One document matched: draft-ietf-netconf-server-model-09.xml
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<rfc category="std"
ipr="trust200902"
docName="draft-ietf-netconf-server-model-09" >
<front>
<title abbrev="NETCONF/RESTCONF Server Config Models">NETCONF Server and RESTCONF Server Configuration Models</title>
<author initials="K.W." surname="Watsen" fullname="Kent Watsen">
<organization>Juniper Networks</organization>
<address>
<email>kwatsen@juniper.net</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="J.S." surname="Schoenwaelder" fullname="Juergen Schoenwaelder">
<organization>Jacobs University Bremen</organization>
<address>
<email>j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de</email>
</address>
</author>
<date/>
<area>Operations</area>
<workgroup>NETCONF Working Group</workgroup>
<abstract>
<t>This draft defines a NETCONF server configuration data model and a RESTCONF
server configuration data model. These data models enable configuration of
the NETCONF and RESTCONF services themselves, including which transports are
supported, what ports the servers listen on, call-home parameters, client
authentication, and related parameters.</t>
</abstract>
<note title="Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)">
<t>This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced
with finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes
all of the substitutions that are needed. Please note that no other
RFC Editor instructions are specified anywhere else in this document.</t>
<t>This document contains references to other drafts in progress, both in
the Normative References section, as well as in body text throughout.
Please update the following references to reflect their final RFC assignments:
<list style="symbols">
<t>draft-ietf-netconf-restconf</t>
<t>draft-ietf-netconf-call-home</t>
<t>draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
progress. Please apply the following replacements:
<list style="symbols">
<t><spanx style="verb">VVVV</spanx> --> the assigned RFC value for this draft</t>
<t><spanx style="verb">XXXX</spanx> --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-restconf</t>
<t><spanx style="verb">YYYY</spanx> --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-call-home</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for ports pending IANA assignment
from "draft-ietf-netconf-call-home". Please apply the following replacements:
<list style="symbols">
<t><spanx style="verb">7777</spanx> --> the assigned port value for "netconf-ch-ssh"</t>
<t><spanx style="verb">8888</spanx> --> the assigned port value for "netconf-ch-tls"</t>
<t><spanx style="verb">9999</spanx> --> the assigned port value for "restconf-ch-tls"</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of publication of this
draft. Please apply the following replacement:
<list style="symbols">
<t><spanx style="verb">2016-03-16</spanx> --> the publication date of this draft</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>The following two Appendix sections are to be removed prior to publication:
<list style="symbols">
<t>Appendix A. Change Log</t>
<t>Appendix B. Open Issues</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Artwork in the document contains a temporary YANG containers that need to be
removed.
<list style="symbols">
<t>The "listening-ssh-server" container listed at the end of the artwork in
<xref target="ssh-server-yang-module"/> needs to be removed. Please remove
the ten lines starting with "container listening-ssh-server {" and ending
with "}".</t>
<t>The "listening-tls-server" container listed at the end of the artwork in
<xref target="tls-server-yang-module"/> needs to be removed. Please remove
the ten lines starting with "container listening-tls-server {" and ending
with "}".</t>
</list>
</t>
</note>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction">
<t>This draft defines a NETCONF <xref target="RFC6241"/> server configuration
data model and a RESTCONF <xref target="draft-ietf-netconf-restconf"/>
server configuration data model. These data models enable configuration of
the NETCONF and RESTCONF services themselves, including which transports are
supported, what ports the servers listen on, call-home parameters, client
authentication, and related parameters.</t>
<section title="Terminology">
<t>The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL",
"SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in RFC 2119 <xref target="RFC2119"/>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Tree Diagrams" anchor="tree-diagrams">
<t>A simplified graphical representation of the data models
is used in this document. The meaning of the symbols in
these diagrams is as follows:
<list style="symbols">
<t>Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.</t>
<t>Braces "{" and "}" enclose feature names, and indicate
that the named feature must be present for the subtree
to be present.</t>
<t>Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means
configuration (read-write) and "ro" state data
(read-only).</t>
<t>Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional
node, "!" means a presence container, and "*" denotes a
list and leaf-list.</t>
<t>Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case
nodes are also marked with a colon (":").</t>
<t>Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that
are not shown.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Objectives">
<t>The primary purpose of the YANG modules defined herein is
to enable the configuration of the NETCONF and RESTCONF
services on a network element. This scope includes the following
objectives:</t>
<section title="Support all NETCONF and RESTCONF transports">
<t>The YANG module should support all current NETCONF and RESTCONF
transports, namely NETCONF over SSH <xref target="RFC6242"/>,
NETCONF over TLS <xref target="RFC7589"/>, and RESTCONF over
TLS <xref target="draft-ietf-netconf-restconf"/>, and to be
extensible to support future transports as necessary.</t>
<t>Because implementations may not support all transports,
the module should use YANG "feature" statements
so that implementations can accurately advertise which
transports are supported.</t>
</section>
<section title="Enable each transport to select which keys to use">
<t>Servers may have a multiplicity of host-keys or server-certificates
from which subsets may be selected for specific uses. For instance,
a NETCONF server may want to use one set of SSH host-keys when listening
on port 830, and a different set of SSH host-keys when calling
home. The data models provided herein should enable configuration
of which keys to use on a per-use basis.</t>
</section>
<section title="Support authenticating NETCONF/RESTCONF clients certificates">
<t>When a certificate is used to authenticate a NETCONF or RESTCONF client,
there is a need to configure the server to know how to authenticate the
certificates. The server should be able to authenticate the client's
certificate either by using path-validation to a configured trust anchor
or by matching the client-certificate to one previously configured.</t>
</section>
<section title="Support mapping authenticated NETCONF/RESTCONF client certificates to usernames">
<t>When a client certificate is used for TLS client authentication,
the NETCONF/RESTCONF server must be able to derive a username from the
authenticated certificate. Thus the modules defined herein should enable
this mapping to be configured.</t>
</section>
<section title="Support both listening for connections and call home">
<t>The NETCONF and RESTCONF protocols were originally defined as having the
server opening a port to listen for client connections. More recently
the NETCONF working group defined support for call-home
(<xref target="draft-ietf-netconf-call-home"/>), enabling the server to
initiate the connection to the client, for both the NETCONF and RESTCONF
protocols. Thus the modules defined herein should enable configuration
for both listening for connections and calling home.
Because implementations may not support both listening for
connections and calling home, YANG "feature" statements
should be used so that implementation can accurately
advertise the connection types it supports.</t>
</section>
<section title="For Call Home connections">
<t>The following objectives only pertain to call home connections.</t>
<section title="Support more than one NETCONF/RESTCONF client">
<t>A NETCONF/RESTCONF server may be managed by more than one
NETCONF/RESTCONF client. For instance, a deployment may have one
client for provisioning and another for fault
monitoring. Therefore, when it is desired for a server
to initiate call home connections, it should be able to
do so to more than one client.</t>
</section>
<section title="Support NETCONF/RESTCONF clients having more than one endpoint">
<t>An NETCONF/RESTCONF client managing a NETCONF/RESTCONF server may implement a
high-availability strategy employing a multiplicity of
active and/or passive endpoint. Therefore, when it is
desired for a server to initiate call home connections,
it should be able to connect to any of the client's endpoints.</t>
</section>
<section title="Support a reconnection strategy">
<t>Assuming a NETCONF/RESTCONF client has more than one endpoint, then
it becomes necessary to configure how a NETCONF/RESTCONF server should
reconnect to the client should it lose its connection to one the client's
endpoints. For instance, the NETCONF/RESTCONF server may start with
first endpoint defined in a user-ordered list of endpoints or with the
last endpoints it was connected to.</t>
</section>
<section title="Support both persistent and periodic connections">
<t>NETCONF/RESTCONF clients may vary greatly on how frequently they
need to interact with a NETCONF/RESTCONF server, how responsive
interactions need to be, and how many simultaneous connections
they can support. Some clients may need a persistent
connection to servers to optimize real-time interactions,
while others prefer periodic interactions in order to minimize
resource requirements. Therefore, when it is necessary
for server to initiate connections, it should be configurable
if the connection is persistent or periodic.</t>
</section>
<section title="Reconnection strategy for periodic connections">
<t>The reconnection strategy should apply to both
persistent and periodic connections. How it
applies to periodic connections becomes clear when
considering that a periodic "connection" is
a logical connection to a single server. That is,
the periods of unconnectedness are intentional as
opposed to due to external reasons. A periodic
"connection" should always reconnect to
the same server until it is no longer able to, at
which time the reconnection strategy guides how to
connect to another server.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="keepalives" title="Keep-alives for persistent connections">
<t>If a persistent connection is desired, it is the
responsibility of the connection initiator to actively
test the "aliveness" of the connection. The connection
initiator must immediately work to reestablish a
persistent connection as soon as the connection is
lost. How often the connection should be tested is
driven by NETCONF/RESTCONF client requirements, and therefore
keep-alive settings should be configurable on a
per-client basis.</t>
</section>
<section title="Customizations for periodic connections">
<t>If a periodic connection is desired, it is necessary for the
NETCONF/RESTCONF server to know how often it should connect. This
frequency determines the maximum amount of time a NETCONF/RESTCONF
client may have to wait to send data to a server. A server may
connect to a client before this interval expires if desired
(e.g., to send data to a client).</t>
</section>
</section>
</section>
<section title="High-Level Design">
<t>The solution presented in this document defines a configurable
keychain object, reusable groupings for SSH and TLS based servers,
and, finally, the configurable NETCONF and RESTCONF server objects,
which are the primary purpose for this draft. Each of these are defined in
a distinct YANG module, thus a total of five YANG modules are defined
in this document. The relationship between these five YANG modules
is illustrated by the tree diagram below.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
+--------------------+
|ietf-system-keychain|
+--------------------+
^ ^
| |
<leafref> | | <leafref>
+------------+ +------------+
| |
+---------------+ +------------------+
|ietf-ssh-server| | ietf-tls-server |
+---------------+ +------------------+
^ ^ ^
| <uses> | |
| <augments> | |
| +--------------------+ | <augments>
| | |
+-------------------+ +--------------------+
|ietf-netconf-server| |ietf-restconf-server|
+-------------------+ +--------------------+
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Solution">
<t>Each of the following five sections relate to one of the YANG
modules depicted by the figure above.</t>
<section title="The System Keychain Model" anchor="keychain-model">
<t>The system keychain model defined in this section provides a configurable
object having the following characteristics:
<list style="symbols">
<t>A semi-configurable list of private keys, each with one or more associated
certificates. Private keys MUST be either preinstalled (e.g., an IDevID key),
be generated by request, or be loaded by request. Each private key is MAY have
associated certificates, either preinstalled or configured after creation.</t>
<t>A configurable list of lists of trust anchor certificates. This enables
the server to have use-specific trust anchors. For instance, one list of
trust anchors might be used to authenticate management connections (e.g.,
client certificate-based authentication for NETCONF or RESTCONF connections),
and a different list of trust anchors might be used for when connecting to a
specific Internet-based service (e.g., a zero touch bootstrap server).</t>
<t>An RPC to generate a certificate signing request for an existing private
key, a passed subject, and an optional attributes. The signed certificate
returned from an external certificate authority (CA) can be later set using
a standard configuration change request (e.g., <edit-config>).</t>
<t>An RPC to request the server to generate a new private key using the
specified algorithm and key length.</t>
<t>An RPC to request the server to load a new private key.</t>
</list>
</t>
<section title="Tree Diagram">
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
module: ietf-system-keychain
+--rw keychain
+--rw private-keys
| +--rw private-key* [name]
| | +--rw name string
| | +--ro algorithm? kc:algorithms
| | +--ro key-length? uint32
| | +--ro public-key binary
| | +--rw certificate-chains
| | | +--rw certificate-chain* [name]
| | | +--rw name string
| | | +--rw certificate* binary
| | +---x generate-certificate-signing-request
| | +---w input
| | | +---w subject binary
| | | +---w attributes? binary
| | +--ro output
| | +--ro certificate-signing-request binary
| +---x generate-private-key
| | +---w input
| | +---w name string
| | +---w key-usage? enumeration
| | +---w algorithm kc:algorithms
| | +---w key-length? uint32
| +---x load-private-key
| +---w input
| +---w name string
| +---w private-key binary
+--rw trusted-certificates* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw description? string
+--rw trusted-certificate* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw certificate? binary
notifications:
+---n certificate-expiration
+--ro certificate instance-identifier
+--ro expiration-date yang:date-and-time
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Example Usage">
<t>The following example illustrates the "generate-private-key" action
in use with the RESTCONF protocol and JSON encoding.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
REQUEST
-------
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]
POST https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-system-keychain:keychain/\
private-keys/generate-private-key HTTP/1.1
HOST: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang.operation+json
{
"ietf-system-keychain:input" : {
"name" : "ex-key-sect571r1",
"algorithm" : "sect571r1"
}
}
RESPONSE
--------
HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2015 11:01:00 GMT
Server: example-server
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
<t>The following example illustrates the "load-private-key" action
in use with the RESTCONF protocol and JSON encoding.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
REQUEST
-------
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]
POST https://example.com/restconf/data/ietf-system-keychain:keychain/\
private-keys/generate-private-key HTTP/1.1
HOST: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang.operation+xml
<input xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system-keychain">
<name>ex-key-sect571r1</name>
<private-key>
NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd\
VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER\
V6QVJCZ05WQkFNVENrTlNUQ0JKYzNOMVpYS0NDUUNVRHBNSll6UG8zREF\
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25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2\
WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9L=
</private-key>
</input>
RESPONSE
--------
HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2015 11:01:00 GMT
Server: example-server
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
<t>The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing-request"
action in use with the NETCONF protocol.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
REQUEST
-------
<rpc message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
<keychain
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system-keychain">
<private-keys>
<private-key>
<name>ex-key-sect571r1</name>
<generate-certificate-signing-request>
<subject>
cztvaWRoc2RmZ2tqaHNkZmdramRzZnZzZGtmam5idnNvO2R
manZvO3NkZmJpdmhzZGZpbHVidjtvc2lkZmhidml1bHNlmO
Z2aXNiZGZpYmhzZG87ZmJvO3NkZ25iO29pLmR6Zgo=
</subject>
<attributes>
bwtakWRoc2RmZ2tqaHNkZmdramRzZnZzZGtmam5idnNvut4
arnZvO3NkZmJpdmhzZGZpbHVidjtvc2lkZmhidml1bHNkYm
Z2aXNiZGZpYmhzZG87ZmJvO3NkZ25iO29pLmC6Rhp=
</attributes>
</generate-certificate-signing-request>
</private-key>
</private-keys>
</keychain>
</action>
</rpc>
RESPONSE
--------
<rpc-reply message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<certificate-signing-request
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system-keychain">
LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCk1JSUNrekNDQWZ5Z
0F3SUJBZ0lKQUpRT2t3bGpNK2pjTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQkJRVU
FNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlYKQkFZVEFsVlRNUkF3RGdZRFZRUUtFd2RsZUd
GdGNHeGxNUk13RVFZRFZRUURFd3BEVWt3Z1NYTnpkV1Z5TUI0WApE
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El1QWMrQ1RsTkNmc0d6cEw1Um5ydXZsOFRIcUJTdGZQY3N0Zk1KT1
FaNzlnNlNWVldsMldzaHE1bUViCkJNNitGNzdjbTAvU25FcFE0TnV
bXBDT2YKQWdNQkFBR2pnYXd3Z2Frd0hRWURWUjBPQkJZRUZKY1o2W
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mMKTUE0R0ExVWREd0VCL3dRRUF3SUNCREFTQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFQ0
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SWHgzZjdVM2xZTgotLS0tLUVORCBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate-signing-request>
</rpc-reply>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
<t>The following example illustrates what a fully configured keychain object
might look like. The private-key shown below is consistent with the
generate-private-key and generate-certificate-signing-request examples above.
This example also assumes that the resulting CA-signed certificate has been
configured back onto the server. Lastly, this example shows that three
lists of trusted certificates having been configured.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<keychain xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system-keychain">
<!-- private keys and associated certificates -->
<private-keys>
<private-key>
<name>tpm-protected-key</name>
<algorithm>sect571r1</algorithm>
<public-key>
cztvaWRoc2RmZ2tqaHNkZmdramRzZnZzZGtmam5idnNvO2RmanZvO3NkZ
mJpdmhzZGZpbHVidjtvc2lkZmhidml1bHNkYmZ2aXNiZGZpYmhzZG87Zm
JvO3NkZ25iO29pLmR6Zgo=
</public-key>
<certificate-chains>
<certificate-chain>
<name>default-idevid-chain</name>
<certificate>
diR1V4RXpBUkJnTlZCQU1UQ2tOU1RDQkpjM04xWlhJd2daOHdEUVl
LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCk1JSUNrekNDQWZ5Z
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</certificate>
<certificate>
KS29aSWh2Y04KQVFFQkJRQURnWTBBTUlHSkFvR0JBTXVvZmFPNEV3
El1QWMrQ1RsTkNmc0d6cEw1Um5ydXZsOFRIcUJTdGZQY3N0Zk1KT1
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SSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate>
</certificate-chain>
<certificate-chain>
<name>my-ldevid-chain</name>
<certificate>
0F3SUJBZ0lKQUpRT2t3bGpNK2pjTUEwR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFQkJRVU
FNRFF4Q3pBSkJnTlYKQkFZVEFsVlRNUkF3RGdZRFZRUUtFd2RsZUd
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</certificate>
<certificate>
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</certificate>
</certificate-chain>
</certificate-chains>
</private-key>
</private-keys>
<!-- trusted netconf/restconf client certificates -->
<trusted-certificates>
<name>explicitly-trusted-client-certs</name>
<description>
Specific client authentication certificates that are to be
explicitly trusted NETCONF/RESTCONF clients. These are
needed for client certificates not signed by our CA.
</description>
<trusted-certificate>
<name>George Jetson</name>
<certificate>
QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ
MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ
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LS0tLUVORCBDRVJUSUZJQ0FURS0tLS0tCg==
</certificate>
</trusted-certificate>
<trusted-certificate>
<name>Fred Flintstone</name>
<certificate>
VlEVlFRREV3Vm9ZWEJ3ZVRDQm56QU5CZ2txaGtpRzl3MEJBUUVGQUFPQm
pRQXdnWWtDCmdZRUE1RzRFSWZsS1p2bDlXTW44eUhyM2hObUFRaUhVUzV
rRUpPQy9hSFA3eGJXQW1ra054ZStUa2hrZnBsL3UKbVhsTjhSZUd1ODhG
NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd
VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER
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zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot
QWtUOCBDRVUUZJ0RUF==
</certificate>
</trusted-certificate>
</trusted-certificates>
<!-- trust anchors for netconf/restconf clients -->
<trusted-certificates>
<name>deployment-specific-ca-certs</name>
<description>
Trust anchors used only to authenticate NETCONF/RESTCONF
client connections. Since our security policy only allows
authentication for clients having a certificate signed by
our CA, we only configure its certificate below.
</description>
<trusted-certificate>
<name>ca.example.com</name>
<certificate>
WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM
lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk
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MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ
25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2
RJSUJQFRStS0Cg==
</certificate>
</trusted-certificate>
</trusted-certificates>
<!-- trust anchors for random HTTPS servers on Internet -->
<trusted-certificates>
<name>common-ca-certs</name>
<description>
Trusted certificates to authenticate common HTTPS servers.
These certificates are similar to those that might be
shipped with a web browser.
</description>
<trusted-certificate>
<name>ex-certificate-authority</name>
<certificate>
NGcEk3UE90cnNFVjRwTUNBd0VBQWFPQ0FSSXdnZ0VPCk1CMEdBMVVkRGd
VEJiZ0JTWEdlbUEKMnhpRHVOTVkvVHFLNWd4cFJBZ1ZOYUU0cERZd05ER
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Z05WSFI4RVlqQmdNRjZnSXFBZ2hoNW9kSFJ3T2k4dlpYaGgKYlhCc1pTN
QmdOVkJBWVRBbFZUTVJBd0RnWURWUVFLRXdkbAplR0Z0Y0d4bE1RNHdEQ
MkF6a3hqUDlVQWtHR0dvS1U1eUc1SVR0Wm0vK3B0R2FieXVDMjBRd2kvZ
NQmdOVkhSTUJBZjhFCkFqQUFNQTRHQTFVZER3RUIvd1FFQXdJSGdEQnBC
WmdsK2gyTTg3QmtGMjhWbW1CdFFVaWc3OEgrRkYyRTFwdSt4ZVRJbVFFM
lLQllsdWpOcjFTMnRLR05EMUc2OVJpK2FWNGw2NTdZNCtadVJMZgpRYjk
zSFNwSDdwVXBCYnA4dmtNanFtZjJma3RqZHBxeFppUUtTbndWZTF2Zwot
25PZnpZNEhONApXY0pTaUpZK2xtYWs3RTRORUZXZS9RdGp4NUlXZmdvN2
WpiMjB2WlhoaGJYQnNaUzVqY215aU9L=
</certificate>
</trusted-certificate>
</trusted-certificates>
</keychain>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
<t>The following example illustrates a "certificate-expiration"
notification in XML.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
['\' line wrapping added for formatting only]
<notification
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
<eventTime>2016-07-08T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
<certificate-expiration
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system-keychain">
<certificate>
/kc:keychain/kc:private-keys/kc:private-key/kc:certificate-chains\
/kc:certificate-chain/kc:certificate[3]
</certificate>
<expiration-date>2016-08-08T14:18:53-05:00</expiration-date>
</certificate-expiration>
</notification>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="YANG Model" anchor="keychain-yang-module">
<t>This YANG module makes extensive use of data types defined in
<xref target="RFC5280"/> and <xref target="RFC5958"/>.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-system-keychain@2016-03-16.yang"
module ietf-system-keychain {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system-keychain";
prefix "kc";
import ietf-yang-types { // RFC 6991
prefix yang;
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
<mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
WG Chair: Mahesh Jethanandani
<mailto:mjethanandani@gmail.com>
Editor: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
description
"This module defines a keychain to centralize management of
security credentials.
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2016-03-16" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC VVVV: NETCONF Server and RESTCONF Server Configuration
Models";
}
typedef algorithms {
type enumeration {
enum rsa { description "The RSA algorithm."; }
enum secp192r1 { description "The secp192r1 algorithm."; }
enum secp256r1 { description "The secp256r1 algorithm."; }
enum secp384r1 { description "The secp384r1 algorithm."; }
enum secp521r1 { description "The secp521r1 algorithm."; }
// what about ecdh_x25519 and ecdh_x448 in TLS 1.3?
}
description
"Asymmetric key algorithms. This list has been trimmed down
to the minimal subset of algorithms recommended by the IETF.
Please see the Design Consideration section in RFC VVVV for
more information about this.";
}
container keychain {
description
"A list of private-keys and their associated certificates, as
well as lists of trusted certificates for client certificate
authentication. RPCs are provided to generate a new private
key and to generate a certificate signing requests.";
container private-keys {
description
"A list of private key maintained by the keychain.";
list private-key {
key name;
description
"A private key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the private key.";
}
leaf algorithm {
type kc:algorithms;
config false;
description
"The algorithm used by the private key.";
}
leaf key-length {
type uint32;
config false;
description
"The key-length used by the private key.";
}
leaf public-key {
type binary;
config false;
mandatory true;
description
"An OneAsymmetricKey 'publicKey' structure as specified
by RFC 5958, Section 2 encoded using the ASN.1
distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified
in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5958:
Asymmetric Key Packages
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
container certificate-chains {
description
"Certificate chains associated with this private key.
More than one chain per key is enabled to support,
for instance, a TPM-protected key that has associated
both IDevID and LDevID certificates.";
list certificate-chain {
key name;
description
"A certificate chain for this public key.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the certificate chain.";
}
leaf-list certificate {
type binary;
ordered-by user;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC
5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.
The list of certificates that run from the server
certificate towards the trust anchor. The chain MAY
include the trust anchor certificate itself.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
action generate-certificate-signing-request {
description
"Generates a certificate signing request structure for
the associated private key using the passed subject and
attribute values. Please review both the Security
Considerations and Design Considerations sections in
RFC VVVV for more information regarding this action
statement.";
input {
leaf subject {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"The 'subject' field from the CertificationRequestInfo
structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded
using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as
specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
leaf attributes {
type binary;
description
"The 'attributes' field from the CertificationRequestInfo
structure as specified by RFC 2986, Section 4.1 encoded
using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as
specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
output {
leaf certificate-signing-request {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"A CertificationRequest structure as specified by RFC
2986, Section 4.1 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 2986:
PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
Version 1.7.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
}
action generate-private-key {
description
"Requests the device to generate a private key using the
specified algorithm and key length.";
input {
leaf name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The name this private-key should have when listed
in /keychain/private-keys. As such, the passed
value must not match any existing 'name' value.";
}
leaf key-usage {
type enumeration {
enum signing { description "signing"; }
enum encryption { description "encryption"; }
// unclear if these should be somehow more
// specific or varied.
}
description
"An optional parameter further restricting the use of
this key. Some algorithms inherently restrict use
(DH for signing) whereas others can support more than
one use (RSA). This flag forces the device to only
allow the key to be used for the indicated purposes.";
}
leaf algorithm {
type kc:algorithms;
mandatory true;
description
"The algorithm to be used when generating the key.";
}
leaf key-length {
type uint32;
description
"For algorithms that need a key length specified
when generating the key.";
}
}
}
action load-private-key {
description
"Requests the device to load a private key";
input {
leaf name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The name this private-key should have when listed
in /keychain/private-keys. As such, the passed
value must not match any existing 'name' value.";
}
leaf private-key {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description
"An OneAsymmetricKey structure as specified by RFC
5958, Section 2 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.
Note that this is the raw private with no shrouding
to protect it. The strength of this private key
MUST NOT be greater than the strength of the secure
connection over which it is communicated. Devices
SHOULD fail this request if ever that happens.";
reference
"RFC 5958:
Asymmetric Key Packages
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
}
list trusted-certificates {
key name;
description
"A list of trusted certificates. Each list SHOULD be specific
to a purpose. For instance, there could be one list for
authenticating NETCONF/RESTCONF client certificates, and
another list for authenticating manufacturer-signed data,
and yet another list for authenticated web servers.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this list of trusted certificates.";
}
leaf description {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary description for this list of trusted
certificates.";
}
list trusted-certificate {
key name;
description
"A trusted certificate for a specific use.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this trusted certificate.";
}
leaf certificate {
type binary;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC
5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished
encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
}
}
}
notification certificate-expiration {
description
"A notification indicating that a configured certificate is
either about to expire or has already expired. When to send
notifications is an implementation specific decision, but
it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a month
for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and then once
a day thereafter.";
leaf certificate {
type instance-identifier;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies which certificate is expiring or is expired.";
}
leaf expiration-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="The SSH Server Model" anchor="ssh-server-model">
<t>The SSH Server model presented in this section presents two
YANG groupings, one for a server that opens a socket to accept
TCP connections on, and another for a server that has had the
TCP connection opened for it already (e.g., inetd).</t>
<t>The SSH Server model (like the TLS Server model presented
below) is provided as a grouping so that it can be used in
different contexts. For instance, the NETCONF Server model
presented in <xref target="netconf-server-model"/> uses one
grouping to configure a NETCONF server listening for
connections and the other grouping to configure NETCONF
call home.</t>
<t>A shared characteristic between both groupings is the
ability to configure which host key is presented to
clients, the private key for which is held in the keychain
configuration presented before. Another shared characteristic
is the ability to configure which trusted CA or client
certificates the server should be used to authenticate
clients when using X.509 based client certificates
<xref target="RFC6187"/>.</t>
<section title="Tree Diagram">
<t>The following tree diagram represents the data model for
the grouping used to configure an SSH server to listen for
TCP connections. The tree diagram for the other grouping
is not provided, but it is the same except without the
"address" and "port" fields.</t>
<t>NOTE: the diagram below shows "listening-ssh-server" as
a YANG container (not a grouping). This temporary container
was created only to enable the `pyang` tool to output the
tree diagram, as groupings by themselves have no protocol
accessible nodes, and hence `pyang` would output an empty
tree diagram.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
module: ietf-ssh-server
+--rw listening-ssh-server
+--rw address? inet:ip-address
+--rw port inet:port-number
+--rw host-keys
| +--rw host-key* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw (type)?
| +--:(public-key)
| | +--rw public-key? -> /kc:keychain/private-keys/pri
vate-key/name
| +--:(certificate)
| +--rw certificate? -> /kc:keychain/private-keys/pri
vate-key/certificate-chains/certificate-chain/certificate {ssh-x509-cer
ts}?
+--rw client-cert-auth {ssh-x509-certs}?
+--rw trusted-ca-certs? -> /kc:keychain/trusted-certific
ates/name
+--rw trusted-client-certs? -> /kc:keychain/trusted-certific
ates/name
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Example Usage">
<t>This section shows how it would appear if the temporary
listening-ssh-server container just mentioned above were
populated with some data. This example is consistent with
the examples presented earlier in this document.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<listening-ssh-server
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server">
<port>830</port>
<host-keys>
<host-key>
<name>deployment-specific-certificate</name>
<certificate>ex-key-sect571r1-cert</certificate>
</host-key>
</host-keys>
</certificates>
<client-cert-auth>
<trusted-ca-certs>
deployment-specific-ca-certs
</trusted-ca-certs>
<trusted-client-certs>
explicitly-trusted-client-certs
</trusted-client-certs>
</client-cert-auth>
</listening-ssh-server>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="YANG Model" anchor="ssh-server-yang-module">
<t>This YANG module has a normative reference to <xref target="RFC4253"/>.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ssh-server@2016-03-16.yang"
module ietf-ssh-server {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server";
prefix "ts";
import ietf-inet-types { // RFC 6991
prefix inet;
}
import ietf-system-keychain {
prefix kc; // RFC VVVV
revision-date 2016-03-16;
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
<mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
WG Chair: Mahesh Jethanandani
<mailto:mjethanandani@gmail.com>
Editor: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
description
"This module defines a reusable grouping for a SSH server that
can be used as a basis for specific SSH server instances.
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2016-03-16" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC VVVV: NETCONF Server and RESTCONF Server Configuration
Models";
}
// features
feature ssh-x509-certs {
description
"The ssh-x509-certs feature indicates that the NETCONF
server supports RFC 6187";
reference
"RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
Authentication";
}
// grouping
grouping non-listening-ssh-server-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for a SSH server that can be used as a
basis for specific SSH server instances.";
container host-keys {
description
"The list of host-keys the SSH server will present when
establishing a SSH connection.";
list host-key {
key name;
min-elements 1;
ordered-by user;
description
"An ordered list of host keys the SSH server will use to
construct its ordered list of algorithms, when sending
its SSH_MSG_KEXINIT message, as defined in Section 7.1
of RFC 4253.";
reference
"RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
leaf name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"An arbitrary name for this host-key";
}
choice type {
description
"The type of host key being specified";
leaf public-key {
type leafref {
path "/kc:keychain/kc:private-keys/kc:private-key/"
+ "kc:name";
}
description
"The public key is actually identified by the name of
its cooresponding private-key in the keychain.";
}
leaf certificate {
if-feature ssh-x509-certs;
type leafref {
path "/kc:keychain/kc:private-keys/kc:private-key/"
+ "kc:certificate-chains/kc:certificate-chain/"
+ "kc:certificate";
}
description
"The name of a certificate in the keychain.";
}
}
}
}
container client-cert-auth {
if-feature ssh-x509-certs;
description
"A reference to a list of trusted certificate authority (CA)
certificates and a reference to a list of trusted client
certificates.";
leaf trusted-ca-certs {
type leafref {
path "/kc:keychain/kc:trusted-certificates/kc:name";
}
description
"A reference to a list of certificate authority (CA)
certificates used by the SSH server to authenticate
SSH client certificates.";
}
leaf trusted-client-certs {
type leafref {
path "/kc:keychain/kc:trusted-certificates/kc:name";
}
description
"A reference to a list of client certificates used by
the SSH server to authenticate SSH client certificates.
A clients certificate is authenticated if it is an
exact match to a configured trusted client certificate.";
}
}
}
grouping listening-ssh-server-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for a SSH server that can be used as a
basis for specific SSH server instances.";
leaf address {
type inet:ip-address;
description
"The IP address of the interface to listen on. The SSH
server will listen on all interfaces if no value is
specified.";
}
leaf port {
type inet:port-number;
mandatory true; // will a default augmented in work?
description
"The local port number on this interface the SSH server
listens on.";
}
uses non-listening-ssh-server-grouping;
}
container listening-ssh-server {
description
"This container will be removed by the RFC Editor. This
container is currently only present in order to enable
the `pyang` tool to generate tree diagram output of this
module (used in the draft) as it otherwise would not
contain any protocol accessible nodes to output.";
uses listening-ssh-server-grouping;
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="The TLS Server Model" anchor="tls-server-model">
<t>The TLS Server model presented in this section presents two
YANG groupings, one for a server that opens a socket to accept
TCP connections on, and another for a server that has had the
TCP connection opened for it already (e.g., inetd).</t>
<t>The TLS Server model (like the SSH Server model presented
above) is provided as a grouping so that it can be used in
different contexts. For instance, the NETCONF Server model
presented in <xref target="netconf-server-model"/> uses one
grouping to configure a NETCONF server listening for
connections and the other grouping to configure NETCONF
call home.</t>
<t>A shared characteristic between both groupings is the
ability to configure which server certificate is presented to
clients, the private key for which is held in the keychain
model presented in <xref target="keychain-model"/>.
Another shared characteristic is the ability to configure which
trusted CA or client certificates the server should be used to
authenticate clients.</t>
<section title="Tree Diagram">
<t>The following tree diagram represents the data model for
the grouping used to configure an TLS server to listen for
TCP connections. The tree diagram for the other grouping
is not provided, but it is the same except without the
"address" and "port" fields.</t>
<t>NOTE: the diagram below shows "listening-ssh-server" as
a YANG container (not a grouping). This temporary container
was created only to enable the `pyang` tool to output the
tree diagram, as groupings by themselves have no protocol
accessible nodes, and hence `pyang` would output an empty
tree diagram.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
module: ietf-tls-server
+--rw listening-tls-server
+--rw address? inet:ip-address
+--rw port inet:port-number
+--rw certificates
| +--rw certificate* [name]
| +--rw name -> /kc:keychain/private-keys/private-key/cert
ificate-chains/certificate-chain/certificate
+--rw client-auth
+--rw trusted-ca-certs? -> /kc:keychain/trusted-certific
ates/name
+--rw trusted-client-certs? -> /kc:keychain/trusted-certific
ates/name
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Example Usage">
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<listening-tls-server
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server">
<port>6513</port>
<certificates>
<certificate>
<name>ex-key-sect571r1-cert</name>
</certificate>
</certificates>
<client-auth>
<trusted-ca-certs>
deployment-specific-ca-certs
</trusted-ca-certs>
<trusted-client-certs>
explicitly-trusted-client-certs
</trusted-client-certs>
</client-auth>
</listening-tls-server>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="YANG Model" anchor="tls-server-yang-module">
<!--
<t>This YANG module imports YANG types from <xref
target="RFC6991"/> and <xref target="RFC7407"/>.</t>
-->
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tls-server@2016-03-16.yang"
module ietf-tls-server {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server";
prefix "ts";
import ietf-inet-types { // RFC 6991
prefix inet;
}
import ietf-system-keychain {
prefix kc; // RFC VVVV
revision-date 2016-03-16;
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
<mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
WG Chair: Mahesh Jethanandani
<mailto:mjethanandani@gmail.com>
Editor: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
description
"This module defines a reusable grouping for a TLS server that
can be used as a basis for specific TLS server instances.
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2016-03-16" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC VVVV: NETCONF Server and RESTCONF Server Configuration
Models";
}
// grouping
grouping non-listening-tls-server-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for a TLS server that can be used as a
basis for specific TLS server instances.";
container certificates {
description
"The list of certificates the TLS server will present when
establishing a TLS connection in its Certificate message,
as defined in Section 7.4.2 in RRC 5246.";
reference
"RFC 5246:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2";
list certificate {
key name;
min-elements 1;
description
"An unordered list of certificates the TLS server can pick
from when sending its Server Certificate message.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The TLS Protocol, Section 7.4.2";
leaf name {
type leafref {
path "/kc:keychain/kc:private-keys/kc:private-key/"
+ "kc:certificate-chains/kc:certificate-chain/"
+ "kc:certificate";
}
description
"The name of the certificate in the keychain.";
}
}
}
container client-auth {
description
"A reference to a list of trusted certificate authority (CA)
certificates and a reference to a list of trusted client
certificates.";
leaf trusted-ca-certs {
type leafref {
path "/kc:keychain/kc:trusted-certificates/kc:name";
}
description
"A reference to a list of certificate authority (CA)
certificates used by the TLS server to authenticate
TLS client certificates.";
}
leaf trusted-client-certs {
type leafref {
path "/kc:keychain/kc:trusted-certificates/kc:name";
}
description
"A reference to a list of client certificates used by
the TLS server to authenticate TLS client certificates.
A clients certificate is authenticated if it is an
exact match to a configured trusted client certificate.";
}
}
}
grouping listening-tls-server-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for a TLS server that can be used as a
basis for specific TLS server instances.";
leaf address {
type inet:ip-address;
description
"The IP address of the interface to listen on. The TLS
server will listen on all interfaces if no value is
specified.";
}
leaf port {
type inet:port-number;
mandatory true; // will a default augmented in work?
description
"The local port number on this interface the TLTLS server
listens on.";
}
uses non-listening-tls-server-grouping;
}
container listening-tls-server {
description
"This container will be removed by the RFC Editor. This
container is currently only present in order to enable
the `pyang` tool to generate tree diagram output of this
module (used in the draft) as it otherwise would not
contain any protocol accessible nodes to output.";
uses listening-tls-server-grouping;
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="The NETCONF Server Model" anchor="netconf-server-model">
<t>The NETCONF Server model presented in this section supports servers
both listening for connections to accept as well as initiating call-home
connections. This model also supports both the SSH and TLS transport
protocols, using the SSH Server and TLS Server groupings presented in
<xref target="ssh-server-model"/> and <xref target="tls-server-model"/>
respectively. All private keys and trusted certificates are held in the
keychain model presented in <xref target="keychain-model"/>. YANG
feature statements are used to enable implementations to advertise
which parts of the model the NETCONF server supports.</t>
<section title="Tree Diagram">
<t>The following tree diagram uses line-wrapping in order to comply
with xml2rfc validation. This is annoying as I find that drafts (even
txt drafts) look just fine with long lines - maybe xml2rfc
should remove this warning? - or pyang could have an option to
suppress printing leafref paths?</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
module: ietf-netconf-server
+--rw netconf-server
+--rw session-options
| +--rw hello-timeout? uint16
+--rw listen {(ssh-listen or tls-listen)}?
| +--rw max-sessions? uint16
| +--rw idle-timeout? uint16
| +--rw endpoint* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw (transport)
| +--:(ssh) {ssh-listen}?
| | +--rw ssh
| | +--rw address? inet:ip-address
| | +--rw port inet:port-number
| | +--rw host-keys
| | | +--rw host-key* [name]
| | | +--rw name string
| | | +--rw (type)?
| | | +--:(public-key)
| | | | +--rw public-key? -> /kc:keychain/p
rivate-keys/private-key/name
| | | +--:(certificate)
| | | +--rw certificate? -> /kc:keychain/p
rivate-keys/private-key/certificate-chains/certificate-chain/certificat
e {ssh-x509-certs}?
| | +--rw client-cert-auth {ssh-x509-certs}?
| | +--rw trusted-ca-certs? -> /kc:keychain/t
rusted-certificates/name
| | +--rw trusted-client-certs? -> /kc:keychain/t
rusted-certificates/name
| +--:(tls) {tls-listen}?
| +--rw tls
| +--rw address? inet:ip-address
| +--rw port inet:port-number
| +--rw certificates
| | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | +--rw name -> /kc:keychain/private-keys/p
rivate-key/certificate-chains/certificate-chain/certificate
| +--rw client-auth
| +--rw trusted-ca-certs? -> /kc:keychain/t
rusted-certificates/name
| +--rw trusted-client-certs? -> /kc:keychain/t
rusted-certificates/name
| +--rw cert-maps
| +--rw cert-to-name* [id]
| +--rw id uint32
| +--rw fingerprint x509c2n:tls-fingerpr
int
| +--rw map-type identityref
| +--rw name string
+--rw call-home {(ssh-call-home or tls-call-home)}?
+--rw netconf-client* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw (transport)
| +--:(ssh) {ssh-call-home}?
| | +--rw ssh
| | +--rw endpoints
| | | +--rw endpoint* [name]
| | | +--rw name string
| | | +--rw address inet:host
| | | +--rw port? inet:port-number
| | +--rw host-keys
| | | +--rw host-key* [name]
| | | +--rw name string
| | | +--rw (type)?
| | | +--:(public-key)
| | | | +--rw public-key? -> /kc:keychain/p
rivate-keys/private-key/name
| | | +--:(certificate)
| | | +--rw certificate? -> /kc:keychain/p
rivate-keys/private-key/certificate-chains/certificate-chain/certificat
e {ssh-x509-certs}?
| | +--rw client-cert-auth {ssh-x509-certs}?
| | +--rw trusted-ca-certs? -> /kc:keychain/t
rusted-certificates/name
| | +--rw trusted-client-certs? -> /kc:keychain/t
rusted-certificates/name
| +--:(tls) {tls-call-home}?
| +--rw tls
| +--rw endpoints
| | +--rw endpoint* [name]
| | +--rw name string
| | +--rw address inet:host
| | +--rw port? inet:port-number
| +--rw certificates
| | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | +--rw name -> /kc:keychain/private-keys/p
rivate-key/certificate-chains/certificate-chain/certificate
| +--rw client-auth
| +--rw trusted-ca-certs? -> /kc:keychain/t
rusted-certificates/name
| +--rw trusted-client-certs? -> /kc:keychain/t
rusted-certificates/name
| +--rw cert-maps
| +--rw cert-to-name* [id]
| +--rw id uint32
| +--rw fingerprint x509c2n:tls-fingerpr
int
| +--rw map-type identityref
| +--rw name string
+--rw connection-type
| +--rw (connection-type)?
| +--:(persistent-connection)
| | +--rw persistent!
| | +--rw idle-timeout? uint32
| | +--rw keep-alives
| | +--rw max-wait? uint16
| | +--rw max-attempts? uint8
| +--:(periodic-connection)
| +--rw periodic!
| +--rw idle-timeout? uint16
| +--rw reconnect_timeout? uint16
+--rw reconnect-strategy
+--rw start-with? enumeration
+--rw max-attempts? uint8
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Example Usage">
<t>Configuring a NETCONF Server to listen for NETCONF client
connections using both the SSH and TLS transport protocols,
as well as configuring call-home to two NETCONF clients,
one using SSH and the other using TLS.</t>
<t>This example is consistent with other examples presented
in this document.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<netconf-server
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-server">
<listen>
<!-- listening for SSH connections -->
<endpoint>
<name>netconf/ssh</name>
<ssh>
<address>11.22.33.44</address>
<host-keys>
<host-key>
<public-key>my-rsa-key</public-key>
</host-key>
<host-key>
<certificate>TPM key</certificate>
</host-key>
</host-keys>
<client-cert-auth>
<trusted-ca-certs>
deployment-specific-ca-certs
</trusted-ca-certs>
<trusted-client-certs>
explicitly-trusted-client-certs
</trusted-client-certs>
</client-cert-auth>
</ssh>
</endpoint>
<!-- listening for TLS connections -->
<endpoint>
<name>netconf/tls</name>
<tls>
<address>11.22.33.44</address>
<certificates>
<certificate>ex-key-sect571r1-cert</certificate>
</certificates>
<client-auth>
<trusted-ca-certs>
deployment-specific-ca-certs
</trusted-ca-certs>
<trusted-client-certs>
explicitly-trusted-client-certs
</trusted-client-certs>
<cert-maps>
<cert-to-name>
<id>1</id>
<fingerprint>11:0A:05:11:00</fingerprint>
<map-type>x509c2n:san-any</map-type>
</cert-to-name>
<cert-to-name>
<id>2</id>
<fingerprint>B3:4F:A1:8C:54</fingerprint>
<map-type>x509c2n:specified</map-type>
<name>scooby-doo</name>
</cert-to-name>
</cert-maps>
</client-auth>
</tls>
</endpoint>
</listen>
<call-home>
<!-- calling home to an SSH-based NETCONF client -->
<netconf-client>
<name>config-mgr</name>
<ssh>
<endpoints>
<endpoint>
<name>east-data-center</name>
<address>11.22.33.44</address>
</endpoint>
<endpoint>
<name>west-data-center</name>
<address>55.66.77.88</address>
</endpoint>
</endpoints>
<host-keys>
<host-key>
<certificate>TPM key</certificate>
</host-key>
</host-keys>
<client-cert-auth>
<trusted-ca-certs>
deployment-specific-ca-certs
</trusted-ca-certs>
<trusted-client-certs>
explicitly-trusted-client-certs
</trusted-client-certs>
</client-cert-auth>
</ssh>
<connection-type>
<periodic>
<idle-timeout>300</idle-timeout>
<reconnect-timeout>60</reconnect-timeout>
</periodic>
</connection-type>
<reconnect-strategy>
<start-with>last-connected</start-with>
<max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
</reconnect-strategy>
</netconf-client>
<!-- calling home to a TLS-based NETCONF client -->
<netconf-client>
<name>event-correlator</name>
<tls>
<endpoints>
<endpoint>
<name>east-data-center</name>
<address>22.33.44.55</address>
</endpoint>
<endpoint>
<name>west-data-center</name>
<address>33.44.55.66</address>
</endpoint>
</endpoints>
<certificates>
<certificate>ex-key-sect571r1-cert</certificate>
</certificates>
<client-auth>
<trusted-ca-certs>
deployment-specific-ca-certs
</trusted-ca-certs>
<trusted-client-certs>
explicitly-trusted-client-certs
</trusted-client-certs>
<cert-maps>
<cert-to-name>
<id>1</id>
<fingerprint>11:0A:05:11:00</fingerprint>
<map-type>x509c2n:san-any</map-type>
</cert-to-name>
<cert-to-name>
<id>2</id>
<fingerprint>B3:4F:A1:8C:54</fingerprint>
<map-type>x509c2n:specified</map-type>
<name>scooby-doo</name>
</cert-to-name>
</cert-maps>
</client-auth>
</tls>
<connection-type>
<persistent>
<idle-timeout>300</idle-timeout>
<keep-alives>
<max-wait>30</max-wait>
<max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
</keep-alives>
</persistent>
</connection-type>
<reconnect-strategy>
<start-with>first-listed</start-with>
<max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
</reconnect-strategy>
</netconf-client>
</call-home>
</netconf-server>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="YANG Model" anchor="netconf-yang-module">
<t>This YANG module imports YANG types from <xref
target="RFC6991"/> and <xref target="RFC7407"/>.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-netconf-server@2016-03-16.yang"
module ietf-netconf-server {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-server";
prefix "ncserver";
import ietf-inet-types { // RFC 6991
prefix inet;
}
import ietf-x509-cert-to-name { // RFC 7407
prefix x509c2n;
}
import ietf-ssh-server { // RFC VVVV
prefix ss;
revision-date 2016-03-16;
}
import ietf-tls-server { // RFC VVVV
prefix ts;
revision-date 2016-03-16;
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
<mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
WG Chair: Mahesh Jethanandani
<mailto:mjethanandani@gmail.com>
Editor: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
description
"This module contains a collection of YANG definitions for
configuring NETCONF servers.
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2016-03-16" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC VVVV: NETCONF Server and RESTCONF Server Configuration
Models";
}
// Features
feature ssh-listen {
description
"The ssh-listen feature indicates that the NETCONF server
supports opening a port to accept NETCONF over SSH
client connections.";
reference
"RFC 6242: Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)";
}
feature ssh-call-home {
description
"The ssh-call-home feature indicates that the NETCONF
server supports initiating a NETCONF over SSH call
home connection to NETCONF clients.";
reference
"RFC YYYY: NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home";
}
feature tls-listen {
description
"The tls-listen feature indicates that the NETCONF server
supports opening a port to accept NETCONF over TLS
client connections.";
reference
"RFC 7589: Using the NETCONF Protocol over Transport
Layer Security (TLS) with Mutual X.509
Authentication";
}
feature tls-call-home {
description
"The tls-call-home feature indicates that the NETCONF
server supports initiating a NETCONF over TLS call
home connection to NETCONF clients.";
reference
"RFC YYYY: NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home";
}
feature ssh-x509-certs {
description
"The ssh-x509-certs feature indicates that the NETCONF
server supports RFC 6187";
reference
"RFC 6187: X.509v3 Certificates for Secure Shell
Authentication";
}
// top-level container (groupings below)
container netconf-server {
description
"Top-level container for NETCONF server configuration.";
container session-options { // SHOULD WE REMOVE THIS ALTOGETHER?
description
"NETCONF session options, independent of transport
or connection strategy.";
leaf hello-timeout {
type uint16;
units "seconds";
default 600;
description
"Specifies the maximum number of seconds that a SSH/TLS
connection may wait for a hello message to be received.
A connection will be dropped if no hello message is
received before this number of seconds elapses. If set
to zero, then the server will wait forever for a hello
message.";
}
}
container listen {
if-feature "(ssh-listen or tls-listen)";
description
"Configures listen behavior";
leaf max-sessions {
type uint16;
default 0;
description
"Specifies the maximum number of concurrent sessions
that can be active at one time. The value 0 indicates
that no artificial session limit should be used.";
}
leaf idle-timeout {
type uint16;
units "seconds";
default 3600; // one hour
description
"Specifies the maximum number of seconds that a NETCONF
session may remain idle. A NETCONF session will be dropped
if it is idle for an interval longer than this number of
seconds. If set to zero, then the server will never drop
a session because it is idle. Sessions that have a
notification subscription active are never dropped.";
}
list endpoint {
key name;
description
"List of endpoints to listen for NETCONF connections on.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the NETCONF listen endpoint.";
}
choice transport {
mandatory true;
description
"Selects between available transports.";
case ssh {
if-feature ssh-listen;
container ssh {
description
"SSH-specific listening configuration for inbound
connections.";
uses ss:listening-ssh-server-grouping {
refine port {
default 830;
}
}
}
}
case tls {
if-feature tls-listen;
container tls {
description
"TLS-specific listening configuration for inbound
connections.";
uses ts:listening-tls-server-grouping {
refine port {
default 6513;
}
augment "client-auth" {
description
"Augments in the cert-to-name structure.";
uses cert-maps-grouping;
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
container call-home {
if-feature "(ssh-call-home or tls-call-home)";
description
"Configures call-home behavior";
list netconf-client {
key name;
description
"List of NETCONF clients the NETCONF server is to initiate
call-home connections to.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the remote NETCONF client.";
}
choice transport {
mandatory true;
description
"Selects between available transports.";
case ssh {
if-feature ssh-call-home;
container ssh {
description
"Specifies SSH-specific call-home transport
configuration.";
uses endpoints-container {
refine endpoints/endpoint/port {
default 7777;
}
}
uses ss:non-listening-ssh-server-grouping;
}
}
case tls {
if-feature tls-call-home;
container tls {
description
"Specifies TLS-specific call-home transport
configuration.";
uses endpoints-container {
refine endpoints/endpoint/port {
default 8888;
}
}
uses ts:non-listening-tls-server-grouping {
augment "client-auth" {
description
"Augments in the cert-to-name structure.";
uses cert-maps-grouping;
}
}
}
}
}
container connection-type {
description
"Indicates the kind of connection to use.";
choice connection-type {
description
"Selects between available connection types.";
case persistent-connection {
container persistent {
presence true;
description
"Maintain a persistent connection to the NETCONF
client. If the connection goes down, immediately
start trying to reconnect to it, using the
reconnection strategy.
This connection type minimizes any NETCONF client
to NETCONF server data-transfer delay, albeit at
the expense of holding resources longer.";
leaf idle-timeout {
type uint32;
units "seconds";
default 86400; // one day;
description
"Specifies the maximum number of seconds that a
a NETCONF session may remain idle. A NETCONF
session will be dropped if it is idle for an
interval longer than this number of seconds.
If set to zero, then the server will never drop
a session because it is idle. Sessions that
have a notification subscription active are
never dropped.";
}
container keep-alives {
description
"Configures the keep-alive policy, to proactively
test the aliveness of the SSH/TLS client. An
unresponsive SSH/TLS client will be dropped after
approximately max-attempts * max-wait seconds.";
reference
"RFC YYYY: NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call
Home, Section 3.1, item S6";
leaf max-wait {
type uint16 {
range "1..max";
}
units seconds;
default 30;
description
"Sets the amount of time in seconds after which
if no data has been received from the SSH/TLS
client, a SSH/TLS-level message will be sent
to test the aliveness of the SSH/TLS client.";
}
leaf max-attempts {
type uint8;
default 3;
description
"Sets the number of maximum number of sequential
keep-alive messages that can fail to obtain a
response from the SSH/TLS client before assuming
the SSH/TLS client is no longer alive.";
}
}
}
}
case periodic-connection {
container periodic {
presence true;
description
"Periodically connect to the NETCONF client, so that
the NETCONF client may deliver messages pending for
the NETCONF server. The NETCONF client is expected
to close the connection when it is ready to release
it, thus starting the NETCONF server's timer until
next connection.";
leaf idle-timeout {
type uint16;
units "seconds";
default 300; // five minutes
description
"Specifies the maximum number of seconds that a
a NETCONF session may remain idle. A NETCONF
session will be dropped if it is idle for an
interval longer than this number of seconds.
If set to zero, then the server will never drop
a session because it is idle. Sessions that
have a notification subscription active are
never dropped.";
}
leaf reconnect_timeout {
type uint16 {
range "1..max";
}
units minutes;
default 60;
description
"Sets the maximum amount of unconnected time the
NETCONF server will wait before re-establishing
a connection to the NETCONF client. The NETCONF
server may initiate a connection before this
time if desired (e.g., to deliver an event
notification message).";
}
}
}
}
}
container reconnect-strategy {
description
"The reconnection strategy guides how a NETCONF server
reconnects to a NETCONF client, after discovering its
connection to the client has dropped. The NETCONF
server starts with the specified endpoint and tries
to connect to it max-attempts times before trying the
next endpoint in the list (round robin).";
leaf start-with {
type enumeration {
enum first-listed {
description
"Indicates that reconnections should start with
the first endpoint listed.";
}
enum last-connected {
description
"Indicates that reconnections should start with
the endpoint last connected to. If no previous
connection has ever been established, then the
first endpoint configured is used. NETCONF
servers SHOULD be able to remember the last
endpoint connected to across reboots.";
}
}
default first-listed;
description
"Specifies which of the NETCONF client's endpoints the
NETCONF server should start with when trying to connect
to the NETCONF client.";
}
leaf max-attempts {
type uint8 {
range "1..max";
}
default 3;
description
"Specifies the number times the NETCONF server tries to
connect to a specific endpoint before moving on to the
next endpoint in the list (round robin).";
}
}
}
}
}
grouping cert-maps-grouping {
description
"A grouping that defines a container around the
cert-to-name structure defined in RFC 7407.";
container cert-maps {
uses x509c2n:cert-to-name;
description
"The cert-maps container is used by a TLS-based NETCONF
server to map the NETCONF client's presented X.509
certificate to a NETCONF username. If no matching and
valid cert-to-name list entry can be found, then the
NETCONF server MUST close the connection, and MUST NOT
accept NETCONF messages over it.";
reference
"RFC WWWW: NETCONF over TLS, Section 7";
}
}
grouping endpoints-container {
description
"This grouping is used by both the ssh and tls containers
for call-home configurations.";
container endpoints {
description
"Container for the list of endpoints.";
list endpoint {
key name;
min-elements 1;
ordered-by user;
description
"User-ordered list of endpoints for this NETCONF client.
Defining more than one enables high-availability.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this endpoint.";
}
leaf address {
type inet:host;
mandatory true;
description
"The IP address or hostname of the endpoint. If a
hostname is configured and the DNS resolution results
in more than one IP address, the NETCONF server
will process the IP addresses as if they had been
explicitly configured in place of the hostname.";
}
leaf port {
type inet:port-number;
description
"The IP port for this endpoint. The NETCONF server will
use the IANA-assigned well-known port if no value is
specified.";
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="The RESTCONF Server Model">
<t>The RESTCONF Server model presented in this section supports servers
both listening for connections to accept as well as initiating call-home
connections. This model supports the TLS transport only, as RESTCONF
only supports HTTPS, using the TLS Server groupings presented in
<xref target="tls-server-model"/>. All private keys and trusted
certificates are held in the keychain model presented in
<xref target="keychain-model"/>. YANG feature statements are used to
enable implementations to advertise which parts of the model the
RESTCONF server supports.</t>
<section title="Tree Diagram">
<t>The following tree diagram uses line-wrapping in order to comply
with xml2rfc validation. This is annoying as I find that drafts (even
txt drafts) look just fine with long lines - maybe xml2rfc
should remove this warning? - or pyang could have an option to
suppress printing leafref paths?</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
module: ietf-restconf-server
+--rw restconf-server
+--rw listen {tls-listen}?
| +--rw max-sessions? uint16
| +--rw endpoint* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw (transport)
| +--:(tls) {tls-listen}?
| +--rw tls
| +--rw address? inet:ip-address
| +--rw port inet:port-number
| +--rw certificates
| | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | +--rw name -> /kc:keychain/private-keys/p
rivate-key/certificate-chains/certificate-chain/certificate
| +--rw client-auth
| +--rw trusted-ca-certs? -> /kc:keychain/t
rusted-certificates/name
| +--rw trusted-client-certs? -> /kc:keychain/t
rusted-certificates/name
| +--rw cert-maps
| +--rw cert-to-name* [id]
| +--rw id uint32
| +--rw fingerprint x509c2n:tls-fingerpr
int
| +--rw map-type identityref
| +--rw name string
+--rw call-home {tls-call-home}?
+--rw restconf-client* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw (transport)
| +--:(tls) {tls-call-home}?
| +--rw tls
| +--rw endpoints
| | +--rw endpoint* [name]
| | +--rw name string
| | +--rw address inet:host
| | +--rw port? inet:port-number
| +--rw certificates
| | +--rw certificate* [name]
| | +--rw name -> /kc:keychain/private-keys/p
rivate-key/certificate-chains/certificate-chain/certificate
| +--rw client-auth
| +--rw trusted-ca-certs? -> /kc:keychain/t
rusted-certificates/name
| +--rw trusted-client-certs? -> /kc:keychain/t
rusted-certificates/name
| +--rw cert-maps
| +--rw cert-to-name* [id]
| +--rw id uint32
| +--rw fingerprint x509c2n:tls-fingerpr
int
| +--rw map-type identityref
| +--rw name string
+--rw connection-type
| +--rw (connection-type)?
| +--:(persistent-connection)
| | +--rw persistent!
| | +--rw keep-alives
| | +--rw max-wait? uint16
| | +--rw max-attempts? uint8
| +--:(periodic-connection)
| +--rw periodic!
| +--rw reconnect-timeout? uint16
+--rw reconnect-strategy
+--rw start-with? enumeration
+--rw max-attempts? uint8
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Example Usage">
<t>Configuring a RESTCONF Server to listen for RESTCONF client
connections, as well as configuring call-home to one
RESTCONF client.</t>
<t>This example is consistent with other examples presented
in this document.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<restconf-server
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-restconf-server">
<!-- listening for TLS (HTTPS) connections -->
<listen>
<endpoint>
<name>netconf/tls</name>
<tls>
<address>11.22.33.44</address>
<certificates>
<certificate>ex-key-sect571r1-cert</certificate>
</certificates>
<client-auth>
<trusted-ca-certs>
deployment-specific-ca-certs
</trusted-ca-certs>
<trusted-client-certs>
explicitly-trusted-client-certs
</trusted-client-certs>
<cert-maps>
<cert-to-name>
<id>1</id>
<fingerprint>11:0A:05:11:00</fingerprint>
<map-type>x509c2n:san-any</map-type>
</cert-to-name>
<cert-to-name>
<id>2</id>
<fingerprint>B3:4F:A1:8C:54</fingerprint>
<map-type>x509c2n:specified</map-type>
<name>scooby-doo</name>
</cert-to-name>
</cert-maps>
</client-auth>
</tls>
</endpoint>
</listen>
<!-- calling home to a RESTCONF client -->
<call-home>
<restconf-client>
<name>config-manager</name>
<tls>
<endpoints>
<endpoint>
<name>east-data-center</name>
<address>22.33.44.55</address>
</endpoint>
<endpoint>
<name>west-data-center</name>
<address>33.44.55.66</address>
</endpoint>
</endpoints>
<certificates>
<certificate>ex-key-sect571r1-cert</certificate>
</certificates>
<client-auth>
<trusted-ca-certs>
deployment-specific-ca-certs
</trusted-ca-certs>
<trusted-client-certs>
explicitly-trusted-client-certs
</trusted-client-certs>
<cert-maps>
<cert-to-name>
<id>1</id>
<fingerprint>11:0A:05:11:00</fingerprint>
<map-type>x509c2n:san-any</map-type>
</cert-to-name>
<cert-to-name>
<id>2</id>
<fingerprint>B3:4F:A1:8C:54</fingerprint>
<map-type>x509c2n:specified</map-type>
<name>scooby-doo</name>
</cert-to-name>
</cert-maps>
</client-auth>
</tls>
<connection-type>
<periodic>
<idle-timeout>300</idle-timeout>
<reconnect-timeout>60</reconnect-timeout>
</periodic>
</connection-type>
<reconnect-strategy>
<start-with>last-connected</start-with>
<max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
</reconnect-strategy>
</restconf-client>
</call-home>
</restconf-server>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="YANG Model" anchor="restconf-yang-module">
<t>This YANG module imports YANG types from <xref
target="RFC6991"/> and <xref target="RFC7407"/>.</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-restconf-server@2016-03-16.yang"
module ietf-restconf-server {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-restconf-server";
prefix "rcserver";
//import ietf-netconf-acm {
// prefix nacm; // RFC 6536
//}
import ietf-inet-types { // RFC 6991
prefix inet;
}
import ietf-x509-cert-to-name { // RFC 7407
prefix x509c2n;
}
import ietf-tls-server { // RFC VVVV
prefix ts;
revision-date 2016-03-16;
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
WG Chair: Mehmet Ersue
<mailto:mehmet.ersue@nsn.com>
WG Chair: Mahesh Jethanandani
<mailto:mjethanandani@gmail.com>
Editor: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>";
description
"This module contains a collection of YANG definitions for
configuring RESTCONF servers.
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC VVVV; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2016-03-16" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC VVVV: NETCONF Server and RESTCONF Server Configuration
Models";
}
// Features
feature tls-listen {
description
"The listen feature indicates that the RESTCONF server
supports opening a port to listen for incoming RESTCONF
client connections.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: RESTCONF Protocol";
}
feature tls-call-home {
description
"The call-home feature indicates that the RESTCONF server
supports initiating connections to RESTCONF clients.";
reference
"RFC YYYY: NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home";
}
feature client-cert-auth {
description
"The client-cert-auth feature indicates that the RESTCONF
server supports the ClientCertificate authentication scheme.";
reference
"RFC ZZZZ: Client Authentication over New TLS Connection";
}
// top-level container
container restconf-server {
description
"Top-level container for RESTCONF server configuration.";
container listen {
if-feature tls-listen;
description
"Configures listen behavior";
leaf max-sessions {
type uint16;
default 0; // should this be 'max'?
description
"Specifies the maximum number of concurrent sessions
that can be active at one time. The value 0 indicates
that no artificial session limit should be used.";
}
list endpoint {
key name;
description
"List of endpoints to listen for RESTCONF connections on.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the RESTCONF listen endpoint.";
}
choice transport {
mandatory true;
description
"Selects between available transports.";
case tls {
if-feature tls-listen;
container tls {
description
"TLS-specific listening configuration for inbound
connections.";
uses ts:listening-tls-server-grouping {
refine port {
default 443;
}
augment "client-auth" {
description
"Augments in the cert-to-name structure.";
uses cert-maps-grouping;
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
container call-home {
if-feature tls-call-home;
description
"Configures call-home behavior";
list restconf-client {
key name;
description
"List of RESTCONF clients the RESTCONF server is to
initiate call-home connections to.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for the remote RESTCONF client.";
}
choice transport {
mandatory true;
description
"Selects between TLS and any transports augmented in.";
case tls {
if-feature tls-call-home;
container tls {
description
"Specifies TLS-specific call-home transport
configuration.";
uses endpoints-container {
refine endpoints/endpoint/port {
default 9999;
}
}
uses ts:non-listening-tls-server-grouping {
augment "client-auth" {
description
"Augments in the cert-to-name structure.";
uses cert-maps-grouping;
}
}
}
}
}
container connection-type {
description
"Indicates the RESTCONF client's preference for how the
RESTCONF server's connection is maintained.";
choice connection-type {
description
"Selects between available connection types.";
case persistent-connection {
container persistent {
presence true;
description
"Maintain a persistent connection to the RESTCONF
client. If the connection goes down, immediately
start trying to reconnect to it, using the
reconnection strategy.
This connection type minimizes any RESTCONF client
to RESTCONF server data-transfer delay, albeit at
the expense of holding resources longer.";
container keep-alives {
description
"Configures the keep-alive policy, to proactively
test the aliveness of the TLS client. An
unresponsive TLS client will be dropped after
approximately (max-attempts * max-wait) seconds.";
reference
"RFC YYYY: NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home,
Section 3.1, item S6";
leaf max-wait {
type uint16 {
range "1..max";
}
units seconds;
default 30;
description
"Sets the amount of time in seconds after which
if no data has been received from the TLS
client, a TLS-level message will be sent to
test the aliveness of the TLS client.";
}
leaf max-attempts {
type uint8;
default 3;
description
"Sets the number of sequential keep-alive messages
that can fail to obtain a response from the TLS
client before assuming the TLS client is no
longer alive.";
}
}
}
}
case periodic-connection {
container periodic {
presence true;
description
"Periodically connect to the RESTCONF client, so that
the RESTCONF client may deliver messages pending for
the RESTCONF server. The RESTCONF client is expected
to close the connection when it is ready to release
it, thus starting the RESTCONF server's timer until
next connection.";
leaf reconnect-timeout {
type uint16 {
range "1..max";
}
units minutes;
default 60;
description
"The maximum amount of unconnected time the RESTCONF
server will wait before re-establishing a connection
to the RESTCONF client. The RESTCONF server may
initiate a connection before this time if desired
(e.g., to deliver a notification).";
}
}
}
}
}
container reconnect-strategy {
description
"The reconnection strategy guides how a RESTCONF server
reconnects to an RESTCONF client, after losing a connection
to it, even if due to a reboot. The RESTCONF server starts
with the specified endpoint and tries to connect to it
max-attempts times before trying the next endpoint in the
list (round robin).";
leaf start-with {
type enumeration {
enum first-listed {
description
"Indicates that reconnections should start with
the first endpoint listed.";
}
enum last-connected {
description
"Indicates that reconnections should start with
the endpoint last connected to. If no previous
connection has ever been established, then the
first endpoint configured is used. RESTCONF
servers SHOULD be able to remember the last
endpoint connected to across reboots.";
}
}
default first-listed;
description
"Specifies which of the RESTCONF client's endpoints the
RESTCONF server should start with when trying to connect
to the RESTCONF client.";
}
leaf max-attempts {
type uint8 {
range "1..max";
}
default 3;
description
"Specifies the number times the RESTCONF server tries to
connect to a specific endpoint before moving on to the
next endpoint in the list (round robin).";
}
}
}
}
}
grouping cert-maps-grouping {
description
"A grouping that defines a container around the
cert-to-name structure defined in RFC 7407.";
container cert-maps {
uses x509c2n:cert-to-name;
description
"The cert-maps container is used by a TLS-based RESTCONF
server to map the RESTCONF client's presented X.509
certificate to a RESTCONF username. If no matching and
valid cert-to-name list entry can be found, then the
RESTCONF server MUST close the connection, and MUST NOT
accept RESTCONF messages over it.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: The RESTCONF Protocol";
}
}
grouping endpoints-container {
description
"This grouping is used by tls container for call-home
configurations.";
container endpoints {
description
"Container for the list of endpoints.";
list endpoint {
key name;
min-elements 1;
ordered-by user;
description
"User-ordered list of endpoints for this RESTCONF client.
Defining more than one enables high-availability.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"An arbitrary name for this endpoint.";
}
leaf address {
type inet:host;
mandatory true;
description
"The IP address or hostname of the endpoint. If a
hostname is configured and the DNS resolution results
in more than one IP address, the RESTCONF server
will process the IP addresses as if they had been
explicitly configured in place of the hostname.";
}
leaf port {
type inet:port-number;
description
"The IP port for this endpoint. The RESTCONF server will
use the IANA-assigned well-known port if no value is
specified.";
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Design Considerations">
<t>The manner that the both local and remote endpoints have been specified
in the ietf-netconf-server and ietf-rest-server modules does not directly
support virtual routing and forwarding (VRF), though they have been specified
in such a way to enable external modules will augment in VRF designations
when needed.</t>
<t>This document uses PKCS #10 <xref target="RFC2986"/> for the
"generate-certificate-signing-request" action. The use of Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF) <xref target="RFC4211"/> was considered,
but is was unclear if there was market demand for it, and so support
for CRMF has been left out of this specification. If it is desired
to support CRMF in the future, placing a "choice" statement in both
the input and output statements, along with an "if-feature" statement
on the CRMF option, would enable a backwards compatible solution.</t>
<t>This document puts a limit of the number of elliptical curves
supported. This was done to match industry trends in IETF best
practice (e.g., matching work being done in TLS 1.3). In additional
algorithms are needed, they MAY be augmented in by another module,
or added directly in a future version of this document.</t>
<t>Both this document and Key Chain YANG Data Model <xref
target="draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain"/> define keychain YANG
modules. The authors looked at this and agree that they two
modules server different purposes and hence not worth merging
into one document. To underscore this further, this document
renamed its module from "ietf-keychain" to "ietf-system-keychain"
and that other document renamed its module from "ietf-key-chain"
to "ietf-routing-key-chain".</t>
<t>For the trusted-certificates list, Trust Anchor Format <xref target="RFC5914"/>
was evaluated and deemed inappropriate due to this document's need to also support
pinning. That is, pinning a client-certificate to support NETCONF over TLS
client authentication.</t>
</section>
<section title="Security Considerations">
<t>This document defines a keychain mechanism that is entrusted with the
safe keeping of private keys, and the safe keeping of trusted certificates.
Nowhere in this API is there an ability to access (read out) a private key
once it is known to the keychain. Further, associated public keys and
attributes (e.g., algorithm name, key length, etc.) are read-only. That
said, this document allows for the deletion of private keys and their
certificates, as well the deletion of trusted certificates. Access control
mechanisms (e.g., NACM <xref target="RFC6536"/>) MUST be in place so as to
authorize such client actions. Further, whilst the data model allows for
private keys and trusted certificates in general to be deleted, implementations
should be well aware that some privates keys (e.g., those in a TPM) and
some trusted certificates, should never be deleted, regardless if the
authorization mechanisms would generally allow for such actions.</t>
<t>For the "generate-certificate-signing-request" action, it is RECOMMENDED
that devices implement assert channel binding <xref target="RFC5056"/>, so
as to ensure that the application layer that sent the request is the same
as the device authenticated in the secure transport layer was established.</t>
<t>This document defines a data model that includes a list of private keys.
These private keys MAY be deleted using standard NETCONF or RESTCONF
operations (e.g., <edit-config>). Implementations SHOULD automatically
(without explicit request) zeroize these keys in the most secure manner
available, so as to prevent the remnants of their persisted storage
locations from being analyzed in any meaningful way.</t>
<t>The keychain module define within this document defines the "load-private-key"
action enabling a device to load a client-supplied private key. This is a private
key with no shrouding to protect it. The strength of this private key MUST NOT
be greater than the strength of the underlying secure transport connection over
which it is communicated. Devices SHOULD fail this request if ever the strength
of the private key is greater then the strength of the underlying transport.</t>
<t>A denial of service (DoS) attack MAY occur if the NETCONF server limits the
maximum number of NETCONF sessions it will accept (i.e. the 'max-sessions' field
in the ietf-netconf-server module is not zero) and either the "hello-timeout"
or "idle-timeout" fields in ietf-netconf-server module have been set to indicate
the NETCONF server should wait forever (i.e. set to zero).</t>
<!--
I removed all the NACM statements in the new modules
<t>There are a number of data nodes defined in the
"ietf-netconf-server" and "ietf-restconf-server" YANG
modules which are readable and/or writable that may
be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some
network environments. Write and read operations to
these data nodes can have a negative effect on network
operations. It is thus important to control write
and read access to these data nodes. Below are the
data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability.</t>
<t>netconf-server/tls/client-auth/trusted-ca-certs:
<list style="symbols">
<t>This container contains certificates that a NETCONF server
is to use as trust anchors for authenticating X.509-based
client certificates. Write access to this node is
protected using an nacm:default-deny-write statement.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>netconf-server/tls/client-auth/trusted-client-certs:
<list style="symbols">
<t>This container contains certificates that a NETCONF server
is to trust directly when authenticating X.509-based
client certificates. Write access to this node is
protected using an nacm:default-deny-write statement.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>restconf-server/tls/client-auth/trusted-ca-certs:
<list style="symbols">
<t>This container contains certificates that a RESTCONF server
is to use as trust anchors for authenticating X.509-based
client certificates. Write access to this node is
protected using an nacm:default-deny-write statement.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>restconf-server/tls/client-auth/trusted-client-certs:
<list style="symbols">
<t>This container contains certificates that a RESTCONF server
is to trust directly when authenticating X.509-based
client certificates. Write access to this node is
protected using an nacm:default-deny-write statement.</t>
</list>
</t>
-->
</section>
<section title="IANA Considerations">
<section title="The IETF XML Registry">
<t>This document registers two URIs in the IETF XML
registry <xref target="RFC2119"/>. Following the format in
<xref target="RFC3688"/>, the following registrations are
requested:</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-server
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-restconf-server
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="The YANG Module Names Registry">
<t>This document registers five YANG modules in the
YANG Module Names registry <xref target="RFC6020"/>.
Following the format in <xref target="RFC6020"/>, the
the following registrations are requested:</t>
<t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
name: ietf-system-keychain
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-system-keychain
prefix: kc
reference: RFC VVVV
name: ietf-ssh-server
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ssh-server
prefix: ssvr
reference: RFC VVVV
name: ietf-tls-server
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server
prefix: tsvr
reference: RFC VVVV
name: ietf-netconf-server
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-server
prefix: ncsvr
reference: RFC VVVV
name: ietf-restconf-server
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-restconf-server
prefix: rcsvr
reference: RFC VVVV
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Acknowledgements">
<t>The authors would like to thank for following for
lively discussions on list and in the halls (ordered
by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin Bjorklund, Benoit Claise,
Mehmet Ersue, David Lamparter, Alan Luchuk, Ladislav Lhotka,
Radek Krejci, Tom Petch, Phil Shafer, Sean Turner, and
Bert Wijnen.</t>
<t>
Juergen Schoenwaelder and was partly funded by Flamingo, a
Network of Excellence project (ICT-318488) supported by the
European Commission under its Seventh Framework Programme.
</t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
&rfc2119;
&rfc2986;
&rfc4253;
&rfc5280;
&rfc5958;
&rfc6020;
&rfc6187;
&rfc6241;
&rfc6242;
&rfc6991;
&rfc7407;
&rfc7589;
<reference anchor='draft-ietf-netconf-call-home'>
<front>
<title>
NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home
</title>
<author initials='K.W.' surname='Watsen'
fullname='Kent Watsen'>
<organization>Juniper Networks</organization>
</author>
<date year='2014' />
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft'
value='draft-ieft-netconf-call-home-02' />
</reference>
<reference anchor='draft-ietf-netconf-restconf'>
<front>
<title>RESTCONF Protocol</title>
<author initials='A.B.' surname='Bierman'
fullname='Andy Bierman'>
<organization>YumaWorks</organization>
</author>
<author initials='M' surname='Bjorklund'
fullname='Martin Bjorklund'>
<organization>Tail-f Systems</organization>
</author>
<author initials='K.W.' surname='Watsen'
fullname='Kent Watsen'>
<organization>Juniper Networks</organization>
</author>
<date year='2014' />
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft'
value='draft-ieft-netconf-restconf-04' />
</reference>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
&rfc3688;
&rfc4211;
&rfc5056;
&rfc5914;
&rfc6536;
<reference anchor='draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain' target="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain">
<front>
<title>Key Chain YANG Data Model</title>
<author initials='A.L.' surname='Lindem' fullname='Acee Lindem'>
<organization>Cisco</organization>
</author>
<author initials='Y.Q.' surname='Qu' fullname='Yingzhen Qu'>
<organization>Cisco</organization>
</author>
<author initials='D.Y.' surname='Yeung' fullname='Derek Yeung'>
<organization>Cisco</organization>
</author>
<author initials='I.C.' surname='Chen' fullname='Ing-Wher Chen'>
<organization>Ericson</organization>
</author>
<author initials='J.Z.' surname='Zhang' fullname='Jeffery Zhang'>
<organization>Juniper</organization>
</author>
<author initials='Y.Y.' surname='Yang' fullname='Yi Yang'>
<organization>Cisco</organization>
</author>
<date year='2016' />
</front>
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain' />
</reference>
</references>
<section title="Change Log">
<section title="00 to 01">
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>Restructured document so it flows better</t>
<t>Added trusted-ca-certs and trusted-client-certs
objects into the ietf-system-tls-auth module</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="01 to 02">
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>removed the "one-to-many" construct</t>
<t>removed "address" as a key field</t>
<t>removed "network-manager" terminology</t>
<t>moved open issues to github issues</t>
<t>brought TLS client auth back into model</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="02 to 03">
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>fixed tree diagrams and surrounding text</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="03 to 04">
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>reduced the number of grouping statements</t>
<t>removed psk-maps and associated feature statements</t>
<t>added ability for listen/call-home instances to specify
which host-keys/certificates (of all listed) to use</t>
<t>clarified that last-connected should span reboots</t>
<t>added missing "objectives" for selecting which keys to use,
authenticating client-certificates, and mapping authenticated
client-certificates to usernames</t>
<t>clarified indirect client certificate authentication</t>
<t>added keep-alive configuration for listen connections</t>
<t>added global-level NETCONF session parameters</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="04 to 05">
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>Removed all refs to the old ietf-system-tls-auth module</t>
<t>Removed YANG 1.1 style if-feature statements (loss some expressiveness)</t>
<t>Removed the read-only (config false) lists of SSH host-keys and TLS certs</t>
<t>Added an if-feature around session-options container</t>
<t>Added ability to configure trust-anchors for SSH X.509 client certs</t>
<t>Now imports by revision, per best practice</t>
<t>Added support for RESTCONF server</t>
<t>Added RFC Editor instructions</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="05 to 06">
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>Removed feature statement on the session-options container (issue #21).</t>
<t>Added NACM statements to YANG modules for sensitive nodes (issue #24).</t>
<t>Fixed default RESTCONF server port value to be 443 (issue #26).</t>
<t>Added client-cert-auth subtree to ietf-restconf-server module (issue #27).</t>
<t>Updated draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg reference to RFC 7407 (issue #28).</t>
<t>Added description statements for groupings (issue #29).</t>
<t>Added description for braces to tree diagram section (issue #30).</t>
<t>Renamed feature from "rfc6187" to "ssh-x509-certs" (issue #31).</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="06 to 07">
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>Replaced "application" with "NETCONF/RESTCONF client" (issue #32).</t>
<t>Reverted back to YANG 1.1 if-feature statements (issue #34).</t>
<t>Removed import by revisions (issue #36).</t>
<t>Removed groupings only used once (issue #37).</t>
<t>Removed upper-bound on hello-timeout, idle-timeout, and max-sessions (issue #38).</t>
<t>Clarified that when no listen address is configured, the
NETCONF/RESTCONF server will listen on all addresses (issue #41).</t>
<t>Update keep-alive reference to new section in Call Home draft (issue #42).</t>
<t>Modified connection-type/persistent/keep-alives/interval-secs default value,
removed the connection-type/periodic/linger-secs node, and also removed the
reconnect-strategy/interval-secs node (issue #43).</t>
<t>Clarified how last-connected reconnection type should work across reboots (issue #44).</t>
<t>Clarified how DNS-expanded hostnames should be processed (issue #45).</t>
<t>Removed text on how to implement keep-alives (now in the call-home draft)
and removed the keep-alive configuration for listen connections (issue #46).</t>
<t>Clarified text for .../periodic-connection/timeout-mins (issue #47).</t>
<t>Fixed description on the "trusted-ca-certs" leaf-list (issue #48).</t>
<t>Added optional keychain-based solution in appendix A (issue #49).</t>
<t>Fixed description text for the interval-secs leaf (issue #50).</t>
<t>moved idle-time into the listen, persistent, and periodic subtrees (issue #51).</t>
<t>put presence statements on containers where it makes sense (issue #53).</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="07 to 08">
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>Per WG consensus, replaced body with the keychain-based approach described
in -07's Appendix.</t>
<t>Added a lot of introductory text, improved examples, and what not.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="08 to 09">
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>Renamed ietf-keychain to ietf-system-keychain to disambiguate from the
routing area working group's keychain model (they similarly renamed their
model from ietf-key-chain to ietf-routing-key-chain).</t>
<t>Added an action statement to ietf-system-keychain to load a private key.</t>
<t>Added a notification statement to ietf-system-keychain to notify when
a certificate is nearing expiration and beyond.</t>
<t>Converted all binary types to use ASN.1 DER encoding.</t>
<t>Added a Design Considerations section.</t>
<t>Filled in the Security Considerations section.</t>
<t>Removed the Other Considerations section.</t>
<t>Extended the Editorial Note section.</t>
<t>Added many Normative and Informative references.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Open Issues">
<t>Please see: https://github.com/netconf-wg/server-model/issues.</t>
</section>
</back>
</rfc>
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