One document matched: draft-ietf-netconf-zerotouch-00.xml
<?xml version='1.0'?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM 'rfc2629.dtd'>
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc compact="no"?>
<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
<?rfc strict="no"?>
<?rfc rfcedstyle="yes"?>
<rfc category="std"
ipr="trust200902"
docName="draft-ietf-netconf-zerotouch-00">
<front>
<title abbrev="ZeroTouch">Zero Touch Provisioning for NETCONF Call Home (ZeroTouch)</title>
<author initials="K.W." surname="Watsen" fullname="Kent Watsen">
<organization>Juniper Networks</organization>
<address>
<email>kwatsen@juniper.net</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="S.H." surname="Hanna" fullname="Stephen Hanna">
<organization>Juniper Networks</organization>
<address>
<email>shanna@juniper.net</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="J.M.C." surname="Clarke" fullname="Joe Marcus Clarke">
<organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
<address>
<email>jclarke@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="M.A." surname="Abrahamsson" fullname="Mikael Abrahamsson">
<organization>T-Systems</organization>
<address>
<email>"mikael.abrahamsson@t-systems.se</email>
</address>
</author>
<date day="1" month="July" year="2014"/>
<area>Operations</area>
<workgroup>NETCONF Working Group</workgroup>
<keyword>zerotouch</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>This draft presents a technique for establishing a
secure NETCONF connection between a newly deployed
IP-based device, configured with just its factory
default settings, and the new owner's Network Management
System (NMS).</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction">
<section title="Terminology">
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL",
"SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in RFC 2119 <xref target="RFC2119"/>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Objectives">
<t>A fundamental business requirement is to reduce
operational costs where possible. Deploying new
IP-based devices is many times one of the largest
costs in running a network, as sending trained
specialists to each site to do an installation is
both cost prohibitive and does not scale.</t>
<t>Both networking vendors and standard bodies have
tried to address this issue, with varying levels of
success. For instance, the Broadband Forum TR-069
specification <xref target="TR069"/> relies solely
on DHCP for NMS discovery, but this can only work in
environments where the DHCP server is locally administered,
which is not the case when the device is connected to
an ISP's network. In another example, some network
vendors have enabled their devices to load an initial
configuration from removable storage media (e.g., a
USB flash drive), but not all devices have such ports.</t>
<t>The solution presented herein, ZeroTouch, enables
a device to securely obtain an initial configuration
from the network without any operator intervention.
The discovered configuration initiates the device to
"call home" using either the SSH or TLS, as described in
<xref target="NETCONF-REVERSE-SSH"/> and <xref target="RFC5539bis"/>
respectively.</t>
<t><vspace blankLines="3"/></t>
</section>
<section title="Use Cases" anchor="use-cases">
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>Connecting to a remotely administered network
<list style="empty">
<t>This use-case involves scenarios, such as a remote
branch office or convenience store, whereby the device
connects to an ISP's network. In this case, the device
receives only generic networking settings (address, netmask,
gateway, DNS servers, etc.) provided by the ISP,
with no site-specific customizations, such that the
device has no recourse but to reach out to the
presumably insecure network for its initial
configuration.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Connecting to a locally administered network
<list style="empty">
<t>This use-case covers all other scenarios and
differs only in that the device may additionally
receive some site-specific information to guide
its call home process, which could then direct
it to a local server for its initial configuration.
If no site-specific information is provided, or the
device is unable to use the information provided,
it can then reach out to network just as it would
for a remotely administered network.</t>
</list>
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t><vspace blankLines="30"/></t>
</section>
<section title="Actors and Roles">
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
+----------+ fetches Configlet
+-------| Device |-------------------+
| +----------+ |
| ^ |
| | V
| call home | +----------+
| | | Config |
| | | Server |<----+
| | produces +----------+ |
| | |
| | |
| +----------+ delegates trust |
| | Vendor |-------------------+ |
| +----------+ | |
| ^ | |
| | V |
| | +----------+ |
| | imports | Config | |
| | trust | Signer | |
| | anchor +----------+ |
| | ^ |
| | | |
| +---------+ requests signing | |
+------>| NMS |--------------------+ |
+---------+ |
| places signed Configlet onto |
+-------------------------------------+
]]></artwork>
<postamble>Though not represented as a box in the diagram,
the Configlet is also a first-class object in the solution.</postamble>
</figure>
</t>
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>Configlet
<list style="empty">
<t>A Configlet is an XML document that, when
loaded onto a device, configures the device
to initiate a call home connection to a deployment
specific NMS, as well as set a local administrator
account for the NMS to log into. The Configlet
is signed and optionally encrypted. More information
about Configlets is in <xref target="configlet"/>.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Configuration Server
<list style="empty">
<t>A Configuration Server hosts configurations
to be downloaded over a network. Configuration
Servers can be deployed either on the locally
administered network or on some external network
(e.g., the Internet). Configuration Servers are
known to devices in the form of a URI, which can
be either preconfigured or dynamically discovered.
More information about Configuration Servers is
in <xref target="config-server"/>.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Configuration Signer
<list style="empty">
<t>A Configuration Signer is an entity that the
device's vendor has delegated the signing function
to. A Configuration Signer only needs to ensure
that the requestor is the rightful owner of the
device to which a configuration is destined. A
Configuration Signer may be site-specific or an
external entity. More information about
Configuration Signers is in
<xref target="config-signer"/>.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Device
<list style="empty">
<t>The device is the networking entity that initiates
ZeroTouch, whenever booting with its factory default
settings. The device is preconfigured with a secure
device identity, for Configuration Servers URIs, and
certificates for Configuration Signers and
Configuration Servers it trusts by default. A
device may dynamically discover additional URIs and
certificates from a locally-administered network.
More information about Devices
is in <xref target="device"/>.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Network Management System
<list style="empty">
<t>The NMS is the deployment-specific system that
devices initiate their call home connections to.
The NMS must be configured with vendor-specific
trust anchors and unique device identifiers.
The administrators of the NMS system interact with
Configuration Signer and Configuration Server
systems to stage the the device configurations.
More information about Network Management Systems
is in <xref target="nms"/>.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Vendor
<list style="empty">
<t>Vendors manufacture the devices with secure
device identities and preconfigured Configuration
URIs, and Configuration Signer certificates.
Vendors are the de facto Configuration Signer
for the devices it manufactures, but may
delegate that role to external Configuration
Signers. More information about Vendors is in
<xref target="vendor"/>.</t>
</list>
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t><vspace blankLines="3"/></t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Configuration Server" anchor="config-server">
<t>A Configuration Server is the entity hosting configurations
that can be downloaded over a network. This section describes
the service interface a Configuration Server must implement
as well as what's needed for transport security.</t>
<section title="Service Interface">
<t>Configuration Servers are known to devices in the form
of a URI. Configuration Servers MUST support the URI schemes
"https" and "http". Other URI schemes are not supported.</t>
<t>When accessing a Configuration Server, the device
appends its unique device identifier (UID) to the URI. The
unique identifies MUST be the same as the identifier stored
within the device's IDevID certificate.</t>
<t>
For instance, if the URI were:
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
http://example.com/zerotouch/devices/
https://example.com/zerotouch?id=
]]></artwork>
</figure>
then the device would try to access:
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
http://example.com/zerotouch/devices/<uid>
https://example.com/zerotouch?id=<uid>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
<t>When accessing the Configuration Server, the HTTP
Accept-Type MUST be set to either "application/zerotouch-config"
or "application/zerotouch-bootimage". Please see
<xref target="zerotouch-media-types"/>. A wildcard Accept-Type
(e.g., */*) SHOULD default to "application/zerotouch-config".</t>
</section>
<section title="Interactive Interface">
<t>The Configuration server SHOULD to provide some
user-facing interface to enable to the end-user to
provide a Configlet and, optionally, an bootimage file.
How the Configlet and bootimage file are provided to the
Configuration Server is outside the scope of this
document.</t>
<t><vspace blankLines="3"/></t>
</section>
<section title="Transport Security">
<t>As described in <xref target="config-signer"/>, configurations
MUST be signed and MAY be encrypted. As such, transport-level
security is not needed to assure authenticity or confidentiality
of the configuration itself. However, transport-level security
enables devices to authenticate the Configuration Server and
also extends confidentiality to the application-level protocol.
Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED for Configuration Servers to
support transport-level encryption.</t>
<t>If a Configuration Server uses X.509-based encryption,
then its X.509 certificate MUST have a chain of trust
to a trust anchor known to devices (see
<xref target="device-precondition"/>. More specifically, the
Configuration Server MUST possess all the intermediate
certificates leading to the trust anchor.</t>
<t>When a Configuration Server negotiates encryption with the
device, it provides the chain of certificates, from its own
to, but not including, the trust anchor. Including the trust
anchor's certificate is unnecessary since the device MUST be
pre-provisioned with it. Devices need the chain of certificates
to be passed so they can validate the server using only a
list of Configuration Server trust anchors.</t>
</section>
<section title="Expiration Policy">
<t>An expiration policy is needed to limit how long a
Configuration Server needs to retain a configuration and,
in turn, how many configurations it might need to retain
at a given time.</t>
<t>It is expected that Configuration Servers will enable
retention information to be given at the same time as
when the configuration is provided to it. Options should
be temporal in nature, not based on access counts, so as
to thwart a DoS attack whereby the configuration is accessed
by an entity other than the device. Configuration Servers
SHOULD put a limit on the maximum amount of time it will
hold onto a configuration before purging it, even if the
configuration had never been accessed.</t>
</section>
<section title="Troubleshooting and Auditing">
<t>In order to facilitate troubleshooting and auditing, the
Configuration Server SHOULD record into a log a record of
the various Configlet download requests. This draft does
not define what information should be kept or for how
long.</t>
<t><vspace blankLines="3"/></t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Configuration Signer" anchor="config-signer">
<section title="Overview" anchor="signer-overview">
<t>A Configuration Signer MUST be able to sign configurations.
This function requires the Configuration Signer be able to
authenticate that the requestor is the true owner of the
device, as identified within the contents of the configuration
being signed.</t>
<t>The user interface a Configuration Signer provides to perform
its role is outside the scope of this document. However, in
order to meet operational expectations, the time it takes to
respond to a request should be as expeditious as possible.</t>
<t>A Configuration Signer does not need to retain a configuration
after signing it. The Configuration Signer SHOULD retain an
audit log for indemnification purposes.</t>
</section>
<section title="Signing Configurations">
<t>A Configlet Signer MUST have an X.509 certificate with
Key Usage capable of signing data (digitalSignature) and
be signed by a certificate authority having a chain of
trust leading to a trust anchor known to the devices
loading its Configlets. The Configlet Signer MUST
possess all intermediate certificates leading to its
trust anchor.</t>
<t>When a Configlet Signer signs a Configlet, it attaches
both the signature and the chain of X.509 certificates,
including its own, but not necessarily including the
trust anchor's certificate. This chain of certificates
is needed so a device can validate a Configlet using
only the Configlet Signer trust anchors known to it.</t>
</section>
<section title="Optional Encryption">
<t>A Configuration Signer MAY optionally encrypt configurations
prior to signing them. This function requires the Configuration
Signer know the device's unique public key, as encoded within
its secure device identity certificate.</t>
<!-- KENT: what KeyUsage bits need to be set?
- are they in IDEVID? -->
</section>
<section title="Delegation of Trust" anchor="delegate-trust">
<t>A device's vendor is the root of trust for all of its
devices. That is, the vendor's devices implicitly trust
the vendor for such things as software images, subscription
updates, and licenses. As such, the vendor is the ultimate
Configuration Signer for its devices.</t>
<t>However, both vendors and its customers may prefer a
this role be performed by another entity. For instance,
a vendor may not want this role due to it being outside
its primary business function, and customers may not want
the vendor to have this role for privacy reasons.</t>
<t>It is therefore provided that a vendor MAY delegate
the Configuration Signer role to other entities. Using
X.509 certificates, the Vendor need only sign the
delegate's certificate signing request (CSR), providing
back to the delegate a signed X.509 certificate
authenticating its ability to perform the signing
function.</t>
<t>In order enable a delegate to fulfill its operational
role, as described in <xref target="signer-overview"/>,
the vendor MUST provide a mechanism that can be used to
authenticate if a given requestor is the true owner of a
specific device. Additionally, to support Configuration
Signers that want to encrypt configurations, the vendor
MUST also provide a means for the Configuration Signer
to know the public key for a given device. How the vendor
provides this information to Configuration Signers is
outside the scope of this document.</t>
</section>
<section title="Delegation to a Specific Customer">
<t>The general expectation is that the Configuration
Signer is an impartial 3rd-party. However, certain
deployments may want to be able to perform the function for
themselves. Yet without constraints, that deployment
could sign configurations for devices that do not
belong to it.</t>
<t>Resolving this concern is possible when 1) the
deployment specific Configuration Signer's certificate
is annotated with a customer identifier and 2) the
devices sold to that customer have that same identifier
encoded into their secure device identifier.</t>
<t>This entails the vendor augmenting its manufacturing
process for these special devices, which would likely
be sold directly to the customer, as opposed to through
a sales channel. This takes extraordinary effort and
likely only implemented for the most important customers,
if at all.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Device" anchor="device">
<section title="Overview">
<t>While the wholistic solution, ZeroTouch, involves a
number of entities, a device being powered-on is the
essential event that sets things in motion.</t>
<t>Whenever a device boots with its factory
default settings, it initiates ZeroTouch with the goal
of finding a configuration to initialize itself with.
Once a configuration is found, the device initializes
its running datastore with it and then enters normal
operation. Since the configuration initializes the
device to call home upon entering its normal operating
mode, the device immediately begins trying to establish
a secure connection with the deployment specific NMS.</t>
</section>
<section title="Factory Default State" anchor="device-precondition">
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
| <device> |
| |
| +------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | <immutable storage> | |
| | | |
| | list of Configlet Signer trust anchor certificates | |
| | list of Configuration Server trust anchor certs | |
| +------------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| +----------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | <other storage> | |
| | | |
| | two sets of Configuration Server URIs | |
| | IDevID entity & associated intermediate certificate(s) | |
| +----------------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| +----------------------+ |
| | <secure storage> | |
| | | |
| | IDevID private key | |
| +----------------------+ |
| |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
<t>Devices supporting ZeroTouch MUST have a
manufacturer-provisioned secure device identifier, as
defined in <xref target="Std-802.1AR-2009"/>. This identifier
is known by the IEEE standard as the Initial Device
Identifier (IDevID). The IDevID includes both an X.509
certificate, encoding a globally unique per-device
identifier, and a chain of X.509 certificates leading to the
manufacturer's well-known trust anchor. The IDevID is needed
in order for the NMS to positively authenticate a device.
For NETCONF over SSH Call Home (<xref target="NETCONF-REVERSE-SSH"/>),
this certificate requirement constrains the SSH host
key algorithms the device is allowed to advertise to
those defined in <xref target="RFC6187"/>.</t>
<t>Devices supporting ZeroTouch MUST be pre-provisioned with
one or more URIs for Internet-based Configuration Servers.
These URIs SHOULD be partitioned into one set that contains
secure schemes (e.g. https://) and another set that
contains insecure schemes (e.g., http://). The
reason for partitioning the URIs is so all the secure schemes
can attempted before any of the insecure schemes (see
<xref target="dev-boot-seq"/>). When using a secure scheme,
the Configuration Server MUST be authenticated using a
trust anchor the device possesses. As each Configuration
Server may use a different trust anchor, this generalizes
to a list of Configuration Server trust anchor certificates.</t>
<t>In order to verify the signature on retrieved
configurations, devices supporting ZeroTouch MUST also
possess the trust anchor for the Configuration Signer
that signed the configuration. Generally, only the
manufacturer's trust anchor is needed, as it can then
delegate trust for 3rd-party Configuration Signers
(see <xref target="delegate-trust"/>). However, for
various reasons, there may be a need for more than one
root anchor and therefore this generalizes to a list
of Configuration Signer trust anchor certificates.</t>
<t>Devices SHOULD ensure that the certificates for its
trust anchors are protected from external modification.
It is for this reason that the diagram shows the
Configuration Signer and Configuration Server certificates
in immutable storage. Similarly, per <xref target="Std-802.1AR-2009"/>,
the IDevID private key shall be stored confidentially and
not available outside the DevID module, hence the diagram
shows it is held within secure storage.</t>
</section>
<section title="Boot Sequence" anchor="dev-boot-seq">
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
DEVICE DHCP CONFIGURATION NMS
| SERVER/RELAY SERVERS |
| | | |
+-->| | | |
| | | | |
| |--[if running config != factory default, boot normally]--+ |
| | | | | |
<---------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| |--(discovery)-->| [if no dhcp server found, boot normally] |
| | | | |
| | +---(offer)---| | |
| | | | | |
| | +--[add any listed config servers to built-in list]--+ |
| | | | | |
| |<------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | (iterate until match, else boot normally) | |
| |------------------------------------------------>| |
| | | | |
| |<------------------------------(zerotouch info)--| |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| |--[if current image != expected, get image]----->| |
| | | | |
| | +-------------------------------------(image)--| |
| | | | | |
| | +--[if image valid, install & reboot]--+ | |
| | | | | |
+---------------------------------------------+ | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
|--[get config]---------------------------------->| |
| | | |
| +------------------------------------(config)--| |
| | | | |
| +--[if config valid, merge into running]--+ | |
| | | | |
| +--------------------------------------+ | |
| | | | |
| +--[per new configuration, call home]----------------->|
| | | |
| | | |
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
<t>Whenever a device boots with its factory default
settings, it initiates ZeroTouch with the goal of
finding a configuration that will enable it to call home
to its deployment-specific NMS.</t>
<t>The process begins with the device using the DHCP
protocol to obtain a dynamic assignment for its networking
stack. When broadcasting the DISCOVERY request, the device
may provide any DHCP options to identify itself or the type
of device it is (e.g. IPV4 options 60 or 61).</t>
<t>If the DHCP servers reside on a locally administered network
(see <xref target="use-cases"/>), then their OFFER responses
MAY include the ZeroTouch Information DHCP option defined in
<xref target="zerotouch-info-option"/>, as well as the legacy
DHCP options for TFTP server name, bootfile name, and/or
vendor specific information (e.g. IPv4 options 43, 66, 67).</t>
<t>If a DHCP server provides both the ZeroTouch Information
and the vendor specific information DHCP options, then the
ZeroTouch Information option MUST be processed first. After
exhausting all ZeroTouch options without being able to call
home, a device MAY then process the information provided by
the legacy DHCP options.</t>
<t>The ZeroTouch Information option <xref target="zerotouch-info-option"/>
provides a set of Configuration Server URIs. If returned by
the DHCP server, the device MUST append each URI to the end
of one of its two sets of Configuration Server URIs, depending
on if the URI's scheme is secure or not. URIs added this way
MUST remain distinguishable from those URIs the device was
shipped with, for reasons discussed next.</t>
<!--
<t>Before trying any of the Configuration Server URIs,
the device SHOULD first try to load a configuration
through local means that assert physical presence.
For instance, a removable USB flash drive or
near-field communication mechanism. Configurations
obtained through an assertion of physical presence
do not have to be signed or contain the device's
unique identifier (e.g., serial number). If a
Configlet is found, the device MUST use it without
trying any of the Configuration Server URIs.</t>
-->
<t>The device then iterates over its two sets of Configuration
Server URIs. The device MUST first try all the URIs
from the set having secure schemes before trying any
of the URIs from the set having insecure schemes. For
each URI, until a match is found and successfully loaded,
the device attempts to initialize itself from the URI.
If the URI uses a secure scheme (e.g., https), the device
MUST validate the Configuration Server's certificate
using one of its Configuration Server trust anchors.
If the device is unable to verify the server's certificate,
the device MUST skip that URI. If the device reaches the
end of all its URIs without finding a usable match,
it SHOULD continue its normal boot sequence using its
factory default configuration.</t>
<t>When the device is accessing a Configuration Server
URI that it was shipped with (i.e. not discovered
while initializing its networking), it MUST do so by
appending its GUID to the URI string and using the
Accept-Type "application/zerotouch-config", as described in
<xref target="config-server"/>. For URIs discovered
via the ZeroTouch Information option, the device
MAY also try the raw URI after trying the permutation
using its GUID.</t>
<t>If the Configuration Server returns a configuration,
the device MUST first verify it before use. Configuration
verification entails both verifying the configuration's
signature using the device's list of Configuration Signer
trust anchors, and also verifying that the unique identifier
within the Configlet matches the device's unique identifier.</t>
<t>Once the configuration is authenticated, the device MUST
compare its software image version with the expected
version specified within the configuration. If there is a
mismatch, the device MUST download the correct image
version from the Configuration Server, by appending
its GUID to the Configuration Server's URI string
and using the Accept-Type "application/zerotouch-bootimage", as described in
<xref target="config-server"/>. For URIs discovered
via the ZeroTouch Information option, the device
MAY also try both the raw URI after trying the permutation
using its GUID. Once the image has been downloaded, the
device MUST install it and reboot, still with the
factory default settings configured, so that ZeroTouch
restarts when the device comes back up.</t>
<t>If the device is running the correct software image
version, it merges the Configlet's contents into its running
configuration. This step effectively modifies the device
so that it is no longer having its factory default setting.
However, since the Configlet configured the device to
"call home," upon entering its normal operating mode, the
device immediately begins trying to establish a call home
connection, as specified by the Configlet.</t>
<t>If configured to establish a SSH connection,
the the device MUST use its IDevID and associated
intermediate X.509 certificates as its host key per
RFC 6187 <xref target="RFC6187"/>. If configured to
establish a TLS connection, the device MUST use its
IDevID and associated intermediate X.509 certificates
as its server-side certificate for the TLS connection.</t>
<t>In order to facilitate troubleshooting, the device
SHOULD record into a log information relating
to its stepping through the ZeroTouch sequence of
steps. This draft does not define any specific
log messages, for instance, for Syslog or SNMP.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Network Management System (NMS)" anchor="nms">
<section title="Overview">
<t>The NMS is the ultimate destination of ZeroTouch for
a device. It is the NMS's network address configured
in the Configlet. The device will initiate a call home
connection to the NMS, using either a SSH or TLS, as
configured by the Configlet loaded.</t>
<t><vspace blankLines="30"/></t>
</section>
<section title="Precondition">
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
| <nsm> |
| |
| +------------------------------------------------------+ |
| | <immutable storage> | |
| | | |
| | list of Configuration Signer trust anchor certs | |
| | list of expected device unique identifiers | |
| +------------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| +--------------------------------------------------+ |
| | <secure storage> | |
| | | |
| | map of device identifiers to login credentials | |
| +--------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
<t>In order to authenticate the device, the NMS
MUST possess the X.509 certificate for the trust anchor
leading to the device's entity certificate. The NMS
uses this certificate to validate the server-certificate
the device presents during SSH or TLS transport negotiation.
Because an NMS may interoperate with multiple vendors, and
a vendor may have more than one trust anchor for signing
its devices IDevID certificates, this generalizes into
the NMS needing a list of trust anchor certificates.
This certificates SHOULD be stored in a way that prevents
tampering, which is why they are shown in immutable
storage in the diagram.</t>
<t>In order for the NMS to validate that the specific
device connecting to it is expected, the MUST have
a list of unique device identifiers that it can use
to validate the device's IDevID certificate with.
The list SHOULD be protected from external modification,
which is why it is shown in immutable storage in the
diagram. In order for the NMS to know the unique
identifiers, device manufacturers will need to provide
a mechanism to convey this information to its customers.
This draft not specify a format for this information exchange.</t>
<t>In addition to authenticating the device, the NMS must
also authenticate itself to the device. How this is done
is deployment specific, but generalizes to the NMS needing
to have login credentials for each device. These credentials
will entail knowing a secret (e.g., password, private key).
For this reason the diagram shows the NMS storing a map of
device credentials in secure storage.</t>
</section>
<section title="Connection Handling">
<t>When receiving a NETCONF call home connection from a
device, the NSM completes the connection as specified in
the SSH <xref target="NETCONF-REVERSE-SSH"/> and TLS
<xref target="RFC5539bis"/> drafts.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Vendor" anchor="vendor">
<section title="Order Information" anchor="order-information">
<t>In order for a Vendor's customers to preconfigure their
NMSs with what devices are expected, as well as to know how to
set the "unique-identifier" field within a Configlet
when requesting a signing, Vendors need to provide a
mechanism for customers to obtain the unique
identifier value for the devices they have
ordered. For instance, customers could receive emails
containing shipping information for their devices.</t>
<t>Additionally, to facilitate workflows where the
devices are initially received by a customer-specific
warehouse, or moved after having been unboxed, it is
ideal for the unique identifier to be easily tracked
through labels affixed to the device as well as the box
it is packaged in. A device's serial number is commonly
treated this way and would be suitable for this purpose,
so long as it is directly related to its IDevID identity.</t>
</section>
<section title="Ownership Validation">
<t>In order for Configuration Signers to validate that a
requestor is the true owner of a device (i.e. its IDevID
identity), Vendors need to provide a mechanism enabling
a near real-time lookup. The interface used to implement
this lookup is outside the scope of this document.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Configlet" anchor="configlet">
<section title="Overview" anchor="configlet-overview">
<t>A Configlet is an XML file, containing specific
YANG-defined configuration, that has been signed by
a trusted signer known to the device (e.g., the
device's manufacturer).</t>
<t>The Configlet data-model, defined by the YANG
module in this document (see <xref target="configlet"/>),
is just enough to configure a local user account and
either reverse-SSH or reverse-TLS. More specifically,
this data-model is a subset of what's defined in
ietf-system and ietf-netconf-server YANG models. This
focused data-model is consistent with the common
use-case of having the NMS push a full configuration
to a device when it calls home.</t>
<t>The signature on the Configlet is enveloped,
meaning that the signature is contained inside the
XML file itself. The signature block also contains
the X.509 certificate of the Configlet Signer
and its chain of trust.</t>
<t>Once a device authenticates the signature on a
Configlet and matches the unique identifier
(e.g., serial number) within the Configlet, it merges
the configuration contained in the Configlet into
its running datastore.</t>
</section>
<section title="Data Model">
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
module: ietf-netconf-zerotouch
+--rw configlet
+--rw target-requirements
| +--rw unique-identifier string
| +--rw software-version string
+--rw configuration
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
<t>The Configlet's data model is no more than a wrapper
around a header (i.e. <target-requirements>) and a
payload (i.e. <configuration>).</t>
<t>The <target-requirements> element contains
information that MUST be validated by the device
prior to processing the <configuration> element.
Specifically, it contains:
<list style="symbols">
<t>unique-identifier
<list style="empty">
<t>The unique-identifier field is used to ensure that
the Configlet is loaded onto the targeted device
and no other. This field is also used by the
Configuration Signer, when ensuring the requestor
is the true owner of the device. The value MUST
be the same as the 'subject' field in the device's
DevID credential, as specified by section 7.2.8 in
IEEE Std 802.1AR-2009.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>software-version
<list style="empty">
<t>The software-version field is used to ensure
the device is running the right software version
prior to loading the configuration (e.g., 14.1R2.5).
If the device finds that it is not running the
correct version of software, it can pull the
correct version from the Configuration Server.</t>
</list>
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>The <configuration> element contains the configuration
that is to be committed to the device's running datastore. This
element uses the "anyxml" type, enabling it to contain either
vendor-specific or standards-based data models. When using
standard models, in order to complete a call home connection,
only the following is needed:
<list style="symbols">
<t>The "authentication" subtree from "ietf-system", defined in draft-ietf-netmod-system.</t>
<t>If TLS is supported, everything from "ietf-system-tls-auth", defined in draft-ietf-netconf-server-model.</t>
<t>The "call-home" subtree from "ietf-netconf-server", defined in draft-ietf-netconf-server-model.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Signature">
<t>All Configlets MUST be signed by a Configuration Signer
in order to be authentic. Devices MUST reject any Configlet
that is either unsigned or having an invalid signature.
Configlets are signed using the W3C standard
"XML Signature Syntax and Processing" <xref target="XMLSIG"/>.
The entire contents of the Configlet MUST be signed. The
signature block must also include the Configlet Signer's
certificate and any intermediate certificates leading to
a Configlet Signer trust anchor. A signed Configlet
example is in section <xref target="signed-configlet"/>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Encryption (optional)">
<t>Configlets MAY optionally be encrypted prior to being
signed. Encrypting the Configlet provides confidentiality
for the Configlet's contents without relying on transport-level
security. Configlets are encrypted using the W3C standard
"XML Encryption Syntax and Processing" <xref target="XMLENC"/>.
The entire contents of the Configlet MUST be encrypted.
An encrypted Configlet example is in section
<xref target="signed-encrypted-configlet"/>.</t>
</section>
<section title="YANG Module">
<t>
<figure>
<preamble>Following is the YANG module for the
Configlet:</preamble>
<artwork><![CDATA[
module ietf-netconf-zerotouch {
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-zerotouch";
prefix "zerotouch";
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
<mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
WG Chair: Bert Wijnen
<mailto:bertietf@bwijnen.net>
Editor: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
description
"This module contains a collection of YANG definitions for
configuring NETCONF zerotouch.
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with actual RFC number and
// remove this note
// RFC Ed.: please update the date to the date of publication
revision "2014-07-01" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for NETCONF ZeroTouch Configlet";
}
container configlet {
description
"Top-level container for ZeroTouch configuration objects.";
container target-requirements {
description
"Specifies requirements for device this is loaded onto";
leaf unique-identifier {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The device MUST have this unique identifier. The value
MUST be the same as the 'subject' field in the device's
DevID credential, as specified by section 7.2.8 in
IEEE Std 802.1AR-2009.";
}
leaf software-version {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The device MUST must be running this version of software.
The value for this field is device-specific, but it MUST
be an exact match (e.g., 14.1R2.5)";
}
}
anyxml configuration {
mandatory true;
description
"The configuration to be committed to the device's running
datastore. The configuration MUST be valid for the target
device. Device's supporting ZeroTouch SHOULD at least
support both the following standard data-models:
ietf-system // the authentication container
ietf-system-tls-auth // everything, if TLS supported
ietf-netconf-server // the call-home container
These three data models contain everything needed to
support NETCONF call home using either SSH or TLS.";
}
}
}
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Security Considerations">
<section title="Immutable storage for trust anchors">
<t>Devices SHOULD ensure that all its trust anchor
certificates, including those for the Configuration
Signer and Configuration Server, are protected from
external modification. It is for this reason that
the diagram in <xref target="device-precondition"/>
shows them in immutable storage.</t>
<t>However, it may be necessary to update these
certificates over time (e.g., the vendor wants to
delegate trust to a new CA). It is therefore expected
that devices MAY update these trust anchors when
needed through a verifiable process, such as a
software upgrade using signed software images.</t>
</section>
<section title="Substitutions">
<t>It is generally not possible to substitute a
Configlet created for a different device, since
devices assert that the Configlet contains their
unique identifier (e.g., serial number).</t>
<t>However, it is possible to substitute a Configlet
created for a device with a different Configlet
created for the same device. Generally, unless
imposed by the Configuration Signers, there is no
limit to the number of Configlets that may be
generated for a given device. This could be resolved, in
part, by placing a timestamp into the Configlet and
ensuring devices do not load Configlets older than some
amount, but this requires the devices have an accurate
clock when validating a Configlet and for Configuration
Signers to not sign a Configlet when another Configlet
is still active.</t>
</section>
<section title="Confidentiality">
<t>This draft allows devices to use insecure schemes when
doing a Configuration Server lookup. This is deemed
acceptable because the Configlet is tamper-proof, since
it MUST be signed, only confidentiality is lost.</t>
<t>Confidentiality of a Configlet's contents is assured
when either the Configlet is encrypted or when the a
secure scheme is used when accessing the Configuration Server.</t>
<t>Some confidentiality is lost when an insecure scheme is
used to access a Configuration Server, as then the device's
unique identifier is in the clear.</t>
<t>Given the fairly regular format for unique identifiers,
it is possible that an adversary to guess unique identifiers
and access a device's Configlet. Configlets that have been
encrypted do not disclose any confidential information.</t>
</section>
<section title="Entropy loss over time">
<t>Section 7.2.7.2 of the IEEE Std 802.1AR-2009 standard says
that IDevID certificate should never expire (i.e. having a
notAfter 99991231235959Z). Given the long-lived
nature of these certificates, it is paramount to use a
strong key length (e.g., 512-bit ECC). Vendors SHOULD
deploy Online Certificate State Protocol (OCSP) responders
or CRL Distribution Points (CDP) to revoke certificates in
case necessary.</t>
</section>
<section title="Serial Numbers">
<t>This draft mentions using the device's serial number as
its unique identifier in its IDevID certificate. This is
because serial numbers are ubiquitous and prominently
contained in invoices and on labels affixed to devices and
their packaging. That said, serial numbers many times encode
revealing information, such as the device's model number,
manufacture date, and/or sequence number. Knowledge of this
information may provide an adversary with details needed
to launch an attack. To address this concern, the
certificate could contain the hash of the serial number
instead, which the NMS could also compute, but doing so
is much less intuitive and raises questions if it is just
security through obscurity.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="IANA Considerations">
<section title="ZeroTouch Information DHCP Option" anchor="zerotouch-info-option">
<t>TBD, but it essentially returns a list of URIs.</t>
</section>
<section title="Media Types for Images and Configurations" anchor="zerotouch-media-types">
<t>TBD, but in accordance with RFC 6838, the draft registers: application/zerotouch-configlet
and application/zerotouch-bootimage</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Acknowledgements">
<t>The authors would like to thank for following for
lively discussions on list and in the halls (ordered
by last name):
David Harrington,
Dean Bogdanovic,
Martin Bjorklund,
Wes Hardaker,
Russ Mundy,
Reinaldo Penno,
Randy Presuhn,
Juergen Schoenwaelder.</t>
<t>Special thanks goes to Russ Mundy and Wes Hardaker
for brainstorming the original I-D's solution during
the IETF 87 meeting in Berlin.</t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<reference anchor="RFC2119">
<front>
<title>
Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels
</title>
<author initials="S.B." surname="Bradner"
fullname="Scott Bradner">
<organization>Harvard University</organization>
</author>
<date month="March" year="1997" />
</front>
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14" />
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC3365">
<front>
<title>
Strong Security Requirements for Internet
Engineering Task Force Standard Protocols
</title>
<author initials="J.S." surname="Schiller"
fullname="Jeffrey Schiller">
<organization>
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
</organization>
</author>
<date month="August" year="2002" />
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3365" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC4252">
<front>
<title>
The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol
</title>
<author initials="T.Y." surname="Ylonen"
fullname="Tatu Ylonen">
<organization>
SSH Communications Security Corp
</organization>
</author>
<author initials="C.L." surname="Lonvick"
fullname="Chris Lonvick" role="editor">
<organization>
Cisco Systems, Inc.
</organization>
</author>
<date month="January" year="2006" />
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4252" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC5539bis">
<front>
<title>
Using the NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS)
</title>
<author initials="M.B." surname="Badra"
fullname="Mohamad Badra">
<organization>LIMOS Laboratory</organization>
</author>
<author initials="A.L." surname="Luchuk"
fullname="Alan Luchuk">
<organization>
SNMP Research, Inc.
</organization>
</author>
<date month="March" year="2011" />
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5539" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6187">
<front>
<title>
X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell Authentication
</title>
<author initials="K.I." surname="Igoe"
fullname="Kevin Igoe">
<organization>National Security Agency</organization>
</author>
<author initials="D.S." surname="Stebila"
fullname="Douglas Stebila">
<organization>
Queensland University of Technology
</organization>
</author>
<date month="March" year="2011" />
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6187" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6241">
<front>
<title>NETCONF Configuration Protocol</title>
<author initials="R.E." surname="Enns"
fullname="Rob Enns" role="editor">
<organization>Juniper Networks</organization>
</author>
<author initials="M.B." surname="Bjorklund"
fullname="Martin Bjorklund" role="editor">
<organization>Tail-f Systems</organization>
</author>
<author initials="J.S." surname="Schoenwaelder"
fullname="Juergen Schoenwaelder" role="editor">
<organization>Jacobs University</organization>
</author>
<author initials="A.B." surname="Bierman"
fullname="Andy Bierman" role="editor">
<organization>Brocade</organization>
</author>
<date month="June" year="2011" />
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6241" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="NETCONF-REVERSE-SSH">
<front>
<title>NETCONF over SSH Call Home</title>
<author initials="K.W." surname="Watsen"
fullname="Kent Watsen">
<organization>Juniper Networks</organization>
</author>
<date month="April" year="2014"/>
</front>
<format type="HTML" target="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-reverse-ssh-05"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Std-802.1AR-2009">
<front>
<title>IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity</title>
<author fullname="WG802.1 - Higher Layer LAN Protocols Working Group">
<organization>IEEE SA-Standards Board</organization>
</author>
<date month="December" year="2009"/>
</front>
<format type="HTML" target="http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/802.1AR-2009.html"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="XMLSIG">
<front>
<title>XML Signature Syntax and Processing</title>
<author fullname="World Wide Web Consortium"></author>
<date month="April" year="2013"/>
</front>
<format type="HTML" target="http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core1/"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="XMLENC">
<front>
<title>XML Encryption Syntax and Processing</title>
<author fullname="World Wide Web Consortium"></author>
<date month="April" year="2013"/>
</front>
<format type="HTML" target="http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core1/"/>
</reference>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<reference anchor="TR069">
<front>
<title>
TR-069 Amendment 3, CPE WAN Management Protocol
</title>
<author surname="The Broadband Forum"
fullname="The Broadband Forum"/>
<date month="November" year="2010" />
</front>
<format type="PDF" target="http://www.broadband-forum.org/technical/download/TR-069_Amendment-3.pdf"/>
</reference>
</references>
<section title="Examples" anchor="examples">
<section title="Signed Configlet" anchor="signed-configlet">
<t>
<figure>
<preamble>This example illustrates a Configlet
configuring both a local user account and
call home using SSH. This Configlet includes both
the Configuration Signer's certificate as well as
an Intermediate certificate. Note that '\'
characters have been added for formatting
reasons.</preamble>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<configlet xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-zerotouch">
<target-requirements>
<unique-identifier>0123456789</unique-identifier>
<software-version>14.1R3.5</software-version>
</target-requirements>
<configuration>
<!-- from ietf-system.yang -->
<system xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system">
<authentication>
<user>
<name>admin</name>
<ssh-key>
<name>admin's rsa ssh host-key</name>
<algorithm>ssh-rsa</algorithm>
<key-data>AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDeJMV8zrtsi8CgEsRC
jCzfve2m6zD3awSBPrh7ICggLQvHVbPL89eHLuecStKL3HrEgXaI/O2Mwj
E1lG9YxLzeS5p2ngzK61vikUSqfMukeBohFTrDZ8bUtrF+HMLlTRnoCVcC
WAw1lOr9IDGDAuww6G45gLcHalHMmBtQxKnZdzU9kx/fL3ZS5G76Fy6sA5
vg7SLqQFPjXXft2CAhin8xwYRZy6r/2N9PMJ2Dnepvq4H2DKqBIe340jWq
EIuA7LvEJYql4unq4Iog+/+CiumTkmQIWRgIoj4FCzYkO9NvRE6fOSLLf6
gakWVOZZgQ8929uWjCWlGlqn2mPibp2Go1</key-data>
</ssh-key>
<!--<password>$1$salt$hash</password>-->
</user>
</authentication>
</system>
<!-- from ietf-netconf-server.yang -->
<netconf-server xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-server">
<ssh>
<call-home>
<applications>
<application>
<name>config-mgr</name>
<description>
This entry requests the device to periodically
connect to the Configuration Manager application
</description>
<servers>
<server>
<address>config-mgr1.example.com</address>
</server>
<server>
<address>config-mgr2.example.com</address>
</server>
</servers>
<connection-type>
<periodic>
<timeout-mins>5</timeout-mins>
<linger-secs>10</linger-secs>
</periodic>
</connection-type>
<reconnect-strategy>
<start-with>last-connected</start-with>
<interval-secs>10</interval-secs>
<count-max>3</count-max>
</reconnect-strategy>
<host-keys>
<host-key>
<name>ssh_host_key_cert</name>
</host-key>
<host-key>
<name>ssh_host_key_cert2</name>
</host-key>
</host-keys>
</application>
</applications>
</call-home>
</ssh>
</netconf-server>
</configuration>
<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<SignedInfo>
<CanonicalizationMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
<SignatureMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
<Reference>
<Transforms>
<Transform
Algorithm=\
"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
</Transforms>
<DigestMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<DigestValue>2xlFdlVifb1snGBLJuEZYrLjSUQ=</DigestValue>
</Reference>
</SignedInfo>
<SignatureValue>\
HUx3S7TZXGJGUhazWGRSB9CBMZ0T+tTrB1fOnTcKi9wU4UOnSw5KMWDvOVwc6ldM
UIOJIuJigWhSkn+VvWSWz6qy7LTYIywNcxDyghMvmMXfoRXETpL+qCDxribMi4VW
mVhEw1oe83kJt7W/0DJUE7FFKRUhPjy9EgxpQX/7WdKSK+4f2uYkSpq2UumW3DIU
LeK9vNRVQBbhmcF3zZWANmwKH5V4WeQimwWE497AeSYWgSImSetADI0NvvXfBZjx
JqzFEaYLNz8IB0ZVY+w14s1RZbN7YmxhN1R3q52wWvHjR2SylR/Z5BpIhYoDeKoD
HMQMf3HZL06Hm5S8r8rgGg==</SignatureValue>
<KeyInfo>
<X509Data>
<X509Certificate>\
MIIFKjCCBBKgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAwMRMwEQYDVQQKFApUUE1f
VmVuZG9yMRkwFwYDVQQDFBBKdW5pcGVyX1hYWFhYX0NBMB4XDTEzMTAyMDE2MjIx
MFoXDTE0MTAyMDE2MjIxMFowKzETMBEGA1UEChQKVFBNX1ZlbmRvcjEUMBIGA1UE
AxQLY2hpcF8wMDAwMDEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDf
4hyWqFsf801sZYJQBJ0PB4cHmlnPNOs9pv3QCCB1PzlYhfcDOygVmqhzZjPY+t7q
ZTjPs/E8n5X4dd0DkR80uc4MWmzc40Pz2HAW6GQ2mo+eUYzXUqQFbi3EkqrzddZk
gRi6vuadMkAcJH8ugYR+cbw/LlpXhIy2A5fUh4JP7Y9l1wABTbK8eGhF9cvGxBYR
+KqZJycoV6aaIvD/0NO1CNSaGeAJXXxXWoRF5E6HVKsolTHPPdi+40BmYrCuuWy6
1ybCIP5uZZ7Oza4j0n/fPb6SEqEa0I1zUEWlFQMZYsBClNY5TzWHNgQ5dPJO2qgx
PONwnLIsx46DlAzlpFpXAgMBAAGjggJSMIICTjAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMIGTBgNV
HSABAf8EgYgwgYUwgYIGC2CGSAGG+EUBBy8BMHMwOQYIKwYBBQUHAgEWLWh0dHA6
Ly93d3cudmVyaXNpZ24uY29tL3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvaW5kZXguaHRtbDA2BggrBgEF
BQcCAjAqGihUQ1BBIFRydXN0ZWQgUGxhdGZvcm0gTW9kdWxlIEVuZG9yc2VtZW50
MIHXBgNVHSMEgc8wgcyAFCHd7bYICEQX3QxR30ixhppG7bjmoYGwpIGtMIGqMQsw
CQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECBMKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTESMBAGA1UEBxMJU3Vubnl2
YWxlMRkwFwYDVQQKFBBKdW5pcGVyX05ldHdvcmtzMR0wGwYDVQQLFBRDZXJ0aWZp
Y2F0ZV9Jc3N1YW5jZTEZMBcGA1UEAxQQVFBNX1RydXN0X0FuY2hvcjEdMBsGCSqG
SIb3DQEJARYOY2FAanVuaXBlci5jb22CAQEwcQYDVR0fBGowaDBmoC6gLIYqaHR0
cDovL2NybC5qdW5pcGVyLm5ldD9jYT1KdW5pcGVyX1hYWFhYX0NBojSkMjAwMRMw
EQYDVQQKFApUUE1fVmVuZG9yMRkwFwYDVQQDFBBKdW5pcGVyX1hYWFhYX0NBMFsG
A1UdEQEB/wRRME+kTTBLMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVSzEYMBYGA1UEChMPTXkgT3JnYW5p
emF0aW9uMRAwDgYDVQQLEwdNeSBVbml0MRAwDgYDVQQDEwdNeSBOYW1lMA0GCSqG
SIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCsVFVA90O8E4p/8ohBYQRezVaWidTHCTM1sdAoeljlrsFX
xqwcQEGVT3BpzwN8w2r+iKOKLQkWv64os0KKL0RIIjmCmJ2RukqH/R0M8Air4+Im
iWI3xV+HzVRsJIrCRT2tzxbchU/i/LQiwhteUEZ9sZbHKyLQe9x9HgByM05ifOGh
z2dcb7AWNlo7nJtRBmx0v9iim2kktqGMuXgBzlnMMabqHMb4L+vjww2Wn5nNYbr/
oXq4fa01MGQyvRPAEOwL3ZxcaqKHvmTn9coBLhpP3nQIEV+V+PngQjtBmwdkjIj5
feDp86jGN6348H+z9CzXUSbyOn6utIxN0SvVESxx</X509Certificate>
<X509Certificate>\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</X509Certificate>
</X509Data>
</KeyInfo>
</Signature>
</configlet>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Signed Encypted Configlet" anchor="signed-encrypted-configlet">
<t>
<figure>
<preamble>This example is the same as to previous
example (section <xref target="signed-configlet"/>)
except that the Configlet was encrypted using the
device's public key prior to being signed using
the Configuration Server's private key. Note that
'\' characters have been added for formatting
reasons.</preamble>
<artwork><![CDATA[
// This example is currently missing
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Change Log">
<section title="ID to 00">
<t>
<list>
<t>Complete re-write. Switched from using signed DNS
records using DNSSEC to using signed YANG-defined
XML files using XML Signature. This update took
into a lot a feedback from both operators and
vendors.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="00 to 01">
<t>
<list>
<t>Major structural update; the essence is the same.
Most every section was rewritten to some degree.</t>
<t>Added a Use Cases section</t>
<t>Added diagrams for "Actors and Roles" and
"NMS Precondition" sections, and greatly improved
the "Device Boot Sequence" diagram</t>
<t>Removed support for physical presence or any
ability for Configlets to not be signed.</t>
<t>Defined the ZeroTouch Information DHCP option</t>
<t>Added an ability for devices to also download
images from Configuration Servers</t>
<t>Added an ability for Configlets to be encrypted</t>
<t>Now Configuration Servers only have to support
HTTP/S - no other schemes possible</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
</back>
</rfc>
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-21 10:17:11 |