One document matched: draft-jennings-behave-rtcweb-firewall-01.txt
Differences from draft-jennings-behave-rtcweb-firewall-00.txt
rtcweb P. Patel
Internet-Draft C. Jennings
Intended status: Informational S. Nandakumar
Expires: January 21, 2016 J. Rosenberg
D. Wing
Cisco
July 20, 2015
Firewall Traversal for WebRTC
draft-jennings-behave-rtcweb-firewall-01
Abstract
Traversal of RTP through corporate firewalls has traditionally been
complex, requiring the deployment of Session Border Controllers
(SBCs) or wide open pinholes. This draft proposes a simple technique
that allows WebRTC based RTP traffic to traverse firewalls without
complex firewall configuration and without deployment of SBCs or
other middleboxes.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 21, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Firewall Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Recognizing STUN packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Policy decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Creating the pinhole rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. Tracking media vs data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. WebRTC Browsers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Blocking Media Hiding in HTTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Deployment Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. WebRTC Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Firewall Admins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Design Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Why not just use TCP? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Security Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. Alternate Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.1. Firewall Auth Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.2. Any Cast Whitelist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Problem Statement
WebRTC [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview] based voice and video
communications systems are becoming far more common inside
enterprises, which often need voice and video media to traverse the
enterprise firewall. This can happen when a device inside the
firewall such as a web browser or phone is exchanging media with a
conference bridge or gateway outside the firewall, or it can happen
when a device inside the firewall is talking to a device in another
enterprise or behind a different firewall.
This problem is not unique to WebRTC media of course. It is common
practice for enterprise administrators to block outbound UDP through
the corporate firewall. This is done for several reasons:
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1. The lack of any kind of return messages means that there is no
way to know that the recipient of the UDP traffic really wants
it. Infected computers within the enterprise could utilize UDP
as the source of a DDoS attack. If the firewall permitted such
outbound traffic, the enterprise could in effect be a
contributing source to such an attack. By blocking UDP, the
enterprise IT admin ensures that this cannot happen - at least
not to external targets.
2. There have been prior attacks that have utilized UDP as a command
and control channel for orchestrating DDoS attacks. At the time,
UDP had little usage within enterprises (most VoIP was internal
to the enterprise when it existed at all). Consequently, infosec
departments have deemed it safer to block UDP outright in order
to prevent such further incidents.
3. Many IT administrators enable various packet inspection
operations on traffic flowing through the firewall. High volume
UDP traffic - such as voice or video - can be costly to inspect.
As such, in cases where there is a need for traversal of such
traffic, IT has preferred to deploy an SBC that, in essence,
verifies that the traffic is VoIP and authorizes its egress. The
IT administrator then enables traffic to/from the SBC through the
firewall. In other words, VoIP authorization is delegated to an
outsourced SBC.
As more and more IP communications services move to the cloud, there
is an increased need for VoIP traffic to traverse the enterprise
firewall. At the same time, the entire point of a cloud service is
that it does not require the deployment of on premises
infrastructure, making SBC-based solutions less desirable. An
alternative solution that has been historically used is to enable
outbound UDP in the firewall to specific IP addresses, corresponding
to the external service (TURN servers or conference servers) that the
enterprise wishes to authorize. With more applications running on
virtual machines within cloud compute platforms like Amazon EC2, IP
addresses are decreasingly usable as identifiers for a service. VMs
running TURN servers or conferencing servers may be established and
torn down by the day, hour or even minute, with continuously changing
IP addresses. Given the multitenant nature of such providers, IT
departments are unwilling to whitelist the IP addresses for the
entire block used by such providers.
Consequently, there is a growing need for solutions that allow VoIP
traversal through the corporate firewall that alleviate the concerns
above. This issue is further exacerbated by the growing adoption of
WebRTC by enterprise applications, which provide a ready source of
RTP traffic which often needs to traverse the firewall.
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2. Solution Requirements
We believe the solution must meet the following requirements:
REQ-1: The solution must enable traversal of real-time media without
requiring deployment of additional media intermediaries on premise
(e.g., no SBC required)
REQ-2: The solution must not require the whitelisting of specific
external IP addresses
REQ-3: The solution must enable the enterprise to be sure that the
receiving party of the traffic desires the traffic
REQ-4: The solution must work with P2P calls between users in
different enterprises without requiring a TURN server
REQ-5: The solution must work with cloud services external to the
enterprise which terminate media on servers, such as conference
servers, voicemail servers, and so on.
REQ-6: The solution must not require decryption of either signaling
or media traffic at the firewall or at any other intermediary
REQ-7: The solution must allow the IT department to easily make
policy decisions about which applications are allowed, or not
allowed, to traverse the firewall
REQ-8: The solution must not require inspection of every single UDP
packet that traverses the firewall
REQ-9: The solution must provide a minimum level of proof that the
traffic is WebRTC media or data and not something else
REQ-10: The solution must work with WebRTC traffic. Note that
solving this for non-WebRTC is a non-requirement.
3. Solution Overview
Many of the reasons for blocking UDP at the corporate firewall have
their origins in the lack of a three-way handshake for UDP traffic.
TCP's three-way handshake ensures that the receiving party of the
connection desires the traffic. Similarly, HTTP traffic easily
traverses the firewall since it provides application identification
information in the URL.
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Consequently, the solution proposed here relies on the ICE
connectivity checks, which provide a similar handshake and ensure
consent of the remote party.
The firewall looks for an outbound ICE connectivity check and allows
inbound ICE connectivity checks that are going to the same location
that cared the outbound and that have the correct random ufrag value
that was created by the client inside the firewall. After a
successful ICE connectivity check, the firewall allows other media to
flow on the same 5 tuple that had the successful ICE connectivity
check. Timers are used to removed the various pinholes created.
In addition, the initial outbound STUN packets can contain the STUN
ORIGIN field which the firewall can use to make an authorization
decision on the application.
The end result is a system where:
o STUN packets are only allowed "in" if they know the crypto random
username generated by a client inside the firewall
o Non STUN packets are only allowed "in" if they match a 5 tuple
that a client inside the firewall sent a packet too
o Non STUN packets are only allowed "out" if the destination they
are sending to did a stun consent handshake
4. Firewall Processing
The firewall processing is broken into three stages: recognizing STUN
packets, making a policy decision as to whether each STUN packet
should trigger a pinhole to be created, and managing the lifetime of
any pinholes that are created.
The term 3-tuple is used to refer to IP address, protocol (which is
always UPD), and port that the firewall sees as the address of the
client inside the firewall.
The term 4-tuple is used to refer to 3-tuple plus the ice ufrag that
was send in the STUN request message for the client inside the
firewall.
The term 5-tuple is used to refer to the 3-tuple plus the IP address
and port of the device outside the firewall.
When matching a ufrag, if it is a STUN request that came from outside
the firewall, the two halves of the username on either side of the
":" need to be swapped before matching.
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4.1. Recognizing STUN packets
STUN messages all have a magic cookie value of 0x2112A442 in the 4th
to 8th byte. This can be used to quickly filter nearly all UDP
packets that are not STUN packets. Many firewalls are capable of
doing this in hardware. STUN supports an optional FINGERPRINT
attribute that provides a 32 bit CRC over the message.
Option A: Firewalls SHOULD look at outbound UDP packets and if they
have the correct magic cookie they can classify them as STUN packets.
Option B: The firewall looks for any outgoing STUN requests to the
STUN port (3478). When it finds one, it stores the 3 tuple of the
source address port and protocol=UDP and for the next 30 seconds
checks any packets from this 3 tuple to see if they are ICE
connectivity checks.
Open Issue: * decide between option A and B. A requires looking at
all UDP packets but will likely work better than B. Most firewalls
look at all TCP packets so probably bot a big deal.
Firewalls that desire fewer false positives MAY also check that the
FINGERPRINT attribute is correct. Open Issue: MAY, MUST, MUST NOT -
what do we want here. If we put MAY or MUST, then browsers MUST
include this. If browsers are not required to provide this then I
think we are more in the MUST not category.
4.2. Policy decision
Once the firewall has received a STUN packet from inside the
firewall, it needs to decide if the packet is acceptable. For most
situations the firewall SHOULD accept all outbound STUN packets.
This is similar to allowing all outbound TCP flows. Some firewalls
may choose to look at other factors including the outside UDP port
and the ORIGIN attribute in the STUN packet.
In general WebRTC media can be sent on a wide range of UDP ports but
the two ports that are commonly used are the the RTP port (5004) and
TURN port (3478). Some firewalls MAY choose to only allow flows
where the destination port on the outside of the firewall is one of
these.
The STUN ORIGIN attribute [I-D.ietf-tram-stun-origin] carries the
origin of the web page that caused the various STUN requests. So for
example, if a browser was on a page such as example.com and that page
used the WebRTC calls to set up a connection, the STUN request's
ORIGIN attribute would include example.com. This allows the firewall
to see the web application (in this case, example.com) that is
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requesting the pinhole be opened. The firewall MAY have a white list
or black list for domains in STUN ORIGIN.
4.3. Creating the pinhole rules
Once a STUN packet is accepted, the firewall MUST create a temporary
rule that causes the firewall to allow any inbound or outbound ICE
messages on this 4-tuple. This pinhole MUST to be valid for at least
5 seconds from the time of creation.
The firewall keeps track of the STUN transaction ID for all STUN
requests messages that traverse the 4 tuple along with the 5 tuple
they were sent on and direction (inbound or outbound). If the
firewall sees a STUN Success binding responses, with the same
transaction ID, and on the same 5 tuple but in the opposite direction
as the STUN request, then a valid ICE connectivity check has happened
and the firewall MUST create a pinhole for this 5 tuple that allows
any UDP traffic to flow across that 5 tuple. This pinhole MUST to be
valid for at least 30 seconds from the time of creation.
The firewall continues watching ICE connectivity checks across this
5-tuple as described in the previous paragraph and anytime the a
valid ICE connectivity check happens, this effectively extends the
lifetime of the pinhole by 30 seconds. The procedures in
[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness] will ensure that an ICE
connectivity check is done more often than every 30 seconds.
4.4. Tracking media vs data
WebRTC can send audio and video as well as carry a data channel.
Confidential data could leave an enterprise by a video camera being
pointed at a document, but IT departments are often more concerned
about the data channel. It is easy for the firewall to separately
track the amount of RTP media and non-media data for each WebRTC
flow. If the first byte of the UDP message is 23, it is non-media
data; if it is in the range 127 to 192 it is audio or video data.
More information about this can be found in
[I-D.ietf-avtcore-rfc5764-mux-fixes]. Network management systems on
the firewall can track these two separately which can help identify
unusual usage.
5. WebRTC Browsers
Open Issue: how much randomness for ICE ufrag
o ICE mandates at least 24 bits of randomness but we could require
the browsers produce 64 bits of randomness
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This specification would require browsers to include the FINGERPRINT
and ORIGIN attributes in STUN for this to work correctly.
Open Issue: Does adding the ORIGIN reduce user privacy?
o Consider the following case. The user goes to
https://facebook.com and initiates a call with another Facebook
user. The domain facebook.com will appear (unencrypted) in the
STUN packets sent from the browser to Facebook's TURN server.
Anyone along the network path could tell that the user is using
Facebook's TURN server. However, when the original TLS connection
for the HTTP was made, the Server Name Indication (SNI) in the TLS
of the HTTPS connection also revealed facebook.com, largely for
the same reasons - so that the firewall would be able to see which
applications are using the network.
6. Blocking Media Hiding in HTTP
The IETF is designing systems to send interactive audio and video
such that it looks like HTTPS and HTTP to the proxies and firewalls.
The reasons for doing this is that sometimes the proxies and
firewalls allow this to work when the mechanisms and channels
designed for sending audio and video data have been explicitly
disabled by the firewall administrators. Many firewall
administrators feel this circumvents the policy they are trying to
enforce and desire a way to prevent this. Any scheme for preventing
this has some risk of impacting normal HTTP traffic, so there is a
desire to provide guidance around ways to do that in this draft.
Any HTTP or HTTPS connection that sends more than 10 requests per
second for longer than 10 seconds should be paused for 1 second, and
any HTTP/S requests from that client's IP address in the 1 second
pause time should be buffered or simply dropped. This strategy
ensures there is no impact to clients other than the one exceeding
the rate limit and minimizes the impact to other applications on the
device while still reducing the incentive to try and run calls this
way.
7. Deployment Advice
7.1. WebRTC Servers
WebRTC media servers and TURN servers with public IP address(es) that
can receive incoming packets from anywhere on the Internet are
suggested to listen for UDP on ports 53 (DNS), 123 (NTP), and 5004
for RTP media servers and 3478 for TURN servers. UDP destined for
port 53 or 123 if often allowed by firewalls that otherwise block
UDP.
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7.2. Firewall Admins
Often the approach has been to lock down everything, so that all UDP
is blocked. This simply causes applications to do things like embed
the data in normal looking HTTP or HTTPS requests. Malware and
viruses use similar approaches. Just turning off all UDP results in
a poor user experience some of the time, which results in users
moving to applications and devices outside the firewall. The IT
department loses the visibility into what is going on and can no
longer protect its users when their computers become compromised.
Allowing things that users want to use to work and monitoring them to
detect when things have gone wrong is very valuable.
8. Design Consideration
8.1. Why not just use TCP?
TODO
9. Security Concerns
Enterprises have a range of concerns around WebRTC traffic traversal
of the firewall. The major concerns that are raised include:
1. Unlike TCP, UDP does not have a connection where a device inside
the firewall has confirmed that it wants to talk to the thing
outside.
2. Incoming UDP pinholes allow out of band packets to be spoofed
into connecting as there is no equivalent of a TCP sequence
number to check.
3. UDP has been used by malware command and control protocols so we
block it.
4. We do not want enable ways for data to be exfiltrated outside the
firewall with no monitoring.
5. An encrypted data channel in WebRTC can be used to bring malware
into the company.
6. An encrypted media or data channel in WebRTC can be used as a
command and control channel for malware inside the firewall.
7. An encrypted data channel in WebRTC can be used by an outside
attacker to exfiltrate private files from inside the firewall.
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10. Alternate Approaches
10.1. Firewall Auth Tokens
[I-D.reddy-rtcweb-stun-auth-fw-traversal] attempts to solve a similar
problem by proposing a new comprehension-optional FW-FLOWDATA STUN
attribute as part of ICE Connectivity checks enabling the firewall to
permit outgoing UDP flows across the firewall. FW-FLOWDATA STUN
provides necessary information, such as lifetime, and candidate
information, enabling a firewall to apply the required policy rules.
However, [I-D.reddy-rtcweb-stun-auth-fw-traversal] requires
establishing shared keys across the firewall(s) and the WebRTC server
for successfully verifying the authenticity of the FW-FLOWDATA
information. In summary, we believe
[I-D.reddy-rtcweb-stun-auth-fw-traversal] to have following short-
comings
1. Requiring a tight coupling between the application server (WebRTC
server) and firewall(s)
2. Requiring additional efforts for Firewall Admins within an
enterprise to distribute and maintain the shared authentication
keys needed to generate authentication tags for the FW-FLOWDATA
attribute.
3. [I-D.reddy-rtcweb-stun-auth-fw-traversal] doesn't apply for
distributing keys across firewalls in different administrative
domains.
10.2. Any Cast Whitelist
Deploying media or TURN servers on a single any-cast IP address also
makes it easier for firewall administrators to whitelist the address.
Concerns have been raised that two packets sent from the same host to
a given any-cast address may get delivered to different servers.
This is certainly possible in theory but in practice it does not seem
be happen in limited experiments done so far.
11. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Shaun Cooley and Alissa Cooper.
12. References
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12.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-avtcore-rfc5764-mux-fixes]
Petit-Huguenin, M. and G. Salgueiro, "Multiplexing Scheme
Updates for Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)
Extension for Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)",
draft-ietf-avtcore-rfc5764-mux-fixes-02 (work in
progress), March 2015.
[I-D.ietf-tram-stun-origin]
Johnston, A., Uberti, J., Yoakum, J., and K. Singh, "An
Origin Attribute for the STUN Protocol", draft-ietf-tram-
stun-origin-05 (work in progress), February 2015.
12.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview]
Alvestrand, H., "Overview: Real Time Protocols for
Browser-based Applications", draft-ietf-rtcweb-overview-14
(work in progress), June 2015.
[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-stun-consent-freshness]
Perumal, M., Wing, D., R, R., Reddy, T., and M. Thomson,
"STUN Usage for Consent Freshness", draft-ietf-rtcweb-
stun-consent-freshness-15 (work in progress), June 2015.
[I-D.reddy-rtcweb-stun-auth-fw-traversal]
Reddy, T., Perumal, M., and D. Wing, "STUN Extensions for
Authenticated Firewall Traversal", draft-reddy-rtcweb-
stun-auth-fw-traversal-00 (work in progress), July 2012.
Authors' Addresses
Pradeep Patel
Cisco
Email: pradpate@cisco.com
Cullen Jennings
Cisco
Email: fluffy@iii.ca
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Suhas Nandakumar
Cisco
Email: snandaku@cisco.com
Jonathan Rosenberg
Cisco
Email: jdrosen@cisco.com
Dan Wing
Cisco
Email: dwing@cisco.com
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