One document matched: draft-jeong-i2nsf-sdn-security-services-03.txt
Differences from draft-jeong-i2nsf-sdn-security-services-02.txt
Network Working Group J. Jeong
Internet-Draft H. Kim
Intended status: Standards Track Sungkyunkwan University
Expires: April 11, 2016 J. Park
ETRI
October 9, 2015
Software-Defined Networking Based Security Services using Interface to
Network Security Functions
draft-jeong-i2nsf-sdn-security-services-03
Abstract
This document describes a framework, objectives, requirements, and
use cases for security services based on Software-Defined Networking
(SDN) using a common Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF).
It first proposes the framework of SDN-based security services in the
I2NSF framework. It then explains two use cases, such as centralized
firewall system and centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 11, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System . . . . . . . . 9
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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1. Introduction
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is a set of techniques that enables
users to directly program, orchestrate, control and manage network
resources through software (e.g., SDN applications). It relocates
the control of network resources to a dedicated network element,
namely SDN controller. The SDN controller uses interfaces to
arbitrate the control of network resources in a logically centralized
manner. It also manages and configures the distributed network
resources, and provides the abstracted view of the network resources
to the SDN applications. The SDN applications can customize and
automate the operations (including management) of the abstracted
network resources in a programmable manner via the interfaces
[RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-SDN-Architecture][ONF-OpenFlow].
Due to the increase of sophisticated network attacks, the legacy
security services become difficult to cope with such network attacks
in an autonomous manner. SDN has been introduced to make networks
more controllable and manageable, and this SDN technology will be
promising to autonomously deal with such network attacks in a prompt
manner.
This document describes a framework, objectives and requirements to
support the protection of network resources through SDN-based
security services using a common interface to Network Security
Functions (NSF) [i2nsf-framework]. It uses an interface to NSF
(I2NSF) for such SDN-based security services that are performed in
virtual machines through network functions virtualization [ETSI-NFV].
This document addresses the challenges of the exisiting systems for
security services. As feasible solutions to handle these challenges,
this document proposes two use cases of the security services, such
as centralized firewall system and centralized DDoS-attack mitigation
system.
For the centralized firewall system, this document raises limitations
in legacy firewalls in terms of flexibility and administration costs.
Since in many cases, access control management for firewall is
manually performed, it is difficult to add the access control policy
rules corresponding to new network attacks in a prompt and autonomous
manner. Thus, this situation requires expensive administration
costs. This document introduces a use case of SDN-based firewall
system to overcome these limitations.
For the centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system, this document
raises limitations in legacy DDoS-attack mitigation techniques in
terms of flexibility and administration costs. Since in many cases,
network configuration for the mitigation is manually performed, it is
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difficult to dynamically configure network devices to limit and
control suspicious network traffic for DDoS attacks. This document
introduces a use case of SDN-based DDoS-attack mitigation system to
provide an autonomous and prompt configuration for suspicious network
traffic.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Terminology
This document uses the terminology described in [RFC7149],
[ITU-T.Y.3300], [ONF-SDN-Architecture], [ONF-OpenFlow],
[ITU-T.X.1252], and [ITU-T.X.800]. In addition, the following terms
are defined below:
o Software-Defined Networking: A set of techniques that enables to
directly program, orchestrate, control, and manage network
resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and operation of
network services in a dynamic and scalable manner [ITU-T.Y.3300].
o Access Control: A procedure used to determine if an entity should
be granted access to resources, facilities, services, or
information based on pre-established rules and specific rights or
authority associated with the requesting party [ITU-T.X.1252].
o Access Control Policy: The set of rules that define the conditions
under which access may take place [ITU-T.X.800].
o Access Control Policy Rules: Security policy rules concerning the
provision of the access control service [ITU-T.X.800].
o Network Resources: Network devices that can perform packet
forwarding in a network system. The network resources include
network switch, router, gateway, WiFi access points, and similar
devices.
o Firewall: A firewall that is a device or service at the junction
of two network segments that inspects every packet that attempts
to cross the boundary. It also rejects any packet that does not
satisfy certain criteria for disallowed port numbers or IP
addresses.
o Centralized Firewall System: A centralized firewall that can
establish and distribute access control policy rules into network
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resources for efficient firewall management. These rules can be
managed dynamically by a centralized server for firewall. SDN can
work as a network-based firewall system through a standard
interface between firewall applications and network resources.
o Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System: A centralized mitigator
that can establish and distribute access control policy rules into
network resources for efficient DDoS-attack mitigation. These
rules can be managed dynamically by a centralized server for DDoS-
attack mitigation. SDN can work as a network-based mitigation
system through a standard interface between DDoS-attack mitigation
applications and network resources.
4. Overview
This section describes the referenced architecture to support SDN-
based security services, such as centralized firewall system and
centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system. Also, it describes a
framework for SDN-based security services using I2NSF.
|
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Security Functions |
| | (e.g., firewall, DDoS-attack mitigation, | Application
| | web filter, deep packet inspection) | Layer
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|------------------------------------------------------------
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ (Application-
| | Application Support | Control Interface)
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Orchestration | SDN Controller
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Layer
| | Abstraction |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|-------------------------------------------------------------
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ (Resource-
| | Control Support | Control Interface)
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Data Transport and Processing | Resource Layer
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Figure 1: High-level Architecture for SDN-based Security Services
As shown in Figure 1, security functions as security services (e.g.,
firewall, DDoS-attack mitigation, web filter, deep packet inspection)
run on the top of SDN controller [ITU-T.Y.3300]
[ONF-SDN-Architecture]. When an administrator enforces security
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policies for such security services through an application interface,
SDN controller generates the corresponding access control policy
rules to meet such security policies in an autonomous and prompt
manner. According to the generated access control policy rules, the
network resources such as switches take an action to mitigate network
attacks, for example, dropping packets with suspicious patterns.
+------------+
|Client/AppGW|
+------------+
|
| Service Layer Interface
|
+-------------------+ +-------------+
|Security Controller|<------------------------->|Vendor System|
+-------------------+ Vendor Facing Interface +-------------+
|
| Capability Layer Interface
|
+-------------------+ +-------------------+ +-------------------+
|Security Function 1|-|Security Function 2|....|Security Function n|
+-------------------+ +-------------------+ +-------------------+
|
| SDN Northbound Interface
|
+-----------------+
|Switch Controller|
+-----------------+
|
| SDN Southbound Interface
|
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+
|Switch 1|-|Switch 2|......|Switch m|
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+
Figure 2: A Framework for SDN-based Security Services using I2NSF
Figure 2 shows a framework to support SDN-based security services
using I2NSF [i2nsf-framework]. As shown in Figure 2, client and
application gateway (AppGW) can use security services by delivering
their high-level security policies to security controller via service
layer interface. Security controller asks security function(s)
function-level security services via capability layer interface. The
security functions run on top of virtual machines through NFV
[ETSI-NFV]. Securiy functions asks switch controller to perform
their required security services on switches under the supervision of
switch controller.
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Capability layer interface between security controller and security
functions can be implemented by Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF) [RFC6241] with a data modeling language called YANG
[RFC6020] that describes function-level security services.
5. Objectives
o Prompt reaction to new network attacks: SDN-based security
services allow private networks to defend themselves against new
sophisticated network attacks.
o Automatic defense from network attacks: SDN-based security
services identify the category of network attack (e.g., malware
and DDoS attacks) and take counteraction for the defense without
the intervention of network administrators.
o Network-load-aware resource allocation: SDN-based security
services measure the overhead of resources for security services
and dynamically select resources considering load balance for the
maximum network performance.
6. Requirements
SDN-based security services provide dynamic and flexible network
resource management to mitigate network attacks, such as malware and
DDoS attacks. In order to support this capability, the requirements
for SDN-based security services are described as follows:
o SDN-based security services are required to support the
programmability of network resources to mitigate network attacks.
o SDN-based security services are required to support the
orchestration of network resources and SDN applications to
mitigate network attacks.
o SDN-based security services are required to provide an application
interface allowing the management of access control policies in an
autonomous and prompt manner.
o SDN-based security services are required to provide a resource-
control interface for the control of network resources to mitigate
network attacks.
o SDN-based security services are required to provide the logically
centralized control of network resources to mitigate network
attacks.
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7. Use Cases
This section introduces two use cases for security services based on
SDN: (i) centralized firewall system and (ii) centralized DDoS-attack
mitigation system.
7.1. Centralized Firewall System
For the centralized firewall system, a centralized network firewall
can manage each network resource and firewall rules can be managed
flexibly by a centralized server for firewall (called Firewall). The
centralized network firewall controls each switch for the network
resource management and the firewall rules can be added or deleted
dynamically.
The procedure of firewall operations in the centralized firewall
system is as follows:
1. Switch forwards an unknown flow's packet to SDN Controller.
2. SDN Controller forwards the unknown flow's packet to an
appropriate security service application, such as Firewall.
3. Firewall analyzes the headers and contents of the packet.
4. If Firewall regards the packet as a malware's packet with a
suspicious pattern, it reports the malware's packet to SDN
Controller.
5. SDN Controller installs new rules (e.g., drop packets with the
suspicious pattern) into switches.
6. The malware's packets are dropped by switches.
For the above centralized firewall system, the existing SDN protocols
can be used through standard interfaces between the firewall
application and switches [RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300]
[ONF-SDN-Architecture][ONF-OpenFlow].
Legacy firewalls have some challenges such as the expensive cost,
performance, management of access control, establishment of policy,
and packet-based access mechanism. The proposed framework can
resolve these challenges through the above centralized firewall
system based on SDN as follows.
o Cost: The cost of adding firewalls to network resources such as
routers, gateways, and switches is substantial due to the reason
that we need to add firewall on each network resource. To solve
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this, each network resource can be managed centrally such that a
single firewall is manipulated by a centralized server.
o Performance: The performance of firewalls is often slower than the
link speed of network interfaces. Every network resource for
firewall needs to check firewall rules according to network
conditions. Firewalls can be adaptively deployed among network
switches, depending on network conditions in the framework.
o The management of access control: Since there may be hundreds of
network resources in an administered network, the dynamic
management of access control for security services like firewall
is a challenge. In the framework, firewall rules can be
dynamically added for new malware.
o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows
are permitted or denied for firewall within a specific
organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view
is helpful to determine security policies for such a network.
o Packet-based access mechanism: Packet-based access mechanism is
not enough for firewall in practice since the basic unit of access
control is usually users or applications. Therefore, application
level rules can be defined and added to the firewall system
through the centralized server.
7.2. Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System
For the centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system, a centralized
DDoS-attack mitigation can manage each network resource and
manipulate rules to each switch through a centralized server for
DDoS-attack mitigation (called DDoS-attack Mitigator). The
centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system defends servers against
DDoS attacks outside private network, that is, from public network.
Servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS servers)
and stateful servers (e.g., web servers). For DDoS-attack
mitigation, traffic flows in switches are dynamically configured by
traffic flow forwarding path management according to the category of
servers [AVANT-GUARD]. Such a managenent should consider the load
balance among the switches for the defense against DDoS attacks.
The procedure of DDoS-attack mitigation operations in the centralized
DDoS-attack mitigation system is as follows:
1. Switch periodically reports an inter-arrival pattern of a flow's
packets to SDN Controller.
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2. SDN Controller forwards the flow's inter-arrival pattern to an
appropriate security service application, such as DDoS-attack
Mitigator.
3. DDoS-attack Mitigator analyzes the reported pattern for the flow.
4. If DDoS-attack Mitigator regards the pattern as a DDoS attack, it
computes a packet dropping probability corresponding to
suspiciousness level and reports this DDoS-attack flow to SDN
Controller.
5. SDN Controller installs new rules into switches (e.g., forward
packets with the suspicious inter-arrival pattern with a dropping
probability).
6. The suspicious flow's packets are randomly dropped by switches
with the dropping probability.
For the above centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system, the existing
SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces between the
DDoS-attack mitigator application and switches [RFC7149]
[ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-SDN-Architecture][ONF-OpenFlow].
The centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system has challenges similar
to the centralized firewall system. The proposed framework can
resolve these challenges through the above centralized DDoS-attack
mitigation system based on SDN as follows.
o Cost: The cost of adding DDoS-attack mitigators to network
resources such as routers, gateways, and switches is substantial
due to the reason that we need to add DDoS-attack mitigator on
each network resource. To solve this, each network resource can
be managed centrally such that a single DDoS-attack mitigator is
manipulated by a centralized server.
o Performance: The performance of DDoS-attack mitigators is often
slower than the link speed of network interfaces. The checking of
DDoS attacks may reduce the performance of the network interfaces.
DDoS-attack mitigators can be adaptively deployed among network
switches, depending on network conditions in the framework.
o The management of network resources: Since there may be hundreds
of network resources in an administered network, the dynamic
management of network resources for performance (e.g., load
balancing) is a challenge for DDoS-attack mitigation. In the
framework, as dynamic network resource management, traffic flow
forwarding path management can handle the load balancing of
network switches [AVANT-GUARD]. With this management, the current
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and near-future workload can be spread among the network switches
for DDoS-attack mitigation. In addition, DDoS-attack mitigation
rules can be dynamically added for new DDoS attacks.
o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows
are permitted or denied for new DDoS-attacks (e.g., DNS reflection
attack) within a specific organization network under management.
Thus, a centralized view is helpful to determine security policies
for such a network.
8. Security Considerations
This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are
specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300].
9. Acknowledgements
This work was partly supported by the ICT R&D program of MSIP/IITP
[10041244, SmartTV 2.0 Software Platform] and ETRI.
This document has greatly benefited from inputs by Jinyong Kim, Mahdi
Daghmehchir-Firoozjaei, and Geumhwan Cho.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to
Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
RFC 2119, March 1997.
[i2nsf-framework] Lopez, E., Lopez, D., Dunbar, L., Zhuang, X.,
Parrott, J., Krishnan, R., and S. Durbha,
"Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions", draft-merged-i2nsf-framework-02 ,
June 2015.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC7149] Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-
Defined Networking: A Perspective from within
a Service Provider Environment", RFC 7149,
March 2014.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J.,
and A. Bierman, "Network Configuration
Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, June 2011.
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[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling
Language for the Network Configuration
Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, October 2010.
[ITU-T.Y.3300] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300, "Framework of
Software-Defined Networking", June 2014.
[ONF-SDN-Architecture] ONF, "SDN Architecture", June 2014.
[ONF-OpenFlow] ONF, "OpenFlow Switch Specification (Version
1.4.0)", October 2013.
[ITU-T.X.1252] Recommendation ITU-T X.1252, "Baseline
Identity Management Terms and Definitions",
April 2010.
[ITU-T.X.800] Recommendation ITU-T X.800, "Security
Architecture for Open Systems Interconnection
for CCITT Applications", March 1991.
[AVANT-GUARD] Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., and G.
Gu, "AVANT-GUARD: Scalable and Vigilant
Switch Flow Management in Software-Defined
Networks", ACM CCS, November 2013.
[ETSI-NFV] ETSI GS NFV 002 V1.1.1, "Network Functions
Virtualisation (NFV); Architectural
Framework", October 2013.
Authors' Addresses
Jaehoon Paul Jeong
Department of Software
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 440-746
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4957
Fax: +82 31 290 7996
EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu
URI: http://cpslab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
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Hyoungshick Kim
Department of Software
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 440-746
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4324
Fax: +82 31 290 7996
EMail: hyoung@skku.edu
URI: http://seclab.skku.edu/people/hyoungshick-kim/
Jung-Soo Park
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute
218 Gajeong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
Daejeon, 305-700
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 42 860 6514
EMail: pjs@etri.re.kr
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