One document matched: draft-ietf-xmpp-e2e-requirements-01.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-xmpp-e2e-requirements-00.txt
XMPP P. Saint-Andre, Ed.
Internet-Draft Cisco
Intended status: Informational March 8, 2010
Expires: September 9, 2010
Requirements for End-to-End Encryption in the Extensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol (XMPP)
draft-ietf-xmpp-e2e-requirements-01
Abstract
This document describes requirements for end-to-end encryption in the
Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP).
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2010.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
Saint-Andre Expires September 9, 2010 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft XMPP E2E Requirements March 2010
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Application Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Saint-Andre Expires September 9, 2010 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft XMPP E2E Requirements March 2010
1. Introduction
End-to-end or "e2e" encryption of traffic sent over the Extensible
Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is a desirable goal. Since
1999, the Jabber/XMPP developer community has experimented with
several such technologies, including OpenPGP [XMPP-PGP], S/MIME
[XMPP-SMIME], and encrypted sessions [XMPP-SESS]. More recently, the
community has explored the possibility of using Transport Layer
Security [TLS] as the base technology for e2e encryption. In order
to provide a foundation for deciding on a sustainable approach to e2e
encryption, this document specifies a set of requirements that the
ideal technology would meet.
The preferred venue for discussion of this document is the
xmpp@ietf.org mailing list; visit
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/xmpp> for further information.
2. Scope
There are several different forms of communication between XMPP
entitites:
1. One-to-one communication sessions between two entities, where
each entity is online and available during the life of the
session so that all of the communications occur in real time.
2. One-to-one messages that are not transferred in real time but
that instead are stored when sent and then forwarded when the
recipient is next online; these are usually called "offline
messages" as described in [OFFLINE].
3. One-to-many information broadcast, such as undirected presence
stanzas sent from one user to many contacts as described in
[XMPP-IM] and data syndication as described in [PubSub].
4. Many-to-many communication sessions among more than two entities,
such as a text conference in a chatroom as described in [MUC].
Ideally, any technology for end-to-end encryption in XMPP could be
extended to cover all of the foregoing communication methods.
However, both one-to-many broadcast and many-to-many sessions are
deemed out-of-scope for this document, and this document puts more
weight on one-to-one communication sessions (the typical scenario for
XMPP) than on offline messages.
3. Threat Analysis
XMPP technologies are typically deployed using a client-server
architecture. As a result, XMPP endpoints (often but not always
Saint-Andre Expires September 9, 2010 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft XMPP E2E Requirements March 2010
controlled by human users) need to communicate through one or more
servers. For example, the user juliet@capulet.lit connects to the
capulet.lit server and the user romeo@montague.lit connects to the
montague.lit server, but in order for Juliet to send a message to
Romeo the message will be routed over her client-to-server connection
with capulet.lit, over a server-to-server connection between
capulet.lit and montague.lit, and over Romeo's client-to-server
connection with montague.lit. Although [XMPP-CORE] requires support
for Transport Layer Security [TLS] to make it possible to encrypt all
of these connections, when XMPP is deployed any of these connections
might be unencrypted. Furthermore, even if the server-to-server
connection is encrypted and both of the client-to-server connections
are encrypted, the message would still be in the clear while
processed by both the capulet.lit and montague.lit servers.
In this specification we primarily address communications security
("commsec") between two parties, especially confidentiality, data
integrity, and peer entity authentication. Communications security
can be subject to a variety of attacks, which [RFC3552] divides into
passive and active categories. In a passive attack, information is
leaked (e.g., a passive attacker could read all of the messages that
Juliet sends to Romeo). In an active attack, the attacker can add,
modify, or delete messages between the parties, thus disrupting
communications.
Traditionally, it seems that XMPP users have been concerned more
about passive attacks (such as eavesdropping) than about active
attacks (such as man-in-the-middle), perhaps because they have
thought that their communications are "just chat", because they have
had no expectation that endpoints could be authenticated, or because
they have believed that hijacked communications would be detected
socially (e.g., because the other party did not have an authentic
"voice" in a text conversation). However, both forms of attack are
of concern in this protocol.
In particular, we consider the following types of attacks and
attackers:
o One type of passive attack might involve monitoring all the
conversations of a given party. To help prevent this, it is
important for the party to ensure that its connection with its
server is protected using TLS. However, in this case the
eavesdropper could monitor outbound traffic from the party's
server, either to other connected clients or to other servers,
since that traffic might be unencrypted. In addition, the
eavesdropper could attack the party's server so that it gains
access to all traffic within the server, or masquerade as the
party's server so that the party is fooled into connecting to the
Saint-Andre Expires September 9, 2010 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft XMPP E2E Requirements March 2010
attacker rather than directly to the party's server.
o Another type of passive attack might involve monitoring of a
single conversation between two particular parties. In this case
the eavesdropper could monitor communications over the server-to-
server connection between the parties' servers, or over the
client-to-server connection between either party and that party's
server.
o One type of active attack would involve modification of the XML
stanzas used to advertise support for the protocol "building
blocks" that make it possible to negotiate a secure session; as a
result, other parties would be led to believe that the party does
not have the ability to negotate a secure session and therefore
would not attempt such a negotiation.
o Another type of active attack would involve modification or
outright deletion of the XML stanzas used to negotiate a secure
session (such as those described in this document), with the
result that the parties would think the negotiation has failed for
legitimate reasons such as incompatibilities between the parties'
clients.
o A more sophisticated active attack would involve a cryptanalytic
attack on the keying material or other credentials used to
establish trust between the parties, such as an ephemeral password
exchanged during an initial certificate exchange if Secure Remote
Password [TLS-SRP] is used.
Other attacks are possible, and the foregoing list is best considered
incomplete at this time.
Although an attacker might be able to launch an attack once, it is
possible that the attacker cannot launch an attack multiple times.
Given that the communication pattern in XMPP is typically to hold
multiple different conversations that are separated in time, many end
users might consider it acceptable to engage in a "leap of faith" the
first time two parties negotiate a secure communication session, then
check to make sure that the credentials are the same in subsequent
communication sessions.
4. Security Requirements
This document stipulates the following security requirements for end-
to-end encryption of XMPP communications:
Confidentiality: The one-to-one XML stanzas exchanged between two
entities (conventionally, "Alice" and "Bob") must not be
understandable to any other entity that might intercept the
communications. The encrypted stanzas should be understood by an
intermediate server only to the extent absolutely required to
Saint-Andre Expires September 9, 2010 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft XMPP E2E Requirements March 2010
route them (i.e., the 'from' and 'to' addresses). However, note
that some intermediaries might require or desire access to more
detailed information in order to route XMPP stanzas (e.g., data
about confidentiality levels or delivery semantics).
Integrity: Alice and Bob must be sure that no other entity can
change the content of the XML stanzas they exchange, or remove or
insert stanzas undetected.
Replay Protection: Alice or Bob must be able to identify and reject
any communications that are copies of their previous
communications resent by another entity.
Perfect Forward Secrecy: The encrypted communication should not be
revealed even if long-lived keys are compromised in the future
(e.g., Steve steals Bob's computer). For long-lived sessions it
must be possible to periodically change the decryption keys.
Trust: The protocol must enable Alice and Bob to establish trust in
each other's credentials either within the protocol or using
outside channels. The supported credential types might include
self-signed certificates, pre-shared keys, and shared secrets,
either as stable credentials or as mechanisms for bootstrapping
trust in ephemeral keying material. The protocol must not force
the use of any public key infrastructure (PKI), certification
authority, web of trust, or any other trust model that is external
to the trust established between Alice and Bob; however, if
external authentication or trust models are available then Alice
and Bob should be able to use such trust models to enhance any
trust that exists between them.
Authentication: Each party to a conversation should be able to
determine that the other party is who they want to communicate
with (Alice must be able to know that Bob really is Bob, or at
least is an entity that possesses a credential to which only Bob
is expected to have access). Authentication can be as simple as
Alice confirming that Bob is the same Bob that she communicated
with yesterday or that she talked with on the telephone (identity
coherence across time). The reliable association between an
entity and its public keys is "identification" and therefore
beyond the scope of this document.
Identity Protection: No entity other than the intermediate servers
and the parties themselves should be able to identify Alice or
Bob. Naturally, the JabberIDs they use to route their stanzas are
unavoidably vulnerable to interception. Therefore, even if Alice
and Bob protect their identities by using different JabberIDs for
each session, it must be possible for their user agents to
authenticate them transparently, without any other entity
identifying them via an active ("man-in-the-middle") attack, or
even linking them to their previous sessions. If that is not
possible because Alice and Bob choose to authenticate using public
keys instead of retained shared secrets, then the public keys must
not be revealed to other entities using a passive attack. Bob
Saint-Andre Expires September 9, 2010 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft XMPP E2E Requirements March 2010
should also be able to choose between protecting either his public
key or Alice's public key from disclosure through an active
attack.
Robustness: The protocol should have multiple lines of defense and
should force an attacker to surmount more than one difficult
challenge before an attack can succeed (for example, by generating
encryption keys using as many shared secrets as possible, such as
retained secrets or optional passwords).
Upgradability: The protocol must be upgradable so that, if a
vulnerability is discovered, a new version can fix it. Alice must
tell Bob which versions of the protocol she is prepared to
support. Upgradability refers to the protocol as a whole as well
as to components thereof (e.g., cryptographic hashing algorithms).
5. Application Requirements
In addition to the foregoing security profile, this document also
stipulates the following application-specific requirements:
Generality: The solution must be generally applicable to the full
content of any XML stanza type (<message/>, <presence/>, and
<iq/>) sent between two entities. It is deemed acceptable if the
solution does not apply to many-to-many stanzas (e.g., groupchat
messages sent within the context of multi-user chat) or one-to-
many stanzas (e.g., presence "broadcasts" and publish-subscribe
notifications); end-to-end encryption of such stanzas might
require separate solutions.
Implementability: The only good security technology is an
implemented security technology. The solution should be one that
XMPP client developers can implement in a relatively
straightforward and interoperable fashion. Ideally the solution
would reuse existing technologies so that client developers can
also reuse existing libraries, as they already do for security
features such as Transport Layer Security [TLS] and the Simple
Authentication and Security Layer [SASL].
Usability: The requirement of usability takes implementability one
step further by stipulating that the solution should be one that
organizations can deploy and humans can use with the ease-of-use
of, say, "https:" URLs. Experience has shown that solutions
requiring a full public key infrastructure do not get widely
deployed and that solutions requiring any user action are not
widely used. If, however, Alice and/or Bob are prepared to verify
the integrity of their copies of each other's keys (thus enabling
them to discover targeted active attacks or even the mass
surveilance of a population), then the actions necessary for them
to achieve that should be minimal (requiring no more effort than a
one-time out-of-band verification of a string of up to 8
Saint-Andre Expires September 9, 2010 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft XMPP E2E Requirements March 2010
alphanumeric characters).
Efficiency: Cryptographic operations are highly CPU intensive,
particularly public key and Diffie-Hellman operations.
Cryptographic data structures can be relatively large, especially
public keys and certificates. Network round trips can introduce
unacceptable delays, especially over high-latency wireless
connections. The solution must perform efficiently even when CPU
and network bandwidth are constrained. The number of stanzas
required for negotiation of encrypted communication should be
minimized.
Flexibility: The solution must be compatible with a variety of
existing and future cryptographic algorithms and identity
certification schemes, including [X509] and [OpenPGP]. The
protocol must also be able to evolve to correct the weaknesses
that are inevitably discovered once any cryptographic protocol is
in widespread use.
Offline messages: It should be possible to encrypt one-to-one
communications that are stored for later delivery (so-called
"offline messages") and still benefit from Perfect Forward Secrecy
(with a slightly longer period of vulnerability than if both
parties were online simultaneously). However, any vulnerabilities
introduced into the solution in order to enable such offline
communications must not make real-time communications more
vulnerable.
6. Security Considerations
Security issues are discussed throughout this document.
7. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for the IANA.
8. Acknowledgements
Much of the text in this document has been copied from [XEP-0210].
The editor wishes to thank Ian Paterson for his work on that document
and the ESessions technology in general.
Thanks also to Bernard Aboba for his feedback.
9. Informative References
[MUC] Saint-Andre, P., "Multi-User Chat", XSF XEP 0045,
Saint-Andre Expires September 9, 2010 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft XMPP E2E Requirements March 2010
July 2008.
[OFFLINE] Saint-Andre, P., "Best Practices for Handling Offline
Messages", XSF XEP 0160, January 2006.
[OpenPGP] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.
Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880, November 2007.
[PubSub] Millard, P., Saint-Andre, P., and R. Meijer, "Publish-
Subscribe", XSF XEP 0060, September 2008.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
July 2003.
[SASL] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.
[TLS] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[TLS-SRP] Taylor, D., Wu, T., Mavrogiannopoulos, N., and T. Perrin,
"Using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS
Authentication", RFC 5054, November 2007.
[X509] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[XEP-0210]
Paterson, I., "Requirements for Encrypted Sessions", XSF
XEP 0210, May 2007.
[XMPP-CORE]
Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP): Core", draft-ietf-xmpp-3920bis-05 (work
in progress), March 2010.
[XMPP-IM] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP): Instant Messaging and Presence",
draft-ietf-xmpp-3921bis-05 (work in progress), March 2010.
[XMPP-PGP]
Muldowney, T., "Current Jabber OpenPGP Usage", XSF
XEP 0027, November 2006.
[XMPP-SESS]
Saint-Andre Expires September 9, 2010 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft XMPP E2E Requirements March 2010
Paterson, I., Saint-Andre, P., and D. Smith, "Encrypted
Session Negotiation", XSF XEP 0116, May 2007.
[XMPP-SMIME]
Saint-Andre, P., "End-to-End Signing and Object Encryption
for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
(XMPP)", RFC 3923, October 2004.
Author's Address
Peter Saint-Andre (editor)
Cisco
Email: psaintan@cisco.com
Saint-Andre Expires September 9, 2010 [Page 10]
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-24 01:11:01 |