One document matched: draft-ietf-netconf-system-keychain-00.xml
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<rfc category="std"
ipr="trust200902"
docName="draft-ietf-netconf-system-keychain-00" >
<front>
<title>System Keychain Model</title>
<author initials="K.W." surname="Watsen" fullname="Kent Watsen">
<organization>Juniper Networks</organization>
<address>
<email>kwatsen@juniper.net</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="G.W." surname="Wu" fullname="Gary Wu">
<organization>Cisco Networks</organization>
<address>
<email>garywu@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date/>
<area>Operations</area>
<workgroup>NETCONF Working Group</workgroup>
<abstract>
<t>This document defines a YANG data module for a system-level keychain
mechanism, that might be used to hold onto private keys and certificates
that are trusted by the system advertising support for this module.</t>
</abstract>
<note title="Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)">
<t>This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced
with finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes
all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor
instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.</t>
<t>This document contains references to other drafts in progress, both in
the Normative References section, as well as in body text throughout.
Please update the following references to reflect their final RFC assignments:
<list style="symbols">
<t>draft-ietf-netconf-restconf</t>
<t>draft-ietf-netconf-call-home</t>
<t>draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
progress. Please apply the following replacements:
<list style="symbols">
<t><spanx style="verb">VVVV</spanx> --> the assigned RFC value for this draft</t>
<t><spanx style="verb">XXXX</spanx> --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-restconf</t>
<t><spanx style="verb">YYYY</spanx> --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-call-home</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for ports pending IANA assignment
from "draft-ietf-netconf-call-home". Please apply the following replacements:
<list style="symbols">
<t><spanx style="verb">7777</spanx> --> the assigned port value for "netconf-ch-ssh"</t>
<t><spanx style="verb">8888</spanx> --> the assigned port value for "netconf-ch-tls"</t>
<t><spanx style="verb">9999</spanx> --> the assigned port value for "restconf-ch-tls"</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of publication of this
draft. Please apply the following replacement:
<list style="symbols">
<t><spanx style="verb">2016-07-08</spanx> --> the publication date of this draft</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>The following two Appendix sections are to be removed prior to publication:
<list style="symbols">
<t>Appendix A. Change Log</t>
<t>Appendix B. Open Issues</t>
</list>
</t>
</note>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction">
<t>This document defines a YANG <xref target="RFC6020"/> data module for
a system-level keychain mechanism, which can be used to hold onto
private keys and certificates that are trusted by the system advertising
support for this module.</t>
<t>This module provides a centralized location for security sensitive
data, so that the data can be then referenced by other modules.
There are two types of data that are maintained by this module:
<list style="symbols">
<t>Private keys, and any associated public certificates.</t>
<t>Sets of trusted certificates.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>This document extends special consideration for systems that have
Trusted Protection Modules (TPMs). These systems are unique in
that the TPM must be directed to generate new private keys (it is
not possible to load a private key into a TPM) and it is not
possible to backup/restore the TPM's private keys as configuration.</t>
<t>It is not required that a system has an operating system level
keychain utility to implement this module.</t>
<section title="Terminology">
<t>The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL",
"SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in RFC 2119 <xref target="RFC2119"/>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Tree Diagrams" anchor="tree-diagrams">
<t>A simplified graphical representation of the data models
is used in this document. The meaning of the symbols in
these diagrams is as follows:
<list style="symbols">
<t>Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.</t>
<t>Braces "{" and "}" enclose feature names, and indicate
that the named feature must be present for the subtree
to be present.</t>
<t>Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means
configuration (read-write) and "ro" state data
(read-only).</t>
<t>Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional
node, "!" means a presence container, and "*" denotes a
list and leaf-list.</t>
<t>Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case
nodes are also marked with a colon (":").</t>
<t>Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that
are not shown.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="The System Keychain Model" anchor="keychain-model">
<t>The system keychain module defined in this section provides a configurable
object having the following characteristics:
<list style="symbols">
<t>A semi-configurable list of private keys, each with one or more associated
certificates. Private keys MUST be either preinstalled (e.g., a key associated
to an IDevID <xref target="Std-802.1AR-2009"/> certificate),
be generated by request, or be loaded by request. Each private key is MAY have
associated certificates, either preinstalled or configured after creation.</t>
<t>A configurable list of lists of trust anchor certificates. This enables
the server to have use-case specific trust anchors. For instance, one list of
trust anchors might be used to authenticate management connections (e.g.,
client certificate-based authentication for NETCONF or RESTCONF connections),
and a different list of trust anchors might be used for when connecting to a
specific Internet-based service (e.g., a zero touch bootstrap server).</t>
<t>An RPC to generate a certificate signing request for an existing private
key, a passed subject, and an optional attributes. The signed certificate
returned from an external certificate authority (CA) can be later set using
a standard configuration change request (e.g., <edit-config>).</t>
<t>An RPC to request the server to generate a new private key using the
specified algorithm and key length.</t>
<t>An RPC to request the server to load a new private key.</t>
</list>
</t>
<section title="Overview">
<t>The system keychain module has the following tree diagram. Please see <xref target="tree-diagrams"/> for information on how to interpret this diagram.
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
module: ietf-system-keychain
+--rw keychain
+--rw private-keys
| +--rw private-key* [name]
| | +--rw name string
| | +--ro algorithm? identityref
| | +--ro key-length? uint32
| | +--ro public-key binary
| | +--rw certificate-chains
| | | +--rw certificate-chain* [name]
| | | +--rw name string
| | | +--rw certificate* binary
| | +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| | +---w input
| | | +---w subject binary
| | | +---w attributes? binary
| | +--ro output
| | +--ro certificate-signing-request binary
| +---x generate-private-key
| | +---w input
| | +---w name string
| | +---w algorithm identityref
| | +---w key-length? uint32
| +---x load-private-key
| +---w input
| +---w name string
| +---w private-key binary
+--rw trusted-certificates* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw description? string
| +--rw trusted-certificate* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw certificate? binary
+--rw trusted-ssh-host-keys* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw description? string
| +--rw trusted-host-key* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw host-key binary
+--rw user-auth-credentials
+--rw user-auth-credential* [username]
+--rw username string
+--rw auth-method* [priority]
+--rw priority uint8
+--rw (auth-type)?
+--:(certificate)
| +--rw certificate* -> /keychain/private-
keys/private-key/certificate-chains/certificate-chain/name
+--:(public-key)
| +--rw public-key* -> /keychain/private-
keys/private-key/name
+--:(ciphertext-password)
| +--rw ciphertext-password? string
+--:(cleartext-password)
+--rw cleartext-password? string
notifications:
+---n certificate-expiration
+--ro certificate instance-identifier
+--ro expiration-date yang:date-and-time
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Example Usage">
<t>The following example illustrates the "generate-private-key" action
in use with the RESTCONF protocol and JSON encoding.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
REQUEST
-------
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]
POST https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-system-keychain:keychain/\
private-keys/generate-private-key HTTP/1.1
HOST: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang.operation+json
{
"ietf-system-keychain:input" : {
"name" : "ex-key-sect571r1",
"algorithm" : "sect571r1"
}
}
RESPONSE
--------
HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2015 11:01:00 GMT
Server: example-server
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
<t>The following example illustrates the "load-private-key" action
in use with the RESTCONF protocol and JSON encoding.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
REQUEST
-------
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]
POST https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-system-keychain:keychain/\
private-keys/load-private-key HTTP/1.1
HOST: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang.operation+xml
<input xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system-keychain">
<name>ex-key-sect571r1</name>
<private-key>
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</private-key>
</input>
RESPONSE
--------
HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2015 11:01:00 GMT
Server: example-server
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
<t>The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing-request"
action in use with the NETCONF protocol.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
REQUEST
-------
<rpc message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
<keychain
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system-keychain">
<private-keys>
<private-key>
<name>ex-key-sect571r1</name>
<generate-certificate-signing-request>
<subject>
cztvaWRoc2RmZ2tqaHNkZmdramRzZnZzZGtmam5idnNvO2R
manZvO3NkZmJpdmhzZGZpbHVidjtvc2lkZmhidml1bHNlmO
Z2aXNiZGZpYmhzZG87ZmJvO3NkZ25iO29pLmR6Zgo=
</subject>
<attributes>
bwtakWRoc2RmZ2tqaHNkZmdramRzZnZzZGtmam5idnNvut4
arnZvO3NkZmJpdmhzZGZpbHVidjtvc2lkZmhidml1bHNkYm
Z2aXNiZGZpYmhzZG87ZmJvO3NkZ25iO29pLmC6Rhp=
</attributes>
</generate-certificate-signing-request>
</private-key>
</private-keys>
</keychain>
</action>
</rpc>
RESPONSE
--------
<rpc-reply message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<certificate-signing-request
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system-keychain">
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</certificate-signing-request>
</rpc-reply>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
<t>The following example illustrates what a fully configured keychain object
might look like. The private-key shown below is consistent with the
generate-private-key and generate-certificate-signing-request examples above.
This example also assumes that the resulting CA-signed certificate has been
configured back onto the server. Lastly, this example shows that three
lists of trusted certificates having been configured.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<keychain xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system-keychain">
<!-- private keys and associated certificates -->
<private-keys>
<private-key>
<name>my-rsa-user-key</name>
<algorithm>rsa</algorithm>
<public-key>
cztvaWRoc2RmZ2tqaHNkZmdramRzZnZzZGtmam5idnNvO2RmanZvO3NkZ
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</public-key>
<certificate-chains>
<certificate-chain>
<name>my-rsa-chain</name>
<certificate>
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</certificate>
</certificate-chain>
</certificate-chains>
</private-key>
<private-key>
<name>my-ec-user-key</name>
<algorithm>secp256r1</algorithm>
<public-key>
mJpdmhzZGZpbHVidjtvc2lkZmhidml1bHNkYmZ2aXNiZGZpYmhzZG87Zm
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</public-key>
<certificate-chains>
<certificate-chain>
<name>my-ec-chain</name>
<certificate>
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</certificate>
</certificate-chain>
</certificate-chains>
</private-key>
<private-key>
<name>tpm-protected-key</name>
<algorithm>sect571r1</algorithm>
<public-key>
cztvaWRoc2RmZ2tqaHNkZmdramRzZnZzZGtmam5idnNvO2RmanZvO3NkZ
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</public-key>
<certificate-chains>
<certificate-chain>
<name>default-idevid-chain</name>
<certificate>
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</certificate>
<certificate>
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SSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate>
</certificate-chain>
<certificate-chain>
<name>my-ldevid-chain</name>
<certificate>
0F3SUJBZ0lKQUpRT2t3bGpNK2pjTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQkJRVU
FNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlYKQkFZVEFsVlRNUkF3RGdZRFZRUUtFd2RsZUd
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SWM2xZTgotLS0tLUVORCBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate>
<certificate>
LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCk1JSUNrekNDQWZ5Z
0F3SUJBZ0lKQUpRT2t3bGpNK2pjTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQkJRVU
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c4d0tSSElkYW1WL0pGTmlQS0VXSTF4K1I1aDZmazcrQzQ1QXg1RWV
SWHgzZjdVM2xZTgotLS0tLUVORCBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate>
</certificate-chain>
</certificate-chains>
</private-key>
</private-keys>
<!-- trusted netconf/restconf client certificates -->
<trusted-certificates>
<name>explicitly-trusted-client-certs</name>
<description>
Specific client authentication certificates that are to be
explicitly trusted NETCONF/RESTCONF clients. These are
needed for client certificates not signed by our CA.
</description>
<trusted-certificate>
<name>George Jetson</name>
<certificate>
QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ
MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ
25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2
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VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER
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V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF
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Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN
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LS0tLUVORCBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate>
</trusted-certificate>
<trusted-certificate>
<name>Fred Flintstone</name>
<certificate>
VlEVlFRREV3Vm9ZWEJ3ZVRDQm56QU5CZ2txaGtpRzl3MEJBUUVGQUFPQm
pRQXdnWWtDCmdZRUE1RzRFSWZsS1p2bDlXTW44eUhyM2hObUFRaUhVUzV
rRUpPQy9hSFA3eGJXQW1ra054ZStUa2hrZnBsL3UKbVhsTjhSZUd1ODhG
NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd
VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER
V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF
NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC
Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN
WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9LUTJNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQW
xWVE1SQXdEZ1lEVlFRSwpFd2RsZUdGdGNHeGxNUk13RVFZRFZRUURFd3B
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WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM
lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk
zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot
QWtUOCBDRVUUZJ0RUF==
</certificate>
</trusted-certificate>
</trusted-certificates>
<!-- trust anchors (CA certs) for netconf/restconf clients -->
<trusted-certificates>
<name>deployment-specific-ca-certs</name>
<description>
Trust anchors used only to authenticate NETCONF/RESTCONF
client connections. Since our security policy only allows
authentication for clients having a certificate signed by
our CA, we only configure its certificate below.
</description>
<trusted-certificate>
<name>ca.example.com</name>
<certificate>
WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM
lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk
zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot
NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd
VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER
V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF
NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC
Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN
WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9LUTJNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlZCQVlUQW
QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ
MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ
25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2
RJSUJQFRStS0Cg==
</certificate>
</trusted-certificate>
</trusted-certificates>
<!-- trust anchors for random HTTPS servers on Internet -->
<trusted-certificates>
<name>common-ca-certs</name>
<description>
Trusted certificates to authenticate common HTTPS servers.
These certificates are similar to those that might be
shipped with a web browser.
</description>
<trusted-certificate>
<name>ex-certificate-authority</name>
<certificate>
NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd
VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER
V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF
Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN
QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ
MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ
NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC
WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM
lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk
zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot
25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2
WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9L=
</certificate>
</trusted-certificate>
</trusted-certificates>
<!-- trusted SSH host keys -->
<trusted-ssh-host-keys>
<name>explicitly-trusted-ssh-host-keys</name>
<description>
Trusted SSH host keys used to authenticate SSH servers.
These host keys would be analogous to those stored in
a known_hosts file in OpenSSH.
</description>
<trusted-host-key>
<name>corp-fw1</name>
<host-key>
VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER
NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd
WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9L=
</host-key>
</trusted-host-key>
</trusted-ssh-host-keys>
<!-- user credentials and associated authentication methods -->
<user-auth-credentials>
<user-auth-credential>
<username>admin</username>
<auth-method>
<priority>1</priority>
<certificate-chain>my-ec-chain</certificate-chain>
<certificate-chain>my-rsa-chain</certificate-chain>
</auth-method>
<auth-method>
<priority>2</priority>
<public-key>my-rsa-user-key</public-key>
</auth-method>
</user-auth-credential>
<user-auth-credential>
<username>tester</username>
<auth-method>
<priority>1</priority>
<cleartext-password>testing123</cleartext-password>
</auth-method>
</user-auth-credential>
<user-auth-credential>
<username>ldevid</username>
<auth-method>
<priority>1</priority>
<certificate-chain>my-ldevid-chain</certificate-chain>
</auth-method>
</user-auth-credential>
</user-auth-credentials>
</keychain>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
<t>The following example illustrates a "certificate-expiration"
notification in XML.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]
<notification
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
<eventTime>2016-07-08T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
<certificate-expiration
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system-keychain">
<certificate>
/kc:keychain/kc:private-keys/kc:private-key/kc:certificate-chains\
/kc:certificate-chain/kc:certificate[3]
</certificate>
<expiration-date>2016-08-08T14:18:53-05:00</expiration-date>
</certificate-expiration>
</notification>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="YANG Module" anchor="keychain-yang-module">
<t>This YANG module makes extensive use of data types defined in
<xref target="RFC5280"/> and <xref target="RFC5958"/>.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-system-keychain@2016-07-08.yang"
module ietf-system-keychain {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system-keychain";
prefix "kc";
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
<mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
WG Chair: Mahesh Jethanandani
<mailto:mjethanandani@gmail.com>
Editor: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
description
"This module defines a keychain to centralize management of
security credentials.
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2016-07-08" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC VVVV: NETCONF Server and RESTCONF Server Configuration
Models";
}
identity key-algorithm {
description
"Base identity from which all key-algorithms are derived.";
}
identity rsa {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The RSA algorithm.";
reference
"RFC3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1:
RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.";
}
identity secp192r1 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The secp192r1 algorithm.";
reference
"RFC5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
identity secp256r1 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The secp256r1 algorithm.";
reference
"RFC5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
identity secp384r1 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The secp384r1 algorithm.";
reference
"RFC5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
identity secp521r1 {
base key-algorithm;
description
"The secp521r1 algorithm.";
reference
"RFC5480:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information.";
}
container keychain {
description
"A list of private-keys and their associated certificates, as
well as lists of trusted certificates for client certificate
authentication. RPCs are provided to generate a new private
key and to generate a certificate signing requests.";
container private-keys {
description
"A list of private key maintained by the keychain.";
list private-key {
key name;
description
"A private key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the private key.";
}
leaf algorithm {
type identityref {
base "key-algorithm";
}
config false;
description
"The algorithm used by the private key.";
}
leaf key-length {
type uint32;
config false;
description
"The key-length used by the private key.";
}
leaf public-key {
type binary;
config false;
mandatory true;
description
"An OneAsymmetricKey 'publicKey' structure as specified
by RFC 5958, Section 2 encoded using the ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5958:
Asymmetric Key Packages
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
container certificate-chains {
description
"Certificate chains associated with this private key.
More than one chain per key is enabled to support,
for instance, a TPM-protected key that has associated
both IDevID and LDevID certificates.";
list certificate-chain {
key name;
description
"A certificate chain for this public key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the certificate chain. The
name must be a unique across all private keys, not
just within this private key.";
}
leaf-list certificate {
type binary;
ordered-by user;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC
5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.
The list of certificates that run from the server
certificate towards the trust anchor. The chain MAY
include the trust anchor certificate itself.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
action generate-certificate-signing-request {
description
"Generates a certificate signing request structure for
the associated private key using the passed subject and
attribute values. Please review both the Security
Considerations and Design Considerations sections in
RFC VVVV for more information regarding this action
statement.";
input {
leaf subject {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"The 'subject' field from the CertificationRequestInfo
structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded
using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as
specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
leaf attributes {
type binary;
description
"The 'attributes' field from the CertificationRequestInfo
structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded
using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as
specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
output {
leaf certificate-signing-request {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"A CertificationRequest structure as specified by RFC
2986, Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
}
action generate-private-key {
description
"Requests the device to generate a private key using the
specified algorithm and key length.";
input {
leaf name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The name this private-key should have when listed
in /keychain/private-keys. As such, the passed
value must not match any existing 'name' value.";
}
leaf algorithm {
type identityref {
base "key-algorithm";
}
mandatory true;
description
"The algorithm to be used when generating the key.";
}
leaf key-length {
type uint32;
description
"For algorithms that need a key length specified
when generating the key.";
}
}
}
action load-private-key {
description
"Requests the device to load a private key";
input {
leaf name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The name this private-key should have when listed
in /keychain/private-keys. As such, the passed
value must not match any existing 'name' value.";
}
leaf private-key {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"An OneAsymmetricKey structure as specified by RFC
5958, Section 2 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.
Note that this is the raw private with no shrouding
to protect it. The strength of this private key
MUST NOT be greater than the strength of the secure
connection over which it is communicated. Devices
SHOULD fail this request if ever that happens.";
reference
"RFC 5958:
Asymmetric Key Packages
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
}
list trusted-certificates {
key name;
description
"A list of trusted certificates. These certificates
can be used by a server to authenticate clients, or by clients
to authenticate servers. The certificates may be endpoint
specific or for certificate authorities (to authenticate many
clients at once. Each list of certificates SHOULD be specific
to a purpose, as the list as a whole may be referenced by other
modules. For instance, a NETCONF server model might point to
a list of certificates to use when authenticating client
certificates.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this list of trusted certificates.";
}
leaf description {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary description for this list of trusted
certificates.";
}
list trusted-certificate {
key name;
description
"A trusted certificate for a specific use. Note, this
'certificate' is a list in order to encode any
associated intermediate certificates.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this trusted certificate. Must
be unique across all lists of trusted certificates
(not just this list) so that a leafref to it from
another module can resolve to unique values.";
}
leaf certificate { // rename to 'data'?
type binary;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC
5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
list trusted-ssh-host-keys {
key name;
description
"A list of trusted host-keys. These host-keys can be used
by clients to authenticate SSH servers. The host-keys are
endpoint specific. Each list of host-keys SHOULD be
specific to a purpose, as the list as a whole may be
referenced by other modules. For instance, a NETCONF
client model might point to a list of host-keys to use
when authenticating servers host-keys.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this list of trusted SSH host keys.";
}
leaf description {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary description for this list of trusted SSH host
keys.";
}
list trusted-host-key {
key name;
description
"A trusted host key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this trusted host-key. Must be
unique across all lists of trusted host-keys (not just
this list) so that a leafref to it from another module
can resolve to unique values.
Note that, for when the SSH client is able to listen
for call-home connections as well, there is no reference
identifier (e.g., hostname, IP address, etc.) that it
can use to uniquely identify the server with. The
call-home draft recommends SSH servers use X.509v3
certificates (RFC6187) when calling home.";
}
leaf host-key { // rename to 'data'?
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"An OneAsymmetricKey 'publicKey' structure as specified
by RFC 5958, Section 2 encoded using the ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5958:
Asymmetric Key Packages
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
/*
Are the auth credentials truly limited to SSH?
Could they be used by an HTTP client to log into an HTTP server?
If truly just for SSH, maybe rename?
*/
container user-auth-credentials {
description
"A list of user authentication credentials that can be used
by an SSH client to log into an SSH server, using any of
the supported authentication methods (e.g., password,
public key, client certificate, etc.).";
list user-auth-credential {
key username;
description
"The authentication credentials for a specific user.";
leaf username {
type string;
description
"The username of this user. This will be the username
used, for instance, to log into an SSH server.";
}
list auth-method {
key priority;
description
"A method of authenticating as this user.";
leaf priority {
type uint8;
description
"When multiple authentication methods in this list are
supported by the server, the one with the lowest priority
value will be the one that is used.";
}
choice auth-type {
description
"The authentication type.";
leaf-list certificate {
type leafref {
path "/keychain/private-keys/private-key/"
+ "certificate-chains/certificate-chain/name";
}
ordered-by user;
description
"A list of references to certificates that can be used for
user authentication. When multiple certificates in this
list supported by the server, the one that comes
before the others in the leaf-list will be used.";
}
leaf-list public-key {
type leafref {
path "/keychain/private-keys/private-key/name";
}
ordered-by user;
description
"A list of references to public keys that can be used for
user authentication. When multiple public keys in this
list supported by the server, the one that comes
before the others in the leaf-list will be used.";
}
leaf ciphertext-password {
type string;
description
"An ciphertext password. The method of encipherment and
how that method can be determined from this string is
implementation-specific.";
}
leaf cleartext-password {
type string;
description
"An cleartext password.";
}
}
}
}
}
}
notification certificate-expiration {
description
"A notification indicating that a configured certificate is
either about to expire or has already expired. When to send
notifications is an implementation specific decision, but
it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a month
for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and then once
a day thereafter.";
leaf certificate {
type instance-identifier;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies which certificate is expiring or is expired.";
}
leaf expiration-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Design Considerations">
<t>This document uses PKCS #10 <xref target="RFC2986"/> for the
"generate-certificate-signing-request" action. The use of Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF) <xref target="RFC4211"/> was considered,
but is was unclear if there was market demand for it, and so support
for CRMF has been left out of this specification. If it is desired
to support CRMF in the future, placing a "choice" statement in both
the input and output statements, along with an "if-feature" statement
on the CRMF option, would enable a backwards compatible solution.</t>
<t>This document puts a limit of the number of elliptical curves
supported by default. This was done to match industry trends in IETF best
practice (e.g., matching work being done in TLS 1.3). If additional
algorithms are needed, they MAY be augmented in by another module,
or added directly in a future version of this document.</t>
<t>Both this document and Key Chain YANG Data Model <xref
target="draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain"/> define keychain YANG
modules. The authors looked at this and agree that they two
modules server different purposes and hence not worth merging
into one document. To underscore this further, this document
renamed its module from "ietf-keychain" to "ietf-system-keychain"
and that other document renamed its module from "ietf-key-chain"
to "ietf-routing-key-chain".</t>
<t>For the trusted-certificates list, Trust Anchor Format <xref target="RFC5914"/>
was evaluated and deemed inappropriate due to this document's need to also support
pinning. That is, pinning a client-certificate to support NETCONF over TLS
client authentication.</t>
</section>
<section title="Security Considerations">
<t>This document defines a keychain mechanism that is entrusted with the
safe keeping of private keys, and the safe keeping of trusted certificates.
Nowhere in this API is there an ability to access (read out) a private key
once it is known to the keychain. Further, associated public keys and
attributes (e.g., algorithm name, key length, etc.) are read-only. That
said, this document allows for the deletion of private keys and their
certificates, as well the deletion of trusted certificates. Access control
mechanisms (e.g., NACM <xref target="RFC6536"/>) MUST be in place so as to
authorize such client actions. Further, whilst the data model allows for
private keys and trusted certificates in general to be deleted, implementations
should be well aware that some privates keys (e.g., those in a TPM) and
some trusted certificates, should never be deleted, regardless if the
authorization mechanisms would generally allow for such actions.</t>
<t>For the "generate-certificate-signing-request" action, it is RECOMMENDED
that devices implement assert channel binding <xref target="RFC5056"/>, so
as to ensure that the application layer that sent the request is the same
as the device authenticated in the secure transport layer was established.</t>
<t>This document defines a data model that includes a list of private keys.
These private keys MAY be deleted using standard NETCONF or RESTCONF
operations (e.g., <edit-config>). Implementations SHOULD automatically
(without explicit request) zeroize these keys in the most secure manner
available, so as to prevent the remnants of their persisted storage
locations from being analyzed in any meaningful way.</t>
<t>The keychain module define within this document defines the "load-private-key"
action enabling a device to load a client-supplied private key. This is a private
key with no shrouding to protect it. The strength of this private key MUST NOT
be greater than the strength of the underlying secure transport connection over
which it is communicated. Devices SHOULD fail this request if ever the strength
of the private key is greater then the strength of the underlying transport.</t>
<!--
I removed all the NACM statements in the new modules
<t>There are a number of data nodes defined in the
"ietf-netconf-server" and "ietf-restconf-server" YANG
modules which are readable and/or writable that may
be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some
network environments. Write and read operations to
these data nodes can have a negative effect on network
operations. It is thus important to control write
and read access to these data nodes. Below are the
data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability.</t>
<t>netconf-server/tls/client-auth/trusted-ca-certs:
<list style="symbols">
<t>This container contains certificates that a NETCONF server
is to use as trust anchors for authenticating X.509-based
client certificates. Write access to this node is
protected using an nacm:default-deny-write statement.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>netconf-server/tls/client-auth/trusted-client-certs:
<list style="symbols">
<t>This container contains certificates that a NETCONF server
is to trust directly when authenticating X.509-based
client certificates. Write access to this node is
protected using an nacm:default-deny-write statement.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>restconf-server/tls/client-auth/trusted-ca-certs:
<list style="symbols">
<t>This container contains certificates that a RESTCONF server
is to use as trust anchors for authenticating X.509-based
client certificates. Write access to this node is
protected using an nacm:default-deny-write statement.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>restconf-server/tls/client-auth/trusted-client-certs:
<list style="symbols">
<t>This container contains certificates that a RESTCONF server
is to trust directly when authenticating X.509-based
client certificates. Write access to this node is
protected using an nacm:default-deny-write statement.</t>
</list>
</t>
-->
</section>
<section title="IANA Considerations">
<section title="The IETF XML Registry">
<t>This document registers one URI in the IETF XML
registry <xref target="RFC2119"/>. Following the format in
<xref target="RFC3688"/>, the following registration is
requested:</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system-keychain
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="The YANG Module Names Registry">
<t>This document registers one YANG module in the
YANG Module Names registry <xref target="RFC6020"/>.
Following the format in <xref target="RFC6020"/>, the
the following registration is requested:</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
name: ietf-system-keychain
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system-keychain
prefix: kc
reference: RFC VVVV
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Acknowledgements">
<t>The authors would like to thank for following for
lively discussions on list and in the halls (ordered
by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin Bjorklund, Benoit Claise,
Mehmet Ersue, David Lamparter, Alan Luchuk, Ladislav Lhotka,
Radek Krejci, Tom Petch, Juergen Schoenwaelder; Phil Shafer,
Sean Turner, and Bert Wijnen.</t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
&rfc2119;
&rfc2986;
&rfc5280;
&rfc5958;
&rfc6020;
&rfc6241;
<reference anchor='draft-ietf-netconf-restconf'>
<front>
<title>RESTCONF Protocol</title>
<author initials='A.B.' surname='Bierman'
fullname='Andy Bierman'>
<organization>YumaWorks</organization>
</author>
<author initials='M' surname='Bjorklund'
fullname='Martin Bjorklund'>
<organization>Tail-f Systems</organization>
</author>
<author initials='K.W.' surname='Watsen'
fullname='Kent Watsen'>
<organization>Juniper Networks</organization>
</author>
<date year='2014' />
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft'
value='draft-ieft-netconf-restconf-04' />
</reference>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
&rfc3688;
&rfc4211;
&rfc5056;
&rfc5914;
&rfc6536;
<reference anchor="Std-802.1AR-2009" target="http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/802.1AR-2009.html">
<front>
<title>IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity</title>
<author fullname="WG802.1 - Higher Layer LAN Protocols Working Group">
<organization>IEEE SA-Standards Board</organization>
</author>
<date month="December" year="2009"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor='draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain' target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain">
<front>
<title>Key Chain YANG Data Model</title>
<author initials='A.L.' surname='Lindem' fullname='Acee Lindem'>
<organization>Cisco</organization>
</author>
<author initials='Y.Q.' surname='Qu' fullname='Yingzhen Qu'>
<organization>Cisco</organization>
</author>
<author initials='D.Y.' surname='Yeung' fullname='Derek Yeung'>
<organization>Cisco</organization>
</author>
<author initials='I.C.' surname='Chen' fullname='Ing-Wher Chen'>
<organization>Ericson</organization>
</author>
<author initials='J.Z.' surname='Zhang' fullname='Jeffery Zhang'>
<organization>Juniper</organization>
</author>
<author initials='Y.Y.' surname='Yang' fullname='Yi Yang'>
<organization>Cisco</organization>
</author>
<date year='2016' />
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain' />
</reference>
</references>
<section title="Change Log">
<section title="server-model-09 to 00">
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>This draft was split out from draft-ietf-netconf-server-model-09.</t>
<t>Removed key-usage parameter from generate-private-key action.</t>
<t>Now /private-keys/private-key/certificates/certificate/name
must be globally unique (unique across all private keys).</t>
<t>Added top-level 'trusted-ssh-host-keys' and 'user-auth-credentials'
to support SSH client modules.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Open Issues">
<t>Please see: https://github.com/netconf-wg/system-keychain/issues.</t>
</section>
</back>
</rfc>
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