One document matched: draft-ietf-tokbind-https-02.xml


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<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ietf-tokbind-https-02" ipr="trust200902">
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  <!-- ***** FRONT MATTER ***** -->

  <front>
    <!-- The abbreviated title is used in the page header - it is only necessary if the 
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    <title>Token Binding over HTTP</title>

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    <author fullname="Andrei Popov" initials="A."
            surname="Popov">
      <organization>Microsoft Corp.</organization>

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          <country>USA</country>
        </postal>

        <email>andreipo@microsoft.com</email>

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    </author>

    <author fullname="Magnus Nyström" initials="M."
            surname="Nyström">
      <organization>Microsoft Corp.</organization>

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          <street></street>

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        <email>mnystrom@microsoft.com</email>

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    </author>

    <author fullname="Dirk Balfanz" initials="D."
            surname="Balfanz" role="editor">
      <organization>Google Inc.</organization>

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        <email>balfanz@google.com</email>

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    </author>

    <author fullname="Adam Langley" initials="A."
            surname="Langley">
      <organization>Google Inc.</organization>

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        <email>agl@google.com</email>

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    </author>

    <date year="2015" />

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    <workgroup>Internet Engineering Task Force</workgroup>

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    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes a collection of mechanisms that allow
      HTTP servers to cryptographically bind authentication tokens
      (such as cookies and OAuth tokens) to a <xref
      target="RFC5246">TLS</xref> connection.</t>

      <t>We describe both <spanx style="emph">first-party</spanx> as
      well as <spanx style="emph">federated</spanx> scenarios. In a
      first-party scenario, an HTTP server issues a security token
      (such as a cookie) to a client, and expects the client to send
      the security token back to the server at a later time in order
      to authenticate. Binding the token to the TLS connection between
      client and server protects the security token from theft, and
      ensures that the security token can only be used by the client
      that it was issued to.</t>

      <t>Federated token bindings, on the other hand, allow servers to
      cryptographically bind security tokens to a <xref
      target="RFC5246">TLS</xref> connection that the client has with
      a <spanx style="emph">different</spanx> server than the one
      issuing the token.</t>

      <t>This Internet-Draft is a companion document to <xref
      target="TBPROTO">The Token Binding Protocol</xref></t>
    </abstract>
  </front>

  <middle>
    <section title="Introduction">
      <t><xref target="TBPROTO">The Token Binding Protocol</xref>
      defines a Token Binding ID for a TLS connection between a client
      and a server. The Token Binding ID of a TLS connection is
      related to a private key that the client proves possession of to
      the server, and is long-lived (i.e., subsequent TLS connections
      between the same client and server have the same Token Binding
      ID). When issuing a security token (e.g. an HTTP cookie or an
      OAuth token) to a client, the server can include the Token
      Binding ID in the token, thus cryptographically binding the
      token to TLS connections between that particular client and
      server, and inoculating the token against theft by
      attackers.</t>
      <t>While the <xref target="TBPROTO">Token Binding
      Protocol</xref> defines a message format for establishing a
      Token Binding ID, it doesn't specify how this message is
      embedded in higher-level protocols. The purpose of this
      specification is to define how TokenBindingMessages are embedded
      in HTTP (both versions <xref target="RFC2616">1.1</xref> and
      <xref target="I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2">2</xref>). Note that
      TokenBindingMessages are only defined if the underlying
      transport uses TLS. This means that Token Binding over HTTP is
      only defined when the HTTP protocol is layered on top of TLS
      (commonly referred to as HTTPS).</t>
      <t>HTTP clients establish a Token Binding ID with a server by
      including a special HTTP header in HTTP requests. The HTTP
      header value is a TokenBindingMessage.</t>
      <t>TokenBindingMessages allow clients to establish multiple
      Token Binding IDs with the server, by including multiple
      TokenBinding structures in the TokenBindingMessage. By default,
      a client will establish a <spanx style="emph">provided</spanx>
      Token Binding ID with the server, indicating a Token Binding ID
      that the client will persistently use with the server. Under
      certain conditions, the client can also include a <spanx
      style="emph">referred</spanx> Token Binding ID in the
      TokenBindingMessage, indicating a Token Binding ID that the
      client is using with a <spanx style="emph">different</spanx>
      server than the one that the TokenBindingMessage is sent
      to. This is useful in federation scenarios.</t>

      <section title="Requirements Language">
        <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
        "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
        document are to be interpreted as described in <xref target="RFC2119" />.</t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section title="The Token-Binding Header">
      <t>Once a client and server have negotiated the Token Binding
      Protocol with HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2 (see <xref
      target="TBPROTO">The Token Binding Protocol</xref>), clients
      MUST include the Token-Binding header in their HTTP requests. The ABNF 
      of the Token-Binding header is:
      </t>
      <figure><artwork><![CDATA[

 Token-Binding = "Token-Binding" ":" [CFWS] EncodedTokenBindingMessage
        ]]></artwork></figure>

      <t>The EncodedTokenBindingMessage is a web-safe Base64-encoding 
      of the TokenBindingMessage as defined in the <xref
      target="TBPROTO">TokenBindingProtocol</xref>.</t>

      <t>The TokenBindingMessage MUST contain a TokenBinding with
      TokenBindingType provided_token_binding, which MUST be signed
      with the Token Binding key used by the client for connections
      between itself and the server that the HTTP request is sent to
      (clients use different Token Binding keys for different
      servers). The Token Binding ID established by this TokenBinding
      is called a <spanx style="emph">Provided Token Binding
      ID</spanx></t>

      <t>In HTTP/2, the client SHOULD use <xref
      target="I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-compression">Header
      Compression</xref> to avoid the overhead of repeating the same
      header in subsequent HTTP requests.</t>
    </section>

    <section title="Federation Use Cases">

      <section title="Introduction">
	<t>For privacy reasons, clients use different private keys to
	establish Provided Token Binding IDs with different
	servers. As a result, a server cannot bind a security token
	(such as an OAuth token or an OpenID Connect identity token)
	to a TLS connection that the client has with a different
	server. This is, however, a common requirement in federation
	scenarios: For example, an Identity Provider may wish to issue
	an identity token to a client and cryptographically bind that
	token to the TLS connection between the client and a Relying
	Party.</t>
	
	<t>In this section we describe mechanisms to achieve this. The
	common idea among these mechanisms is that a server (called
	the <spanx style="emph">Token Consumer</spanx> in this
	document) gives the client permission to reveal the Provided
	Token Binding ID that is used between the client and itself,
	to another server (called the <spanx style="emph">Token
	Provider</spanx> in this document). Also common across the
	mechanisms is how the Token Binding ID is revealed to the
	Token Provider: The client uses the <xref
	target="TBPROTO">Token Binding Protocol</xref>, and
	includes a TokenBinding structure in the Token-Binding HTTP
	header defined above.  What differs between the various
	mechanisms is <spanx style="emph">how</spanx> the Token
	Consumer grants the permission to reveal the Token Binding ID
	to the Token Provider. Below we specify one such mechanism, which is 
  suitable for redirect-based interactions between Token Consumers and
  Token Providers.</t>
      </section>

      <section title="Overview">
	<t>In a Federated Sign-On protocol, an Identity Provider issues
	an identity token to a client, which sends the identity token
	to a Relying Party to authenticate itself. Examples of this
	include OpenID Connect (where the identity token is called "ID
	Token") and SAML (where the identity token is a SAML
	assertion).</t>
	<t>To better protect the security of the identity token, the
	Identity Provider may wish to bind the identity token to the TLS
	connection between the client and the Relying Party, thus
	ensuring that only said client can use the identity token: The
	Relying Party will compare the Token Binding ID in the identity
	token with the Token Binding ID of the TLS connection between it
	an the client.</t>
	<t>This is an example of a federation scenario, which more
	generally can be described as follows:
	<list style="symbols">
	  <t>A Token Consumer causes the client to issue a token request
	  to the Token Provider. The goal is for the client to obtain a
	  token and then use it with the Token Consumer.</t>
	  <t>The client delivers the token request to the Token
	  Provider.</t>
	  <t>The Token Provider issues the token. The token is issued
	  for the specific Token Consumer who requested it (thus
	  preventing malicious Token Consumers from using tokens with
	  other Token Consumers). The token is, however, typically a
	  bearer token, meaning that any client can use it with the
	  Token Consumer, not just the client to which it was
	  issued.</t>
	  <t>Therefore, in the previous step, the Token Provider may
	  want to include in the token the Token-Binding public key that the client
    uses when communicating with the Token Consumer, thus 
    <spanx style="emph">binding</spanx> the token to client's Token-Binding
    keypair. The client
    proves possession of the private key when communicating with 
    the Token Consumer through the <xref target="TBPROTO">Token
	  Binding Protocol</xref>, and reveals the corresponding public key of this 
    keypair as part of the Token Binding ID. Comparing the public key from the
    token with the public key from the Token Binding ID allows the Token 
    Consumer to verify that the token was sent to it by the legitimate 
    client.</t>
	  <t>To allow the Token Provider to include the Token-Binding public key in
    the token, the Token Binding ID (between client and Token Consumer) must 
    therefore be communicated to the Token Provider along with the token
    request. Communicating a Token Binding ID involves proving possession of a 
    private key and is described in the <xref target="TBPROTO">Token
	  Binding Protocol</xref>.</t>
	</list>
	</t>
	<t>The client will perform this last operation (proving
	possession of a private key that corresponds to a Token Binding
	ID between the client and the Token Consumer while delivering
	the token request to the Token Provider) only if the Token
	Consumer permits the client to do so.</t>
	<t>Below, we specify how Token Consumers can grant this permission. during
  redirect-based federation protocols.</t>
      </section>
      
      <section title="HTTP Redirects">
	<t>When a Token Consumer redirects the client to a Token
	Provider as a means to deliver the token request, it SHOULD
	include a Include-Referer-Token-Binding-ID HTTP response header in its HTTP
	response. The ABNF of the Include-Referer-Token-Binding-ID header is:</t> 
	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[

 Include-Referer-Token-Binding-ID = "Include-Referer-Token-Binding-ID" ":" 
                                     [CFWS] %x74.72.75.65 ; "true", case-sensitive	
        ]]></artwork></figure>
      
	<t>Including this response header signals to the client that it
	should reveal the Token Binding ID used between the client and
	the Token Consumer to the Token Provider. In the absence of this 
        response header, the client will not disclose any information 
        about the Token Binding used between the client and the Token 
        Consumer to the Token Provider.</t>
	
	<t>This header has only meaning if the HTTP status code is 301,
	302, 303, 307 or 308, and MUST be ignored by the client for any other status
	codes. If the client supports the Token Binding Protocol, and
	has negotiated the Token Binding Protocol with both the Token
	Consumer and the Token Provider, it already sends the
	following header to the Token Provider with each HTTP
	request (see above):</t>
	<figure><artwork><![CDATA[

 Token-Binding: EncodedTokenBindingMessage
        ]]></artwork></figure>

	<t>The TokenBindingMessage SHOULD contain a TokenBinding with
	TokenBindingType referred_token_binding. If included, this 
        TokenBinding MUST be signed 
	with the Token Binding key used by the client for connections
	between itself and the Token Consumer (more specifically, the
	web origin that issued the Include-Referer-Token-Binding-ID
	response header). The Token Binding ID established by this
	TokenBinding is called a <spanx style="emph">Referred Token
	Binding ID</spanx>.</t>
	
	<t>As described above, the TokenBindingMessage MUST
	additionally contain a Provided Token Binding ID, i.e., a
	TokenBinding structure with TokenBindingType
	provided_token_binding, which MUST be signed with the Token
	Binding key used by the client for connections between itself
	and the Token Privider (more specifically, the web origin that
	the token request sent to).
	</t>
      </section>
      
      <section title="Negotiated Key Parameters">
	<t>The <xref target="TBPROTO">Token Binding Protocol</xref>
	allows the server and client to negotiate a signature algorithm
	used in the TokenBindingMessage. It is possible that the Token
	Binding ID used between the client and the Token Consumer, and
	the Token Binding ID used between the client and Token Provider,
	use different signature algorithms. The client MUST use the
	signature algorithm negotiated with the Token Consumer in the
	referred_token_binding TokenBinding of the TokenBindingMessage,
	even if that signature algorithm is different from the one
	negotiated with the origin that the header is sent to.</t>
	<t>Token Providers SHOULD support all the
	SignatureAndHashAlgorithms specified in the <xref
	target="TBPROTO">Token Binding Protocol</xref>. If a token
	provider does not support the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
	specified in the referred_token_binding TokenBinding in the
	TokenBindingMessage, it MUST issue an unbound token.</t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="Security" title="Security Considerations">
      <section title="Security Token Replay">
        <t>The goal of the Federated Token Binding mechanisms is to
        prevent attackers from exporting and replaying tokens used in
        protocols between the client and Token Consumer, thereby
        impersonating legitimate users and gaining access to protected
        resources. Bound tokens can still be replayed by  malware
        present in the client. In order to export the token to
        another machine and successfully replay it, the attacker also
        needs to export the corresponding private key. The Token
        Binding private key is therefore a high-value asset and MUST
        be strongly protected, ideally by generating it in a hardware
        security module that prevents key export.</t>
      </section>
      <section title="Privacy Considerations">
        <t>The Token Binding protocol uses persistent, long-lived TLS
        Token Binding IDs. To protect privacy, TLS Token Binding IDs
        are never transmitted in clear text and can be reset by the
        user at any time, e.g. when clearing browser cookies. Unique
        Token Binding IDs MUST be generated for connections to
        different origins, so they cannot be used by cooperating
        servers to link user identities.</t>
      </section>
      <section title="Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS">
        <t>The Token Binding protocol relies on the exported key material (EKM)
          value <xref target="RFC5705" /> to associate a TLS connection with a
          TLS Token Binding. The triple handshake attack <xref
          target="TRIPLE-HS" /> is a known TLS protocol vulnerability allowing
          the attacker to synchronize keying manterial between TLS
          connections. The attacker can then successfully replay bound tokens.
          For this reason, the Token Binding protocol MUST NOT be negotiated
          unless the Extended Master Secret TLS extension <xref
          target="I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash"/> has also been negotiated.</t>
      </section>
      <section title="Sensitivity of the Token-Binding Header">
        <t>
          The purpose of the Token Binding protocol is to convince the server
          that the client that initiated the TLS connection controls a certain
          key pair. For the server to correctly draw this conclusion after
          processing the Token-Binding header, certain secrecy and integrity
          requirements must be met.
        </t>
        <t>
          For example, the client's private Token Binding key must be kept
          secret by the client. If the private key is not secret, then another
          actor in the system could create a valid Token Binding header,
          impersonating the client. This can render the main purpose of the
          protocol - to bind bearer tokens to certain clients - moot: Consider,
          for example, an attacker who obtained (perhaps through a network
          intrusion) an authentication cookie that a client uses with a certain
          server. Consider further that the server bound that cookie to the
          client's Token Binding ID precisely to thwart cookie theft. If the
          attacker were to come into possession of the client's private key, he
          could then establish a TLS connection with the server and craft a
          Token-Binding header that matches the binding present in the cookie,
          thus successfully authenticating as the client, and gaining access to
          the client's data at the server. The Token Binding protocol, in this
          case, didn't successfully bind the cookie to the client.
        </t>
        <t>
          Likewise, we need integrity protection of the Token-Binding header: A
          client shouldn't be tricked into sending a Token-Binding header to a
          server that contains Token Binding messages about key pairs that the
          client doesn't control. Consider an attacker A that somehow has
          knowledge of the exported keying material (EKM) for a TLS connection
          between a client C and a server S. (While that is somewhat unlikely,
          it's also not entirely out of the question, since the client might
          not treat the EKM as a secret - after all, a pre-image-resistant hash
          function has been applied to the TLS master secret, making it
          impossible for someone knowing the EKM to recover the TLS master
          secret. Such considerations might lead some clients to not treat the
          EKM as a secret.) Such an attacker A could craft a Token-Binding
          header with A's key pair over C's EKM. If the attacker could now
          trick C to send such a header to S, it would appear to S as if C
          controls a certain key pair when in fact it doesn't (the attacker A
          controls the key pair).
        </t>
        <t>
          If A has a pre-existing relationship with S (perhaps has an account
          on S), it now appears to the server S as if A is connecting to it,
          even though it is really C. (If the server S doesn't simply use Token
          Binding keys to identify clients, but also uses bound authentication
          cookies, then A would also have to trick C into sending one of A's
          cookies to S, which it can do through a variety of means - inserting
          cookies through Javascript APIs, setting cookies through
          related-domain attacks, etc.) In other words, A tricked C into
          logging into A's account on S. This could lead to a loss of privacy
          for C, since A presumably has some other way to also access the
          account, and can thus indirectly observe A's behavior (for example,
          if S has a feature that lets account holders see their activity
          history on S).
        </t>
        <t>
          Therefore, we need to protect the integrity of the Token-Binding
          header. One origin should not be able to set the Token-Binding header
          (through a DOM API or otherwise) that the User Agent uses with
          another origin.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section title="Securing Federated Sign-On Protocols">
        <t>
          As explained above, in a federated sign-in scenario a client will
          prove possession of two different key pairs to a Token Provider: One
          key pair is the "provided" Token Binding key pair (which the client
          normally uses with the Token Provider), and the other is the
          "referred" Token Binding key pair (which the client normally uses
          with the Token Consumer). The Token Provider is expected to issue a
          token that is bound to the referred Token Binding key.
        </t>
        <t>
          Both proofs (that of the provided Token Binding key and that of the
          referred Token Binding key) are necessary. To show this, consider the
          following scenario:
          <list style="symbols">
            <t>
              The client has an authentication token with the Token Provider
              that is bound to the client's Token Binding key.
            </t>
            <t>
              The client wants to establish a secure (i.e., free of
              men-in-the-middle) authenticated session with the Token Consumer,
              but hasn't done so yet (in other words, we're about to run the
              federated sign-on protocol).
            </t>
            <t>
              A man-in-the-middle is allowed to intercept the connection
              between client and Token Consumer or between Client and Token
              Provider (or both).
            </t>
          </list>
          The goal is to detect the presence of the man-in-the-middle in these
          scenarios.
        </t>
        <t>
          First, consider a man-in-the-middle between the client and the Token
          Provider. Recall that we assume that the client possesses a bound
          authentication token (e.g., cookie) for the Token Provider. The
          man-in-the-middle can intercept and modify any message sent by the
          client to the Token Provider, and any message sent by the Token
          Provider to the client. (This means, among other things, that the
          man-in-the-middle controls the Javascript running at the client in
          the origin of the Token Provider.) It is not, however, in possession
          of the client's Token Binding key. Therefore, it can either choose to
          replace the Token Binding key in requests from the client to the
          Token Provider, and create a Token-Binding header that matches the
          TLS connection between the man-in-the-middle and the Token Provider;
          or it can choose to leave the Token-Binding header unchanged. If it
          chooses the latter, the signature in the Token Binding message
          (created by the original client on the exported keying material (EKM)
          for the connection between client and man-in-the-middle) will not
          match the EKM between man-in-the-middle and the Token Provider. If it
          chooses the former (and creates its own signature, with its own Token
          Binding key, over the EKM for the connection between
          man-in-the-middle and Token Provider), then the Token Binding message
          will match the connection between man-in-the-middle and Token
          Provider, but the Token Binding key in the message will not match the
          Token Binding key that the client's authentication token is bound to.
          Either way, the man-in-the-middle is detected by the Token Provider,
          but only if the proof of key possession of the provided Token Binding
          key is required in the protocol (as we do above).
        </t>
        <t>
          Next, consider the presence of a man-in-the-middle between client and
          Token Consumer. That man-in-the-middle can intercept and modify any
          message sent by the client to the Token Consumer, and any message
          sent by the Token Consumer to the client. The Token Consumer is the
          party that redirects the client to the Token Provider. In this case,
          the man-in-the-middle controls the redirect URL, and can tamper with
          any redirect URL issued by the Token Consumer (as well as with any
          Javascript running in the origin of the Token Consumer). The goal of
          the man-in-the-middle is to trick the Token Issuer to issue a token
          bound to <spanx style="emph">its</spanx> Token Binding key, not to
          the Token Binding key of the legitimate client. To thwart this goal
          of the man-in-the-middle, the client's referred Token Binding key
          must be communicated to the Token Producer in a manner that can not
          be affected by the man-in-the-middle (who, as we recall, can modify
          redirect URLs and Javascript at the client). Including the referred
          Token Binding message in the Token-Binding header (as opposed to,
          say, including the referred Token Binding key in an application-level
          message as part of the redirect URL) is one way to assure that the
          man-in-the-middle between client and Token Consumer cannot affect the
          communication of the referred Token Binding key to the Token Provider.
        </t>
        <t>
          Therefore, the Token-Binding header in the federated sign-on use case
          contains both, a proof of possession of the provided Token Binding
          key, as well as a proof of possession of the referred Token Binding
          key.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>

  <!--  *****BACK MATTER ***** -->

  <back>
    <!-- References split into informative and normative -->

    <!-- There are 2 ways to insert reference entries from the citation libraries:
     1. define an ENTITY at the top, and use "ampersand character"RFC2629; here (as shown)
     2. simply use a PI "less than character"?rfc include="reference.RFC.2119.xml"?> here
        (for I-Ds: include="reference.I-D.narten-iana-considerations-rfc2434bis.xml")

     Both are cited textually in the same manner: by using xref elements.
     If you use the PI option, xml2rfc will, by default, try to find included files in the same
     directory as the including file. You can also define the XML_LIBRARY environment variable
     with a value containing a set of directories to search.  These can be either in the local
     filing system or remote ones accessed by http (http://domain/dir/... ).-->

    <references title="Normative References">
      &RFC2119;
      &RFC5246;
      &RFC7301;
      &RFC2616;
      &RFC5705;
      &RFC5929;
      &RFC4492;
      &RFC5226;
      <reference anchor="TBPROTO">
        <front>
          <title>The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0</title>
          <author initials="A." surname="Popov">
            <organization>Microsoft</organization>
          </author>
          <date year="2014" />
        </front>
      </reference>
      <?rfc include="reference.I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-compression.xml"?>
    </references>

    <references title="Informative References">
      <?rfc include="reference.I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2.xml"?>
      <?rfc include="reference.I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash.xml"?>

      <reference anchor="TRIPLE-HS">
        <front>
          <title>Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters: Breaking and Fixing Authentication over 
          TLS. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy</title>
          <author initials="K." surname="Bhargavan">
            <organization>Inria Paris-Rocquencourt</organization>
          </author>
          <author initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud">
            <organization>Inria Paris-Rocquencourt</organization>
          </author>
          <author initials="C." surname="Fournet">
            <organization>Inria Paris-Rocquencourt</organization>
          </author>
          <author initials="A." surname="Pironti">
            <organization>Inria Paris-Rocquencourt</organization>
          </author>
          <author initials="P." surname="Strub">
            <organization>Inria Paris-Rocquencourt</organization>
          </author>
          <date year="2014" />
        </front>
      </reference>
    </references>

    <!-- Change Log
      v00 2014-08-21  Andrei Popov   Initial version
      v00 2015-03-27  Andrei Popov   Renamed as tokbind WG draft
      v01 2015-06-30  Dirk Balfanz   Added Sec- prefix to header
      v02 2015-06-30  Dirk Balfanz   Removed Sec- prefix, added design rationalization in Security Considerations section
    -->
  </back>
</rfc>

PAFTECH AB 2003-20262026-04-24 05:22:02