One document matched: draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-cmac96and128-05.txt
Differences from draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-cmac96and128-04.txt
Network Working Group A. Kato
Internet-Draft S. Kanno
Intended status: Standards Track NTT Software Corporation
Expires: June 24, 2010 M. Kanda
NTT
T. Iwata
Nagoya University
December 21, 2009
The Camellia-CMAC-96 and Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 Algorithms and Its Use
with IPsec
draft-kato-ipsec-camellia-cmac96and128-05
Abstract
This memo specifies two new algorithms for IPsec. One is the usage
of Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) with the Camellia
block cipher as an authentication mechanism in the IPsec
Encapsulating Security Payload and Authentication Header protocols.
This algorithm is called Camellia-CMAC-96. The other algorithm is a
pseudo-random function (PRF) based on CMAC with the Camellia block
cipher for the Internet Key Exchange, version 2. This algorithm is
called Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 24, 2010.
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the BSD License.
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English.
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Camellia-CMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Camellia-CMAC-96 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Test Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. Camellia-CMAC-96 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10.1. Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10.2. Informative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
1. Introduction
The NIST specification [1] for the CMAC (Cipher-based Message
Authentication Code) mode of operation for a block cipher describes a
method to use the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as a Message
Authentication Code (MAC) that has a 128-bit output length.
The Camellia block cipher has the same external interface as the AES.
This memo specifies two new algorithms for IPsec that replace AES by
Camellia in already specified applications of CMAC for IPsec [8] and
[9]. One is the usage of CMAC mode with Camellia [2] as the
underlying block cipher as an authentication mechanism in the IPsec
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [5] and Authentication Header
(AH) [4] protocols. This algorithm is called Camellia-CMAC-96. The
128-bit CMAC output is also useful as a long-lived Pseudo-Random
Function (PRF). Thus, the other algorithm is a PRF based on CMAC
with the Camellia block cipher for version 2 of the Internet Key
Exchange (IKEv2) [6] that supports fixed and variable key sizes for
the Key Derivation Function (KDF) and authentication, respectively.
This algorithm is called Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128.
The Camellia algorithm and its properties are described in [2]. This
document does not cover implementation details of CMAC. Those
details can be found in [1]. For further information on IKE, AH and
ESP, refer to [3], [4], [5], and [6].
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
2. Definitions
CBC
Cipher Block Chaining mode of operation for a block cipher,
providing a block cipher for arbitrary message sizes.
MAC
Message Authentication Code. A bit string of a fixed
length, computed by the MAC generation algorithm, that is
used to establish the authority and, hence, the integrity
of a message.
CMAC
A MAC algorithm based on a symmetric key block cipher in
CBC mode, as specified in [1].
Key (K)
128-bit (16-octet) key for the Camellia block cipher.
Denoted by K.
Variable-length Key (VK)
Variable-length key for Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128, denoted by
VK.
Message (M)
Message to be authenticated. Denoted by M.
Length (len)
The length of message M in octets. Denoted by len. The
minimum value is 0. The maximum value is not specified in
this document.
VKlen
The length of VK in octets.
truncate(T,l)
Truncate T (MAC) in most-significant-bit-first (MSB-first)
order to a length of l octets.
T
The output of Camellia-CMAC.
Camellia-CMAC
CMAC generation function based on the Camellia block cipher
with 128-bit key.
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
Camellia-CMAC-96
IPsec AH and ESP MAC generation function based on Camellia-
CMAC, which truncates the 128-bit CMAC output to its 96
most-significant bits.
Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128
IPsec AH and ESP PRF based on Camellia-CMAC, which removes
the 128-bit key length restriction.
SKEYSEED
Seed of shared key calculated from the nonces exchanged
during the IKE_SA_INIT exchange and the Diffie-Hellman
shared secret in the IKEv2 specification [6].
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
3. Camellia-CMAC
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has
specified the Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) [1].
CMAC is a keyed hash function that is based on a symmetric key block
cipher, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard [10]. The CMAC
algorithm provides a framework for inserting various block cipher
algorithms.
Camellia-CMAC uses the Camellia block cipher [2] as a building block
in CMAC [1]. To generate a MAC, Camellia-CMAC(K, M, len) takes a
secret key 'K', a message of variable length 'M', and the length of
the message in octets 'len' as inputs and returns a fixed-length bit
string.
In this specification, Camellia-CMAC is always used with 128-bit
length key.
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
4. Camellia-CMAC-96
For IPsec message authentication in AH and ESP, Camellia-CMAC is used
in its truncated form denoted as Camellia-CMAC-96 -- Camellia-CMAC
with its output truncated to 96 bits. Its output is a 96-bit MAC
that meets the default authenticator length as specified in [4]. The
result of truncation is taken in MSB-first order.
Figure 1 describes Camellia-CMAC-96 algorithm:
In step 1, Camellia-CMAC with key K is applied to the message M of
length len octets.
In step 2, the output of step 1 is truncated to its first 12 octets,
and the result (TT) is returned.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ Algorithm Camellia-CMAC-96 +
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ +
+ Input : K (128-bit Key) +
+ : M (message to be authenticated) +
+ : len (length of message in octets) +
+ Output : Truncated T (truncated output to length 12 octets) +
+ +
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
+ +
+ Step 1. T := Camellia-CMAC (K,M,len); +
+ Step 2. TT := truncate (T, 12); +
+ return TT; +
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Figure 1: Algorithm Camellia-CMAC-96
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
5. Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128
The Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 algorithm is identical to Camellia-CMAC
except that the 128-bit key length restriction is removed.
IKEv2 [6] uses PRFs for multiple purposes, most notably for
generating keying material and authentication of the IKE_SA.
When using Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 as the PRF described in [6],
Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 is considered to admit a variable key length in
all places, and the amount of keying material generated when new keys
are generated is 128 bits (i.e., preferred key length when generating
keying material of SK_d, SK_pi, and SK_pr is 128 bits).
When generating SKEYSEED the full of Ni and Nr are used as key for
the PRF.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 +
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ +
+ Input : VK (Variable-length key) +
+ : M (Message, i.e., the input data of the PRF) +
+ : VKlen (length of VK in octets) +
+ : len (length of M in octets) +
+ Output : PRV (128-bit Pseudo-Random Variable) +
+ +
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
+ Variable: K (128-bit key for Camellia-CMAC) +
+ +
+ Step 1. If VKlen is equal to 16 +
+ Step 1a. then +
+ K := VK; +
+ Step 1b. else +
+ K := Camellia-CMAC(0^128, VK, VKlen); +
+ Step 2. PRV := Camellia-CMAC(K, M, len); +
+ return PRV; +
+ +
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Figure 2: Algorithm Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128
In step 1, the 128-bit key, K, for Camellia-CMAC is derived as
follows:
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
o If the key VK is exactly 128 bits, then we use it as-is (step 1a).
o If it is longer or shorter than 128 bits, then we derive the key K
by applying the Camellia-CMAC algorithm using the 128-bit all-zero
string as the key and VK as the input message (step 1b).
In step 2, we apply the Camellia-CMAC algorithm using K as the key
and M as the input message. The output of this algorithm is
returned.
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
6. Test Cases
6.1. Camellia-CMAC-96
This section contains four test cases, which can be used to confirm
that an implementation has correctly implemented Camellia-CMAC-96.
----------------
K 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 0
M <empty string>
T ba925782 aaa1f5d9 a00f8964
----------------
K 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 16
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
T 6d962854 a3b9fda5 6d7d45a9
----------------
K 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 40
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411
T 5c18d119 ccd67661 44ac1866
----------------
K 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 64
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411 e5fbc119 1a0a52ef
f69f2445 df4f9b17 ad2b417b e66c3710
T c2699a6e ba55ce9d 939a8a4e
6.2. Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128
This section contains twelve test cases, which can be used to confirm
that an implementation has correctly implemented Camellia-CMAC-PRF-
128. The first four test cases use 128 bit VK; the next four test
cases use 192 bit VK; and the last four test cases use 256 bit VK.
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
VKlen = 16
----------------
VK 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 0
M <empty string>
T ba925782 aaa1f5d9 a00f8964 8094fc71
----------------
VK 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 16
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
T 6d962854 a3b9fda5 6d7d45a9 5ee17993
----------------
VK 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 40
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411
T 5c18d119 ccd67661 44ac1866 131d9f22
----------------
VK 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
Mlen = 64
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411 e5fbc119 1a0a52ef
f69f2445 df4f9b17 ad2b417b e66c3710
T c2699a6e ba55ce9d 939a8a4e 19466ee9
------------------------------------------------------------
VKlen = 24
----------------
VK 8e73b0f7 da0e6452 c810f32b 809079e5
62f8ead2 522c6b7b
K abddaa68 e8b9f0af 2fb4db53 41cf1d91
Mlen = 0
M <empty string>
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
T f4739892 c70bd23e 891f66c0 5fefbf27
----------------
VK 8e73b0f7 da0e6452 c810f32b 809079e5
62f8ead2 522c6b7b
K abddaa68 e8b9f0af 2fb4db53 41cf1d91
Mlen = 16
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
T 60a33814 53babaed 1a11dfd3 d24c1410
----------------
VK 8e73b0f7 da0e6452 c810f32b 809079e5
62f8ead2 522c6b7b
K abddaa68 e8b9f0af 2fb4db53 41cf1d91
Mlen = 40
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411
T 42b9d47f 4f58bc29 85b6f82c 23b121cb
----------------
VK 8e73b0f7 da0e6452 c810f32b 809079e5
62f8ead2 522c6b7b
K abddaa68 e8b9f0af 2fb4db53 41cf1d91
Mlen = 64
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411 e5fbc119 1a0a52ef
f69f2445 df4f9b17 ad2b417b e66c3710
T d078729f dcae9abc ff1ea4d6 18ed4501
------------------------------------------------------------
VKlen = 32
----------------
VK 603deb10 15ca71be 2b73aef0 857d7781
1f352c07 3b6108d7 2d9810a3 0914dff4
K b5aeeae9 2c23bed7 167af194 2e831597
Mlen = 0
M <empty string>
T c96d7d40 d4aaab78 ac906b91 c82bd690
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
----------------
VK 603deb10 15ca71be 2b73aef0 857d7781
1f352c07 3b6108d7 2d9810a3 0914dff4
K b5aeeae9 2c23bed7 167af194 2e831597
Mlen = 16
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
T 104de4b9 0da6baf1 fa73945b e614f032
----------------
VK 603deb10 15ca71be 2b73aef0 857d7781
1f352c07 3b6108d7 2d9810a3 0914dff4
K b5aeeae9 2c23bed7 167af194 2e831597
Mlen = 40
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411
T 2d3684e9 1cb1b303 a7db8648 f25ee16c
----------------
VK 603deb10 15ca71be 2b73aef0 857d7781
1f352c07 3b6108d7 2d9810a3 0914dff4
K b5aeeae9 2c23bed7 167af194 2e831597
Mlen = 64
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411 e5fbc119 1a0a52ef
f69f2445 df4f9b17 ad2b417b e66c3710
T d6b0f1b7 dda2b62a eca6d51d da63fdda
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
7. Security Considerations
The security provided by Camellia-CMAC-96 and Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128
is built on the strong cryptographic algorithm Camellia and CMAC. At
the time of this writing, there are no known practical cryptographic
attacks against Camellia or CMAC.
However, as is true with any cryptographic algorithm, part of its
strength lies in the secret key, K, and the correctness of the
implementation in all of the participating systems. If the secret
key is compromised or inappropriately shared, it guarantees neither
authentication nor message integrity at all. The secret key shall be
generated in a way that meets the pseudo randomness requirement of
RFC 4086 [7] and should be kept safe. If and only if
Camellia-CMAC-96 and Camellia-CMAC-PRF-128 are used properly it
provides the authentication and integrity that meet the best current
practice of message authentication.
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
8. IANA Considerations
The IANA has allocated value <TBD1> for IKEv2 Transform Type 3
(Integrity Algorithm) to the AUTH_CAMELLIA_CMAC_96 algorithm, and has
allocated a value of <TBD2> for IKEv2 Transform Type 2 (Pseudo-Random
Function) to the PRF_CAMELLIA128_CMAC algorithm.
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
9. Acknowledgements
We thank Tim Polk and Tero Kivinen for their initial review of this
document. Special thanks to Alfred Hoenes for several very detailed
reviews and suggestions.
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
10. References
10.1. Normative
[1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Recommendation
for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:The CMAC Mode for
Authentication", Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005.
[2] Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, "A Description of the
Camellia Encryption Algorithm", RFC 3713, April 2004.
10.2. Informative
[3] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[4] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, December 2005.
[5] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303,
December 2005.
[6] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, "Internet Key
Exchange Protocol: IKEv2", draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2bis-06 (work
in progress), December 2009.
[7] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[8] Song, JH., Poovendran, R., and J. Lee, "The AES-CMAC-96
Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", RFC 4494, June 2006.
[9] Gustin, J. and A. Goyens, "A Uniform Resource Name (URN)
Namespace for SWIFT Financial Messaging", RFC 3615,
September 2003.
[10] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, November 2001,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf>.
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft The Camellia CMAC-96 and CMAC-PRF-128 December 2009
Authors' Addresses
Akihiro Kato
NTT Software Corporation
Phone: +81-45-212-9803
Fax: +81-45-212-9800
Email: kato.akihiro@po.ntts.co.jp
Satoru Kanno
NTT Software Corporation
Phone: +81-45-212-9803
Fax: +81-45-212-9800
Email: kanno.satoru@po.ntts.co.jp
Masayuki Kanda
NTT
Phone: +81-422-59-3456
Fax: +81-422-59-4015
Email: kanda.masayuki@lab.ntt.co.jp
Tetsu Iwata
Nagoya University
Email: iwata@cse.nagoya-u.ac.jp
Kato, et al. Expires June 24, 2010 [Page 19]
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-24 04:34:38 |