One document matched: draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-02.xml
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<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-02" ipr="trust200902">
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<front>
<title abbrev="oauth-dyn-reg">OAuth Dynamic Client Registration
Protocol</title>
<author fullname="Justin Richer" initials="J" role="editor"
surname="Richer">
<organization>The MITRE Corporation</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email>jricher@mitre.org</email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="John Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley">
<organization abbrev="Ping Identity">Ping Identity</organization>
<address>
<email>ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization abbrev="Microsoft">Microsoft</organization>
<address>
<email>mbj@microsoft.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Maciej Machulak" initials="M" surname="Machulak">
<organization>Newcastle University</organization>
<address>
<email>m.p.machulak@ncl.ac.uk</email>
<uri>http://ncl.ac.uk/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<date day="27" month="November" year="2012" />
<abstract>
<t>This specification defines an endpoint and protocol for dynamic
registration of OAuth Clients at an Authorizaiton Server.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction">
<t>In some use-case scenarios, it is desirable or necessary to allow
OAuth clients to obtain authorization from an OAuth authorization server
without the two parties having previously interacted. Nevertheless, in
order for the authorization server to accurately represent to end-users
which client is seeking authorization to access the end-user's
resources, a method for automatic and unique registration of clients is
needed. The OAuth2 authorization framework does not define how the
relationship between the Client and the Authorization Server is
initialized, or how a given client is assigned a unique Client
Identifier. Historically, this has happened out-of-band from the OAuth
protocol. This draft provides a mechanism for a client to register
itself with the Authorization Server, which can be used to dynamically
provision a Client Identifier, and optionally a Client Secret.</t>
<t>As part of the registration process, this specification also defines
a mechanism for the client to present the Authorization Server with a
set of metadata, such as a display name and icon to be presented to the
user during the authorization step. This draft provides a method for the
client to register and update this information over time.</t>
<section title="Notational Conventions">
<t>The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in <xref
target="RFC2119"></xref>.</t>
<t>Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
are case sensitive.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="terminology" title="Terminology">
<t>This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Refresh Token",
"Authorization Code", "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server",
"Authorization Endpoint", "Client", "Client Identifier", "Client
Secret", "Protected Resource", "Resource Owner", "Resource Server",
and "Token Endpoint" defined by <xref target="RFC6750">OAuth
2.0</xref>.</t>
<t>This specification defines the following additional terms:</t>
<t><list style="symbols">
<t>Client Registration Endpoint: The OAuth 2.0 Endpoint through
which a Client can request new registration and manage the
metadata associated with it.</t>
<t>Registration Access Token: An OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token issued by
the Authorization Server through the Client Registration Endpoint
which is used by the Client to authenticate itself during update
and secret rotation operations.</t>
</list></t>
</section>
<section title="Requirements">
<t>[[ Following are proposed requirements for dynamic client
registration. This section is intended for discussion and will likely
be removed in the final draft. ]]</t>
<section title="The client needs to be uniquely identifiable by the authorization server">
<t>In order for an authorization server to do proper user-delegated
authorization and prevent unauthorized access it must be able to
identify clients uniquely. As is done today in OAuth, the client
identifier (and optional secret) should thus be issued by the
authorization server and not simply accepted as proposed by the
client.</t>
</section>
<section title="The authorization server must collect metadata about a client for later user interaction">
<t>In order for the authorization server to describe a client to an
end-user in an authorization step it needs information about the
client. This can be the client name at a minimum, but today servers
usually request at least a description, a homepage URL, and an icon
when doing manual registration.</t>
</section>
<section title="The authorization server should have the option of strongly authenticating the client and its metadata">
<t>In order to prevent spoofing of clients and enable dynamic
building of strong trust relationships, the authorization server
should have the option to verify the provided information. This
might be solved using message signature verification.</t>
</section>
<section title="Dynamic client registration must be possible from both web-server applications and applications with other capabilities and limitations, such as native applications">
<t>Each instance of a native application (that is, the specific
instance running on each device) that is installed and run by the
same user may need the option of getting a unique client identifier.
In this case, there are implications around gathering and displaying
enough information to ensure that the end-user is delegating
authorization to the intended application. The registration protocol
should be simple and flexible enough to allow for multiple types of
applications.</t>
</section>
<section title="Transaction integrity must be ensured">
<t>When a client sends information to a server endpoint, it might
take time for this data to propagate through big server
installations that spread across various data centers. Care needs to
be taken that subsequent interactions with the user after the
registration process, such as an authorization request, show the
correct data.</t>
</section>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="client-metadata" title="Client Metadata">
<t>Clients generally have an array of metadata associated with their
unique Client Identifier at the Authorization Server. These can range
from human-facing display strings, such as a client name, to items that
impact the security of the protocol, such as the list of valid redirect
URIs.</t>
<t>Extensions and profiles of this specification MAY expand this list,
but MUST at least accept all parameters on this list. The Authorization
Server MUST ignore any additional parameters sent by the Client that it
does not understand.</t>
<t><list style="hanging">
<t hangText="redirect_uris"><vspace blankLines="0" />REQUIRED A
space-delimited list of redirect URIs.</t>
<t hangText="client_name"><vspace blankLines="0" />RECOMMENDED.
Human-readable name of the Client to be presented to the user.</t>
<t hangText="client_url"><vspace />RECOMMENDED. URL of the homepage
of the client. If present, the server SHOULD display this URL to the
end user.</t>
<t hangText="logo_url"><vspace blankLines="0" />OPTIONAL. URL that
references a logo for the Client application. If present, the server
SHOULD display this image to the end user during approval.</t>
<t hangText="contacts"><vspace blankLines="0" />OPTIONAL. Space
delimited list of email addresses for people responsible for this
client. The Authorization Server MAY may these addresses available
to end users for support queries. An Authorization Server MAY use
these email addresses as identifiers for an administrative page for
this client.</t>
<t hangText="tos_url"><vspace blankLines="0" />OPTIONAL. URL that
points to a human-readable Terms of Service for the Client. The
Authorization Server SHOULD display this URL to the End-User if it
is given.</t>
<t hangText="token_endpoint_auth_method"><vspace
blankLines="0" />OPTIONAL. The requested authentication type for the
Token Endpoint. Valid values are:<list style="symbols">
<t><spanx style="verb">none</spanx> this is a public client as
defined in OAuth 2.0 and does not have a client secret</t>
<t><spanx style="verb">client_secret_post</spanx> the client
uses the HTTP POST parameters defined in OAuth2.0 section
2.3.1</t>
<t><spanx style="verb">client_secret_basic</spanx> the client
uses HTTP Basic defined in OAuth 2.0 section 2.3.1</t>
<t><spanx style="verb">client_secret_jwt</spanx> the client uses
the JWT Assertion profile with a semetric secret issued by the
server</t>
<t><spanx>private_key_jwt</spanx> the client uses the JWT
Assertion profile with its own private key</t>
</list>Other Authentication methods may be defined by extension.
If unspecified or omitted, the default is <spanx style="verb">client_secret_basic</spanx>
HTTP Basic Authentication Scheme as specified in Section 2.3.1 of
<xref target="RFC6749">OAuth 2.0</xref>.</t>
<t hangText="policy_url"><vspace blankLines="0" />OPTIONAL. A URL
location that the Client provides to the End-User to read about the
how the profile data will be used. The Authorization Server SHOULD
display this URL to the End-User if it is given.</t>
<t hangText="jwk_url"><vspace blankLines="0" />OPTIONAL. URL for the
Client's <xref target="JWK">JSON Web Key</xref> document that is
used for signing Token Endpoint Requests. If jwk_encryption_url is
not provided, the key at jwk_url is also used as the key to encrypt
responses to the Client. If the Client registers both <spanx
style="verb">x509_url</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">jwk_url</spanx>,
the keys contained in both formats MUST be the same.</t>
<t hangText="jwk_encryption_url"><vspace blankLines="0" />OPTIONAL.
URL for the Client's <xref target="JWK">JSON Web Key</xref> that is
used to encrypt any responses to the Client. If the Client registers
both <spanx style="verb">jwk_encryption_url</spanx> and <spanx
style="verb">x509_encryption_url</spanx>, the keys contained in both
formats MUST be the same.</t>
<t hangText="x509_url"><vspace blankLines="0" />OPTIONAL. URL for
the Client's PEM encoded X.509 Certificate or Certificate chain that
is used for signing Token Endpoint Requests. If <spanx style="verb">x509_encryption_url</spanx>
is not provided, <spanx style="verb">x509_url</spanx> it is also
used to encrypt responses to the Client. If the Client registers
both <spanx style="verb">x509_url</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">jwk_url</spanx>,
the keys contained in both formats MUST be the same.</t>
<t hangText="x509_encryption_url"><vspace blankLines="0" />OPTIONAL.
URL for the Client's PEM encoded X.509 Certificate or Certificate
chain that is used to encrypt the ID Token and User Info Endpoint
Responses to the Client. If the Client registers both <spanx
style="verb">jwk_encryption_url</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">x509_encryption_url</spanx>,
the keys contained in both formats SHOULD be the same.</t>
<t hangText="default_max_age"><vspace blankLines="0" />OPTIONAL.
Maximum age of a session in integer seconds. Specifies that the
End-User must be actively authenticated if any present
authentication is older than the specified number of seconds by
default.</t>
<t hangText="default_acr"><vspace blankLines="0" />OPTIONAL. Default
Authentication Context class Reference. String that specifies the
default authentication context value that the Authorization server
must use for processing requests from this client.</t>
</list></t>
</section>
<section title="Client Registration Endpoint">
<t>The Client Registration Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Endpoint defined in
this document that is designed to allow a Client to register itself with
the Authorization Server. The Client Registration Endpoint MUST accept
HTTP POST messages with request parameters encoded in the entity body
using the <spanx style="verb">application/x-www-form-urlencoded</spanx>
format. The Client Registration Endpoint MUST be protected by a
transport-layer security mechanism when sending requests to the
Registration Endpoint. The server MUST support TLS 1.2 <xref
target="RFC5246">RFC 5246</xref> and/or TLS 1.0 <xref
target="RFC2246"></xref> and MAY support additional transport-layer
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the Client
MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per <xref
target="RFC6125">RFC 6125</xref>.</t>
<t>The Endpoint defines three operations that a client can take on it,
switched by the "operation" parameter:</t>
<t><list style="symbols">
<t>client_register: request that the Authorization Server generate a
new Client Identifier (and optionally a Client Secret) and associate
it with the set of presented <xref
target="client-metadata">metadata</xref></t>
<t>client_update: update the <xref
target="client-metadata">metadata</xref> associated with a Client
Identifier</t>
<t>rotate_secret: issue a new Registration Access Token and, if
applicable, a Client Secret for a Client</t>
</list></t>
<t>In order to facilitate registered clients updating their information,
the Client Registration Endpoint issues a request_access_token for
clients to securely identify themselves in future connections. As such,
the Endpoint MUST accept requests with <xref target="RFC6750">OAuth 2.0
Bearer Tokens</xref> for these operations.</t>
<t>In order to support open registration and facilitate wider
interoperability, the Client Registration Endpoint SHOULD allow
client_register requests with no further authentication. These requests
MAY be rate-limited to prevent a denial-of-service attack on the Client
Registration Endpoint.</t>
<t>In addition, the Client Registration Endpoint MAY accept an initial
authorization credential in the form of an <xref target="RFC6749">OAuth
2.0 </xref> access token in order to limit registration to only
previously authorized parties. The method by which this access token is
obtained by the registrant is generally out-of-band and is out of scope
of this specification.</t>
<t>These two aspects, operation selection and client authentication, are
represented by two parameters common to all operations:</t>
<t><list style="hanging">
<t hangText="operation">REQUIRED. Values are <spanx style="verb">client_register</spanx>
(for new registrations), <spanx style="verb">rotate_secret</spanx>
to request rotation of the <spanx style="verb">client_secret</spanx>,
and <spanx style="verb">client_update</spanx> (for updating
parameters of an existing <spanx style="verb">client_id</spanx>).</t>
<t hangText="access_token">OPTIONAL. An OAuth2 Bearer token used to
access the Client Registration Endpoint, as defined in OAuth2
Bearer. This parameter MUST NOT be sent if the Access Token is sent
in the HTTP Authorization header as described in Section 7.1 of
<xref target="RFC6749">OAuth 2.0</xref>. Access Tokens sent in the
authorization header must be <xref target="RFC6750">OAuth 2.0 Bearer
Tokens</xref>.</t>
</list>Each operation takes a different parameter set, and all
operations are described below.</t>
<t>The Client Registration Endpoint MUST ignore all parameters it does
not understand.</t>
<section title="Client Registration Request">
<t>This operation registers a new client to the Authorization Server.
The Authorization Server assigns this client a unique Client
Identifier, optionally assigns a Client Secret, and associates the
metadata given in the request with the issued Client Identifier. The
request includes the two parameters described above as well as any
parameters described in <xref target="client-metadata">Client
Metadata</xref>.</t>
<t><?rfc subcompact="yes"?><list style="hanging">
<t hangText="operation"><vspace />REQUIRED. MUST have the value
<spanx style="verb">client_register</spanx></t>
<t hangText="access_token"><vspace />OPTIONAL. used to restrict
new client registration. This parameter MUST NOT be sent if the
Access Token is sent in the HTTP Authorization header as described
in Section 7.1 of <xref target="RFC6749">OAuth 2.0</xref>. Access
Tokens sent in the authorization header must be <xref
target="RFC6750">OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tokens</xref>.</t>
<t hangText="redirect_uris">REQUIRED</t>
<t hangText="client_name">RECOMMENDED</t>
<t hangText="client_url">RECOMMENDED</t>
<t hangText="logo_url">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="contacts">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="tos_url">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="token_endpoint_auth_method">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="policy_url">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="jwk_url">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="jwk_encryption_url">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="x509_url">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="x509_encryption_url">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="default_max_age">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="default_acr">OPTIONAL</t>
</list><?rfc subcompact="no"?>For example, a client could send the
following registration request to the Client Registration
Endpoint:</t>
<figure>
<preamble>Following is a non-normative example request (with line
wraps for display purposes only):</preamble>
<artwork><![CDATA[POST /register HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Host: server.example.com
operation=client_register
&redirect_uris=https://client.example.org/callback
%20https://client.example.org/callback2
&client_name=My%20Example%20Client
&logo_url=https://client.example.org/logo.png
&token_endpoint_auth_type=client_secret_basic
&jwk_url=https://client.example.org/my_rsa_public_key.jwk
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="Client Registration Response">
<t>Upon successful registration, the Client Registration Endpoint
returns the newly-created Client Identifier and, optionally, a Client
Secret. The response also contains a Registration Access Token that is
to be used by the client to perform subsequent operations at this
endpoint, such as client_update and rotate_secret. These items are
returned as a JSON document with the following fields as top-level
members of the root JSON object.</t>
<t><list style="hanging">
<t hangText="client_id"><vspace />REQUIRED. The unique Client
identifier, MUST NOT be currently valid for any other registered
Client.</t>
<t hangText="client_secret"><vspace />OPTIONAL. The Client secret.
This MUST be unique for each <spanx style="verb">client_id</spanx>.
This value is used by confidential clients to authenticate to the
Token Endpoint as described in OAuth 2.0 Section 2.3.1.</t>
<t hangText="registration_access_token"><vspace />REQUIRED. The
Access token to be used by the client to perform <spanx
style="verb">client_update</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">rotate_secret</spanx>
requests.</t>
<t hangText="issued_at"><vspace />OPTIONAL. Specifies the
timestamp when the Client Identifier was issued. The timestamp
value MUST be a positive integer. The value is expressed in the
number of seconds since January 1, 1970 00:00:00 GMT.</t>
<t hangText="expires_at"><vspace />OPTIONAL. The number of seconds
from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC that the <spanx
style="verb">client_secret</spanx> will expire or <spanx
style="verb">0</spanx> if they do not expire. See <xref
target="RFC3339">RFC 3339</xref> for details regarding date/times
in general and UTC in particular.</t>
</list></t>
<figure>
<preamble>Following is a non-normative example response:</preamble>
<artwork><![CDATA[HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_secret":
"cf136dc3c1fd9153029bb9c6cc9ecead918bad9887fce6c93f31185e5885805d",
"registration_access_token": "reg-23410913-abewfq.123483",
"expires_at":2893276800
}]]></artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="Client Update Request">
<t>This operation updates a previously-registered client with new
metadata at the Authorization Server. This request MUST be protected
by the Registration Authorization Token associated with the Client.
This request MAY include any fields described in <xref
target="client-metadata">Client Metadata</xref>. The values of Client
Metadata fields in this request MUST replace (not augment) the values
previously associated with this Client. Empty values in Client
Metadata MUST be taken as a request to clear any existing value of
that field.</t>
<t><?rfc subcompact="yes"?><list style="hanging">
<t hangText="operation"><vspace />REQUIRED, MUST have the value
<spanx style="verb">client_update</spanx></t>
<t hangText="access_token"><vspace />REQUIRED, unless presented in
the Authorization Header as in <xref target="RFC6750">OAuth2
Bearer</xref>. The Registration Access Token that was issued
during the client_register step, or previous client_update or
rotate_secret calls.</t>
<t hangText="redirect_uris">REQUIRED</t>
<t hangText="client_name">RECOMMENDED</t>
<t hangText="client_url">RECOMMENDED</t>
<t hangText="logo_url">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="contacts">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="tos_url">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="token_endpoint_auth_method">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="policy_url">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="jwk_url">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="jwk_encryption_url">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="x509_url">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="x509_encryption_url">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="default_max_age">OPTIONAL</t>
<t hangText="default_acr">OPTIONAL</t>
</list><?rfc subcompact="no"?>For example, a client could send the
following registration request to the Client Registration
Endpoint:</t>
<figure>
<preamble>Following is a non-normative example request (with line
wraps for display purposes only):</preamble>
<artwork><![CDATA[POST /register HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
operation=client_update
&redirect_uris=https://client.example.org/callback
%20https://client.example.org/callback2
&client_name=My%20Example%20
&logo_url=https://client.example.org/logo.png
&token_endpoint_auth_type=client_secret_basic
&jwk_url=https://client.example.org/my_rsa_public_key.jwk
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="Client Update Response">
<t>Upon successful update, the Client Registration Endpoint returns a
JSON document with the following fields as top-level members of the
root JSON object.<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="client_id"><vspace />REQUIRED. The unique Client
identifier, MUST equal the value of the client_id returned in the
original client_register request.</t>
</list></t>
<figure>
<preamble>Following is a non-normative example response:</preamble>
<artwork><![CDATA[HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
}]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>[[ Editor's note: should this return the entire client data object,
for confirmation and review, including any fields that may have been
asserted by the AS? ]]</t>
</section>
<section title="Rotate Secret Request">
<t>This operation allows the client to rotate its current Registration
Access Token as well as its Client Secret, if it has one. </t>
<t><list style="hanging">
<t hangText="operation">REQUIRED. MUST have the value
rotate_secret</t>
<t hangText="access_token">REQUIRED. The Registration Access Token
that was issued during the client_register step, or previous
client_update or rotate_secret calls. This parameter MUST NOT be
sent if the Access Token is sent in the HTTP Authorization header
as described in Section 7.1 of <xref target="RFC6749">OAuth
2.0</xref>. Access Tokens sent in the authorization header must be
<xref target="RFC6750">OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tokens</xref>.</t>
</list></t>
<figure>
<preamble>Following is a non-normative example request (with line
wraps for display purposes only):</preamble>
<artwork><![CDATA[POST /register HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
operation=rotate_secret
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="Rotate Secret Response">
<t>Upon successful rotation of the Registration Access Token and
optionally the Client Secret, the Client Registration Endpoint returns
a JSON document with the following fields as top-level members of the
root JSON object.<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="client_id"><vspace />REQUIRED. The unique Client
identifier, MUST match the client_id issued in the original
client_register request.</t>
<t hangText="client_secret"><vspace />REQUIRED if the server
initially issued this Client a Client Secret, otherwise the server
MUST NOT return a value. The value MUST be unique for each <spanx
style="verb">client_id</spanx>.</t>
<t hangText="registration_access_token"><vspace />REQUIRED The
Access token to be used by the client to perform subsequent <spanx
style="verb">client_update</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">rotate_secret</spanx>
requests.</t>
<t hangText="issued_at"><vspace />OPTIONAL. Specifies the
timestamp when the identifier was issued. The timestamp value MUST
be a positive integer. The value is expressed in the number of
seconds since January 1, 1970 00:00:00 GMT.</t>
<t hangText="expires_at"><vspace />OPTIONAL. The number of seconds
from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC that the <spanx
style="verb">client_secret</spanx> will expire or <spanx
style="verb">0</spanx> if they do not expire. See <xref
target="RFC3339">RFC 3339</xref> for details regarding date/times
in general and UTC in particular.</t>
</list></t>
<figure>
<preamble>Following is a non-normative example response:</preamble>
<artwork><![CDATA[HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_secret":
"cf136dc3c1fd9153029bb9c6cc9ecead918bad9887fce6c93f31185e5885805d",
"registration_access_token": "this.is.a.access.token.value.ffx83",
"expires_at":2893276800
}]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>The Authorization Server SHOULD discard and invalidate the Request
Access Token and the Client Secret associated with this Client after
successful completion of this request.</t>
</section>
<section title="Client Registration Error Response">
<t>When an OAuth error condition occurs, the Client Registration
Endpoint returns an Error Response as defined in Section 5.2 of the
OAuth 2.0 specification.</t>
<t>When a registration error condition occurs, the Client Registration
Endpoint returns a HTTP 400 status code including a JSON object
describing the error in the response body.</t>
<t>The JSON object contains two members:</t>
<t><list style="hanging">
<t hangText="error"><vspace />The error code, a single ASCII
string.</t>
<t hangText="error_description"><vspace />The additional text
description of the error for debugging.</t>
</list></t>
<t>This specification defines the following error codes:</t>
<t><list style="hanging">
<t hangText="invalid_operation"><vspace />The value of <spanx
style="verb">operation</spanx> is invalid or not supported.</t>
<t hangText="invalid_redirect_uri"><vspace />The value of one or
more <spanx style="verb">redirect_uris</spanx> is invalid.</t>
<t hangText="invalid_client_metadata"><vspace />The value of one
of the <xref target="client-metadata">client metadata</xref>
fields is invalid.</t>
</list></t>
<figure>
<preamble>Following is a non-normative example of an error response
(with line wraps for display purposes only):</preamble>
<artwork><![CDATA[HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"error":"invalid_operation",
"error_description":"The value of the operation parameter must
be one of client_register, rotate_secret or client_update."
}]]></artwork>
</figure>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="IANA" title="IANA Considerations">
<t>This document makes no requests of IANA.</t>
</section>
<section title="Security Considerations">
<t>[[ Editor's note: Following are some security considerations taken
whole from the UMA and OpenID Connect source drafts. ]] </t>
<t>Since requests to the Client Registration Endpoint result in the
transmission of clear-text credentials (in the HTTP request and
response), the server MUST require the use of a transport-layer security
mechanism when sending requests to the Registration Endpoint. The server
MUST support TLS 1.2 <xref target="RFC5246">RFC 5246</xref> and/or TLS
1.0 <xref target="RFC2246"></xref> and MAY support additional
transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using
TLS, the Client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per
<xref target="RFC6125">RFC 6125</xref>.</t>
<t>As this endpoint is an OAuth2 Protected Resource, requests to the
Registration Endpoint SHOULD have some rate limiting on failures to
prevent the Registration Access Token from being disclosed though
repeated access attempts.</t>
<t>The authorization server MUST treat all client metadata as
self-asserted. A rogue Client might use the name and logo for the
legitimate Client, which it is trying to impersonate. An Authorization
Server needs to take steps to mitigate this phishing risk, since the
logo could confuse users into thinking they're logging in to the
legitimate Client. For instance, an Authorization Server could warn if
the domain/site of the logo doesn't match the domain/site of redirect
URIs. An Authorization Server can also make warnings against untrusted
Clients in all cases, especially if they're dynamically registered, have
not been trusted by any users at the Authorization Server before.</t>
<t>In a situation where the Authorization Server is supporting open
Client registration, it must be extremely careful with any URL provided
by the Client that will be displayed to the user (e.g. <spanx
style="verb">logo_url</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">policy_url</spanx>).
A rogue Client could specify a registration request with a reference to
a drive-by download in the <spanx style="verb">policy_url</spanx>. The
Authorization Server should check to see if the <spanx style="verb">logo_url</spanx>
and <spanx style="verb">policy_url</spanx> have the same host as the
hosts defined in the array of <spanx style="verb">redirect_uris</spanx>.</t>
<t>While the Client Secret can expire, the Registration Access Token
should not expire while a client is still actively registered. If this
token were to expire, a Client could be left in a situation where it has
no means of updating itself and must register itself anew. As the
Registration Access Tokens are long-term credentials, they MUST be
protected by the Client as a secret. [[ Editor's note: with the right
error codes returned from client_update, the AS could force the Client
to call rotate_secret before going forward, lessening the window for
abuse of a leaked registration token. ]]</t>
</section>
<section title="Acknowledgments">
<t>The authors thank the OAuth Working Group, the User-Managed Access
Working Group, and the OpenID Connect Working Group participants for
their input to this document. In particular, the following individuals
have been instrumental in their review and contribution to various
versions of this document: Torsten Lodderstedt, Eve Maler, Thomas
Hardjono, Christian Scholz, Nat Sakimura, George Fletcher, Amanda
Anganes, and Domenico Catalano.</t>
</section>
<section title="Document History">
<t>[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]</t>
<t>- 02</t>
<t><list style="symbols">
<t>Reorganized contributors and references</t>
<t>Moved OAuth references to RFC</t>
<t>Reorganized model/protocol sections for clarity</t>
<t>Changed terminology to "client register" instead of "client
associate"</t>
<t>Specified that client_id must match across all subsequent
requests</t>
<t>Fixed RFC2XML formatting, especially on lists</t>
</list></t>
<t>- 01</t>
<t><list style="symbols">
<t>Merged UMA and OpenID Connect registrations into a single
document</t>
<t>Changed to form-paramter inputs to endpoint</t>
<t>Removed pull-based registration</t>
</list></t>
<t>- 00</t>
<t><list style="symbols">
<t>Imported original UMA draft specification</t>
</list></t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2617.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5785.xml' ?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2246"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3339"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5246"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6125"?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6749.xml'?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6750.xml'?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4627.xml'?>
<reference anchor="JWA">
<front>
<title>JSON Web Algorithms</title>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization abbrev="Microsoft">Microsoft</organization>
</author>
<date day="12" month="May" year="2012" />
</front>
<format target="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms"
type="HTML" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="JWT">
<front>
<title>JSON Web Token</title>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization abbrev="Microsoft">Microsoft</organization>
</author>
<author fullname="John Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley">
<organization>Ping Identity</organization>
</author>
<author fullname="Nat Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura">
<organization abbrev="NRI">Nomura Research Institute,
Ltd.</organization>
</author>
<date day="22" month="May" year="2012" />
</front>
<format target="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token"
type="HTML" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="JWS">
<front>
<title>JSON Web Signature</title>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization abbrev="Microsoft">Microsoft</organization>
</author>
<author fullname="John Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley">
<organization>Ping Identity</organization>
</author>
<author fullname="Nat Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura">
<organization abbrev="NRI">Nomura Research Institute,
Ltd.</organization>
</author>
<date day="12" month="May" year="2012" />
</front>
<format target="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature"
type="HTML" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="JWE">
<front>
<title>JSON Web Encryption (JWE)</title>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization>Microsoft</organization>
</author>
<author fullname="Eric Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla">
<organization>RTFM, Inc.</organization>
</author>
<author fullname="Joe Hildebrand" initials="J." surname="Hildebrand">
<organization>Cisco Systems, Inc.</organization>
</author>
<date day="12" month="May" year="2012" />
</front>
<format target="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption"
type="HTML" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="JWK">
<front>
<title>JSON Web Key (JWK)</title>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization>Microsoft</organization>
</author>
<date day="12" month="May" year="2012" />
</front>
<format target="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key"
type="HTML" />
</reference>
</references>
</back>
</rfc>
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