One document matched: draft-josefsson-pkix-textual-01.txt
Differences from draft-josefsson-pkix-textual-00.txt
Network Working Group S. Josefsson
Internet-Draft SJD AB
Intended status: Standards Track S. Leonard
Expires: January 18, 2013 Penango, Inc.
July 17, 2012
Text Encodings of PKIX and CMS Structures
draft-josefsson-pkix-textual-01
Abstract
This document describes and discuss the text encodings of Public-Key
Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates, PKIX Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRLs), PKCS #10 Certification Request Syntax, PKCS
#7 structures, Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), PKCS #8 Private-
Key Information Syntax, and Attribute Certificates. The text
encodings are well-known, are implemented by several applications and
libraries, and are widely deployed. This document is intended to
articulate the de-facto rules that existing implementations operate
by, and to give recommendations that will promote interoperability
going forward.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 18, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. ABNF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Text Encoding of PKIX Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Explanatory Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. File Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Text Encoding of PKIX CRLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Text Encoding of PKCS #10 Certification Request Syntax . . . . 7
7. Text Encoding of PKCS #7 Cryptographic Message Syntax . . . . 8
8. Text Encoding of Cryptographic Message Syntax . . . . . . . . 9
9. Text Encoding of PKCS #8 Private Key Info, and One
Asymmetric Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. Text Encoding of PKCS #8 Encrypted Private Key Info . . . . . 9
11. Text Encoding of Attribute Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12. Non-Conforming Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Editorial Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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1. Introduction
Several security-related standards used on the Internet define data
formats that are normally encoded using Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER) [CCITT.X690.2002], which is a binary data format. This
document is about text encodings of some of these formats:
1. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile [RFC5280], for both
Certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).
2. PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax [RFC2986].
3. PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax [RFC2315].
4. Cryptographic Message Syntax [RFC5652].
5. PKCS #8: Private-Key Information Syntax [RFC5208] and One
Asymmetric Key (in Asymmetric Key Package [RFC5958]).
6. An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization
[RFC5755].
A disadvantage of a binary data format is that it cannot be
interchanged in textual transports, such as e-mail or text documents.
One advantage with text encodings is that they are easy to modify
using common text editors; for example, a user may concatenate
several certificates to form a certificate chain with copy-and-paste
operations.
The tradition within the RFC series can be traced back to PEM
[RFC1421], based on a proposal by M. Rose in Message Encapsulation
[RFC0934]. Originally called "PEM encapsulation mechanism",
"encapsulated PEM message", or (arguably) "PEM printable encoding",
today the format is sometimes referred to as "PEM encoding".
Variations include OpenPGP ASCII Armor and OpenSSH Key File Format.
For reasons that basically boil down to non-coordination (or gross
inattention), many PKIX and CMS libraries implement a text encoding
that is similar to--but not identical with--PEM encoding. This
Internet-Draft calls this format "PKIX text encoding", articulates
the de-facto rules that most implementations operate by, and provides
recommendations that will promote interoperability going forward.
Peter Gutmann's X.509 Style Guide [X509SG] contains a section "base64
Encoding" that describes the formats and contains suggestions similar
to what is in this document.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119].
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2. General Considerations
PKIX text encoding begins with a line starting with "-----BEGIN" and
ends with a line starting with "-----END". Between these lines, or
"encapsulation boundaries", are base64 [RFC4648]-encoded data. Data
before the "-----BEGIN" and after the "-----END" encapsulation
boundaries are permitted and MUST NOT cause parsers to malfunction.
Furthermore, parsers MUST ignore whitespace and other non-alphabetic
characters [DP1] and MUST handle different newline conventions.
The type of data encoded is labeled depending on the type label in
the "-----BEGIN" line (pre-encapsulation boundary). For example, the
line may be "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" to indicate that the
content is a PKIX certificate (see further below). Generators MUST
put the same label on the "-----END" line (post-encapsulation
boundary) as the corresponding "-----BEGIN" line. Parsers MAY
disregard the label on the "-----END" line instead of signaling an
error if there is a label mismatch.
The label type implies that the encoded data follows the specified
syntax. Parsers MUST handle non-conforming data gracefully.
However, not all parsers or generators prior to this Internet-Draft
behave consistently. A conforming parser MAY interpret the contents
as another label type, but ought to be aware of the security
implications discussed in the Security Considerations section.
Unlike PEM encoding, OpenPGP ASCII armor, and OpenSSH key file
format, PKIX text encoding does NOT define or permit attributes to be
encoded alongside the PKIX or CMS data. Whitespace MAY appear
between the pre-encapsulation boundary and the base64, but generators
SHOULD NOT emit such whitespace.
Files MAY contain multiple instances of the text encoded
representation. This is used, for example, when a file contains
several certificates. Whether the instances are ordered or unordered
depends on the context.
Generators MUST wrap the base64 encoded lines so that each line
consists of exactly 64 characters except for the final line which
will encode as much data is left (within the 64 character line
boundary). Parsers MAY handle other line sizes. These requirements
are consistent with PEM [RFC1421].
3. ABNF
The ABNF of the PKIX text encoding is:
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pkixmsg ::= preeb
*eolWSP
base64text
posteb
preeb ::= "-----BEGIN " label "-----" eol
posteb ::= "-----END " label "-----" eol
base64char ::= ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/"
base64pad ::= "="
base64line ::= 1*base64char eol
base64finl ::= *base64char *2base64pad eol ; implies that:
; ...AB= <CRLF> = <CRLF>
; is invalid. not sure
; if this is a good idea
base64text ::= *base64line base64finl
; we could also use <encbinbody> from RFC 1421,
; which requires 16 groups of 4 chars, which means 64 chars
; exactly per line, except the final line
labelchar ::= %x21-2C / %x2E-%7E ; any printable character,
; except hyphen
label ::= labelchar *(labelchar / labelchar "-" / SP) labelchar
eol ::= CRLF / CR / LF
eolWSP ::= WSP / CR / LF ; compare with LWSP
Figure 1: ABNF
4. Text Encoding of PKIX Certificates
4.1. Encoding
PKIX certificates are encoded using the "CERTIFICATE" label. The
encoded data MUST be a DER encoded ASN.1 "Certificate" structure as
described in section 4 of [RFC5280].
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Figure 2: Certificate Example
Historically the label "X509 CERTIFICATE" and also, less common,
"X.509 CERTIFICATE" have been used. Generators conforming to this
document MUST generate "CERTIFICATE" labels and MUST NOT generate
"X509 CERTIFICATE" or "X.509 CERTIFICATE" labels. Parsers are NOT
RECOMMENDED to treat "X509 CERTIFICATE" or "X.509 CERTIFICATE" as
equivalent to "CERTIFICATE", but a valid exception may be for
backwards compatibility (potentially together with a warning).
4.2. Explanatory Text
Many tools are known to emit explanatory text before the BEGIN and
after the END labels for PKIX certificates, more than any other type.
If emitted, such text SHOULD be related to the certificate, such as
providing a textual representation of key data elements in the
certificate.
Subject: CN=Atlantis
Issuer: CN=Atlantis
Validity: from 7/9/2012 3:10:38 AM UTC to 7/9/2013 3:10:37 AM UTC
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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Figure 3: Certificate Example with Explanatory Text
4.3. File Extension
Although text encodings of PKIX structures can occur anywhere, many
tools are known to offer an option to encode PKIX structures in this
text encoding. To promote interoperability and to separate DER
encodings from text encodings, This Internet-Draft RECOMMENDS that
the extension ".crt" be used for this text encoding. Implementations
should be aware that in spite of this recommendation, many tools
still default to encode certificates in this text encoding with the
extension ".cer".
5. Text Encoding of PKIX CRLs
PKIX CRLs are encoded using the "X509 CRL" label. The encoded data
MUST be a DER encoded ASN.1 "CertificateList" structure as described
in Section 5 of [RFC5280].
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
Figure 4: CRL Example
Historically the label "CRL" has rarely been used. Today it is not
common and many popular tools do not understand the label.
Therefore, this document standardizes "X509 CRL" in order to promote
interoperability and backwards-compatibility. Generators conforming
to this document MUST generate "X509 CRL" labels and MUST NOT
generate "CRL" labels. Parsers are NOT RECOMMENDED to treat "CRL" as
equivalent to "X509 CRL".
6. Text Encoding of PKCS #10 Certification Request Syntax
PKCS #10 Certification Requests are encoded using the "CERTIFICATE
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REQUEST" label. The encoded data MUST be a DER encoded ASN.1
"CertificationRequest" structure as described in [RFC2986].
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
MIIBWDCCAQcCAQAwTjELMAkGA1UEBhMCU0UxJzAlBgNVBAoTHlNpbW9uIEpvc2Vm
c3NvbiBEYXRha29uc3VsdCBBQjEWMBQGA1UEAxMNam9zZWZzc29uLm9yZzBOMBAG
ByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAhAzoABLLPSkuXY0l66MbxVJ3Mot5FCFuqQfn6dTs+9/CM
EOlSwVej77tj56kj9R/j9Q+LfysX8FO9I5p3oGIwYAYJKoZIhvcNAQkOMVMwUTAY
BgNVHREEETAPgg1qb3NlZnNzb24ub3JnMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDwYDVR0PAQH/
BAUDAwegADAWBgNVHSUBAf8EDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgM/ADA8
AhxBvfhxPFfbBbsE1NoFmCUczOFApEuQVUw3ZP69AhwWXk3dgSUsKnuwL5g/ftAY
dEQc8B8jAcnuOrfU
-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
Figure 5: PKCS #10 Example
The label "NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST" is also in wide use. Generators
conforming to this document MUST generate "CERTIFICATE REQUEST"
labels. Parsers MAY treat "NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST" as equivalent to
"CERTIFICATE REQUEST".
7. Text Encoding of PKCS #7 Cryptographic Message Syntax
PKCS #7 Cryptographic Message Syntax structures are encoded using the
"PKCS7" label. The encoded data MUST[mustshould1] be a DER encoded
ASN.1 "ContentInfo" structure as described in [RFC2315].
-----BEGIN PKCS7-----
MIHjBgsqhkiG9w0BCRABF6CB0zCB0AIBADFho18CAQCgGwYJKoZIhvcNAQUMMA4E
CLfrI6dr0gUWAgITiDAjBgsqhkiG9w0BCRADCTAUBggqhkiG9w0DBwQIZpECRWtz
u5kEGDCjerXY8odQ7EEEromZJvAurk/j81IrozBSBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwMwYLKoZI
hvcNAQkQAw8wJDAUBggqhkiG9w0DBwQI0tCBcU09nxEwDAYIKwYBBQUIAQIFAIAQ
OsYGYUFdAH0RNc1p4VbKEAQUM2Xo8PMHBoYdqEcsbTodlCFAZH4=
-----END PKCS7-----
Figure 6: PKCS #7 Example
The label "CERTIFICATE CHAIN" has been in use to denote a
degenerative PKCS #7 structure that contains only a list of
certificates. Several modern tools do not support this label.
Generators MUST NOT generate the "CERTIFICATE CHAIN" label. Parsers
are NOT RECOMMENDED to treat "CERTIFICATE CHAIN" as equivalent to
"PKCS7".
PKCS #7 is an old standard that has long been superseded by CMS.
Implementations SHOULD NOT generate PKCS #7 when CMS is an
alternative.
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8. Text Encoding of Cryptographic Message Syntax
Cryptographic Message Syntax structures are encoded using the "CMS"
label. The encoded data MUST[mustshould2] be a DER encoded ASN.1
"ContentInfo" structure as described in [RFC5652].
-----BEGIN CMS-----
MIGDBgsqhkiG9w0BCRABCaB0MHICAQAwDQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAwgwXgYJKoZIhvcN
AQcBoFEET3icc87PK0nNK9ENqSxItVIoSa0o0S/ISczMs1ZIzkgsKk4tsQ0N1nUM
dvb05OXi5XLPLEtViMwvLVLwSE0sKlFIVHAqSk3MBkkBAJv0Fx0=
-----END CMS-----
Figure 7: CMS Example
CMS is the IETF successor to PKCS #7. Section 1.1.1 of RFC 5652
describes the changes since PKCS #7 v1.5. Implementations SHOULD
generate CMS when it is an alternative, promoting ineroperability and
forwards-compatibility.
9. Text Encoding of PKCS #8 Private Key Info, and One Asymmetric Key
The PrivateKeyInfo structure of PKCS #8 Private Key Information
Syntax, renamed to OneAsymmetricKey in [RFC5958], is encoded using
the "PRIVATE KEY" label. The encoded data SHOULD be a DER encoded
ASN.1 "PrivateKeyInfo" structure as described in PKCS #8, or the
"OneAsymmetricKey" structure as described in [RFC5958]. The two are
semantically identical, and can be distinguished by version number.
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIGEAgEAMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAKBG0wawIBAQQgVcB/UNPxalR9zDYAjQIf
jojUDiQuGnSJrFEEzZPT/92hRANCAASc7UJtgnF/abqWM60T3XNJEzBv5ez9TdwK
H0M6xpM2q+53wmsN/eYLdgtjgBd3DBmHtPilCkiFICXyaA8z9LkJ
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
Figure 8: PKCS #8 PrivateKeyInfo Example
10. Text Encoding of PKCS #8 Encrypted Private Key Info
The EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structure of PKCS #8 Private Key
Information Syntax, called the same in [RFC5958], is encoded using
the "ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY" label. The encoded data SHOULD be a DER
encoded ASN.1 "EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo" structure as described in
PKCS #8 and [RFC5958].
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-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----
MIHNMEAGCSqGSIb3DQEFDTAzMBsGCSqGSIb3DQEFDDAOBAghhICA6T/51QICCAAw
FAYIKoZIhvcNAwcECBCxDgvI59i9BIGIY3CAqlMNBgaSI5QiiWVNJ3IpfLnEiEsW
Z0JIoHyRmKK/+cr9QPLnzxImm0TR9s4JrG3CilzTWvb0jIvbG3hu0zyFPraoMkap
8eRzWsIvC5SVel+CSjoS2mVS87cyjlD+txrmrXOVYDE+eTgMLbrLmsWh3QkCTRtF
QC7k0NNzUHTV9yGDwfqMbw==
-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----
Figure 9: PKCS #8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo Example
11. Text Encoding of Attribute Certificates
Attribute certificates are encoded using the "ATTRIBUTE CERTIFICATE"
label. The encoded data MUST be a DER encoded ASN.1
"AttributeCertificate" structure as described in [RFC5755].
-----BEGIN ATTRIBUTE CERTIFICATE-----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-----END ATTRIBUTE CERTIFICATE-----
Figure 10: Attribute Certificate Example
12. Non-Conforming Examples
[DPncfex] This section contains examples for the non-recommended
label variants described earlier in this document. As discussed
earlier, supporting these are not required and sometimes discouraged.
Still, they can be useful for interoperability testing and for easy
reference.
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-----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE-----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-----END X509 CERTIFICATE-----
Figure 11: Non-standard 'X509' Certificate Example
-----BEGIN X.509 CERTIFICATE-----
MIICLDCCAdKgAwIBAgIBADAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjB9MQswCQYDVQQGEwJCRTEPMA0G
A1UEChMGR251VExTMSUwIwYDVQQLExxHbnVUTFMgY2VydGlmaWNhdGUgYXV0aG9y
aXR5MQ8wDQYDVQQIEwZMZXV2ZW4xJTAjBgNVBAMTHEdudVRMUyBjZXJ0aWZpY2F0
ZSBhdXRob3JpdHkwHhcNMTEwNTIzMjAzODIxWhcNMTIxMjIyMDc0MTUxWjB9MQsw
CQYDVQQGEwJCRTEPMA0GA1UEChMGR251VExTMSUwIwYDVQQLExxHbnVUTFMgY2Vy
dGlmaWNhdGUgYXV0aG9yaXR5MQ8wDQYDVQQIEwZMZXV2ZW4xJTAjBgNVBAMTHEdu
dVRMUyBjZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZSBhdXRob3JpdHkwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMB
BwNCAARS2I0jiuNn14Y2sSALCX3IybqiIJUvxUpj+oNfzngvj/Niyv2394BWnW4X
uQ4RTEiywK87WRcWMGgJB5kX/t2no0MwQTAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA8GA1Ud
DwEB/wQFAwMHBgAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFPC0gf6YEr+1KLlkQAPLzB9mTigDMAoGCCqG
SM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIDGuwD1KPyG+hRf88MeyMQcqOFZD0TbVleF+UsAGQ4enAiEA
l4wOuDwKQa+upc8GftXE2C//4mKANBC6It01gUaTIpo=
-----END X.509 CERTIFICATE-----
Figure 12: Non-standard 'X.509' Certificate Example
-----BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
MIIBWDCCAQcCAQAwTjELMAkGA1UEBhMCU0UxJzAlBgNVBAoTHlNpbW9uIEpvc2Vm
c3NvbiBEYXRha29uc3VsdCBBQjEWMBQGA1UEAxMNam9zZWZzc29uLm9yZzBOMBAG
ByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAhAzoABLLPSkuXY0l66MbxVJ3Mot5FCFuqQfn6dTs+9/CM
EOlSwVej77tj56kj9R/j9Q+LfysX8FO9I5p3oGIwYAYJKoZIhvcNAQkOMVMwUTAY
BgNVHREEETAPgg1qb3NlZnNzb24ub3JnMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwDwYDVR0PAQH/
BAUDAwegADAWBgNVHSUBAf8EDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgM/ADA8
AhxBvfhxPFfbBbsE1NoFmCUczOFApEuQVUw3ZP69AhwWXk3dgSUsKnuwL5g/ftAY
dEQc8B8jAcnuOrfU
-----END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
Figure 13: Non-standard 'NEW' PKCS #10 Example
Josefsson & Leonard Expires January 18, 2013 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft pkix-textual July 2012
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE CHAIN-----
MIHjBgsqhkiG9w0BCRABF6CB0zCB0AIBADFho18CAQCgGwYJKoZIhvcNAQUMMA4E
CLfrI6dr0gUWAgITiDAjBgsqhkiG9w0BCRADCTAUBggqhkiG9w0DBwQIZpECRWtz
u5kEGDCjerXY8odQ7EEEromZJvAurk/j81IrozBSBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwMwYLKoZI
hvcNAQkQAw8wJDAUBggqhkiG9w0DBwQI0tCBcU09nxEwDAYIKwYBBQUIAQIFAIAQ
OsYGYUFdAH0RNc1p4VbKEAQUM2Xo8PMHBoYdqEcsbTodlCFAZH4=
-----END CERTIFICATE CHAIN-----
Figure 14: Non-standard 'CERTIFICATE CHAIN' Example
13. Security Considerations
Data in this format often originates from untrusted sources, thus
parsers must be prepared to handle unexpected data without causing
security vulnerabilities.
Ambiguities are introduced by having more than one canonical encoding
of the same data. The first ambiguity is introduced by permitting
the text encoded representation instead of the binary DER encoding,
but further ambiguities arise when multiple labels are treated as
similar. Variations of whitespace and non-base64 alphabetic
characters can create further ambiguities. Implementations that rely
on canonical representation or the ability to fingerprint a
particular data format need to understand that this Internet-Draft
does not define canonical encodings. If canonical encodings are
desired, the encoded structure must be decoded and processed into a
canonical form (namely, DER encoding). Data encoding ambiguities
also create opportunities for side channels.
14. IANA Considerations
This document implies no IANA Considerations.
15. Acknowledgements
Peter Gutmann suggested to document labels for Attribute Certificates
and PKCS #7 messages, and to add examples for the non-standard
variants.
16. References
Josefsson & Leonard Expires January 18, 2013 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft pkix-textual July 2012
16.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2315] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax
Version 1.5", RFC 2315, March 1998.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
November 2000.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
[RFC5208] Kaliski, B., "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #8:
Private-Key Information Syntax Specification Version 1.2",
RFC 5208, May 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, September 2009.
[RFC5755] Farrell, S., Housley, R., and S. Turner, "An Internet
Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization",
RFC 5755, January 2010.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
August 2010.
[CCITT.X690.2002]
International International Telephone and Telegraph
Consultative Committee, "ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of basic encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
encoding rules (CER) and Distinguished encoding rules
(DER)", CCITT Recommendation X.690, July 2002.
16.2. Informative References
[RFC0934] Rose, M. and E. Stefferud, "Proposed standard for message
encapsulation", RFC 934, January 1985.
[RFC1421] Linn, J., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication
Josefsson & Leonard Expires January 18, 2013 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft pkix-textual July 2012
Procedures", RFC 1421, February 1993.
[RFC2015] Elkins, M., "MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy
(PGP)", RFC 2015, October 1996.
[X509SG] Gutmann, P., "X.509 Style Guide", WWW http://
www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/x509guide.txt,
October 2000.
Editorial Comments
[DP1] S.L.: Non-alphabetic characters is too broad.
Characters such as "+", "/", and "=" are valid base64;
characters such as "-" and "_" are alternate base64
characters but are not used in this specification. In
any event, any non-whitespace characters will cause
existing implementations to fail.
[DPncfex] S.L.: The utility of this section is questionable. We
can shorten up the RFC by removing this section.
[mustshould1] S.L.: SHOULD?
[mustshould2] S.L.: SHOULD?
Authors' Addresses
Simon Josefsson
SJD AB
Johan Olof Wallins Vaeg 13
Solna 171 64
SE
Email: simon@josefsson.org
URI: http://josefsson.org/
Sean Leonard
Penango, Inc.
1215 K Street
17th Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814
USA
Email: dev+ietf@seantek.com
URI: http://www.penango.com/
Josefsson & Leonard Expires January 18, 2013 [Page 14]
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