One document matched: draft-ietf-sip-saml-02.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-sip-saml-01.txt
SIP H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft Nokia Siemens Networks
Intended status: Standards Track J. Hodges
Expires: November 29, 2007 J. Peterson
NeuStar, Inc.
J. Polk
Cisco
D. Sicker
CU Boulder
May 28, 2007
SIP SAML Profile and Binding
draft-ietf-sip-saml-02.txt
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Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
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Abstract
This document specifies a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) profile
of Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) as well as a SAML SIP
binding. The defined SIP SAML Profile composes with the mechanisms
defined in the SIP Identity specification and satisfy requirements
presented in "Trait-based Authorization Requirements for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. SAML Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. SAML Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Abstract Request/Response Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Specification Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Employing SAML in SIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. SIP SAML Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. AS-driven SIP SAML URI-based Attribute Assertion
Fetch Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1.1. Required Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1.2. Profile Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1.3. Profile Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.1.4. Assertion Profile Description . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.1.5. Assertion Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. SAML SIP Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.1. SAML HTTP-URI-based SIP Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8. Example SAML Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9.1. Man-in-the-middle Attacks and Stolen Assertions . . . . . 30
9.2. Forged Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9.3. Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
13. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Appendix A. Appendix: Use-case Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A.1. PSTN-to-SIP Phone Call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A.2. SIP Conferencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
A.3. Compensation using SIP and SAML . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 46
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1. Introduction
This document specifies composition of the Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) V2.0 with SIP [RFC3261] in order to accommodate
richer authorization mechanisms and enable "trait-based
authorization." Trait-based authorization is where one is authorized
to make use of some resource based on roles or traits rather than
ones identifier(s). Motivations for trait-based authorization, along
with use-case scenarios, are presented in [RFC4484].
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) v2.0, "SAMLv2", is an XML-
based framework for creating and exchanging security information.
[OASIS.sstc-saml-exec-overview-2.0-cd-01] and
[OASIS.sstc-saml-tech-overview-2.0-draft-08] provide non-normative
overviews of SAMLv2. The SAMLv2 specification set is normatively
defined by [OASIS.saml-conformance-2.0-os].
Various means of providing trait-based authorization exist:
authorization certificates [RFC3281], SPKI [RFC2693], or extensions
to the authenticated identity body [RFC3893]. The authors selected
SAML due to its increasing use in environments such as the Liberty
Alliance, and the Internet2 project, areas where the applicability to
SIP is widely desired.
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The SIP network element "Authentication Service" is introduced in
[RFC4474]. We reuse this term to refer to a network element that
authenticates and authorizes a user and creates a "SIP identity
assertion". This system entity is the logical equivalent of a "SAML
Authority" in the SAML terminology.
For overall SIP terminology, see [RFC3261].
In this specification, the term, or term component, "SAML" refers to
SAML V2.0 in all cases. For example, the term "SAML assertion"
implicitly means "SAMLv2 assertion". For overall SAML terminology,
see [OASIS.saml-glossary-2.0-os].
The below list maps other various SIP terms to their SAML
(rough-)equivalents:
Element, Network Element:
System Entity, Entity
Authentication Service:
SAML Authority
Invitee, Invited User, Called Party, Callee:
Relying Party
Server, User Agent Server (UAS):
SAML Responder
User Agent Client (UAC), client:
SAML Requester
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Additional terms defined in the context of this specification:
profile attribute(s):
one or more attributes of a "user profile".
user profile, subject profile:
the set of various attributes accompanying (i.e., mapped to) a
user account in many environments.
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3. SAML Introduction
SAML [OASIS.sstc-saml-exec-overview-2.0-cd-01]
[OASIS.sstc-saml-tech-overview-2.0-draft-08] defines an XML-based
framework for exchanging "security assertions" between entities. In
the course of making, or relying upon such assertions, SAML system
entities may use SAML protocols, or other protocols, to communicate
an assertion itself, or the subject of an assertion.
Thus one can employ SAML to make and encode statements such as "Alice
has these profile attributes and her domain's certificate is
available over there, and I'm making this statement, and here's who I
am." Then one can cause such an assertion to be conveyed to some
party who can then rely on it in some fashion for some purpose, for
example input it into some local policy evaluation for access to some
resource. This is done in a particular "context of use". Such a
context of use could be, for example, deciding whether to accept and
act upon a SIP-based invitation to initiate a communication session.
The specification of how SAML is employed in a particular context of
use is known as a "SAML profile". The specification of how SAML
assertions and/or protocol messages are conveyed in, or over, another
protocol is known as a "SAML Binding". Typically, a SAML profile
specifies the SAML bindings that may be used in its context. Both
SAML profiles and SAML bindings reference other SAML specifications,
especially the SAML Assertions and Protocols, aka "SAML Core",
specification [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os].
There is an additional subtle aspect of SAML profiles that is worth
highlighting -- the notion of a "SAML assertion profile". A SAML
assertion profile is the specification of the assertion contents in
the context of a particular SAML profile. It is possibly further
qualified by a particular implementation and/or deployment context.
Condensed examples of SAML assertion profiles are:
o The SAML assertion must contain at least one authentication
statement and no other statements. The relying party must be
represented in the <AudienceRestriction> element. The
SubjectConfirmation Method must be Foo. etc.
o The SAML assertion must contain at least one attribute statement
and may contain more than one. The values for the subject's
profile attributes named "Foo" and "Bar" must be present. An
authentication statement may be present. etc.
The primary facets of SAML itself are:
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o Assertions
o Abstract Request/Response protocol
We describe each in turn below:
3.1. SAML Assertions
A SAML assertion is a package of information including issuer and
subject, conditions and advice, and/or attribute statements, and/or
authentication statements and/or other statements. Statements may or
may not be present. The SAML assertion "container" itself contains
the following information:
Issuing information:
Who issued the assertion, when was it issued and the assertion
identifier.
Subject information:
The name of the subject, the security domain and optional subject
information, like public key.
Conditions under which the assertion is valid:
Special kind of conditions like assertion validity period,
audience restriction and target restriction.
Additional advice:
Explaining how the assertion was made, for example.
In terms of SAML assertions containing SAML attribute statements or
SAML authentication statements, here are explanatory examples:
With a SAML assertion containing a SAML attribute statement, an
issuing authority is asserting that the subject is associated with
certain attributes with certain subject profile attribute values.
For example, user jon@cs.example.com is associated with the
attribute "Department", which has the value "Computer Science".
With a SAML assertion containing a SAML authentication statement,
an issuing authority is asserting that the subject was
authenticated by certain means at a certain time.
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With a SAML assertion containing both a SAML attribute statement
and a SAML authentication statement, an issuing authority is
asserting the union of the above.
3.2. Abstract Request/Response Protocol
SAML defines an abstract request/response protocol for obtaining
assertions. See Section 3 "SAML Protocols" of
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]. A request asks for an assertion. A
response returns the requested assertion or an error. This abstract
protocol may then be cast into particular contexts of use by binding
it to specific underlying protocols, e.g., HTTP or SIP, and
"profiling" it for the specific use case at hand. The SAML HTTP-
based web single sign-on profile is one such example (see Section 4.1
Web Browser SSO Profile of [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os]). Trait-
based SIP communication session establishment, the topic of this
specification, is another.
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4. Specification Scope
The scope of this specification is:
o Specify a SIP profile of SAML -- aka a "SIP SAML profile" -- such
that a subject's profile attributes, and their domain's
certificate, can be conveyed to a relying party using SAML. In
doing so, satisfy the requirements outlined in [RFC4484], and
compose with [RFC4474].
The following are outside the scope of this specification:
o Defining a means for configuring the runtime behavior, or
deployment characteristics, of the Authentication Service.
Discussion:
For example, a SIP Authentication Service could be implemented
such that its SAML-based features are employed, or not, on a
subject-by-subject basis, and/or on a domain-by-domain basis.
o The definition of specific conveyed subject profile attributes
(aka traits).
Discussion:
This specification defines a facility enabling "trait-based
authorization" as discussed in [RFC4484].
The attributes of interest in trait-based authorization will be
ones akin to, for example: roles, organizational membership,
access rights, or authentication event context. Definition of
such attributes is application- and/or deployment-context-
dependent and are not defined in this specification. However, The
SAMLv2 specification defines several "SAML Attribute Profiles" for
encoding attributes from various application domains, e.g., LDAP,
UUID/GUID, DCE PAC, and XACML, in SAML assertions
[OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os].
In order for any trait-based system to be practical, participating
entities must agree on attributes and traits that will be conveyed
and subsequently relied upon. Without such agreements, a trait-
based system cannot be usefully deployed. This specification does
not discuss the manner in which participating entites might
discover one another or agree on the syntax and semantics of
attributes and traits.
Note that SAMLv2 specifies a "metadata" facility that may be
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useful in addressing this need.
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5. Employing SAML in SIP
Employing SAML in SIP necessitates devising a new SAML profile(s) and
binding(s) because the those already specified in the SAMLv2
specification set are specific to other use contexts, e.g., HTTP-
based web browsing. Although SIP bears some similarity to HTTP, it
is a seperately distinct protocol, thus requiring specification of
SIP-specific SAML profile(s) and binding(s). This is technically
straightforward as both SAML and SIP are explicitly extensible.
The "Authenticated Identity Management in SIP" specification
[RFC4474] (aka "SIP Identity") facilitates the composition of SAML
and SIP in that it defines a "mediated authentication architecture"
where verifying endpoints verify SIP identity assertions -- i.e., the
"Identity" header value -- signed by an Authentication Service (AS).
The semantic being that the AS is vouching that it did indeed
authenticate the calling party.
Such an Authentication Service, which likely has access to various
pieces of information concerning the calling party, could also act as
a SAML Authority, and make such information available to the callee
via SAML.
Since [RFC4474] stipulates that the AS must make its certificate
available for retrieval and convey the availability and access
mechanism via a URI, in the Identity-Info header, we have an
opportunity to compose SIP Identity and SAML.
Such composition can be accomplished by having the resource referred
to by the URI in the Identity-Info be a SAML assertion conveying both
the AS's certificate and user profile attributes. This is the
approach defined in this specification. Figure 1 illustrates this
approach in a high-level summary fashion. Figure 2, further below,
illustrates additional details.
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+--------+ +--------------+ +--------+
|Alice@ | |Authentication| | Bob@ |
|example | |Service | |example2|
|.com | |@example.com | |.com |
| | | | | |
+---+----+ +------+-------+ +---+----+
| | |
| INVITE | |
|---------------------->| |
| From:alice@foo.com | |
| | |
| 407 Proxy auth. req. | |
|<----------------------| |
| Challenge | |
| | |
| ACK | |
|---------------------->| |
| | |
| INVITE w/authn creds | |
|---------------------->| |
| | INVITE |
| | w/Identity header |
| |--------------------->|
| | and Identity-Info |
| | |
| | HTTP GET SAML assn |
| |<==================== |
| | and domain cert |
| | |
| | HTTP 200 OK + assn |
| |=====================>|
| | and domain cert |
| 200 OK | |
|<----------------------+----------------------|
| | |
Figure 1: SIP-SAML-based Network Asserted Identity
Since the AS already being trusted to create and add the Identity
header containing the SIP Identity Assertion, and to supply a pointer
to its domain certificate, having it point instead to a SAML
assertion conveying the domain certificate and possibly some user
profile attributes, does not significantly alter the first-order
security considerations examined in [RFC4474]. This specification
provides some additional security considerations analysis below in
Section 9.
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6. SIP SAML Profiles
This section defines one SIP SAML profile:
The "AS-driven SIP SAML URI-based Attribute Assertion Fetch
Profile"
6.1. AS-driven SIP SAML URI-based Attribute Assertion Fetch Profile
6.1.1. Required Information
The information given in this section is similar to the info provided
when registering something, a MIME Media Type, say, with IANA. In
this case, it is for registering this profile with the OASIS SSTC.
See Section 2 "Specification of Additional Profiles" in
[OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os].
Identification:
urn:ietf:params:sip:sip-saml-profile:as:uri:attr:1.0
@@ NOTE: This URN must be agreed upon, and then registered with
IANA per [RFC3553].
Contact Information:
@@ someone's or something's contact info goes here
SAML Confirmation Method Identifiers:
The SAML V2.0 "{bearer,hok,?}" confirmation method identifier is
used in this profile.
Description:
Given below.
Updates:
None.
6.1.2. Profile Overview
Figure 2 illustrates this profile's overall protocol flow. The
following steps correspond to the labeled interactions in the figure.
Within an individual step, there may be one or more actual message
exchanges depending upon the protocol binding employed for that
particular step and other implementation-dependent behavior.
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Although this profile is overview is cast in terms of a SIP INVITE
transaction, the reader should note that the mechanism specified
herein, and in [RFC4474], may be applied to any SIP request message.
Figure 2 begins on the next page.
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+------------------+ +------------------+ +-----------------+
| Caller | |Authn Service (AS)| | Callee |
|Alice@example.com | | @example.com | | Bob@example2.com|
+--------+---------+ +--------+---------+ +--------+--------+
- - | | | (steps)
^ ^ | INVITE | |
| | |---------------------->| | (1a)
| | From:alice@foo.com | |
| C | To:sip:bob@example.com| |
| S | | |
| e | 407 Proxy auth. req. | |
| q |<----------------------| | (1b)
| = | Challenge | |
| N | | |
| | ACK | |
| | |---------------------->| | (1c)
| V | | |
| - | | |
^ | INVITE + authorization| |
D | | header w/ creds | |
| |---------------------->| | (2)
I | | From:alice@foo.com | |
| | To:sip:bob@example.com| |
A | Proxy-Authorization:..| |
C | | INVITE |
L S | |--------------------->| (3)
e | | From:alice@foo.com |
O q | | To:sip:bob@example2.com
| | Identity: ..... |
G = | | Identity-Info: |
| | https://example.com|
| N | | /assns/?ID=abcde |
| | | |
| + | |URI resolution (eg. HTTP)
| | |<=====================| (4)
| 1 | | GET /assns/?ID=abcde |
| | | |
| | | | HTTP/1.1 200 OK |
| | | |=====================>| (5)
| | | | <saml:Assertion> |
| | | | <saml:Subject> |
| | | | <saml:NameID> |
| | | | Alice@example.com
| | | | <saml:SubjConf>
| | | | <saml:SubjConfData>
| | | | <ds:KeyInfo>...
| | | | <saml:AttrStatement>
| | | | foo=bar |
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| | | 200 OK | |
| V |<----------------------+----------------------| (6)
. - | | |
V
Figure 2: AS-driven SIP SAML Attribute Fetch Profile: Example INVITE
Transaction
Step 1. Initial SIP Transaction between Caller and AS
This optional initial step is comprised of substeps 1a, 1b,
and 1c in Figure 2. In this step, the caller, Alice, sends
a SIP request message, illustrated as an INVITE, indicating
Bob as the callee (1a), is subsequently challenged by the AS
(1b), and sends an ACK in response to the challenge (1c).
The latter message signals the completion of this SIP
transaction (which is an optional substep of this profile).
Step 2. Caller sends SIP Request Message with Authorization
Credentials to the AS
Alice then sends an INVITE message in response to the
challenge, or uses cached credentials for the domain if step
1 was skipped, as specified in [RFC4474] and [RFC3261].
Depending on the chosen SIP security mechanism for client
authentication either digest authentication, client side
authentication of Transport Layer Security, or a combination
of both is used to provide the AS with a strong assurance
about the identity of Alice.
Step 3. AS Authorizes the SIP Request and Forwards it to Callee
First, the AS authorizes the received INVITE message as
specified in [RFC4474] and [RFC3261]. If the authorization
is successful, the AS will form the "identity signature" for
the message and add Identity and Identity-Info header fields
to the message. The AS also at this time constructs and
caches a SAML assertion asserting Alice's profile attributes
required by Bob's domain (example2.com), and also containing
a the domain's (example.com) public key certificate, or a
reference to it. This certificate MUST contain the public
key corresponding to the private key used to construct the
signature whose value was placed in the Identity header.
The AS constructs a HTTP-based SAML URI Reference
incorporating the assertion's Assertion ID (see section
2.3.3 of [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]). The AS uses this URI as
the value for the Identity-Info header it adds to the INVITE
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message.
The AS determines which profile attributes (if any) to
assert in the <AttributeStatement> via local configuration
and/or obtaining example2.com's metadata
[OASIS.saml-metadata-2.0-os]. The AS then sends the updated
INVITE message to Bob.
Step 4. Callee Dereferences HTTP-based SAML URI Reference
Bob's UAC or SIP Proxy receives the message and begins
verifying it per the "Verifier Behavior" specified in
[RFC4474]. In order to accomplish this task, it needs to
obtain Alice's domain certificate. It obtains the HTTP-
based SAML URI Reference from the message's Identity-Info
header and dereferences it per Section 7.1. Note that this
is not a SIP message, but an HTTP message [RFC2616].
Step 5. AS Returns SAML Assertion
Upon receipt of the above HTTP request, which contains an
embedded reference to Alice's SAML Assertion, Alice's AS
returns her assertion in an HTTP response message.
Upon receipt of Alice's SAML Assertion, the AS continues its
verification of the INVITE message. If successful, it
returns a 200 OK message directly to Alice. Otherwise it
returns an appropriate SIP error response.
Step 6. Callee Returns SIP 200 OK to Caller
If Bob determines, based upon Alice's identity as asserted
by the AS, and as further substantiated by the information
in the SAML assertion, to accept the INVITE, he returns a
SIP 200 OK message directly to Alice.
6.1.3. Profile Description
The following sections provide detailed definitions of the individual
profile steps. The relevant illustration is Figure 3, below. Note
that this profile is agnostic to the specific SIP request, and also
that the Sender and Authentication Service (AS) may be seperate or
co-located in actuality.
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+------------------+ +------------------+ +------------------+
| Sender | |Authn Service (AS)| | Verifier |
| (UAC) | | (Sender's) | |(UAS or Proxy Svr)|
+--------+---------+ +--------+---------+ +--------+---------+
| | | (steps)
| SIP Request | |
|---------------------->| | (1a)
| | |
| 407 Proxy auth. req. | |
|<----------------------| | (1b)
| Challenge | |
| | |
| ACK | |
|---------------------->| | (1c)
| | |
| | |
|SIP Req + authorization| |
| header w/ creds | |
|---------------------->| | (2)
| | |
| | |
| | SIP Req + Ident & |
| | authz headers |
| |--------------------->| (3)
| | |
| | URI resolution |
| |<=====================| (4)
| | (via HTTP) |
| | |
| | HTTP/1.1 200 OK |
| |=====================>| (5)
| | |
| | |
| | ? | (6)
| | |
Figure 3: AS-driven SIP SAML Attribute Fetch Profile: Message Flow
6.1.3.1. Initial SIP Transaction between Sender and AS
This OPTIONAL step maps to Steps 1 and 2 of Section 5 "Authentication
Service Behavior" of [RFC4474]. If the SIP request sent by the
caller in substep 1a is deemed insufficiently authenticated by the AS
per the rules stipulated by [RFC4474] Steps 1 and 2, then the AS MUST
authenticate the sender of the message. The particulars of how this
is accomplished depend upon implementation and/or deployment
instantiation as discussed in [RFC4474]. Substeps 1b and 1c as shown
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in Figure 3 are non-normative and illustrative only.
6.1.3.2. Sender sends SIP Request Message with Authorization
Credentials to the AS
This step maps to Steps 1 and 2 of Section 5 "Authentication Service
Behavior" of [RFC4474]. This request is presumed to be made in a
context such that the AS will not challenge it -- i.e., the AS will
consider the sender of the message to be authenticated. If this is
not true, then this procedure reverts back to Step 1, above.
Otherwise, the AS carries out all other processing of the message as
stipulated in [RFC4474] Steps 1 and 2, and if successful, this
procedure procedes to the next step below.
6.1.3.3. AS Authorizes the SIP Request and Forwards it to Verifier
This first portion of this step maps to Steps 3 and 4 of Section 5
"Authentication Service Behavior" of [RFC4474], which the AS MUST
perform, although with the following additional substeps:
The AS MUST construct a SAML assertion according to the "Assertion
Profile Description" specified in Section 6.1.4 of this
specification.
The AS SHOULD construct an HTTPS, and MAY construct an HTTP, URI
per Section "3.7.5.1 URI Syntax" of [OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os].
The AS MUST use the URI constructed in the immediately preceding
substep as the value of the Identity-Info header that is added to
the SIP request message per Step 4 of Section 5 of [RFC4474].
Upon successful completion of all of the above, the AS forwards the
request message.
At this point in this step, after perhaps traversing some number of
intermediaries, the SIP request message arrives at a SIP network
entity performing the "verifier" role. This role and its behavior
are specified in Section 6 "Verifier Behavior" of [RFC4474]. The
verifier MUST perform the steps enumerated in the aforementioned
section, with the following modifications:
Step 1 of [RFC4474] Section 6 maps to and is updated by, the
following two steps in this procedure.
Steps 2, 3, and 4 of [RFC4474] Section 6 may be mapped across this
latter portion of this step, and/or the following two steps, as
appropriate.
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6.1.3.4. Verifier Dereferences HTTP-based SAML URI Reference
The verifier SHOULD ascertain whether it has a current cached copy of
the SIP message sender's SAML assertion and domain certificate. If
not, or if the verifier chooses to (e.g., due to local policy), it
MUST dereference the the HTTP-based SAML URI Reference found in the
SIP message's Identity-Info header. To do so, the verifier MUST
employ the "SAML HTTP-URI-based SIP Binding" specified in
Section 7.1.
6.1.3.5. AS Returns SAML Assertion
This step also employs Section 7.1 "SAML HTTP-URI-based SIP Binding".
If the prior step returns an HTTP error (e.g., 4xx series), then this
procedure terminates and the verifier returns (upstream) a SIP 436
'Bad Identity-Info' Response code.
Otherwise, the HTTP response message will contain a SAML assertion
and be denoted as such via the MIME media type of "application/
samlassertion+xml" [IANA.application.samlassertion-xml]. The
verifier MUST perform the verification steps specified in
Section 6.1.5 "Assertion Verification", below. If successful, then
this procedure continues with the next step.
6.1.3.6. Verifier performs Next Step
The SIP request was successfully processed. The verifier now
performs its next step, which depends at least in part on the type of
SIP request it received.
6.1.4. Assertion Profile Description
This section defines the particulars of how the sender, i.e., the
SAML Authority, MUST construct certain portions of the SAML
assertions it issues. The schema for SAML assertions themselves is
defined in Section 2.3 of [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os].
An example SAML assertion, formulated according to this profile is
given in Section 8.
Overall SAML assertion profile requirements:
The SAML assertion MUST be signed by the same key as used to sign
the contents of the Identity header field. Signing of SAML
assertions is defined in Section 5.4 of [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os].
In the following subsections, the SAML assertion profile is specified
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element-by-element, in a top-down, depth-first manner, beginning with
the outermost element, "<Assertion>". Where applicable, the
requirements for an element's XML attributes are also stated, as a
part of the element's description. Requirements for any given
element or XML attribute are only stated when, in the context of use
of this profile, they are not already sufficiently defined by
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os].
6.1.4.1. Element: <Assertion>
Attribute: ID
The value for the ID XML attribute SHOULD be allocated randomly
such that the value meets the randomness requirments specified in
Section 1.3.4 of [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os].
Attribute: IssueInstant
The value for the IssueInstant XML attribute SHOULD be set at the
time the SAML assertion is created (and cached for subsequent
retrieval). This time instant value MAY be temporally the same as
that encoded in the SIP message's Date header, and MUST be at
least temporally later, although it is RECOMMENDED that it not be
10 minutes or more later.
6.1.4.1.1. Element: <Issuer>
The value for the Issuer XML element MUST be a value that matches
either the Issuer or the Issuer Alternative Name fields [RFC3280] in
the certificate conveyed by the SAML assertion in the ds:
X509Certificate element located on this path within the SAML
assertion:
<Assertion
<ds:Signature
<ds:KeyInfo
<ds:X509Data
<ds:X509Certificate
6.1.4.1.2. Element: <Subject>
The <Subject> element SHOULD contain both a <NameID> element and a
<SubjectConfirmation> element.
The value of the <NameID> element MUST be the same as the Address of
Record (AoR) value used in computing the "signed-identity-digest"
which forms the value of the Identity header. See Section 9 of
[RFC4474].
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The <SubjectConfirmation> element attribute Method SHOULD be set to
the value:
urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:sender-vouches
Although it MAY be set to some other implementation- and/or
deployment-specific value. The <SubjectConfirmation> element itself
SHOULD be empty.
6.1.4.1.3. Element: <Conditions>
The <Conditions> element SHOULD contain an <AudienceRestriction>
element, which itself SHOULD contain an <Audience> element. The
value of the <Audience> element SHOULD be the same as the addr-spec
of the SIP request's To header field.
The following XML attributes of the <Conditions> element MUST be set
as follows:
Attribute: NotBefore
The value of the NotBefore XML attribute MUST be set to a time
instant the same as the value for the IssueInstant XML attribute
discussed above, or to a later time.
Attribute: NotOnOrAfter
The value of the NotOnOrAfter XML attribute MUST be set to a time
instant later than the value for NotBefore.
6.1.4.1.4. Element: <AttributeStatement>
The SAML assertion MAY contain an <AttributeStatement> element. If
so, the <AttributeStatement> element will contain attribute-value
pairs, e.g., of a user profile nature, encoded according to either
one of the "SAML Attribute Profiles" as specified in
[OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os], or encoded in some implementation-
and/or deployment-specific attribute profile.
The attribute-value pairs SHOULD in fact pertain to the entity
identified in the SIP From header field, since a SAML assertion
formulated per this overall section is stating that they do.
6.1.5. Assertion Verification
This section specifies the steps that a verifier participating in
this profile MUST perform in addition to the "Verifier Behavior"
specified in Section 6 of [RFC4474].
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The steps are:
1. Before Step 1 in Section 6 of [RFC4474], the verifier MUST
extract the AS's domain certificate from the <ds:
X509Certificate> XML element at the end of the element path
given in Section 6.1.4.1.1.
2. Perform Step 1 in Section 6 of [RFC4474].
3. After Step 1 in Section 6 of [RFC4474], but before Step 2 of
that section, the verifier MUST verify the SAML assertion's
signature via the procedures specified in Section 5.4 of
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] as well as [W3C.xmldsig-core].
@@ TODO: do we need to define a new SIP error response code for
when a SAML assn signature is bad? e.g., '4xx Invalid SAML
asssertion'.
4. Perform Step 2 in Section 6 of [RFC4474].
5. Verify that the signer of the SIP message's Identity header
field is the same as the signer of the SAML assertion.
6. Perform Steps 3 and 4 in Section 6 of [RFC4474].
7. Verify that the SAML assertion's <Issuer> element value matches
the Issuer or the Issuer Alternative Name fields [RFC3280] in
the AS's domain certificate.
8. Verify that the SAML assertion's <NameID> element value is the
same as the Address of Record (AoR) value in the "signed-
identity-digest". See Section 9 of [RFC4474].
9. Verify that the SAML assertion's <SubjectConfirmation> element
value is set to whichever value was configured at
implementation- or deployment-time. The default value is:
urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:sender-vouches
10. Verify that the SAML assertion contains an <Audience> element,
and that its value matches the value of the addr-spec of the SIP
To header field.
11. Verify that the validity period denoted by the NotBefore and
NotOnOrAfter attributes of the <Conditions> element meets the
requirements given in Section 6.1.4.1.3.
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7. SAML SIP Binding
This section specifies one SAML SIP Binding at this time. Additional
bindings may be specified in future revisions of this specification.
7.1. SAML HTTP-URI-based SIP Binding
This section specifies the "SAML HTTP-URI-based SIP Binding",
(SHUSB).
The SHUSB is a profile of the "SAML URI Binding" specified in Section
3.7 of [OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os]. The SAML URI Binding specifies
a means by which SAML assertions can be referenced by URIs and thus
be obtained through resolution of such URIs.
This profile of the SAML URI Binding is congruent with the SAML URI
Binding -- including support for HTTP-based URIs being mandatory to
implement -- except for the following further restrictions which are
specified in the interest of interoperability (section numbers refer
to [OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os]):
Section 3.7.5.3 Security Considerations:
Support for TLS 1.0 or SSL 3.0 is mandatory to implement.
Section 3.7.5.4 Error Reporting:
All SHOULDs in this section are to be interpreted as MUSTs.
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8. Example SAML Assertions
This section presents two examples of a SAML assertion, one unsigned
(for clarity), the other signed (for accuracy).
In the first example, Figure 5, the assertion is attesting with
respect to the subject (lines 7-15) "Alice@example.com" (line 11).
The validity conditions are expressed in lines 16-23, via both a
validity period expressed as temporal endpoints, and an "audience
restriction" stating that this assertion's semantics are valid for
only the relying party named "example2.com". Also, the assertion's
issuer is noted in lines 4-5.
The above items correspond to some aspects of this specification's
SAML assertion profile, as noted below in Security Considerations
dicussions, see: Section 9.1 and Section 9.2.
In lines 24-36, Alice's telephone number is conveyed, in a "typed"
fashion, using LDAP/X.500 schema as the typing means.
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1 <Assertion ID="_a75adf55-01d7-40cc-929f-dbd8372ebdfc"
2 IssueInstant="2003-04-17T00:46:02Z" Version="2.0"
3 xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
4 <Issuer>
5 example.com
6 </Issuer>
7 <Subject>
8 <NameID
9 Format=
10 "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress">
11 Alice@example.com
12 </NameID>
13 <SubjectConfirmation
14 Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:sender-vouches"/>
15 </Subject>
16 <Conditions NotBefore="2003-04-17T00:46:02Z"
17 NotOnOrAfter="2003-04-17T00:51:02Z">
18 <AudienceRestriction>
19 <Audience>
20 example2.com
21 </Audience>
22 </AudienceRestriction>
23 </Conditions>
24 <AttributeStatement>
25 <saml:Attribute
26 xmlns:x500=
27 "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:profiles:attribute:X500"
28 NameFormat=
29 "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"
30 Name="urn:oid:2.5.4.20"
31 FriendlyName="telephoneNumber">
32 <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">
33 +1-888-555-1212
34 </saml:AttributeValue>
35 </saml:Attribute>
36 </AttributeStatement>
37 </Assertion>
Figure 5: Unsigned SAML Assertion Illustrating Conveyance of
Subject Attribute
In the second example, Figure 6, the information described above is
the same, the addition is that this version of the assertion is
signed. All the signature information is conveyed in the <ds:
signature> element, lines 7-47. Thus this assertion's origin and its
integrity are assured. Since this assertion is the same as the one
in the first example above, other than having a signature added, the
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second example below addresses the same Security Considerations
aspects, plus those requiring a Signature.
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1 <Assertion ID="_a75adf55-01d7-40cc-929f-dbd8372ebdfc"
2 IssueInstant="2003-04-17T00:46:02Z" Version="2.0"
3 xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
4 <Issuer>
5 example.com
6 </Issuer>
7 <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
8 <ds:SignedInfo>
9 <ds:CanonicalizationMethod
10 Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
11 <ds:SignatureMethod
12 Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
13 <ds:Reference
14 URI="#_a75adf55-01d7-40cc-929f-dbd8372ebdfc">
15 <ds:Transforms>
16 <ds:Transform
17 Algorithm=
18 "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
19 <ds:Transform
20 Algorithm=
21 "http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
22 <InclusiveNamespaces
23 PrefixList="#default saml ds xs xsi"
24 xmlns=
25 "http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
26 </ds:Transform>
27 </ds:Transforms>
28 <ds:DigestMethod
29 Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
30 <ds:DigestValue>
31 Kclet6XcaOgOWXM4gty6/UNdviI=
32 </ds:DigestValue>
33 </ds:Reference>
34 </ds:SignedInfo>
35 <ds:SignatureValue>
36 hq4zk+ZknjggCQgZm7ea8fI7...Hr7wHxvCCRwubfZ6RqVL+wNmeWI4=
37 </ds:SignatureValue>
38 <ds:KeyInfo>
39 <ds:X509Data>
40 <ds:X509Certificate>
41 MIICyjCCAjOgAwIBAgICAnUwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgakxNVBAYTAlVT
42 MRIwEAYDVQQIEwlXaXNjb ..... dnP6Hr7wHxvCCRwubnZAv2FU78pLX
43 8I3bsbmRAUg4UP9hH6ABVq4KQKMknxu1xQxLhpR1ylGPdioG8cCx3w/w==
44 </ds:X509Certificate>
45 </ds:X509Data>
46 </ds:KeyInfo>
47 </ds:Signature>
48 <Subject>
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49 <NameID
50 Format=
51 "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress">
52 Alice@example.com
53 </NameID>
54 <SubjectConfirmation
55 Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:sender-vouches"/>
56 </Subject>
57 <Conditions NotBefore="2003-04-17T00:46:02Z"
58 NotOnOrAfter="2003-04-17T00:51:02Z">
59 <AudienceRestriction>
60 <Audience>
61 example2.com
62 </Audience>
63 </AudienceRestriction>
64 </Conditions>
65 <AttributeStatement>
66 <saml:Attribute
67 xmlns:x500=
68 "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:profiles:attribute:X500"
69 NameFormat=
70 "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"
71 Name="urn:oid:2.5.4.20"
72 FriendlyName="telephoneNumber">
73 <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">
74 +1-888-555-1212
75 </saml:AttributeValue>
76 </saml:Attribute>
77 </AttributeStatement>
78 </Assertion>
Figure 6: Signed SAML Assertion Illustrating Conveyance of Subject
Attribute
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9. Security Considerations
This section discusses security considerations when using SAML with
SIP.
9.1. Man-in-the-middle Attacks and Stolen Assertions
Threat:
By making SAML assertions available via HTTP-based requests by a
potentially unbounded set of requesters, it is conceivably
possible that anyone would be able to simply request one and
obtain it. By SIP intermediaries on the signaling path for
example. Or, an HTTP intermediary/proxy could intercept the
assertion as it is being returned to a requester.
The attacker could then conceivably attempt to impersonate the
subject (the putative caller) to some SIP-based target entity.
Countermeasures:
Such an attack is implausible for several reasons. The primary
reason is that a message constructed by an imposter using a stolen
assertion that conveys the public key certificate of some domain
will not verify per [RFC4474] because the imposter will not have
the corresponding private key with which to generate the signed
Identity header value.
Also, the SIP SAML assertion profile specified herein that the
subject's SAML assertion must adhere to causes it to be not useful
to arbitrary parties. The subject's assertion:
* should be signed, thus causing any alterations to break its
integrity and make such alterations detectable.
* does not contain an authentication statement. Thus no parties
implementing this specification should be relying on SAML
assertions specified herein as sufficient in and of themselves
to allow access to resources.
* relying party is represented in the SAML assertion's Audience
Restriction.
* Issuer is represented in the SAML assertion.
* validity period for assertion is restricted.
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* etc.
9.2. Forged Assertion
Threat:
A malicious user could forge or alter a SAML assertion in order to
communicate with the SIP entities.
Countermeasures:
To avoid this kind of attack, the entities must assure that proper
mechanisms for protecting the SAML assertion are employed, e.g.,
signing the SAML assertion itself. Section 5.1 of
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] specifies the signing of SAML assertions.
Additionally, the assertion content dictated by the SAML assertion
profile herein ensures ample evidence for a relying party to
verify the assertion and its relationship with the received SIP
request.
9.3. Replay Attack
Threat:
Theft of SIP message protected by the mechanisms described herein
and replay of it at a later time.
Countermeasures:
There are various provisions within [RFC4474] that prevent a
replay attack.
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10. Contributors
The authors would like to thank Marcus Tegnander and Henning
Schulzrinne for his contributions to earlier versions of this
document.
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11. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank RL 'Bob' Morgan, Stefan Goeman, Shida
Schubert, Jason Fischl and Vijay Gurbani for their comments to this
draft. The "AS-driven SIP SAML URI-based Attribute Assertion Fetch
Profile" is based on an idea by Jon Peterson.
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12. IANA Considerations
[Editor's Note: A future version of this document will provide IANA
considerations.]
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13. Open Issues
A list of open issues can be found at:
http://www.tschofenig.com:8080/saml-sip/
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14. References
14.1. Normative References
[OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os]
Cantor, S., Hirsch, F., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E.
Maler, "Bindings for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS
Standard saml-bindings-2.0-os, March 2005.
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-
2.0-os, March 2005.
[OASIS.saml-metadata-2.0-os]
Cantor, S., Moreh, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
"Metadata for the Security Assertion Markup Language
(SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-metadata-2.0-os,
March 2005.
[OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os]
Hughes, J., Cantor, S., Hodges, J., Hirsch, F., Mishra,
P., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Profiles for the OASIS
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS
Standard OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os, March 2005.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2392] Levinson, E., "Content-ID and Message-ID Uniform Resource
Locators", RFC 2392, August 1998.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
June 2002.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
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[RFC3515] Sparks, R., "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Refer
Method", RFC 3515, April 2003.
[RFC3553] Mealling, M., Masinter, L., Hardie, T., and G. Klyne, "An
IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol
Parameters", BCP 73, RFC 3553, June 2003.
[RFC3893] Peterson, J., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
Authenticated Identity Body (AIB) Format", RFC 3893,
September 2004.
[RFC4474] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, August 2006.
[RFC4484] Peterson, J., Polk, J., Sicker, D., and H. Tschofenig,
"Trait-Based Authorization Requirements for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4484, August 2006.
[W3C.xmldsig-core]
Eastlake, D., Reagle , J., and D. Solo, "XML-Signature
Syntax and Processing", W3C Recommendation xmldsig-core,
October 2000, <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/>.
14.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sip-content-indirect-mech]
Burger, E., "A Mechanism for Content Indirection in
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Messages",
draft-ietf-sip-content-indirect-mech-05 (work in
progress), October 2004.
[I-D.ietf-sipping-certs]
Jennings, C. and J. Peterson, "Certificate Management
Service for The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
draft-ietf-sipping-certs-03 (work in progress),
March 2006.
[I-D.jennings-sipping-pay]
Jennings, C., "Payment for Services in Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP)", draft-jennings-sipping-pay-05 (work in
progress), October 2006.
[I-D.peterson-message-identity]
Peterson, J., "Security Considerations for Impersonation
and Identity in Messaging Systems",
draft-peterson-message-identity-00 (work in progress),
October 2004.
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[IANA.application.samlassertion-xml]
OASIS Security Services Technical Committee (SSTC),
"application/samlassertion+xml MIME Media Type
Registration", IANA MIME Media Types Registry application/
samlassertion+xml, December 2004.
[OASIS.saml-conformance-2.0-os]
Mishra, P., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Conformance
Requirements for the Security Assertion Markup Language
(SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-conformance-2.0-os,
March 2005.
[OASIS.saml-glossary-2.0-os]
Hodges, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Glossary for the
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS
Standard saml-glossary-2.0-os, March 2005.
[OASIS.saml-sec-consider-2.0-os]
Hirsch, F., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Security and
Privacy Considerations for the OASIS Security Markup
Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-sec-consider-
2.0-os, March 2005.
[OASIS.sstc-saml-exec-overview-2.0-cd-01]
Madsen, P. and E. Maler, "SAML V2.0 Executive Overview",
OASIS SSTC Committee
Draft sstc-saml-exec-overview-2.0-cd-01, April 2005.
[OASIS.sstc-saml-protocol-ext-thirdparty-cd-01]
Cantor, S., "SAML Protocol Extension for Third-Party
Requests", OASIS SSTC Committee Draft sstc-saml-protocol-
ext-thirdparty-cd-01, March 2006.
[OASIS.sstc-saml-tech-overview-2.0-draft-08]
Hughes, J. and E. Maler, "Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML) V2.0 Technical Overview", OASIS SSTC
Working Draft sstc-saml-tech-overview-2.0-draft-08,
September 2005.
[RFC2543] Handley, M., Schulzrinne, H., Schooler, E., and J.
Rosenberg, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 2543,
March 1999.
[RFC2693] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas,
B., and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693,
September 1999.
[RFC3281] Farrell, S. and R. Housley, "An Internet Attribute
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Certificate Profile for Authorization", RFC 3281,
April 2002.
[RFC3323] Peterson, J., "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3323, November 2002.
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Appendix A. Appendix: Use-case Scenarios
This Appendix explores message flows based on various use-case
scenarios in [RFC4484], and from various discussions, to which SAML-
based solutions are applied. Appendix A.2 shows a SIP conferencing
scenario with role-based access control using SAML.
Note that we present these scenarios as illustrations of possible
SAML-based use cases in SIP. This document does not provide a
detailed exposition of these scenarios -- that is left for addtional
documents.
A.1. PSTN-to-SIP Phone Call
Alice, using a phone connected to the PSTN, wants to make a call to
Bob, who resides in a SIP network. Her call is switched through the
PSTN by means of PSTN signaling (outside the scope of this document)
to the PSTN/SIP gateway. At the gateway, the call is converted from
SS7 signaling to SIP signaling. Since Alice's PSTN phone was
previously "authenticated" via PSTN signaling mechanisms, the gateway
is able to assert her phone's identity (e.g., her telephone number)
via SIP Identity and SAML-based mechanisms (e.g., in order to convey
profile attributes) to Bob's SIP proxy, which also dereferences the
URI in the Identity-Info header in order to obtain the SAML assertion
and the PSTN/SIP Gateway's domain certificate. Alice's INVITE is
then forwarded from the SIP/PSTN gateway to Bob's phone, and is
secured via whatever means is locally established in Bob's
administrative domain.
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+-----------+
+----------------------+ | |
| | SS7 | PSTN/SIP |
| Public Switched |--------------------->| Gateway |
| | | |
| | | |
| Telephone Network | +--+-----------+------+
| ^ | | | ^ V |
+---------+------------+ | | ^ V SIP-Ident |
| SS7 | v ^ V +SAML |
| | +--------+ |
O | | Bob's | |
O /|\ <----+----| SIP | |
/|\ / \ SIP | | Proxy | |
/ \ Bob | | | |
Alice | +--------+ |
| SIP based |
| Network |
+---------------------+
Figure 7: PSTN to SIP call
Note that the INVITE emitted by the PSTN/SIP gateway could
alternatively be simply forwarded by Bob's SIP Proxy to Bob's phone,
and Bob's phone could take on the SIP Identity "verifier" role, which
is being played by Bob's SIP proxy in the figure.
Whichever approach is employed is a decision local to Bob's
administrative domain and can be made independently.
A.2. SIP Conferencing
This section is meant to foster discussion about the usage of SAML in
the domain of conferencing. A user agent who routes its SIP message
through the Authentication Service (Asserting Party) towards a
conferencing server may want or need various of her profile
attributes included and may also need to be authenticated by the
conference server. The following properties could be provided by
this procedure:
o The user identity can be replaced to allow the user to be
anonymous with regard to the Focus. This can be accomplished via
[RFC3323] in combination with [RFC4474], per the latter, or,
o The user identity could be asserted to the Focus, via [RFC4474]
mechanisms, and/or,
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o the SAML assertion could provide additional user profile
information such as group membership (belongs to the students,
staff, faculty group of university X). This could, for non-
identity-based authorization systems, imply certain rights.
The corresponding SIP message flow (in high level detail) could have
the following shape:
+-----+ +-----------+ +-----------+
| | | SIP Proxy | | Focus |
|User | |(Asserting | | (Relying |
| | | party) | | party) |
+--+--+ +-----+-----+ +-----+-----+
| INVITE | |
|sip:conf-factory | INVITE |
|------------------>| w/Identity hdr |
| |------------------>|
| | |
| | HTTP GET SAML assn|
| |<==================|
| | and domain cert |
| | |
| | HTTP 200 OK + assn|
| |==================>|
| | and domain cert |
| | |
| | |
| | Ringing |
| Ringing |<------------------|
|<------------------| |
| | |
| | OK |
| OK |<------------------|
|<------------------| |
| | |
| ACK | |
|------------------>| ACK |
| |------------------>|
| | |
| | |
... many more msgs...
Figure 8: SIP Conferencing and SAML
However, there are obvious scaling issues with the conference server
having to do the outbound requests in order to obtain SAML assertions
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and certificates for conference participants.
This could be addressed by creating another SIP SAML Profile where
the caller obtains the necessary information, e.g., SAML assertions,
and places them into its SIP request message prior to sending it.
This would obviate the need for the callee relying party to make
requests in order to obtain said information. This is a topic for
future work, and possibly future revisions of this specification.
A.3. Compensation using SIP and SAML
This section describes a scenario where SAML is used in SIP to
realize compensation functionality as described in
[I-D.jennings-sipping-pay].
Note that this scenario is not directly addressed by the SIP SAML
Profile and SAML SIP Binding presently defined in this specification.
Rather, this use case calls for additional such profiles and bindings
to be developed.
+--------+ +--------+ +--------+
|Payment | | User | |Merchant|
|Provider| | Alice | |Bob |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
+---+----+ +---+----+ +---+----+
| | |
| | 1) Call |
| |------------------------>|
| | |
| | 2) 402 + Payment Offer |
| 3) Request for |<------------------------|
| a Payment | |
|<----------------------| |
| | |
| 4) SAML Assertion | |
| (=Receipt) | |
|---------------------->| |
| | 5) Call + Receipt |
| |------------------------>|
| | |
| | 6) 200 OK |
| |<------------------------|
| | |
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Figure 9: Message flow for SIP payment
User Alice and the Merchant Bob interact with each other using SIP
and the Alice uses HTTP to exchange messages with a Payment Provider.
Initially, Alice makes a call to Bob (1). Bob determines that a
payment is required and includes information about the payment in an
Offer body of a 402 (Payment Required) response to Alice (2). Alice
looks at this Offer and decides to make a payment. Alice therefore
instructs her Payment Provider to make a transfer from Alice"s
account to the Merchants"s account (3) using a request for a SAML
assertion with the extensions defined in this document. The Payment
Provider returns a receipt for this transfer (4). This receipt is a
SAML Assertion. Alice resubmits the call to Bob but this time
provides the Receipt for the transaction (5). Bob determines whether
the Receipt is valid (by checking the digital signature and the
content of the assertion) and continues with the call processing, if
the authorization was succesful.
The Offer contains information about the participating parties (i.e.,
the Payment Provider, the Merchant Bob, and the user Alice), the
transaction amount, the account identifier for Bob at the Payment
Provider, and a replay protection indicator to make it easier for the
Merchant Bob to avoid replay attacks. User Alice includes this
information when making the Request for Payment to the Payment
Provider; adds its own account information and authorization
password; and sends this to the Payment Provider, which produces a
Receipt for the transaction if it is successful. This transfer from
Alice to the Payment Provider is made across an encrypted, integrity
protected channel. The Receipt includes a timestamp when the Payment
Provider made the transaction and protects the Receipt with a digital
signature. Alice resubmits the call to the Merchant Bob with the
Receipt from the Payment Provier. Merchant Bob can check for replay
attacks using the timestamp and a replay protection indiciator
initially provided with the Offer. Bob can then check the signature
is valid using the Payment Provider"s public key.
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Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
Munich, Bavaria 81739
Germany
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
Jeff Hodges
NeuStar, Inc.
2000 Broadway Street
Redwood City, CA 94063
US
Email: Jeff.Hodges@neustar.biz
Jon Peterson
NeuStar, Inc.
1800 Sutter St Suite 570
Concord, CA 94520
US
Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz
James Polk
Cisco
2200 East President George Bush Turnpike
Richardson, Texas 75082
US
Email: jmpolk@cisco.com
Douglas C. Sicker
University of Colorado at Boulder
ECOT 430
Boulder, CO 80309
US
Email: douglas.sicker@colorado.edu
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