the authenticator.
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7. Home Agent Operation
A Home Agent MUST accept a Binding Update message from a Mobile Node
and maintain accordingly the corresponding Binding Cache Entry if the
Binding Update message can be authenticated as follows:
o If the Binding Update message does not contain a Binding
Authorization Data option, the Mobile Node does not have a usable
permanent home keygen token in its Binding Update List entry for
the home agent, and the Home AGent MUST authenticate the Binding
Update message based on the CGA property of the Mobile Node home
address. The Binding Update message MUST include the following
options:
* a CGA Parameters option for the Cryptographically Generated
Home Address of the Mobile Node as per [RFC4866].
* a valid Timestamp option as per [RFC5213]. That is, if there
is no existing Binding Cache Entry, the time offset between the
Timestamp and local Home Agent clock is recorded in the Binding
Cache Entry. If there exists a Binding Cache Entry, the
Timestamp MUST not differ from the local Home Agent clock for
more than 1.5 times the time offset recorded in the Binding
Cache Entry.
* a valid Signature option as per [RFC4866].
o If the Binding Update message contains a Binding Authorization
Data option, the Mobile Node has a usable permanent home keygen
token in its Binding Update List entry for the home agent, and the
Home Agend MUST authenticate the Binding Update message by proof
of the Mobile Node's knowledge of the permanent home keygen token
by verifying that the authenticator in the Binding Authorization
Data option is calculated based on the permanent home keygen token
with the care-of keygen token set to zero.
If the Binding Update message has been authenticated based on the CGA
property of the Mobile Node home address, the Home Agent MUST include
a new permanent Home Keygen Token in the Binding Acknowledgment.
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8. IPv4 Support
This mechanism can be used when the Mobile Node is attached to an
IPv4-only foreign link by leveraging on [I-D.ebalard-mext-m6t]. IPv4
applications can be supported via assigning an IPv4 Home Address as
described in [RFC5555].
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9. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA considerations yet for this specification.
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10. Security Considerations
There are no security considerations yet for this document.
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11. Acknowledgment
The author acknowledge prior work in the area of Mobile IPv6 security
based on Cryptographically Generated Addresses, Statistically Unique
and Crypgraphically Verifiable Identifiers, and more.
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12. References
12.1. Normative References
[I-D.ebalard-mext-m6t]
Ebalard, A., "MIPv6 from IPv4-only networks",
draft-ebalard-mext-m6t-02 (work in progress),
September 2010.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3775] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.
[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
RFC 3972, March 2005.
[RFC4866] Arkko, J., Vogt, C., and W. Haddad, "Enhanced Route
Optimization for Mobile IPv6", RFC 4866, May 2007.
[RFC5213] Gundavelli, S., Leung, K., Devarapalli, V., Chowdhury, K.,
and B. Patil, "Proxy Mobile IPv6", RFC 5213, August 2008.
[RFC5555] Soliman, H., "Mobile IPv6 Support for Dual Stack Hosts and
Routers", RFC 5555, June 2009.
12.2. Informative References
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[RFC4877] Devarapalli, V. and F. Dupont, "Mobile IPv6 Operation with
IKEv2 and the Revised IPsec Architecture", RFC 4877,
April 2007.
[RFC5533] Nordmark, E. and M. Bagnulo, "Shim6: Level 3 Multihoming
Shim Protocol for IPv6", RFC 5533, June 2009.
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Author's Address
Julien Laganier
Qualcomm Incorporated
5775 Morehouse Drive
San Diego, CA 92121
USA
Phone: +1 858 658 3538
Email: julienl@qualcomm.com
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