One document matched: draft-ietf-uta-xmpp-05.xml
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<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd">
<?rfc compact="yes"?>
<?rfc iprnotified="no" ?>
<?rfc sortrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc strict="yes"?>
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<?rfc tocdepth="4"?>
<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ietf-uta-xmpp-05" ipr="trust200902" updates="6120">
<?xml-stylesheet type='text/xsl' href='rfc2629.xslt' ?>
<front>
<title abbrev="XMPP TLS">Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization>&yet</organization>
<address>
<email>peter@andyet.com</email>
<uri>https://andyet.com/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="T." surname="Alkemade" fullname="Thijs Alkemade">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>me@thijsalkema.de</email>
</address>
</author>
<date/>
<abstract>
<t>This document provides recommendations for the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP). This document updates RFC 6120.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction" anchor='intro'>
<t>The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) <xref target='RFC6120'/> (along with its precursor, the so-called "Jabber protocol") has used Transport Layer Security (TLS) <xref target='RFC5246'/> (along with its precursor, Secure Sockets Layer or SSL) since 1999. Both <xref target='RFC6120'/> and its predecessor <xref target='RFC3920'/> provided recommendations regarding the use of TLS in XMPP. In order to address the evolving threat model on the Internet today, this document provides stronger recommendations.</t>
<t><list style='empty'><t>NOTE: Unless explicitly noted otherwise, all of the recommendations specified in <xref target='I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp'/> apply to XMPP. In the main, this document merely provides supplementary information; those who implement and deploy XMPP technologies are expected to follow the recommendations of <xref target='I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp'/>.</t></list></t>
<t>This document updates <xref target='RFC6120'/>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Terminology" anchor="terms">
<t>Various security-related terms are to be understood in the sense defined in <xref target="RFC4949"/>.</t>
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in <xref target='RFC2119'/>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Recommendations" anchor="rec">
<section title="Support for TLS" anchor="rec-support">
<t>Support for TLS (specifically, the XMPP profile of STARTTLS) is mandatory for XMPP implementations, as already specified in <xref target='RFC6120'/> and its predecessor <xref target='RFC3920'/>.</t>
<t>The server (i.e., the XMPP receiving entity) to which a client or peer server (i.e., the XMPP initiating entity) connects might not offer a stream feature of <starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>. Although in general this stream feature indicates that the server supports XMPP 1.0 and therefore supports TLS, it is possible that this stream feature might be stripped out by an attacker (see Section 2.1 of <xref target='I-D.ietf-uta-tls-attacks'/>). Therefore, the initiating entity SHOULD proceed with the stream negotiation even if the receiving entity does not advertise support for TLS. Similarly, although a receiving entity SHOULD include the <required/> child element to indicate that negotiation of TLS is mandatory, an initiating entity MUST NOT depend on receiving the <required/> flag in determining whether TLS will be enforced for the stream.</t>
</section>
<section title="Compression" anchor="rec-compress">
<t>XMPP supports an application-layer compression technology <xref target='XEP-0138'/>. Although this XMPP extension might have slightly stronger security properties than TLS-layer compression (since it is enabled after SASL authentication, as described in <xref target='XEP-0170'/>), this document neither encourages nor discourages use of XMPP-layer compression.</t>
</section>
<section title="Session Resumption" anchor="rec-resume">
<t>In XMPP, TLS session resumption can be used in concert with the XMPP Stream Management extension; see <xref target='XEP-0198'/> for further details.</t>
</section>
<section title="Authenticated Connections" anchor="rec-auth">
<t>Both the core XMPP specification <xref target='RFC6120'/> and the "CertID" specification <xref target='RFC6125'/> provide recommendations and requirements for certificate validation in the context of authenticated connections. This document does not supersede those specifications. Wherever possible, it is best to prefer authenticated connections (along with SASL <xref target='RFC4422'/>), as already stated in the core XMPP specification <xref target='RFC6120'/>. In particular, clients MUST authenticate servers and servers MUST authenticate clients. This document does not mandate that servers need to authenticate peer servers (see next section).</t>
<t>This document does not modify the recommendations in <xref target='RFC6120'/> regarding the Subject Alternative Names (or other certificate details) that need to be supported for authentication of XMPP connections using PKIX certificates.</t>
<t>The Domain Name Associations (DNA) specification <xref target='I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna'/> describes a framework for XMPP server authentication methods, which include not only PKIX but also DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) as defined in <xref target='I-D.ietf-dane-srv'/> and PKIX over Secure HTTP (POSH) as defined in <xref target='I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh'/>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Unauthenticated Connections" anchor="rec-unauth">
<t>Given the pervasiveness of passive eavesdropping, even an unauthenticated connection might be better than an unencrypted connection (this is similar to the "better than nothing security" approach for IPsec <xref target='RFC5386'/>). Unauthenticated connections include connections negotiated using anonymous Diffie-Hellman algorithms or using self-signed certificates, among other scenarios. In particular, because of current deployment challenges for authenticated connections between XMPP servers (see <xref target='I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna'/> and <xref target='I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh'/> for details), it can be reasonable for XMPP server implementations to accept unauthenticated connections when Server Dialback keys <xref target='XEP-0220'/> are used; although such keys on their own provide only weak identity verification (made stronger through the use of DNSSEC <xref target='RFC4033'/>), this at least enables encryption of server-to-server connections.</t>
</section>
<section title="Server Name Indication" anchor="rec-sni">
<t>Although there is no harm in supporting the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) extension <xref target='RFC6066'/>, this is not necessary since the same function is served in XMPP by the 'to' address of the initial stream header as explained in Section 4.7.2 of <xref target='RFC6120'/>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Human Factors" anchor="rec-user">
<t>It is strongly encouraged that XMPP clients provide ways for end users (and that XMPP servers provide ways for administrators) to complete the following tasks:</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>Determine if a client-to-server or server-to-server connection is encrypted and authenticated.</t>
<t>Determine the version of TLS used for a client-to-server or server-to-server connection.</t>
<t>Inspect the certificate offered by an XMPP server.</t>
<t>Determine the cipher suite used to encrypt a connection.</t>
<t>Be warned if the certificate changes for a given server.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="IANA Considerations" anchor="iana">
<t>This document requests no actions of the IANA.</t>
</section>
<section title="Security Considerations" anchor="security">
<t>The use of TLS can help limit the information available for correlation to the network and transport layer headers as opposed to the application layer. As typically deployed, XMPP technologies do not leave application-layer routing data (such as XMPP 'to' and 'from' addresses) at rest on intermediate systems, since there is only one hop between any two given XMPP servers. As a result, encrypting all hops (sender's client to sender's server, sender's server to recipient's server, recipient's server to recipient's client) can help to limit the amount of "metadata" that might leak.</t>
<t>It is possible that XMPP servers themselves might be compromised. In that case, per-hop encryption would not protect XMPP communications, and even end-to-end encryption of (parts of) XMPP stanza payloads would leave addressing information and XMPP roster data in the clear. By the same token, it is possible that XMPP clients (or the end-user devices on which such clients are installed) could also be compromised, leaving users utterly at the mercy of an adversary.</t>
<t>This document and related actions to strengthen the security of the XMPP network are based on the assumption that XMPP servers and clients have not been subject to widespread compromise. If this assumption is valid, then ubiquitous use of per-hop TLS channel encryption and more significant deployment of end-to-end object encryption technologies will serve to protect XMPP communications to a measurable degree, compared to the alternatives.</t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<reference anchor='I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp'>
<front>
<title>Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS</title>
<author initials='Y' surname='Sheffer' fullname='Yaron Sheffer'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='R' surname='Holz' fullname='Ralph Holz'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='P' surname='Saint-Andre' fullname='Peter Saint-Andre'>
<organization />
</author>
<date month='December' day='7' year='2014' />
<abstract><t>Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Security Layer (DTLS) are widely used to protect data exchanged over application protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, IMAP, POP, SIP, and XMPP. Over the last few years, several serious attacks on TLS have emerged, including attacks on its most commonly used cipher suites and modes of operation. This document provides recommendations for improving the security of both software implementations and deployed services that use TLS and DTLS.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-uta-tls-bcp-08' />
<format type='TXT'
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-uta-tls-bcp-08.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2119">
<front>
<title abbrev='RFC Key Words'>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
<author initials='S.' surname='Bradner' fullname='Scott Bradner'>
<organization>Harvard University</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>1350 Mass. Ave.</street>
<street>Cambridge</street>
<street>MA 02138</street></postal>
<phone>- +1 617 495 3864</phone>
<email>sob@harvard.edu</email></address></author>
<date month='March' year='1997' />
<area>General</area>
<keyword>keyword</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>
In many standards track documents several words are used to signify
the requirements in the specification. These words are often
capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be
interpreted in IETF documents. Authors who follow these guidelines
should incorporate this phrase near the beginning of their document:
<list>
<t>
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
RFC 2119.
</t></list></t>
<t>
Note that the force of these words is modified by the requirement
level of the document in which they are used.
</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='BCP' value='14' />
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='2119' />
<format type='TXT' octets='4723' target='ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2119.txt' />
<format type='HTML' octets='14486' target='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc2119.html' />
<format type='XML' octets='5661' target='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc2119.xml' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC4949'>
<front>
<title>Internet Security Glossary, Version 2</title>
<author initials='R.' surname='Shirey' fullname='R. Shirey'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2007' month='August' />
<abstract>
<t>This Glossary provides definitions, abbreviations, and explanations of terminology for information system security. The 334 pages of entries offer recommendations to improve the comprehensibility of written material that is generated in the Internet Standards Process (RFC 2026). The recommendations follow the principles that such writing should (a) use the same term or definition whenever the same concept is mentioned; (b) use terms in their plainest, dictionary sense; (c) use terms that are already well-established in open publications; and (d) avoid terms that either favor a particular vendor or favor a particular technology or mechanism over other, competing techniques that already exist or could be developed. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4949' />
<format type='TXT' octets='867626' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4949.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC5246'>
<front>
<title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2</title>
<author initials='T.' surname='Dierks' fullname='T. Dierks'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='E.' surname='Rescorla' fullname='E. Rescorla'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2008' month='August' />
<abstract>
<t>This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='5246' />
<format type='TXT' octets='222395' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC6120'>
<front>
<title>Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core</title>
<author initials='P.' surname='Saint-Andre' fullname='P. Saint-Andre'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2011' month='March' />
<abstract>
<t>The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is an application profile of the Extensible Markup Language (XML) that enables the near-real-time exchange of structured yet extensible data between any two or more network entities. This document defines XMPP's core protocol methods: setup and teardown of XML streams, channel encryption, authentication, error handling, and communication primitives for messaging, network availability ("presence"), and request-response interactions. This document obsoletes RFC 3920. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='6120' />
<format type='TXT' octets='451942' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6120.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC6125'>
<front>
<title>Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)</title>
<author initials='P.' surname='Saint-Andre' fullname='P. Saint-Andre'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='J.' surname='Hodges' fullname='J. Hodges'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2011' month='March' />
<abstract>
<t>Many application technologies enable secure communication between two entities by means of Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) certificates in the context of Transport Layer Security (TLS). This document specifies procedures for representing and verifying the identity of application services in such interactions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='6125' />
<format type='TXT' octets='136507' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6125.txt' />
</reference>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-dane-srv">
<front>
<title>Using DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA records with SRV and MX records.</title>
<author initials="T" surname="Finch" fullname="Tony Finch">
<organization/>
</author>
<author initials="M" surname="Miller" fullname="Matthew Miller">
<organization/>
</author>
<author initials="P" surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization/>
</author>
<date month="October" day="21" year="2014"/>
<abstract>
<t>The DANE specification (RFC 6698) describes how to use TLSA resource records in the DNS to associate a server's host name with its TLS certificate, where the association is secured with DNSSEC. However, application protocols that use SRV records (RFC 2782) to indirectly name the target server host names for a service domain cannot apply the rules from RFC 6698. Therefore this document provides guidelines that enable such protocols to locate and use TLSA records.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-dane-srv-08"/>
<format type="TXT" target="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dane-srv-08.txt"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor='I-D.ietf-uta-tls-attacks'>
<front>
<title>Summarizing Current Attacks on TLS and DTLS</title>
<author initials='Y' surname='Sheffer' fullname='Yaron Sheffer'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='R' surname='Holz' fullname='Ralph Holz'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='P' surname='Saint-Andre' fullname='Peter Saint-Andre'>
<organization />
</author>
<date month='October' day='23' year='2014' />
<abstract><t>Over the last few years there have been several serious attacks on TLS, including attacks on its most commonly used ciphers and modes of operation. This document summarizes these attacks, with the goal of motivating generic and protocol-specific recommendations on the usage of TLS and DTLS.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-05' />
<format type='TXT'
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-uta-tls-attacks-05.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna'>
<front>
<title>Domain Name Associations (DNA) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)</title>
<author initials='P' surname='Saint-Andre' fullname='Peter Saint-Andre'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='M' surname='Miller' fullname='Matthew Miller'>
<organization />
</author>
<date month='October' day='23' year='2014' />
<abstract><t>This document improves the security of the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) in two ways. First, it specifies how "prooftypes" can establish a strong association between a domain name and an XML stream. Second, it describes how to securely delegate a source domain to a derived domain, which is especially important in virtual hosting environments.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-xmpp-dna-08' />
<format type='TXT'
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-xmpp-dna-08.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh">
<front>
<title>PKIX over Secure HTTP (POSH)</title>
<author initials="M" surname="Miller" fullname="Matthew Miller">
<organization/>
</author>
<author initials="P" surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization/>
</author>
<date month="October" day="10" year="2014"/>
<abstract>
<t>Experience has shown that it is extremely difficult to deploy proper PKIX certificates for TLS in multi-tenanted environments, since certification authorities will not issue certificates for hosted domains to hosting services, hosted domains do not want hosting services to hold their private keys, and hosting services wish to avoid liability for holding those keys. As a result, domains hosted in multi-tenanted environments often deploy non-HTTP applications such as email and instant messaging using certificates that identify the hosting service, not the hosted domain. Such deployments force end users and peer services to accept a certificate with an improper identifier, resulting in obvious security implications. This document defines two methods that make it easier to deploy certificates for proper server identity checking in non-HTTP application protocols. The first method enables the TLS client associated with a user agent or peer application server to obtain the end-entity certificate of a hosted domain over secure HTTP as an alternative to standard PKIX techniques. The second method enables a hosted domain to securely delegate a non-HTTP application to a hosting service using redirects provided by HTTPS itself or by a pointer in a file served over HTTPS at the hosted domain. While this approach was developed for use in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) as a Domain Name Association prooftype, it can be applied to any non-HTTP application protocol.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-02"/>
<format type="TXT" target="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-02.txt"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC3920'>
<front>
<title abbrev='XMPP Core'>Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core</title>
<author initials='P.' surname='Saint-Andre' fullname='Peter Saint-Andre' role='editor'>
<organization>Jabber Software Foundation</organization>
<address>
<email>stpeter@jabber.org</email></address></author>
<date year='2004' month='October' />
<area>Applications</area>
<workgroup>XMPP Working Group</workgroup>
<keyword>RFC</keyword>
<keyword>Request for Comments</keyword>
<keyword>I-D</keyword>
<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
<keyword>XMPP</keyword>
<keyword>Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol</keyword>
<keyword>Jabber</keyword>
<keyword>IM</keyword>
<keyword>Instant Messaging</keyword>
<keyword>Presence</keyword>
<keyword>XML</keyword>
<keyword>Extensible Markup Language</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>This memo defines the core features of the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), a protocol for streaming Extensible Markup Language (XML) elements in order to exchange structured information in close to real time between any two network endpoints. While XMPP provides a generalized, extensible framework for exchanging XML data, it is used mainly for the purpose of building instant messaging and presence applications that meet the requirements of RFC 2779.</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='3920' />
<format type='TXT' octets='194313' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3920.txt' />
<format type='HTML' octets='281359' target='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/html/rfc3920.html' />
<format type='XML' octets='234610' target='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/xml/rfc3920.xml' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC4033'>
<front>
<title>DNS Security Introduction and Requirements</title>
<author initials='R.' surname='Arends' fullname='R. Arends'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='R.' surname='Austein' fullname='R. Austein'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='M.' surname='Larson' fullname='M. Larson'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='D.' surname='Massey' fullname='D. Massey'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='S.' surname='Rose' fullname='S. Rose'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2005' month='March' />
<abstract>
<t>The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add data origin authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System. This document introduces these extensions and describes their capabilities and limitations. This document also discusses the services that the DNS security extensions do and do not provide. Last, this document describes the interrelationships between the documents that collectively describe DNSSEC. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4033' />
<format type='TXT' octets='52445' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC4422'>
<front>
<title>Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)</title>
<author initials='A.' surname='Melnikov' fullname='A. Melnikov'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='K.' surname='Zeilenga' fullname='K. Zeilenga'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2006' month='June' />
<abstract>
<t>The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) is a framework for providing authentication and data security services in connection-oriented protocols via replaceable mechanisms. It provides a structured interface between protocols and mechanisms. The resulting framework allows new protocols to reuse existing mechanisms and allows old protocols to make use of new mechanisms. The framework also provides a protocol for securing subsequent protocol exchanges within a data security layer.</t><t> This document describes how a SASL mechanism is structured, describes how protocols include support for SASL, and defines the protocol for carrying a data security layer over a connection. In addition, this document defines one SASL mechanism, the EXTERNAL mechanism.</t><t> This document obsoletes RFC 2222. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4422' />
<format type='TXT' octets='73206' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4422.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC5386'>
<front>
<title>Better-Than-Nothing Security: An Unauthenticated Mode of IPsec</title>
<author initials='N.' surname='Williams' fullname='N. Williams'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='M.' surname='Richardson' fullname='M. Richardson'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2008' month='November' />
<abstract>
<t>This document specifies how to use the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocols, such as IKEv1 and IKEv2, to setup "unauthenticated" security associations (SAs) for use with the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and the IPsec Authentication Header (AH). No changes to IKEv2 bits-on-the-wire are required, but Peer Authorization Database (PAD) and Security Policy Database (SPD) extensions are specified. Unauthenticated IPsec is herein referred to by its popular acronym, "BTNS" (Better-Than-Nothing Security). [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='5386' />
<format type='TXT' octets='23103' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5386.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='RFC6066'>
<front>
<title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions</title>
<author initials='D.' surname='Eastlake' fullname='D. Eastlake'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2011' month='January' />
<abstract>
<t>This document provides specifications for existing TLS extensions. It is a companion document for RFC 5246, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2". The extensions specified are server_name, max_fragment_length, client_certificate_url, trusted_ca_keys, truncated_hmac, and status_request. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='6066' />
<format type='TXT' octets='55079' target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6066.txt' />
</reference>
<reference anchor="XEP-0138">
<front>
<title>Stream Compression</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Hildebrand" fullname="Joe Hildebrand">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>jhildebr@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>stpeter@jabber.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<date day="27" month="May" year="2009"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="XSF XEP" value="0138"/>
<format type="HTML" target="http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0138.html"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="XEP-0170">
<front>
<title>Recommended Order of Stream Feature Negotiation</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>stpeter@jabber.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<date day="04" month="January" year="2007"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="XSF XEP" value="0170"/>
<format type="HTML" target="http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0170.html"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="XEP-0198">
<front>
<title>Stream Management</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Karneges" fullname="Justin Karneges">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>justin@affinix.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>stpeter@jabber.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Hildebrand" fullname="Joe Hildebrand">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>jhildebr@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="F." surname="Forno" fullname="Fabio Forno">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>fabio.forno@gmail.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="D." surname="Cridland" fullname="Dave Cridland">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>dave.cridland@isode.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="M." surname="Wild" fullname="Matthew Wild">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>mwild1@gmail.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date day="29" month="June" year="2011"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="XSF XEP" value="0198"/>
<format type="HTML" target="http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0198.html"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="XEP-0220">
<front>
<title>Server Dialback</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Miller" fullname="Jeremie Miller">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>jer@jabber.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre" fullname="Peter Saint-Andre">
<organization/>
<address>
<email>stpeter@jabber.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="P." surname="Hancke" fullname="Philipp Hancke">
<organization/>
<address>
<email/>
</address>
</author>
<date day="27" month="September" year="2013"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="XSF XEP" value="0220"/>
<format type="HTML" target="http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0220.html"/>
</reference>
</references>
<section title="Implementation Notes" anchor="impl">
<t>Some governments enforce legislation prohibiting the export of strong cryptographic technologies. Nothing in this document ought to be taken as advice to violate such prohibitions.</t>
</section>
<section title="Acknowledgements">
<t>The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their input: Dave Cridland, Philipp Hancke, Olle Johansson, Steve Kille, Tobias Markmann, Matt Miller, and Rene Treffer.</t>
</section>
</back>
</rfc>
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