One document matched: draft-ietf-sidr-bogons-03.xml
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<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ietf-sidr-bogons-03.txt" ipr="trust200902">
<front>
<title abbrev="Bogon Attestations">A Profile for Bogon Origin Attestations
(BOAs)</title>
<author fullname="Terry Manderson" initials="T." surname="Manderson">
<organization></organization>
<address>
<email>terry@terrym.net</email>
</address>
</author>
<date year="2009" />
<area>Routing</area>
<workgroup>Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR)</workgroup>
<abstract>
<t>This document defines a standard profile for Bogon Origin
Attestations (BOAs). A BOA is a digitally signed object that provides a
means of verifying that an IP address block holder has not authorised
any Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes that are equivalent to
any of the addresses listed in the BOA. A BOA also provides a means of
verifying that a BGP speaker is not using an AS without appropriate
authority. The proposed application of BOAs is intended
to fit within the requirements for adding security measures to
inter-domain routing, including the ability to support incremental and
piecemeal deployment of such measures, and does not require any changes
to the specification of the Border Gateway Protocol.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section anchor="intro" title="Introduction">
<t>This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the attestations of resource holders
and Internet Registries that certain addresses are currently neither allocated
to any party, nor in use by any party, and any appearance of such addresses or AS's in a
routing advertisement in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) <xref
target="RFC4271"></xref> should be considered an invalid use of such
addresses or Autonomous System Numbers.</t>
<t>The RPKI is based on Resource Certificates. Resource Certificates are
X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile <xref
target="RFC5280"></xref>, and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS
identifiers <xref target="RFC3779"></xref>. A Resource Certificate
describes an action by an Issuer that binds a list of IP address blocks
and Autonomous System (AS) numbers to the Subject of a certificate,
identified by the unique association of the Subject's private key with
the public key contained in the Resource Certificate. The RPKI is
structured such that each current Resource Certificate matches a current
resource allocation or assignment. This is described in <xref
target="I-D.ietf-sidr-arch"></xref>.</t>
<t>BOAs can be regarded as a logical opposite of a Route Origin
Authorization (ROA) <xref target="I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format"></xref>,
however are not contradictory to a ROA and
allows a resource holder to explicitly list those IP addresses and AS's
that are denoted by the holder as not validly appearing in any routing
advertisement, and to make this attestation in a manner that a relying
party can unambiguously validate under the framework of the RPKI.</t>
<t>A BOA is a digitally signed object that makes use of Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS) <xref target="RFC3852"></xref> as a standard
encapsulation format. CMS was chosen to take advantage of existing open
source software available for processing messages in this format.</t>
</section>
<section title="Basic Format">
<t>Using CMS syntax, a BOA is a type of signed-data object. The general
format of a CMS object is:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
contentType ContentType,
content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType }
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
</artwork>
</figure>
<section title="Signed-Data Content Type">
<t>According to the CMS specification, The signed-data content type
shall have ASN.1 type SignedData:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
crls [1] IMPLICIT RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL,
signerInfos SignerInfos }
DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo
</artwork>
</figure>
<section title="version">
<t>The version is the syntax version number. It MUST be 3,
corresponding to the signerInfo structure having version number
3.</t>
</section>
<section title="digestAlgorithms">
<t>The digestAlgorithms set MUST include only SHA-256, the OID for
which is 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1. <xref target="RFC4055"></xref>. It
MUST NOT contain any other algorithms.</t>
</section>
<section title="encapContentInfo">
<t>encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content
type identifier and the content itself.</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
eContentType ContentType,
eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
</artwork>
</figure>
<section title="eContentType">
<t>The ContentType for a BOA is defined as id-ct-rpkiBOA, and has
the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.[TBD]. [This value
needs to be assigned via an OID registration.]</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 }
id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
id-ct-rpkiBOA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct [TBD] }
</artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="eContent">
<t>The content of a BOA identifies a list of one or more AS's and
one or more IP address prefixes that are asserted to be "bogons"
and, accordingly, BOAs are intended to act as a constraint on the
routing system to signal that no route object that that relates to
these AS's or IP addresses should be interpreted as representing a
valid routing attestation. A BOA is formally defined as:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
id-ct-rpkiBOA ::= {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
asIDs SEQUENCE OF asIdsOrRange,
ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE OF BOAIPAddressFamily }
ASIdOrRange ::= CHOICE {
id ASId,
range ASRange }
ASRange ::= SEQUENCE {
min ASId,
max ASId }
ASId ::= INTEGER
BOAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
addressFamily OCTET STRING (SIZE (2..3)),
addresses SEQUENCE OF IPAddress }
IPAddress ::= BIT STRING
</artwork>
</figure>
<section title="version">
<t>The version number of the BogonOriginAttestation MUST be
0.</t>
</section>
<section title="asIDs">
<t>The asIDs field contains the AS numbers that are to be
regarded as Bogon AS's. The set of AS numbers may be explicitly
listed, or specified as a continuous range of values. The field
is to be formatted as per the canonical format specified in
<xref target="RFC3779"></xref>.</t>
</section>
<section title="BOAIPAddressFamily">
<t>The BOAIPAddressFamily field encodes the set of IP address
prefixes that are to be regarded as Bogon IP addresses that are
to be constrained from appearing in any routing advertisement.
The intended semantics of an address prefix in a BOA is that any
route object that has the same address prefix as that listed as
a Bogon IP address, or is a more specific prefix of a Bogon IP
address can be regarded as a Bogon route object.</t>
<t>The syntax of the address prefixes listed in a BOA uses a
subset of the IP Address Delegation extension defined in <xref
target="RFC3779"></xref>. The BOAIPAddressFamily cannot contain
arbitrary address ranges, but in all other respects uses the
same canonical format as the IP Address Delegation
Extension.</t>
<t>Within the BOAIPAddressFamily structure, addressFamily
contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address
family. This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6.
Therefore, addressFamily MUST be either 0001 or 0002. The
addresses field represents prefixes as a sequence of type
IPAddress, as defined in<xref target="RFC3779"></xref>.</t>
</section>
</section>
</section>
<section title="certificates">
<t>The certificates field MUST be included, and MUST contain only
the end entity (EE) certificate needed to validate this BOA.</t>
</section>
<section title="crls">
<t>The crls field MUST be omitted.</t>
</section>
<section title="signerInfo">
<t>SignerInfo is defined under CMS as:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion,
sid SignerIdentifier,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
signature SignatureValue,
unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes OPTIONAL }
</artwork>
</figure>
<section title="version">
<t>The version number MUST be 3, corresponding with the choice of
SubjectKeyIdentifier for the sid.</t>
</section>
<section title="sid">
<t>The sid is defined as:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier }
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>For a BOA, the sid MUST be a SubjectKeyIdentifier.</t>
</section>
<section title="digestAlgorithm">
<t>The digestAlgorithm MUST be SHA-256, the OID for which is
2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1. <xref target="RFC4055"></xref></t>
</section>
<section title="signedAttrs">
<t>Signed Attributes are defined as:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute
Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
attrValues SET OF AttributeValue }
AttributeValue ::= ANY
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>The signedAttr element MUST be present and MUST include the
content-type and message-digest attributes. The signer MAY also
include the signing-time signed attribute, the binary-signing-time
signed attribute, or both signed attributes. Other signed
attributes that are deemed appropriate MAY also be included. The
intent is to allow additional signed attributes to be included if
a future need is identified. This does not cause an
interoperability concern because unrecognized signed attributes
are ignored by the relying party.</t>
<t>The signedAttr MUST include only a single instance of any
particular attribute. Additionally, even though the syntax allows
for a SET OF AttributeValue, in a BOA the attrValues must consist
of only a single AttributeValue.</t>
<section title="Content-Type Attribute">
<t>The ContentType attribute MUST be present. The attrType OID
for the ContentType attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3.</t>
<t>The attrValues for the ContentType attribute in a ROA MUST be
1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.[TBD] (matching the eContentType in the
EncapsulatedContentInfo).</t>
</section>
<section title="Message-Digest Attribute">
<t>The MessageDigest Attribute MUST be present. The attrType OID
for the MessageDigest Attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4.</t>
<t>The attrValues for the MessageDigest attribute contains the
output of the digest algorithm applied to the content being
signed, as specified in Section 11.1 of<xref
target="RFC3852"></xref>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Signing-Time Attribute">
<t>The SigningTime Attribute MAY be present in a BOA. If it is
present it MUST be ignored by the relying party. The presence of
absence of the SigningTime attribute in no way affects the
validation of the BOA (as specified in Section 3). The attrType
OID for the SigningTime attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5.</t>
<t>The SigningTime attribute is defined as:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
id-signingTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 5 }
SigningTime ::= Time
Time ::= CHOICE {
utcTime UTCTime,
generalizedTime GeneralizedTime }
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>The Time element specifies the time, based on the local
system clock, at which the digital signature was applied to the
content.</t>
</section>
<section title="BinarySigningTime Attribute">
<t>The BinarySigningTime Attribute MAY be present. If it is
present it MUST be ignored by the relying party. The presence of
absence of the BinarySigningTime attribute in no way affects the
validation of the ROA (as specified in Section 3). The attrType
OID for the BinarySigningTime attribute is
1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2.46.</t>
<t>The BinarySigningTime attribute is defined as:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
id-aa-binarySigningTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) aa(2) 46 }
BinarySigningTime ::= BinaryTime
BinaryTime ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>The BinaryTime element specifies the time, based on the local
system clock, at which the digital signature was applied to the
content.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="signatureAlgorithm">
<t>The signatureAlgorithm MUST be RSA (rsaEncryption), the OID for
which is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1.</t>
</section>
<section title="signature">
<t>The signature value is defined as:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
SignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>The signature characteristics are defined by the digest and
signature algorithms.</t>
</section>
<section title="unsignedAttrs">
<t>unsignedAttrs MUST be omitted.</t>
</section>
</section>
</section>
</section>
<section title="BOA Validation">
<t>Before a relying party can use a BOA as a constrictor of a routing
announcement, the relying party must use the RPKI to validate the BOA.
To do this the relying party performs the following steps:<vspace
blankLines="1" /> <list style="numbers">
<t>Verify that the BOA syntax complies with this specification. In
particular, verify the following:<vspace blankLines="1" /> <list
style="format %c.">
<t>The contentType of the CMS object is SignedData (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.7.2)<vspace blankLines="1" /></t>
<t>The eContentType of the CMS object is id-ct-rpkiBOA (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.[TBD]) <vspace blankLines="1" /></t>
<t>The version of the SignedData object is 3.<vspace
blankLines="1" /></t>
<t>The digestAlgorithm in the SignedData object is SHA-256 (OID
2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1).<vspace blankLines="1" /></t>
<t>The certificates field in the SignedData object is present
and contains an EE certificate whose Subject Key Identifier
(SKI) matches the sid field of the SignerInfo object. <vspace
blankLines="1" /></t>
<t>The crls field in the SignedData object is omitted.<vspace
blankLines="1" /></t>
<t>The eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo is
rid-ct-rpkiBOA (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.[TBD]) <vspace
blankLines="1" /></t>
<t>The version of the BOA is 0.<vspace blankLines="1" /></t>
<t>The addressFamily in the BOAIPAddressFamily is either IPv4 or
IPv6 (0001 and 0002, respectively).<vspace blankLines="1" /></t>
<t>The version of the SignerInfo is 3.<vspace
blankLines="1" /></t>
<t>The digestAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is SHA-256 (OID
2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1).<vspace blankLines="1" /></t>
<t>The signatureAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is RSA (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.1.1).<vspace blankLines="1" /></t>
<t>The signedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is present and
contains both the ContentType attribute (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.9.3) and the MessageDigest attribute (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.9.4). .<vspace blankLines="1" /></t>
<t>The unsignedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is
omitted.<vspace blankLines="1" /></t>
</list></t>
<t>Use the public key in the EE certificate to verify the signature
on the BOA.<vspace blankLines="1" /></t>
<t>Verify that the EE certificate has an IP Address Delegation
extension <xref target="RFC3779"></xref> and that the IP address
prefixes in that extension cover the IP address prefixes in
the BOA, and the AS numbers in that extension cover the AS
numbers in the BOA.<vspace blankLines="1" /></t>
<t>Verify that no valid ROA exists which also covers any more or less specific
prefixes, or any AS numbers. In the case that a ROA does exist which overlaps
the BOA in any way, the BOA MUST be considered invalid.</t>
<t>Verify that the EE certificate is a valid end-entity certificate
in the resource PKI by constructing a valid certificate path to a
trust anchor. (See <xref target="I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs"></xref> for more
details.)</t>
</list></t>
</section>
<section title="BOA Use Practices">
<t>BOAs are intended to allow relying parties a means of validating
whether route origination information as described in a route
advertisement refers to an IP address or AS number that has not been
validly allocated for use in the routing system.</t>
<t>Any party with a validly assigned Internet resource set and a CA
certificate that describes this allocation can publish a BOA,
independently of the actions of the actions of the party that assigned
the resource set.</t>
<t>An Internet Registry SHOULD maintain a single BOA in relation to each
parent registry that has assigned resources to this registry.</t>
<t>BOAs are not hierarchically related however they are subordinate to
the CA certificate that describes the immediate allocations assigned.</t>
<t>An Internet Registry SHOULD maintain a regular issuance cycle for
BOAs.</t>
<t>For registries that operate on a day-to-day basis in terms of
resource transactions, it is suggested that a local BOA management
practice would be that a new BOA should be issued on a regular 24 hour
basis. The corresponding EE certificate should have a validity period of
no more than 72 hours from the time of issuance. Each time a new EE
certificate for a BOA is issued the previous BOA's EE certificate should
be revoked and the previous BOA removed from the publication
repository.</t>
<t>Parties that operate a local cache of RPKI objects should ensure that
they refresh BOA objects at intervals 24 hours to ensure that they have
the current BOA in the local cache.</t>
</section>
<section title="BOA Interpretation">
<t>A BOA can be used to check an inter-domain routing advertisement
("route") to determine if the origination information in the
route object refers to invalid IP addresses or an invalid AS number.</t>
<t>If a route has an AS origination that refers to an AS number
that is listed in a valid BOA, then the route can be regarded as
a Bogon, and local policies that apply to Bogon AS's can be
applied to the route. However if the AS number of this route is described in
a valid ROA whose EE certificate lists the AS number, the BOA
MUST be considered invalid</t>
<t>If a route has an address prefix that is equal to, or is a
more specific prefix of an IP address that is included in a valid BOA
then the route can be regarded as a Bogon, and local
policies that apply to Bogon prefixes can be applied to the route. However if
the address prefix of the route is described (either more or
less specific) by a valid ROA, the BOA MUST be considered invalid.</t>
<t>BOA interpretation in the context of validation of origination of
route objects is described in <xref
target="I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-validation"></xref>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Security Considerations">
<t>There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a BOA; it
is anticipated that BOAs will be stored in repositories that are
accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is no
explicit authentication associated with a BOA, since the RPKI used for
BOA validation provides authorization but not authentication. Although
the BOA is a signed, application layer object, there is no intent to
convey non-repudiation via a BOA.</t>
<t>The purpose of a BOA is to convey an attestation by an address holder
that there is no authority for the generation of a route that
refers to specified addresses or origination from specified AS's. The
integrity of a BOA must be established in order to validate the
authority of the Bogon Attestation. The BOA makes use of the CMS signed
message format for integrity, and thus inherits the security
considerations associated with that data structure. The right of the BOA
signer to authorize the attestation of specified IP addresses and AS's
as Bogons is established through use of the address space and AS number
PKI described in <xref target="I-D.ietf-sidr-arch"></xref>. Specifically,
a relying party must verify the signature on the BOA using an X.509
certificate issued under this PKI, and check that the prefix(es) in the
BOA match, or are covered by those in the address space extension in the certificate.</t>
</section>
<section title="IANA Considerations">
<t>It would be anticipated that the IANA maintain a BOA for all unallocated space or reserved space
(IPv4, IPv6 and ASNs) not intended for public use.</t>
</section>
<section title="Acknowledgments">
<t>The authors are indebted to the authors of Route Origin Authorization
(ROA) <xref target="I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format"></xref>, M. Lepinski, S.
Kent and D. Kong, as much of the text used to define a BOA has been
borrowed from the ROA format specification, and Russ Housley for
clarification on the CMS profile.</t>
<t>Further the authors wish to thank many security people, too many to name, for clarifying
that negative attestations are a valid and useful security construct.</t>
<t>Lastly, without the orginal thoughts and words from George Michaelson and Geoff Huston this document
would not exist. Their hands helped form the concepts of why we need BOAs in the RPKI and historically
were two of the original three authors of this document.</t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<?rfc linefile="1:http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs.xml"?>
<reference anchor='I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs'>
<front>
<title>A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates</title>
<author initials='G' surname='Huston' fullname='Geoff Huston'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='G' surname='Michaelson' fullname='George Michaelson'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='R' surname='Loomans' fullname='Robert Loomans'>
<organization />
</author>
<date month='February' day='25' year='2009' />
<abstract><t>This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use" of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of- use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the issued certificate.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-16' />
<format type='TXT'
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-16.txt' />
</reference>
<?rfc linefile="601:/tmp/CGI19241.1"?>
<?rfc linefile="1:http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format.xml"?>
<reference anchor='I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format'>
<front>
<title>A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)</title>
<author initials='M' surname='Lepinski' fullname='Matt Lepinski'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='S' surname='Kent' fullname='Stephen Kent'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='D' surname='Kong' fullname='Derrick Kong'>
<organization />
</author>
<date month='November' day='3' year='2008' />
<abstract><t>This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to that one or more prefixes within the address block.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-04' />
<format type='TXT'
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-04.txt' />
</reference>
<?rfc linefile="602:/tmp/CGI19241.1"?>
<?rfc linefile="1:http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-sidr-arch.xml"?>
<reference anchor='I-D.ietf-sidr-arch'>
<front>
<title>An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing</title>
<author initials='M' surname='Lepinski' fullname='Matt Lepinski'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='S' surname='Kent' fullname='Stephen Kent'>
<organization />
</author>
<date month='March' day='9' year='2009' />
<abstract><t>This document describes an architecture for an infrastructure to support improved security of Internet routing. The foundation of this architecture is a public key infrastructure (PKI) that represents the allocation hierarchy of IP address space and Autonomous System Numbers; and a distributed repository system for storing and disseminating the data objects that comprise the PKI, as well as other signed objects necessary for improved routing security. As an initial application of this architecture, the document describes how a legitimate holder of IP address space can explicitly and verifiably authorize one or more ASes to originate routes to that address space. Such verifiable authorizations could be used, for example, to more securely construct BGP route filters.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-sidr-arch-06' />
<format type='TXT'
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-arch-06.txt' />
</reference>
<?rfc linefile="603:/tmp/CGI19241.1"?>
<?rfc linefile="1:http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-validation.xml"?>
<reference anchor='I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-validation'>
<front>
<title>Validation of Route Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate PKI</title>
<author initials='G' surname='Huston' fullname='Geoff Huston'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='G' surname='Michaelson' fullname='George Michaelson'>
<organization />
</author>
<date month='October' day='5' year='2008' />
<abstract><t>This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol. The proposed application is intended to fit within the requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing, including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal deployment, and does not require any changes to the specification of BGP.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-01' />
<format type='TXT'
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-01.txt' />
</reference>
<?rfc linefile="604:/tmp/CGI19241.1"?>
<?rfc linefile="1:http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3779.xml"?>
<reference anchor='RFC3779'>
<front>
<title>X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers</title>
<author initials='C.' surname='Lynn' fullname='C. Lynn'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='S.' surname='Kent' fullname='S. Kent'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='K.' surname='Seo' fullname='K. Seo'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2004' month='June' />
<abstract>
<t>This document defines two X.509 v3 certificate extensions. The first binds a list of IP address blocks, or prefixes, to the subject of a certificate. The second binds a list of autonomous system identifiers to the subject of a certificate. These extensions may be used to convey the authorization of the subject to use the IP addresses and autonomous system identifiers contained in the extensions. [STANDARDS TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='3779' />
<format type='TXT' octets='60732' target='ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc3779.txt' />
</reference>
<?rfc linefile="606:/tmp/CGI19241.1"?>
<?rfc linefile="1:http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3852.xml"?>
<reference anchor='RFC3852'>
<front>
<title>Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)</title>
<author initials='R.' surname='Housley' fullname='R. Housley'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2004' month='July' />
<abstract>
<t>This document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This syntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message content. [STANDARDS TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='3852' />
<format type='TXT' octets='15541' target='ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc3852.txt' />
</reference>
<?rfc linefile="607:/tmp/CGI19241.1"?>
<?rfc linefile="1:http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4055.xml"?>
<reference anchor='RFC4055'>
<front>
<title>Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
<author initials='J.' surname='Schaad' fullname='J. Schaad'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='B.' surname='Kaliski' fullname='B. Kaliski'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='R.' surname='Housley' fullname='R. Housley'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2005' month='June' />
<abstract>
<t>This document supplements RFC 3279. It describes the conventions for using the RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS) signature algorithm, the RSA Encryption Scheme - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-OAEP) key transport algorithm and additional one-way hash functions with the Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 version 1.5 signature algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Encoding formats, algorithm identifiers, and parameter formats are specified. [STANDARDS TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4055' />
<format type='TXT' octets='57479' target='ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc4055.txt' />
</reference>
<?rfc linefile="608:/tmp/CGI19241.1"?>
<?rfc linefile="1:http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4271.xml"?>
<reference anchor='RFC4271'>
<front>
<title>A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)</title>
<author initials='Y.' surname='Rekhter' fullname='Y. Rekhter'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='T.' surname='Li' fullname='T. Li'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='S.' surname='Hares' fullname='S. Hares'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2006' month='January' />
<abstract>
<t>This document discusses the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is an inter-Autonomous System routing protocol.</t><t> The primary function of a BGP speaking system is to exchange network reachability information with other BGP systems. This network reachability information includes information on the list of Autonomous Systems (ASes) that reachability information traverses. This information is sufficient for constructing a graph of AS connectivity for this reachability from which routing loops may be pruned, and, at the AS level, some policy decisions may be enforced.</t><t> BGP-4 provides a set of mechanisms for supporting Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR). These mechanisms include support for advertising a set of destinations as an IP prefix, and eliminating the concept of network "class" within BGP. BGP-4 also introduces mechanisms that allow aggregation of routes, including aggregation of AS paths.</t><t> This document obsoletes RFC 1771. [STANDARDS TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4271' />
<format type='TXT' octets='222702' target='ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc4271.txt' />
</reference>
<?rfc linefile="609:/tmp/CGI19241.1"?>
<?rfc linefile="1:http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml"?>
<reference anchor='RFC5280'>
<front>
<title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
<author initials='D.' surname='Cooper' fullname='D. Cooper'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='S.' surname='Santesson' fullname='S. Santesson'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='S.' surname='Farrell' fullname='S. Farrell'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='S.' surname='Boeyen' fullname='S. Boeyen'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='R.' surname='Housley' fullname='R. Housley'>
<organization /></author>
<author initials='W.' surname='Polk' fullname='W. Polk'>
<organization /></author>
<date year='2008' month='May' />
<abstract>
<t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS TRACK]</t></abstract></front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='5280' />
<format type='TXT' octets='352580' target='ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc5280.txt' />
</reference>
<?rfc linefile="610:/tmp/CGI19241.1"?>
</references>
</back>
</rfc>
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-23 10:54:24 |