One document matched: draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-11.xml
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<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-11"
ipr="trust200902">
<front>
<title abbrev="Proof-of-Possession Key for JWTs">Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)</title>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization>Microsoft</organization>
<address>
<email>mbj@microsoft.com</email>
<uri>http://self-issued.info/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="John Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley">
<organization abbrev="Ping Identity">Ping Identity</organization>
<address>
<email>ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</email>
<uri>http://www.thread-safe.com/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="H." surname="Tschofenig" fullname="Hannes Tschofenig">
<organization>ARM Limited</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<country>Austria</country>
</postal>
<email>Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net</email>
<uri>http://www.tschofenig.priv.at</uri>
</address>
</author>
<date day="18" month="December" year="2015"/>
<area>Security</area>
<workgroup>OAuth Working Group</workgroup>
<keyword>RFC</keyword>
<keyword>Request for Comments</keyword>
<keyword>I-D</keyword>
<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
<keyword>JSON Web Token</keyword>
<keyword>JWT</keyword>
<keyword>Proof-of-Possession</keyword>
<keyword>Holder-of-Key</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>
This specification defines how to declare in a JSON Web Token (JWT)
that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular proof-of-possession key
and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter.
Being able to prove possession of a key is also sometimes described as
the presenter being a holder-of-key.
</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction" anchor="Introduction">
<t>
This specification defines how a JSON Web Token <xref target="JWT"/> can declare
that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular proof-of-possession (PoP) key
and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter.
Proof-of-possession of a key is also sometimes described as
the presenter being a holder-of-key.
The <xref target="I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture"/> specification
describes key confirmation, among other confirmation mechanisms.
This specification defines how to communicate key confirmation key information
in JWTs.
</t>
<t>
Envision the following two use cases.
The first use case employs a symmetric proof-of-possession key and
the second use case employs an asymmetric proof-of-possession key.
</t>
<figure title="Proof-of-Possession with a Symmetric Key" anchor="Figure-1">
<artwork><![CDATA[
+--------------+
| | +--------------+
| |--(3) Presentation of -->| |
| | JWT w/ Encrypted | |
| Presenter | PoP Key | |
| | | |
| |<-(4) Communication ---->| |
| | Authenticated by | |
+--------------+ PoP Key | |
^ ^ | |
| | | |
(1) Sym. (2) JWT w/ | Recipient |
| PoP | Encrypted | |
| Key | PoP Key | |
v | | |
+--------------+ | |
| | | |
| | | |
| |<-(0) Key Exchange for ->| |
| Issuer | Key Encryption Key | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | +--------------+
+--------------+
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
In the case illustrated in <xref target="Figure-1"/>,
either the presenter generates a symmetric key and
privately sends it to the issuer (1)
or the issuer generates a symmetric key and
privately sends it to the presenter (1).
The issuer generates a JWT with an encrypted copy of this
symmetric key in the confirmation claim.
This symmetric key is encrypted with a key known
only to the issuer and the recipient,
which was previously established in step (0).
The entire JWT is integrity protected by the issuer.
The JWT is then (2) sent to the presenter.
Now, the presenter is in possession of the symmetric key as well as the
JWT (which includes the confirmation claim).
When the presenter (3) presents the JWT to the recipient,
it also needs to demonstrate possession of the symmetric key;
the presenter, for example, (4) uses the symmetric key
in a challenge/response protocol with the recipient.
The recipient is then able to verify that it is
interacting with the genuine presenter by decrypting the key
in the confirmation claim of the JWT.
By doing this, the recipient obtains the symmetric key, which it then uses to
verify cryptographically protected messages exchanged with the presenter (4).
This symmetric key mechanism described above is conceptually similar
to the use of Kerberos tickets.
</t>
<t>
Note that for simplicity, the diagram above and associated text describe
the direct use of symmetric keys without the use of derived keys.
A more secure practice is to derive the symmetric keys actually used
from secrets exchanged, such as the key exchanged in step (0),
using a Key Derivation Function (KDF) and use the derived keys,
rather than directly using the secrets exchanged.
</t>
<figure title="Proof-of-Possession with an Asymmetric Key" anchor="Figure-2">
<artwork><![CDATA[
+--------------+
| | +--------------+
| |--(3) Presentation of -->| |
| | JWT w/ Public | |
| Presenter | PoP Key | |
| | | |
| |<-(4) Communication ---->| |
| | Authenticated by | |
+--------------+ PoP Key | |
| ^ | |
| | | |
(1) Public (2) JWT w/ | Recipient |
| PoP | Public | |
| Key | PoP Key | |
v | | |
+--------------+ | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| Issuer | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | +--------------+
+--------------+
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
In the case illustrated in <xref target="Figure-2"/>,
the presenter generates a public/private key pair
and (1) sends the public key to the issuer,
which creates a JWT that contains the public key (or an identifier for it)
in the confirmation claim.
The entire JWT is integrity protected using a digital
signature to protect it against modifications.
The JWT is then (2) sent to the presenter.
When the presenter (3) presents the JWT to the recipient,
it also needs to demonstrate possession of the private key.
The presenter, for example, (4) uses the private key in a TLS exchange
with the recipient or (4) signs a nonce with the private key.
The recipient is able to verify that it is interacting with
the genuine presenter by extracting the public key from
the confirmation claim of the JWT
(after verifying the digital signature of the JWT)
and utilizing it with the private key in the TLS exchange
or by checking the nonce signature.
</t>
<t>
In both cases, the JWT may contain other claims that are needed by the application.
</t>
<section title="Notational Conventions" anchor="NotationalConventions">
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 <xref target="RFC2119"/>.
</t>
<t>
Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values are case sensitive.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title='Terminology' anchor='Terminology'>
<t>
This specification uses terms defined in
the JSON Web Token <xref target="JWT"/>,
JSON Web Key <xref target="JWK"/>, and
JSON Web Encryption <xref target="JWE"/> specifications.
</t>
<t>
These terms are defined by this specification:
</t>
<t>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="Issuer">
<vspace/>
Party that creates the JWT and binds the proof-of-possession key to it.
</t>
<t hangText="Presenter">
<vspace/>
Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key cryptography)
or secret key (for symmetric key cryptography) to a recipient.
</t>
<t hangText="Recipient">
<vspace/>
Party that receives the JWT containing the proof-of-possession key information from the presenter.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title='Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys' anchor="PoP">
<t>
By including a <spanx style="verb">cnf</spanx> (confirmation) claim in a JWT,
the issuer of the JWT declares that the presenter possesses a particular key,
and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm that
the presenter has possession of that key.
The value of the <spanx style="verb">cnf</spanx> claim is a JSON object
and the members of that object identify the proof-of-possession key.
</t>
<t>
The presenter can be identified in one of several ways by the JWT,
depending upon the application requirements.
If the JWT contains a <spanx style="verb">sub</spanx> (subject) claim <xref target="JWT"/>,
the presenter is normally the subject identified by the JWT.
(In some applications, the subject identifier will be relative to
the issuer identified by the <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> (issuer) claim <xref target="JWT"/>.)
If the JWT contains no <spanx style="verb">sub</spanx> (subject) claim,
the presenter is normally the issuer identified by the JWT
using the <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx> (issuer) claim.
The case in which the presenter is the subject of the JWT is analogous to
SAML 2.0 <xref target="OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os"/> SubjectConfirmation usage.
At least one of the <spanx style="verb">sub</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx>
claims MUST be present in the JWT.
Some use cases may require that both be present.
</t>
<t>
Another means used by some applications to identify the presenter
is an explicit claim,
such as the <spanx style="verb">azp</spanx> (authorized party) claim
defined by OpenID Connect <xref target="OpenID.Core"/>.
Ultimately, the means of identifying the presenter is application-specific,
as is the means of confirming possession of the key that is communicated.
</t>
<section title="Confirmation Claim" anchor="Confirmation">
<t>
The <spanx style="verb">cnf</spanx> (confirmation) claim is used in the JWT
to contain members used to identify the proof-of-possession key.
Other members of the <spanx style="verb">cnf</spanx> object may be defined because
a proof-of-possession key may not be the only means of confirming
the authenticity of the token.
This is analogous to the SAML 2.0 <xref target="OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os"/>
SubjectConfirmation element, in which a number of different
subject confirmation methods can be included,
including proof-of-possession key information.
</t>
<t>
The set of confirmation members that a
JWT must contain to be considered valid is context dependent
and is outside the scope of this specification.
Specific applications of JWTs will require implementations
to understand and process some confirmation members in particular ways.
However, in the absence of such requirements, all confirmation members
that are not understood by implementations MUST be ignored.
</t>
<t>
This specification establishes the
IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods" registry for these members
in <xref target="CnfReg"/> and registers the members defined by this specification.
Other specifications can register other members used for confirmation,
including other members for conveying proof-of-possession keys,
possibly using different key representations.
</t>
<t>
The <spanx style="verb">cnf</spanx> claim value MUST represent only a single
proof-of-possession key; thus, at most one of the
<spanx style="verb">jwk</spanx>,
<spanx style="verb">jwe</spanx>,
and <spanx style="verb">jku</spanx>
confirmation values defined below may be present.
Note that if an application needs to represent multiple proof-of-possession
keys in the same JWT, one way for it to achieve this is to
use other claim names, in addition to <spanx style="verb">cnf</spanx>,
to hold the additional proof-of-possession key information.
These claims could use the same syntax and semantics
as the <spanx style="verb">cnf</spanx> claim.
Those claims would be defined by applications or other specifications
and could be registered in
the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry <xref target="IANA.JWT.Claims"/>.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key" anchor="PrivatePoP">
<t>
When the key held by the presenter is an asymmetric private key,
the <spanx style="verb">jwk</spanx> member
is a JSON Web Key <xref target="JWK"/>
representing the corresponding asymmetric public key.
The following example demonstrates such a declaration
in the JWT Claims Set of a JWT:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"aud": "https://client.example.org",
"exp": 1361398824,
"cnf":{
"jwk":{
"kty": "EC",
"use": "sig",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "18wHLeIgW9wVN6VD1Txgpqy2LszYkMf6J8njVAibvhM",
"y": "-V4dS4UaLMgP_4fY4j8ir7cl1TXlFdAgcx55o7TkcSA"
}
}
}
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>
The JWK MUST contain the required key members for a JWK of that key type
and MAY contain other JWK members,
including the <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> (key ID) member.
</t>
<t>
The <spanx style="verb">jwk</spanx> member MAY also be used for a JWK
representing a symmetric key, provided that the JWT is encrypted
so that the key is not revealed to unintended parties.
If the JWT is not encrypted, the symmetric key MUST be encrypted as described below.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-Possession Key" anchor="SymmetricPoP">
<t>
When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key,
the <spanx style="verb">jwe</spanx> member
is an encrypted JSON Web Key <xref target="JWK"/>
encrypted to a key known to the recipient
using the JWE Compact Serialization
containing the symmetric key.
The rules for encrypting a JWK are found in
Section 7 of the JSON Web Key <xref target="JWK"/> specification.
</t>
<t>
The following example illustrates a symmetric key that could subsequently be
encrypted for use in the <spanx style="verb">jwe</spanx> member:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
{
"kty": "oct",
"alg": "HS256",
"k": "ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE"
}
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>
The UTF-8 <xref target="RFC3629"/> encoding of this JWK
is used as the JWE Plaintext when encrypting the key.
</t>
<t>
The following example is a JWE Header that could be used
when encrypting this key:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
{
"alg": "RSA-OAEP",
"enc": "A128CBC-HS256"
}
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>
The following example JWT Claims Set of a JWT illustrates
the use of an encrypted symmetric key as the
<spanx style="verb">jwe</spanx> member value:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "24400320",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"exp": 1311281970,
"iat": 1311280970,
"cnf":{
"jwe":
"eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImVuYyI6IkExMjhDQkMtSFMyNTYifQ.
(remainder of JWE omitted for brevity)"
}
}
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key" anchor="KidPoP">
<t>
The proof-of-possession key can also be identified by the use of
a Key ID instead of communicating the actual key,
provided the recipient is able to obtain the identified key
using the Key ID.
In this case,
the issuer of a JWT declares that the presenter possesses a particular key
and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter by including a
<spanx style="verb">cnf</spanx> (confirmation) claim in the JWT
whose value is a JSON object, with the JSON object containing a
<spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> (key ID) member
identifying the key.
</t>
<t>
The following example demonstrates such a declaration
in the JWT Claims Set of a JWT:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"aud": "https://client.example.org",
"exp": 1361398824,
"cnf":{
"kid": "dfd1aa97-6d8d-4575-a0fe-34b96de2bfad"
}
}
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>
The content of the <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> value is application specific.
For instance, some applications may choose to use a JWK Thumbprint <xref target="JWK.Thumbprint"/>
value as the <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> value.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Representation of a URL for a Proof-of-Possession Key" anchor="jkuPoP">
<t>
The proof-of-possession key can be passed by reference
instead of being passed by value.
This is done using the <spanx style="verb">jku</spanx> (JWK Set URL) member.
Its value is a URI <xref target="RFC3986"/> that refers to a
resource for a set of JSON-encoded public keys represented as a JWK Set <xref target="JWK" />,
one of which is the proof-of-possession key.
If there are multiple keys in the referenced JWK Set document,
a <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> member MUST also be included,
with the referenced key's JWK also containing the same <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> value.
</t>
<t>
The protocol used to acquire the resource MUST provide
integrity protection. An HTTP GET request to retrieve the
JWK Set MUST use Transport Layer Security (TLS)
<xref target="RFC5246"/> and
the identity of the server MUST be validated, as per
Section 6 of <xref target="RFC6125">RFC 6125</xref>.
</t>
<t>
The following example demonstrates such a declaration
in the JWT Claims Set of a JWT:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
{
"iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "17760704",
"aud": "https://client.example.org",
"exp": 1440804813,
"cnf":{
"jku": "https://keys.example.net/pop-keys.json",
"kid": "2015-08-28"
}
}
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="Specifics Intentionally Not Specified" anchor="NotSpecified">
<t>
Proof-of-possession is typically demonstrated by having the presenter sign
a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by the presenter.
This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a "challenge".
</t>
<t>
The means of communicating the nonce and the nature of its contents
are intentionally not described in this specification,
as different protocols will communicate this information in different ways.
Likewise, the means of communicating the signed nonce is also not specified,
as this is also protocol-specific.
</t>
<t>
Note that another means of proving possession of the key
when it is a symmetric key is to encrypt the key to the recipient.
The means of obtaining a key for the recipient is likewise protocol-specific.
</t>
<t>
For examples using the mechanisms defined in this specification,
see <xref target="I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture"/>.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="Security" title="Security Considerations">
<t>
All of the security considerations that
are discussed in <xref target="JWT"/> also apply here.
In addition, proof-of-possession introduces its own unique security issues.
Possessing a key is only valuable if it is kept secret.
Appropriate means must be used to ensure that unintended parties
do not learn private key or symmetric key values.
</t>
<t>
Applications utilizing proof-of-possession should also utilize audience restriction,
as described in Section 4.1.3 of <xref target="JWT"/>,
as it provides different protections.
Proof-of-possession can be used by recipients to reject messages from unauthorized senders.
Audience restriction can be used by recipients to reject messages intended for different recipients.
</t>
<t>
A recipient might not understand the <spanx style="verb">cnf</spanx> claim.
Applications that require
the proof-of-possession keys communicated with it
to be understood and processed must ensure that
the parts of this specification that they use are implemented.
</t>
<t>
Proof-of-possession via encrypted symmetric secrets is subject to replay attacks.
This attack can be avoided when a signed nonce or challenge is used,
since the recipient can use a distinct nonce or challenge for each interaction.
Replay can also be avoided if a sub-key is derived from a shared secret
that is specific to the instance of the PoP demonstration.
</t>
<t>
Similarly to other information included in a JWT,
it is necessary to apply data origin authentication and integrity protection
(via a keyed message digest or a digital signature).
Data origin authentication ensures that the recipient of the JWT
learns about the entity that created the JWT,
since this will be important for any policy decisions.
Integrity protection prevents an adversary from changing
any elements conveyed within the JWT payload.
Special care has to be applied when carrying symmetric keys inside the JWT,
since those not only require integrity protection,
but also confidentiality protection.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="Privacy" title="Privacy Considerations">
<t>
A proof-of-possession key can be used as a correlation handle if the same key
is used with multiple parties.
Thus, for privacy reasons, it is recommended that different proof-of-possession keys
be used when interacting with different parties.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="IANA" title="IANA Considerations">
<t>
The following registration procedure is used for all the
registries established by this specification.
</t>
<t>
Values are registered on a Specification Required
<xref target="RFC5226"/> basis after a three-week review period on the oauth-pop-reg-review@ietf.org mailing
list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the
allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Experts may approve
registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published.
[[ Note to the RFC Editor:
The name of the mailing list should be determined in consultation
with the IESG and IANA. Suggested name: oauth-pop-reg-review@ietf.org. ]]
</t>
<t>
Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use
an appropriate subject
(e.g., "Request to register JWT Confirmation Method: example").
Registration requests that are undetermined for
a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention
(using the iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.
</t>
<t>
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts include
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality,
determining whether it is likely to be of general applicability
or whether it is useful only for a single application,
evaluating the security properties of the item being registered,
and whether the registration makes sense.
</t>
<t>
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are able to
represent the perspectives of different applications using this specification,
in order to enable broadly-informed review of registration decisions.
In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as
creating a conflict of interest for a particular Expert,
that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Experts.
</t>
<section anchor="ClaimsRegistry" title="JSON Web Token Claims Registration">
<t>
This specification registers the <spanx style="verb">cnf</spanx> claim in the IANA
"JSON Web Token Claims" registry <xref target="IANA.JWT.Claims"/>
established by <xref target="JWT"/>.
</t>
<section anchor='ClaimsContents' title='Registry Contents'>
<t> <?rfc subcompact="yes"?>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Claim Name: <spanx style="verb">cnf</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Claim Description: Confirmation
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="Confirmation"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
</section>
<section title="JWT Confirmation Methods Registry" anchor="CnfReg">
<t>
This specification establishes the
IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods" registry
for JWT <spanx style="verb">cnf</spanx> member values.
The registry records the confirmation method member
and a reference to the specification that defines it.
</t>
<section title="Registration Template" anchor="CnfTemplate">
<t>
<list style='hanging'>
<t hangText='Confirmation Method Value:'>
<vspace/>
The name requested (e.g., "kid").
Because a core goal of this specification is for the resulting
representations to be compact, it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short
-- not to exceed 8 characters without a compelling reason to do so.
This name is case-sensitive.
Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive manner
unless the Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason
to allow an exception.
</t>
<t hangText='Confirmation Method Description:'>
<vspace/>
Brief description of the confirmation method (e.g., "Key Identifier").
</t>
<t hangText='Change Controller:'>
<vspace/>
For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the name of the
responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page
URI) may also be included.
</t>
<t hangText='Specification Document(s):'>
<vspace/>
Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
preferably including URIs that
can be used to retrieve copies of the documents.
An indication of the relevant
sections may also be included but is not required.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Initial Registry Contents" anchor="CnfContents">
<t> <?rfc subcompact="yes"?>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Confirmation Method Value: <spanx style="verb">jwk</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Confirmation Method Description: JSON Web Key Representing Public Key
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="PrivatePoP"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Confirmation Method Value: <spanx style="verb">jwe</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Confirmation Method Description: Encrypted JSON Web Key
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="SymmetricPoP"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Confirmation Method Value: <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Confirmation Method Description: Key Identifier
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="KidPoP"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Confirmation Method Value: <spanx style="verb">jku</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Confirmation Method Description: JWK Set URL
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="jkuPoP"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
</section>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<?rfc include='http://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3629.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3986.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5226.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5246.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6125.xml' ?>
<reference anchor="JWT" target='http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519'>
<front>
<title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization>Microsoft</organization>
<address>
<email>mbj@microsoft.com</email>
<uri>http://self-issued.info/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="John Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley">
<organization abbrev="Ping Identity">Ping Identity</organization>
<address>
<email>ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Nat Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura">
<organization abbrev="NRI">Nomura Research Institute</organization>
<address>
<email>n-sakimura@nri.co.jp</email>
</address>
</author>
<date month="May" year="2015"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7519"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7159"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="JWK" target="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517">
<front>
<title>JSON Web Key (JWK)</title>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization>Microsoft</organization>
<address>
<email>mbj@microsoft.com</email>
<uri>http://self-issued.info/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<date month="May" year="2015"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7517"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7157"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="JWE" target="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516">
<front>
<title>JSON Web Encryption (JWE)</title>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization>Microsoft</organization>
<address>
<email>mbj@microsoft.com</email>
<uri>http://self-issued.info/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Joe Hildebrand" initials="J." surname="Hildebrand">
<organization abbrev="Cisco">Cisco Systems, Inc.</organization>
<address>
<email>jhildebr@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date month="May" year="2015"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7516" />
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7156"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="IANA.JWT.Claims" target="http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt">
<front>
<title>JSON Web Token Claims</title>
<author>
<organization>IANA</organization>
</author>
<date/>
</front>
</reference>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<?rfc include='http://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml2/reference.OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os.xml' ?>
<?rfc include="http://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-05.xml" ?>
<reference anchor="OpenID.Core"
target="http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html">
<front>
<title>OpenID Connect Core 1.0</title>
<author fullname="Nat Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura">
<organization abbrev="NRI">Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.</organization>
</author>
<author fullname="John Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley">
<organization abbrev="Ping Identity">Ping Identity</organization>
</author>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization abbrev="Microsoft">Microsoft</organization>
</author>
<author fullname="Breno de Medeiros" initials="B." surname="de Medeiros">
<organization abbrev="Google">Google</organization>
</author>
<author fullname="Chuck Mortimore" initials="C." surname="Mortimore">
<organization abbrev="Salesforce">Salesforce</organization>
</author>
<date day="8" month="November" year="2014"/>
</front>
<format target="http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html"
type="HTML" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="JWK.Thumbprint" target="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638">
<front>
<title>JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint</title>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization>Microsoft</organization>
<address>
<email>mbj@microsoft.com</email>
<uri>http://self-issued.info/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Nat Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura">
<organization abbrev="NRI">Nomura Research Institute</organization>
<address>
<email>n-sakimura@nri.co.jp</email>
<uri>http://nat.sakimura.org/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<date month="September" year="2015" />
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7638" />
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7638"/>
</reference>
</references>
<section title='Acknowledgements' anchor='Acknowledgements'>
<t>
The authors wish to thank
Brian Campbell,
Stephen Farrell,
Barry Leiba,
Kepeng Li,
Chris Lonvick,
James Manger,
Kathleen Moriarty,
Justin Richer,
and Nat Sakimura
for their reviews of the specification.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Document History" anchor="History">
<t>
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
</t>
<t>
-11
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Addressed Sec-Dir review comments by Chris Lonvick and
ballot comments by Stephen Farrell.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-10
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Addressed ballot comments by Barry Leiba.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-09
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Removed erroneous quotation marks around numeric <spanx style="verb">exp</spanx> claim values in examples.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-08
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Added security consideration about also utilizing audience restriction.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-07
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Addressed review comments by Hannes Tschofenig, Kathleen Moriarty, and Justin Richer.
Changes were:
</t>
<t>
Clarified that symmetric proof-of-possession keys
can be generated by either the presenter or the issuer.
</t>
<t>
Clarified that confirmation members that are not understood must be ignored
unless otherwise specified by the application.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-06
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Added diagrams to the introduction.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-05
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Addressed review comments by Kepeng Li.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-04
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Allowed the use of <spanx style="verb">jwk</spanx> for symmetric keys
when the JWT is encrypted.
</t>
<t>
Added the <spanx style="verb">jku</spanx> (JWK Set URL) member.
</t>
<t>
Added privacy considerations.
</t>
<t>
Reordered sections so that the <spanx style="verb">cnf</spanx> (confirmation)
claim is defined before it is used.
</t>
<t>
Noted that applications can define new claim names, in addition to
<spanx style="verb">cnf</spanx>, to represent additional proof-of-possession keys,
using the same representation as <spanx style="verb">cnf</spanx>.
</t>
<t>
Applied wording clarifications suggested by Nat Sakimura.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-03
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Separated the <spanx style="verb">jwk</spanx> and
<spanx style="verb">jwe</spanx> confirmation members;
the former represents a public key as a JWK and
the latter represents a symmetric key as a JWE encrypted JWK.
</t>
<t>
Changed the title to indicate that a proof-of-possession key
is being communicated.
</t>
<t>
Updated language that formerly assumed that the issuer was
an OAuth 2.0 authorization server.
</t>
<t>
Described ways that applications can choose to identify the presenter,
including use of the <spanx style="verb">iss</spanx>,
<spanx style="verb">sub</spanx>, and <spanx style="verb">azp</spanx> claims.
</t>
<t>
Harmonized the registry language with that used in JWT [RFC 7519].
</t>
<t>
Addressed other issues identified during working group last call.
</t>
<t>
Referenced the JWT and JOSE RFCs.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-02
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Defined the terms Issuer, Presenter, and Recipient
and updated their usage within the document.
</t>
<t>
Added a description of a use case using
an asymmetric proof-of-possession key to the introduction.
</t>
<t>
Added the <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> (key ID) confirmation method.
</t>
<t>
These changes address the open issues identified in the previous draft.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-01
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Updated references.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-00
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Created the initial working group draft from draft-jones-oauth-proof-of-possession-02.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</back>
</rfc>
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-24 02:09:10 |