One document matched: draft-ietf-pim-sm-linklocal-03.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-pim-sm-linklocal-02.txt
PIM Working Group W. Atwood
Internet-Draft S. Islam
Updates: 4601 (if approved) Concordia University/CSE
Intended status: Standards Track M. Siami
Expires: August 28, 2008 Concordia University/CIISE
February 25, 2008
Authentication and Confidentiality in PIM-SM Link-local Messages
draft-ietf-pim-sm-linklocal-03
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Abstract
RFC 4601 mandates the use of IPsec to ensure authentication of the
link-local messages in the Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse
Mode (PIM-SM) routing protocol. This document specifies mechanisms
to authenticate the PIM-SM link local messages using the IP security
(IPsec) Authentication Header (AH) or Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP). It specifies optional mechanisms to provide confidentiality
using the ESP. Manual keying is specified as the mandatory and
default group key management solution. To deal with issues of
scalability and security that exist with manual keying, an optional
automated group key management mechanism is specified.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Transport Mode vs. Tunnel Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IPsec Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Manual Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Automated Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.3. Communications Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.4. Neighbor Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Number of Security Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.1. Rekeying Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2. KeyRollover Interval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.3. Rekeying Interval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. IPsec Protection Barrier and GSPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.1. Manual Keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.1.1. SAD Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.1.2. SPD Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.2. Automatic Keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.2.1. SAD Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.2.2. GSPD Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.2.3. PAD Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11. Security Association Lookup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12. Activating the Anti-replay Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
13. Implementing a Security Association Database per Interface . . 21
14. Extended Sequence Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
16. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 28
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1. Introduction
All the PIM-SM [1] control messages have IP protocol number 103.
These messages are either unicast, or multicast with TTL = 1. The
source address used for unicast messages is a domain-wide reachable
address. For the multicast messages, a link-local address of the
interface on which the message is being sent is used as the source
address and a special multicast address, ALL_PIM_ROUTERS (224.0.0.13
in IPv4 and ff02::d in IPv6) is used as the destination address.
These messages are called link-local messages. Hello, Join/Prune and
Assert messages are included in this category. A forged link-local
message may be sent to the ALL_PIM_ROUTERS multicast address by an
attacker. This type of message affects the construction of the
distribution tree [1]. The effects of these forged messages are
outlined in section 6.1 of [1]. Some of the effects are very severe,
whereas some are minor.
PIM-SM version 2 was originally specified in RFC 2117, and revised in
RFC 2362 and RFC 4601. RFC 4601 obsoletes RFC 2362, and corrects a
number of deficiencies. The Security Considerations section of RFC
4601 is based primarily on the new Authentication Header (AH)
specification described in RFC 4302 [2].
Securing the unicast messages can be achieved by the use of a normal
unicast IPsec Security Association between the two communicants.
Securing the user data exchanges is covered in RFC 3740 [6]. This
document focuses on the security issues for link-local messages. It
provides some guidelines to take advantage of the new permitted AH
functionality in RFC 4302, and to bring the PIM-SM specification into
alignment with the new AH specification. This document recommends
manual key management as mandatory to implement, i.e., that all
implementations MUST support, and begins the discussion of an
automated key management protocol that the PIM routers can use.
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2. Terminology
In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [3] and
indicate requirement levels for compliant PIM-SM implementations.
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3. Transport Mode vs. Tunnel Mode
The transport mode Security Association (SA) is generally used
between two hosts or routers/gateways when they are acting as hosts.
The SA must be a tunnel mode SA if either end of the security
association is a router/gateway. Two hosts MAY establish a tunnel
mode SA between themselves. PIM-SM link-local messages are exchanged
between routers. However, since the packets are locally delivered,
the routers assume the role of hosts in the context of the tunnel
mode SA. All implementations conforming to this specification MUST
support transport mode SA to provide required IPsec security to
PIM-SM link-local messages. They MAY also support tunnel mode SA to
provide required IPsec security to PIM-SM link-local messages.
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4. Authentication
Implementations conforming to this specification MUST support
authentication for PIM-SM link-local messages.
In order to provide authentication to PIM-SM link-local messages,
implementations MUST support ESP [5] and MAY support AH [2].
If ESP in transport mode is used, it will only provide authentication
to PIM-SM protocol packets excluding the IPv6 header, extension
headers, and options. (Note: The IPv4 exclusions need to be listed
here as well.)
If AH in transport mode is used, it will provide authentication to
PIM-SM protocol packets, selected portions of the IPv6 header,
extension headers and options. (Note: the IPv4 coverage needs to be
listed here as well.)
When authentication for PIM-SM link-local messages is enabled,
o PIM-SM link-local packets that are not protected with AH or ESP
MUST be silently discarded.
o PIM-SM link-local packets that fail the authentication checks MUST
be silently discarded.
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5. Confidentiality
Implementations conforming to this specification SHOULD support
confidentiality for PIM-SM.
If confidentiality is provided, ESP MUST be used.
When PIM-SM confidentiality is enabled,
o PIM-SM packets that are not protected with ESP MUST be silently
discarded.
o PIM-SM packets that fail the confidentiality checks MUST be
silently discarded.
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6. IPsec Requirements
In order to implement this specification, the following IPsec
capabilities are required.
Transport mode
IPsec in transport mode MUST be supported.
Multiple Security Policy Databases (SPDs)
The implementation MUST support multiple SPDs with an SPD
selection function that provides an ability to choose a specific
SPD based on interface.
Selectors
The implementation MUST be able to use source address, destination
address, protocol, and direction as selectors in the SPD.
Interface ID tagging
The implementation MUST be able to tag the inbound packets with
the ID of the interface (physical or virtual) via which it
arrived.
Manual key support
Manually configured keys MUST be able to secure the specified
traffic.
Encryption and authentication algorithms
The implementation MUST NOT allow the user to choose stream
ciphers as the encryption algorithm for securing PIM-SM packets
since the stream ciphers are not suitable for manual keys. Except
when in conflict with the above statement, the key words "MUST",
"MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT" that appear in
RFC 4835 [7] for algorithms to be supported are to be interpreted
as described in RFC 2119 [3] for PIM-SM support as well.
Encapsulation of ESP packet
IP encapsulation of ESP packets MUST be supported. For
simplicity, UDP encapsulation of ESP packets SHOULD NOT be used.
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7. Key Management
All the implementations MUST support manual configuration of the SAs
that will be used to authenticate PIM-SM link-local messages. This
does not preclude the use of a negotiation protocol such as the
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [11] or Group Secure Association Key
Management Protocol (GSAKMP) [12] to establish SAs.
7.1. Manual Key Management
To establish the SAs at PIM-SM routers, manual key configuration will
be feasible when the number of peers (directly connected routers) is
small. The Network Administrator will configure a router manually
during its boot up process. At that time, the authentication method
and the choice of keys SHOULD be configured. The SAD entry will be
created. The Network Administrator will also configure the Security
Policy Database of a router to ensure the use of the associated SA
while sending a link-local message.
7.2. Automated Key Management
All the link-local messages of the PIM-SM protocol are sent to the
destination address, ALL_PIM_ROUTERS, which is a multicast address.
By using the sender address in conjunction with the destination
address for Security Association lookup, link-local communication
turns to an SSM or "one to many" communication. Since IKE is based
on the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol and works only for two
communicating parties, it is not possible to use IKE for providing
the required "one to many" authentication.
One option is to use Group Domain Of Interpretation (GDOI) [13],
which enables a group of users or devices to exchange encrypted data
using IPsec data encryption. GDOI has been developed to be used in
multicast applications, where the number of end users or devices may
be large and the end users or devices can dynamically join/leave a
multicast group. However, a PIM router is not expected to join/leave
very frequently, and the number of routers is small when compared to
the possible number of users of a multicast application. Moreover,
most of the PIM routers will be located inside the same
administrative domain and are considered as trusted parties. It is
possible that a subset of GDOI functionalities will be sufficient.
A framework for automating key management for RSVP is given in [17].
A companion modification for GDOI is presented in [18]. NOTE: A
similar pair of documents will be prepared for PIM-SM.
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7.3. Communications Patterns
Before discussing the set of security associations that are required
to properly manage a multicast region that is under the control of a
single administration, it is necessary to understand the
communications patterns that will exist among the routers in this
region. From the perspective of a speaking router, the information
from that router is sent (multicast) to all of its neighbors. From
the perspective of a listening router, the information coming from
each of its neighbors is distinct from the information coming from
every other router to which it is directly connected. Thus an
administrative region contains many (small) distinct groups, all of
which happen to be using the same multicast destination address
(e.g., ALL_PIM_ROUTERS, see Section 11), and each of which is
centered on the associated speaking router.
Consider the example configuration as shown in Figure 1.
R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
| | | | |
| | | | |
--------- ---------------
| |
| |
\ /
R1
/ \
| |
| |
--------- --------------------
| | | | |
| | | | |
R7 R8 R9 R10 R11
| | | | |
|
|
-------------
| | |
| | |
R12 R13 R14
Figure 1: Set of router interconnections
In this configuration, router R1 has four interfaces, and is the
speaking router for a group whose listening routers are routers R2
through R11. Router R9 is the speaking router for a group whose
listening routers are routers R1, R8 and R10-R14.
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From the perspective of R1 as a speaking router, if a Security
Association SA1 is assigned to protect outgoing packets from R1, then
it is necessary to distribute the key for this association to each of
the routers R2 through R11. Similarly, from the perspective of R9 as
a speaking router, if a Security Association is assigned to protect
the outgoing packets from R9, then it is necessary to distribute the
key for this association to each of the routers R1, R8, and R10
through R14.
From the perspective of R1 as a listening router, all packets
arriving from R2 through R11 need to be distinguished from each
other, to permit selecting the correct Security Association in the
SAD. (Packets from each of the peer routers (R2 through R11)
represent communication from a different speaker, even though they
are sent using the same destination address.) For a multicast
Security Association, RFC 4301 permits using the Source Address in
the selection function. If the source addresses used by routers R2
through R11 are globally unique, then the source addresses of the
peer routers are sufficient to achieve the differentiation. If the
sending routers use link-local addresses, then these addresses are
unique only on a per-interface basis, and it is necessary to use the
Interface ID tag as an additional selector, i.e., either the
selection function has to have the Interface ID tag as one of its
inputs, or separate SADs have to be maintained for each interface.
If the assumption of connectivity to the key server can be made
(which is true in the PIM-SM case), then the GC/KS can be centrally
located (and duplicated for reliability). If this assumption cannot
be made (i.e., in the case of adjacencies for a unicast router), then
some form of "local" key server must be available for each group.
Given that the listening routers are never more than one hop away
from the speaking router, the speaking router is the obvious place to
locate the "local" key server. This has the additional advantage
that there is no need to duplicate the local key server for
reliability, since if the key server is down, it is very likely that
the speaking router is also down.
7.4. Neighbor Relationships
Each distinct group consists of one speaker, and the set of directly
connected listeners. If the decision is made to maintain one
Security Association per speaker (see Section 8), then the key server
will need to be aware of the adjacencies of each speaker. Procedures
for doing this are under study.
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8. Number of Security Associations
The number of Security Associations to be maintained by a PIM router
depends on the required security level and available key management.
This SHOULD be decided by the Network Administrator. Two different
ways are shown in Figure 2 and 3. It is assumed that A, B and C are
three PIM routers, where B and C are directly connected with A, and
there is no direct link between B and C.
|
B |
SAb ------------>|
SAa <------------|
|
A |
SAb <------------|
SAa ------------>|
SAc <------------|
|
C |
SAc ------------>|
SAa <------------|
|
Directly connected network
Figure 2: Activate unique Security Association for each peer
The first method, shown in Figure 2 is OPTIONAL to implement. In
this method, each node will use a unique SA for its outbound traffic.
A, B, and C will use SAa, SAb, and SAc, respectively for sending any
traffic. Each node will look up the SA to be used based on the
source address. A will use SAb and SAc for packets received from B
and C, respectively. The number of SAs to be activated and
maintained by a PIM router will be equal to the number of directly
connected routers plus one, for sending its own traffic. Also, the
addition of a PIM router in the network will require the addition of
another SA on every directly connected PIM router. This solution
will be scalable and practically feasible with an automated key
management protocol. However, it MAY be used with manual key
management, if the number of directly connected router(s) is small.
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B |
SAo ------------>|
SAi <------------|
|
A |
SAo ------------>|
SAi <------------|
|
C |
SAo ------------>|
SAi <------------|
|
Directly connected network
Figure 3: Activate two Security Associations
The second method, shown in Figure 3, MUST be supported by every
implementation. In this simple method, all the nodes will use two
SAs, one for sending (SAo) and the other for receiving (SAi) traffic.
Thus, the number of SAs is always two and will not be affected by
addition of a PIM router. Although two different SAs are used in
this method, the SA parameters (keys, SPI, etc.) for the two SAs are
identical, i.e., the same information is shared among all the routers
in an administrative region. This document RECOMMENDS the above
method for manual key configuration. However, it MAY also be used
with automated key configuration. When manually configured, the
method suffers from impersonation attacks as mentioned in the
Security Considerations section.
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9. Rekeying
This section will provide the rekeying rules. It will be written
once is is decided whether or not to specify a re-keying protocol as
part of this document.
9.1. Rekeying Procedure
TBD
9.2. KeyRollover Interval
TBD
9.3. Rekeying Interval
TBD
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10. IPsec Protection Barrier and GSPD
10.1. Manual Keying
10.1.1. SAD Entries
The Administrator must configure the necessary Security Associations.
Each SA entry has the Source Address of an authorized peer, and a
Destination Address of ALL_PIM_ROUTERS. Unique SPI values for the
manually configured SAs MUST be assigned by the Administrator, to
ensure that the SPI does not conflict with existing SPI values in the
SAD.
10.1.2. SPD Entries
The Administrator must configure the necessary SPD entries. The SPD
entry must ensure that any outbound IP traffic packet traversing the
IPsec boundary, with PIM as its next layer protocol, PIM message type
of Hello, Join/Prune, bootstrap or Assert, sent to the Destination
Address of ALL_PIM_ROUTERS, is protected by AH. If the IPsec
implementation does not identify PIM message types as a selector, the
"local port" selector can be used, with suitable adjustment.
10.2. Automatic Keying
When automatic keying is used, the SA creation is done dynamically
using a group key management protocol. The GSPD and PAD tables are
configured by the Administrator. The PAD table provides the link
between the IPsec subsystem and the group key management protocol.
For automatic keying, the implementation MUST support the multicast
extensions described in [19].
10.2.1. SAD Entries
All PIM routers participate in an authentication scheme that
identifies permitted neighbors and achieves peer authentication
during SA negotiation, leading to child SAs being established and
saved in the SAD.
10.2.2. GSPD Entries
The Administrator must configure the necessary GSPD entries for "send
only" directionality. This rule MUST trigger the group key
management protocol for a registration exchange. This exchange will
set up the outbound SAD entry that encrypts the multicast PIM control
message. Considering that this rule is "sender only", no inbound SA
is created in the reverse direction.
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In addition, the registration exchange will install GSPD entries
corresponding to each legitimate peer router, with direction "receive
only".
To account for new, legitimate neighbors, the Administrator MUST
configure a GSPD entry for "any" peer router, destined to the
ALL_PIM_ROUTERS address. This entry will trigger a query to the
group key management protocol, to establish the legitimacy (or lack
of it) of the new peer, and install the necessary SAD "receive only"
entry.
10.2.3. PAD Entries
The PAD must be configured by the Administrator with information to
permit identification of legitimate group members and senders. This
will be detailed in a companion document (to be written).
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11. Security Association Lookup
For an SA that carries unicast traffic, three parameters (SPI,
destination address and security protocol type (AH or ESP)) are used
in the Security Association lookup process for inbound packets. The
SPI is sufficient to specify an SA. However, an implementation may
use the SPI in conjunction with the IPsec protocol type (AH or ESP)
for the SA lookup process. According to RFC 4301 [4] and the AH
specification [2], for multicast SAs, in conjunction with the SPI,
the destination address or the destination address plus the sender
address may also be used in the SA lookup. The security protocol
field is not employed for a multicast SA lookup.
The reason for the various prohibitions in the IPsec RFCs concerning
multisender multicast SAs lies in the difficulty of coordinating the
multiple senders. However, if the use of multicast for link-local
messages is examined, it may be seen that in fact the communication
need not be coordinated---from the prospective of a receiving router,
each peer router is an independent sender. In effect, link-local
communication is an SSM communication that happens to use an ASM
address (which is shared among all the routers).
Given that it is always possible to distinguish a connection using
IPsec from a connection not using IPsec, it is recommended that the
address ALL_PIM_ROUTERS be used, to maintain consistency with present
practice.
Given that the sender address of an incoming packet may be only
locally unique (because of the use of link-local addresses), it will
be necessary for a receiver to use the interface ID tag to sort out
the associated SA for that sender. Therefore, this document mandates
that the interface ID tag, the SPI and the sender address MUST be
used in the SA lookup process.
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12. Activating the Anti-replay Mechanism
Although link-level messages on a link constitute a multiple-sender,
multiple-receiver group, the use of the interface ID tag and sender
address for SA lookup essentially resolves the communication into a
separate SA for each sender/destination pair, even for the case where
only two SAs (with identical SA parameters) are used for the entire
administrative region. Therefore, the statement in the AH RFC
(section 2.5 of [2]) that "for a multi-sender SA, the anti-replay
features are not available" becomes irrelevant to the PIM-SM link-
local message exchange.
To activate the anti-replay mechanism in a unicast communication, the
receiver uses the sliding window protocol and it maintains a sequence
number for this protocol. This sequence number starts from zero.
Each time the sender sends a new packet, it increments this number by
one. In a multi-sender multicast group communication, a single
sequence number for the entire group would not be enough.
The whole scenario is different for PIM link-local messages. These
messages are sent to local links with TTL = 1. A link-local message
never propagates through one router to another. The use of the
sender address and the interface ID tag for SA lookup converts the
relationship from a multiple-sender group to multiple single-sender
associations. This specification RECOMMENDS activation of the anti-
replay mechanism only if the SAs are assigned using an automated key
management procedure. In manual key management, the anti-replay
SHOULD NOT be activated. If the number of router(s) to be assigned
manually is small, the Network Administrator MAY consider to activate
anti-replay. If anti-replay is activated a PIM router MUST maintain
a different sliding window for each directly connected sender.
If the SAs are activated according to Figure 3, that is all the nodes
use only two SAs, one SA for sending and the other is for receiving
traffic, a PIM router MAY still activate the anti-replay mechanism.
Instead of maintaining only two SAs, the router will maintain the
same number of SAs as explained in the first method (see Figure 2)
(because of the differentiation based on sender address). For each
active SA a corresponding sequence number MUST be maintained. Thus,
a PIM router will maintain a number of identical SAs, except that the
sender address, interface ID tag and the sequence number are
different for each SA. In this way a PIM router will be at least
free from all the attacks that can be performed by replaying PIM-SM
packets.
Note that when activating anti-replay with manual key configuration,
the following actions must be taken by the network administrator:
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a. If a new router is added, the Network Administrator MUST add a
new SA entry in each peer router.
b. If an existing router has to restart, the Network Administrator
MUST refresh the counter (ESN, see Section 14) to zero for all
the peer routers. This implies deleting all the existing SAs and
adding a new SA with the same configuration and a re-initialized
counter.
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13. Implementing a Security Association Database per Interface
RFC 4601 suggests that it may be desirable to implement a separate
Security Association Database (SAD) for each router interface. The
use of link-local addresses in certain circumstances implies that
differentiation of ambiguous speaker addresses requires the use of
the interface ID tag in the SA lookup. One way to do this is through
the use of multiple SADs. Alternatively, the interface ID tag may be
a specific component of the selector algorithm. This is in
conformance with RFC 4301, which explicitly removes the requirement
for separate SADs that was present in RFC 2401 [8].
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14. Extended Sequence Number
In the [2], there is a provision for a 64-bit Extended Sequence
Number (ESN) as the counter of the sliding window used in the anti-
replay protocol. Both the sender and the receiver maintain a 64-bit
counter for the sequence number, although only the lower order 32
bits is sent in the transmission. In other words, it will not affect
the present header format of AH. If ESN is used, a sender router can
send 2^64 -1 packets without any intervention. This number is very
large, and from a PIM router's point of view, a PIM router can never
exceed this number in its lifetime. This makes it reasonable to
permit manual configuration for a small number of PIM routers, since
the sequence number will never roll over. For this reason, when
manual configuration is used, ESN SHOULD be deployed as the sequence
number for the sliding window protocol.
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15. Security Considerations
The whole document considers the security issues of PIM link-local
messages and proposes a mechanism to protect them.
Limitations of manual keys:
The following are some of the known limitations of the usage of
manual keys.
o If replay protection cannot be provided, the PIM routers will not
be secured against all the attacks that can be performed by
replaying PIM packets.
o Manual keys are usually long lived (changing them often is a
tedious task). This gives an attacker enough time to discover the
keys.
o As the administrator is manually configuring the keys, there is a
chance that the configured keys are weak (there are known weak
keys for DES/3DES at least).
Impersonation attacks:
The usage of the same key on all the PIM routers connected to a link
leaves them all insecure against impersonation attacks if any one of
the PIM routers is compromised, malfunctioning, or misconfigured.
Detailed analysis of various vulnerabilities of routing protocols is
provided in RFC 4593 [14]. For further discussion of PIM-SM and
multicast security the reader is referred to [15], RFC 4609 [16] and
the Security Considerations section of RFC 4601 [1].
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16. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
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17. References
17.1. Normative References
[1] Fenner, B., Handley, M., Holbrook, H., and I. Kouvelas,
"Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM):
Protocol Specification (Revised)", RFC 4601, August 2006.
[2] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, December 2005.
[3] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[4] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[5] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303,
December 2005.
[6] Hardjono, T. and B. Weis, "The Multicast Group Security
Architecture", RFC 3740, March 2004.
[7] Manral, V., "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and
Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 4835, April 2007.
17.2. Informative References
[8] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[9] Islam, S., "Security Issues in PIM-SM Link-local Messages,
Master's Thesis, Concordia University", December 2003.
[10] Islam, S., "Security Issues in PIM-SM Link-local Messages,
Proceedings of LCN 2004", November 2004.
[11] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005.
[12] Harney, H., Meth, U., Colegrove, A., and G. Gross, "GSAKMP:
Group Secure Association Key Management Protocol", RFC 4535,
June 2006.
[13] Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T., and H. Harney, "The Group
Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003.
[14] Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to
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Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, October 2006.
[15] Savola, P. and J. Lingard, "Host Threats to Protocol
Independent Multicast (PIM)", draft-ietf-pim-lasthop-threats-03
(work in progress), October 2007.
[16] Savola, P., Lehtonen, R., and D. Meyer, "Protocol Independent
Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) Multicast Routing Security
Issues and Enhancements", RFC 4609, October 2006.
[17] Behringer, M. and F. Faucheur, "Applicability of Keying Methods
for RSVP Security",
draft-ietf-tsvwg-rsvp-security-groupkeying-00 (work in
progress), February 2008.
[18] Weis, B., "Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) support for
RSVP", draft-weis-gdoi-for-rsvp-01 (work in progress),
February 2008.
[19] Weis, B., Gross, G., and D. Ignjatic, "Multicast Extensions to
the Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol",
draft-ietf-msec-ipsec-extensions-08 (work in progress),
February 2008.
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Authors' Addresses
J. William Atwood
Concordia University/CSE
1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd, West
Montreal, QC H3G 1M8
Canada
Phone: +1(514)848-2424 ext3046
Email: bill@cse.concordia.ca
URI: http://users.encs.concordia.ca/~bill
Salekul Islam
Concordia University/CSE
1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd, West
Montreal, QC H3G 1M8
Canada
Email: salek_is@cse.concordia.ca
URI: http://users.encs.concordia.ca/~salek_is
Maziar Siami
Concordia University/CIISE
1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd, West
Montreal, QC H3G 1M8
Canada
Email: m_siamis@ciise.concordia.ca
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