One document matched: draft-ietf-mile-iodef-guidance-05.xml
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<front>
<title abbrev='IODEF Guidance'>IODEF Usage Guidance</title>
<author initials='M.' surname="Suzuki" fullname='Mio Suzuki'>
<organization>NICT</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>4-2-1, Nukui-Kitamachi</street>
<city>Koganei</city> <region>Tokyo</region>
<code>184-8795</code>
<country>JP</country>
</postal>
<email>mio@nict.go.jp</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials='P' surname="Kampanakis" fullname='Panos Kampanakis'>
<organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>170 West Tasman Dr.</street>
<city>San Jose</city> <region>CA</region>
<code>95134</code>
<country>US</country>
</postal>
<email>pkampana@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date day="4" month="April" year="2016" />
<workgroup>MILE Working Group</workgroup>
<abstract>
<t>The Incident Object Description Exchange Format <xref target="RFC5070"/> defines
a data representation that provides a framework for sharing information commonly exchanged
by Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) about computer security incidents.
Since the IODEF model includes a wealth of available options that can be used to describe
a security incident or issue, it can be challenging for implementers to develop tools that can
Leverage IODEF for incident sharing. This document provides guidelines for IODEF implementers.
It will also address how common security indicators can be represented in IODEF and use-cases
of how IODEF is being used so far. The goal of this document is to make IODEF's adoption by
vendors easier and encourage faster and wider adoption of the model by Computer Security
Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) around the world.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section anchor="intro" title="Introduction">
<t>The Incident Object Description Exchange Format in <xref target="RFC5070"/> defines a
data representation that provides a framework for sharing information commonly exchanged
by Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) about computer security incidents.
The IODEF data model consists of multiple classes and data types that are used in the
IODEF XML schema.</t>
<t>The IODEF schema was designed to be able to describe all the possible fields that would
be needed in a security incident exchange. Thus, IODEF contains plenty data constructs
that could potentially make it harder for IODEF implementers to decide which
are the most important ones. Additionally, in the IODEF schema, there exist multiple
fields and classes which do not necessarily need to be used in every possible data
exchange. Moreover, there are fields that are useful only in data exchanges of
non-traditional security events. This document tries to address the issues above. It will
also address how common security indicators can be represented in IODEF. It will point out
the most important IODEF classes for an implementer and describe other ones that are not
as important. Also, it addresses some common challenges for IODEF implementers and how
they should be addressed. The end goal of this document is to make IODEF's adoption by
vendors easier and encourage faster and wider adoption of the model by Computer Security
Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) around the world.</t>
<t><xref target="strategy"/> discusses the recommended classes and how an IODEF implementer
should chose the classes to implement. <xref target="considerations"/> presents common
considerations and implementer will come across and how to address them. <xref
target="in_action"/> goes over some basic security concepts and how they can be
expressed in IODEF.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="terminology" title="Terminology">
<t>The terminology used in this document follows the one defined in
<xref target="RFC5070"/> and <xref target="RFC7203"/>.</t>
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 <xref target="RFC2119"/>.</t>
</section>
<!-- TODO: MUST and SHOULD language -->
<section anchor="strategy" title="Implementation Strategy">
<t>It is important for IODEF implementers to be able to distinguish how the IODEF
classes will be used for incident information exchanges. It is critical for an
implementer to follow a strategy according to which of the various
IODEF classes he will choose to implement. It is also important to know the most common classes that will
be used to describe common security incident or indicators. Thus, this section will
describe the most important classes and factors an IODEF implementer should take into
consideration before designing the implementation or tool.</t>
<section title="Minimal IODEF document">
<t>This section describes the minimal IODEF document that only equips
mandatory-to-implement classes.
<!-- 05 update by mio -->
An IODEF document must have an IODEF-Document class, which needs to have at
least one Incident class. Here is the structure of the minimal-style Incident class.
</t>
<figure title="Minimal-style Incident class"><artwork><![CDATA[
+-------------------------+
| Incident |
+-------------------------+
| ENUM purpose |<>----------[ IncidentID ]
| |<>----------[ GenerationTime ]
| |<>--{1..*}--[ Contact ]
+-------------------------+
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>This minimal Incident class needs to have the purpose attribute and the
IncidentID, GenerationTime, and Contact elements.
Contact class requires type and role attributes, but no elements are
required by this specification.
Nevertheless, at least one of the elements, such as Email class, need to be
implemented so that the IODEF document can be workable.</t>
<t>Please see Section 7.1 of <xref target="I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis"/>
for example XMLs. </t>
<!-- 05 update ends by mio -->
</section>
<section title="Decide what IODEF will be used for">
<!-- 05 update by mio -->
<t>This section describes that there is no need to implement all
fields of IODEF, the ones that are necessary for your use-cases. The
implementer should look into the schema and decide classes to implement (or not).
Here shows some use cases and nessesary classes.</t>
<t>
If the implementer tackles against DDoS, Flow class and its included information are the most important ones.
The Flow class contains information of related the attacker hosts and victim hosts.
These information may help automated filtering or sink-hole operations. </t>
<t>
Another case is filtering malware c2 traffic.
If modern malware infect some device, it commonly connect to
c2 (command and control) server, and receive command from attackers.
In such a case, filtering traffic to c2 server is important to interupt malware's activity.
Both the Flow class and the URL class of IODEF can indicate the URL of c2 server.
</t>
<t>
Also other external schema can be used to describe
incidents or indicators, as noted in the next section.</t>
<!-- 05 update ends by mio -->
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="considerations" title="IODEF considerations and how to address them">
<t> </t>
<section title="External References">
<!-- 04 update by mio -->
<t>The IODEF format has the Reference class that refers to external information
such as a vulnerability, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) alert, malware sample, advisory,
or attack technique. However, due to insufficiency of the capability of the Reference class itself
to describe external enumeration specifications, the Enumeretion Reference Format needs
to be used with.
The Enumeration Reference Format<xref target="RFC7495"/>
specifies a format to include enumeration values
from external data representations into IODEF,
and manages references to external representations
using IANA registry.</t>
<!-- 04 update ends by mio -->
</section>
<section title="Extensions">
<!-- 04 update -->
<t>The IODEF data model (<xref target="RFC5070"/>) is extensible. Many class
attributes and their values can be extended using using the "ext-*" prefix.
Additional classed can also be defined by using the AdditionalData and RecordItem
classes. An extension to the AdditionalData class for reporting Phishing emails
is defined in <xref target="RFC5901"/>.</t>
<t>Additionally, IODEF can import existing schemata by using an extension framework
defined in <xref target="RFC7203"/>. The framework enables IODEF users to embed
XML data inside an IODEF document using external schemata or structures defined by external
specifications. Examples include CVE, CVRF and OVAL. Thus, <xref target="RFC7203"/>
enhances the IODEF capabilities without further extending the data model.</t>
<t>IODEF implementers should consider using their own IODEF extensions only for data
that cannot be described using existing standards or importing them in and IODEF
document using <xref target="RFC7203"/> is not a suitable option.</t>
<!-- 04 update ends -->
</section>
<section title="Predicate logic">
<!-- 03 update -->
<t>IODEF <xref target="I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis"/> allows
for nesting of incident information. For example,
a EventData Class could include multiple Flows or Records.
In turn, a Flow could consist of many Nodes and a Record
of many RecordData classes. To ensure consistency, IODEF
presumes certain predicate logic. </t>
<t> An EventData class that contains multiple EventData classes
depicts an Event that consists of smaller events. For the parent
event to take place, all the children EventData events SHOULD
take place.<!-- TODO: Are we sure what nested EventData does? -->
An EventData class with multiple
Flows means that all the information defined in the
flows need to exist for the event described to take place.</t>
<t>
For Records, the Records in an event just add more context to the event,
they do not all need to be present for the event to take place.
A Record in an EventData class with three RecordData in it, means that
either of these RecordData classes needs to be present for the event
described to take place. </t>
<t>In <xref target="RFC5070"/>, if a Flow Class
contained two System classes
that have "source" and "target"
as the category attributes, both Systems SHOULD
be present in order for the Flow to be true and thus
marked as an event. There SHOULD NOT be more than
one "source" or "watchlist-source" and one "target"
or "watchlist-target" Systems per Flow.</t>
<t>In Node class, Node information grouped together under a System
class depicts different representations of the same System. For
example, if a System consists of different Nodes with an IPv4 address,
a domain-name and an IPv6 address, they all represent the same system.
Of course, different representations could also be grouped under
the same Node class. </t>
<t><xref target="I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis"/> defined the
HashData Class that describes a file's hash information as also
described in <xref target="RFC5901"/>. Similar to the Node,
if a HashData class consists of many
digital signatures, the signatures represent alternative hash
algorithms for the same signature. For example, if the HashData
type is file-hash, then the signatures represent MD5, SHA1, SHA2
etc hashes.</t>
<t> For grouped Key classes the logic changes. Multiple Key
classes in a WindowsRegistryKeysModified class represent
necessary Windows Registry Keys that constitute an indicator.
All SHOULD be present in order for the indicator to be present.
Multiple WindowsRegistryKeysModified classes grouped under the same
RecordData class represent alternatives for the same indicator.
For example, if a RecordData class included two WindowsRegistryKeysModified
classes, if either of the classes was true the RecordData
class would be true.</t>
</section>
<section title="Predicate Logic for watchlist of indicators">
<t>Multiple indicators occasionally need to be combined in
an IODEF document. For example, a botnet might have multiple
command and control servers. A consistent predicate logic for
indicators SHOULD be followed in order to present such
relationships in IODEF. </t>
<t><xref target="I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis"/> defines two new
category attributes in the System Class that can enhance the IODEF
predicate logic functionality. These are watchlist-source
and watchlist-target and they serve for watchlist indicator
groupings. <!-- 02 update -->
A watchlist of Systems means that the information is ORed with
the information in the Flow section. In other words,
if a Flow Class consists of multiple Systems with
watchlist-source or watchlist-target attributes
the Systems of the same watchlist type are ORed in the Flow Class.
Multiple Flows in the EventData Class follow AND logic as explained in Section 4.3.
There SHOULD NOT be more than one "watchlist-source"
and one "watchlist-target" Systems per Flow.
<!-- 02 update end -->
<!-- An example is http://taxii.mitre.org/about/documents/TAXII_Introduction_briefing_November_2012.pdf (slide 19) -->
In the following example the EventData class will
evaluates as a Flow of one System with source address
being (10.10.10.104 OR 10.10.10.106) AND target address 10.1.1.1
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
<!-- ...XML code omitted... -->
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="watchlist-source" spoofed="no">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
10.10.10.104
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
10.10.10.106
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef:System>
<iodef:System category="target">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
10.1.1.1
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
</iodef:EventData>
<!-- ...XML code omitted... -->
]]></artwork></figure>
</t>
<t>Similarly, the HashData Class
includes a type attribute that introduces watchlist groupings
(i.e. PKI_email_ds_watchlist, PGP_email_ds_watchlist, file_hash_watchlist,
email_hash_watchlist). Two HashData classes that contain a watchlist
type attribute follow OR logic in a RecordData class. In the
following example the RecordData class consists of either of the two
files with two different hashes.
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
<!-- ...XML code omitted... -->
<iodef:RecordData>
<iodef:HashData type="file-hash-watchlist">
<iodef:FileName>dummy.txt</iodef:FileName>
<ds:Reference>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
<ds:DigestValue>
141accec23e7e5157de60853cb1e01bc38042d
08f9086040815300b7fe75c184
</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</iodef:HashData>
<iodef:HashData type="file-hash-watchlist">
<iodef:FileName>dummy2.txt</iodef:FileName>
<ds:Reference>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
<ds:DigestValue>
141accec23e7e5157de60853cb1e01bc38042d
08f9086040815300b7fe75c184
</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</iodef:HashData>
</iodef:RecordData>
<!-- ...XML code omitted... -->
]]></artwork></figure>
</t><!-- 03 update end -->
<t>Similarly, <xref target="I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis"/> introduces
the WindowsRegistryKeyModified Class which consists of Key Classes.
Key has an optional type attribute which has
watchlist as an option in order to include the ability to group
Keys. Multiple Keys of the same watchlist of indicators
SHOULD be grouped in the same WindowsRegistryKeysModified Class.
These Keys follow OR logic. </t>
</section>
<section title="Indicator identifiers">
<!-- 03 update -->
<t><xref target="I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis"/> defines attrbutes indicator-set-id and
indicator-uid. These are data elements that are commonly used as indicators.
They are used in mutliple IODEF classes. Their purpose is to be able to
define indicator relationships and reference respectively. The indicator-uid
is used as a unique indicator identifier. Practitioners MAY use them to
establish that a class represents an indicator that is different than other
IODEF contextual information. </t>
<t>On the other hand, an IODEF report could
contain multiple indicators that are part of the same or different
indicator group. For example, an IP source address, a target address,
that consitute a Flow and a RecordData class respectively could be representing
indicators of a virus and the traffic it generates. In such a situation,
the indicator-set-id for all the classes (Address, RecordData) MUST be
the same. Unrelated indicators MUST contain different indicator-set-id attributes
or no indicator-set-id attributes. </t>
<!-- <t>Similarly,
</t> -->
<!-- 03 update end -->
</section>
<section title="Disclosure level of IODEF">
<!-- <t>This section describes how Restriction can pose challenges -->
<!--are not enough, so they use a new
schema for data marking to have more restrictions (as explained in
http://repoman.apwg.org/research/wiki/dataMarking ) -->
<!-- </t> -->
<!-- 05 update starts by mio -->
<t>This section describes how to control the disclosure level of IODEF
docuemnts.</t>
<t>The information conveyed in IODEF documents should be treated carefully
since the content may be confidential.
There are two types of restrictions on the use of IODEF: disclosure level
indicator provided by IODEF and the one provided by external measures.</t>
<t>IODEF has a common attribute, called "restriction", which indicates the
disclosure guideline to which the sender expects the recipient to adhere for
the information represented in the class and its children.
In this way, the sender can express the level of disclosure for each
components of an IODEF document.
Assorted external measures could be implemented. Among them is RID, which
provides policy guidelines for handling IODEF documents by preparing
RIDPolicy class.</t>
<t>Note that the enforcement of above disclosure guidelines is another issue.
The recipient of the IODEF document needs to follow the guidelines, but
these disclosure guidelines themselves do not provide any enforcement
measures.
Some appropriate measures, be it either technical or operational, need to be
considered for that.</t>
<!-- 05 update ends by mio -->
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="in_action" title="Current uses of IODEF">
<t>IODEF is currently used by various organizations in order to
represent security incidents and share incident and threat information
between security operations organizations.</t>
<!-- 02 update -->
<section title="Inter-vendor and Service Provider Exercise">
<t> Various vendors organized and executed an exercise where multiple
threat indicators were exchanged using IODEF. The transport protocol used
was RID. The threat information shared included incidents like DDoS attacks.
Malware and Spear-Phishing. As this was a proof-of-concept (PoC) exercise
only example information (no real threats) were shared as part of the
exchanges.</t>
<t>
<figure title="PoC peering topology"><artwork><![CDATA[
____________ ____________
| Vendor X | | Vendor Y |
| RID Agent |_______-------------________| RID Agent |
|___________| | Internet | |___________|
-------------
---- RID Report message --->
-- carrying IODEF example ->
--------- over TLS -------->
<----- RID Ack message -----
<--- in case of failure ----
]]></artwork></figure>
The figure above shows how RID interactions took place during the
PoC. Participating organizations were running RID Agent software on-
premises. The RID Agents formed peering relationships with other
participating organizations. When Entity X had a new incident to
exchange it would package it in IODEF and send it to Entity Y over
TLS in a RID Report message. In case there was an issue with the
message, Entity Y would send an RID Acknowledgement message back to
Entity X which included an application level message to describe
the issue. Interoperability between RID agents and the standards,
<xref target="RFC6545"/> and <xref target="RFC6546"/>, was also
proven in this exercise. <xref target="appendix"/> includes some
of the incident IODEF example information that was exchanged by
the organizations' RID Agents as part of this proof-of-concept. </t>
<!-- 02 update end -->
<!-- 03 update -->
<!-- TODO: (optionally): Explain that predicate logic is in each example and that these are explained in the appendix -->
<t> The first use-case included sharing of Malware Data Related to
an Incident between CSIRTs. After Entity X detected an incident, she
would put data about malware found during the incident in a backend system.
Entity X then decided to share the incident information with
Entity Y about the malware discovered. This could be a human
decision or part of an automated process. </t>
<t> Below are the steps followed for the malware information exchange
that was taking place:
<list style="format (%d)">
<t>Entity X has a sharing agreement with Entity Y, and has
already been configured with the IP address of Entity Y’s RID
Agent</t>
<t>Entity X’s RID Agent connects to Entity Y’s RID Agent, and
mutual authentication occurs using PKI certificates.</t>
<t>Entity X pushes out a RID Report message which contains
information about N pieces of discovered malware. IODEF is used
in RID to discribe the
<list style="format (%c)">
<t>Hash of malware files</t>
<t>Registry settings changed by the malware</t>
<t>C&C Information for the malware</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Entity Y receives RID Report message, sends RID Acknowledgement
message</t>
<t>Entity Y stores the data in a format that makes it possible for
the back end to know which source the data came from.</t>
</list> </t>
<t> Another use-case was sharing Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
as presented below information:
Entity X, a Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CIKR) company
detects that their internet connection is saturated with an abnormal
amount of traffic. Further investigation determines that this is an
actual DDoS attack. Entity X's computer incident response team (CIRT)
contacts their ISP and shares information with them about the attack
traffic characteristics. In addition, Entity X has an information sharing
relationship with Entity Y. It shares information with Entity Y on
characteristics of the attack to watch for. Entitty X's ISP is being
overwhelmed by the amount of traffic, so it shares attack signatures
and IP addresses of the most prolific hosts with its adjacent ISPs.</t>
<t> Below are the steps followed for a DDoS information exchange:
<list style="format (%d)">
<t>Entity X has a sharing agreement with Entity Y, and has
already been configured with the IP address of Entity Y’s RID
Agent</t>
<t>Entity X’s RID Agent connects to Entity Y’s RID Agent, and
mutual authentication occurs using PKI certificates.</t>
<t>Entity X pushes out a RID Report message which contains
information about the DDoS attack. IODEF is used in RID to
discribe the
<list style="format (%c)">
<t>Start and Detect dates and times</t>
<t>IP Addresses of nodes sending DDoS Traffic</t>
<t>Sharing and Use Restrictions</t>
<t>Traffic characteristics (protocols and ports)</t>
<t>HTTP User-Agents used</t>
<t>IP Addresses of C&C for a botnet</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Entity Y receives RID Report message, sends RID Acknowledgement
message</t>
<t>Entity Y stores the data in a format that makes it possible for
the back end to know which source the data came from.</t>
</list> </t>
<t> One more use-case was sharing spear-phishing email information
as explained in the following scenario: The board members of several
defense contractors receive an email inviting them to attend a conference
in San Francisco. The board members are asked to provide their
personally identifiable information such as their home address,
phone number, corporate email, etc in an attached document which
came with the email. The board members were also asked to click
on a URL which would allow them to reach the sign up page for the
conference. One of the recipients believes the email to be a phishing
attempt and forwards the email to their corporate CSIRT for analysis.
The CSIRT identifies the email as an attempted spear phishing incident
and distributes the indicators to their sharing partners. </t>
<t> Below are the steps followed for a spear-phishing information exchange
between CSIRTs that was part of this PoC.
<list style="format (%d)">
<t>Entity X has a sharing agreement with Entity Y, and has
already been configured with the IP address of Entity Y’s RID
Agent</t>
<t>Entity X’s RID Agent connects to Entity Y’s RID Agent, and
mutual authentication occurs using PKI certificates.</t>
<t>Entity X pushes out a RID Report message which contains
information about the spear-phishing email. IODEF is used
in RID to discribe the
<list style="format (%c)">
<t>Attachment details (file Name, hash, size, malware family</t>
<t>Target description (IP, domain, NSLookup)</t>
<t>Email information (From, Subject, header information,
date/time, digital signature)</t>
<t>Confidence Score</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Entity Y receives RID Report message, sends RID Acknowledgement
message</t>
<t>Entity Y stores the data in a format that makes it possible for
the back end to know which source the data came from.</t>
</list> </t>
<!-- 03 update end -->
</section>
<!-- 05 update -->
<!-- Here we had two sections that included CIF and APWG. Currently there
is a whole new draft
<section title="Collective Intelligence Framework">
<t> The Collective Intelligence Framework <xref target="CIF"/> is a cyber
threat intelligence management system that uses IODEF to combine known
malicious threat information from multiple sources and use that it to identify,
detect and mitigate. The threat intelligence can be IP addresses, domains and
URLs that are involved in malicious activity. IODEF records can be consumed
by a CIF standalone client or CIF browser plugins that a user can use to
make informed decisions about threat information.</t>
<section title="Anti-Phishing Working Group">
<t> The Anti-Phishing Working Group (<xref target="APWG"/>) is using
<xref target="RFC5070"/> to represent email phishing information.
<xref target="APWG"/> also uses IODEF to aggregate and share
Bot and Infected System Alerting and Notification System (BISANS) and
Cyber Bullying IODEF records. Special IODEF extensions are used in order
to mark the sensitivity of the exchanged information. Shared infected
system or email phishing records can then be used by interested parties
in order to provide mitigations. <xref target="APWG"/> leverages tools of
its eCRISP-X toolkit in order to share and report e-Crime IODEF records.</t>
</section> -->
<section title="Implementations">
<!-- 05 update by mio -->
<t>In order to use IODEF, some tools that copes with IODEF documents, such as
the parsers of IODEF documents, are needed.
Though arbitrary implementations can be done, some guidelines are provided
in <xref target="I-D.ietf-mile-implementreport"/>.
IODEF does not specify any MTI, but provides this guideline document.
The document provides a list of implementations the authors have surveyed at
the time of its publication as well as some tips on the implementations.
Readers are requested to read the draft.</t>
</section>
<!-- 05 update end -->
<section title="Other">
<t> IODEF is also used in various projects and products to consume and
share security information. Various vendor incident reporting products
have the ability to consume and export in IODEF format
<!-- 03 update --><xref target="implementations"/><!-- 03 update end -->.
Perl <!-- 03 update -->
and Python modules (XML::IODEF, Iodef::Pb, iodeflib) <!-- 03 update end -->
exist in order to parse IODEF documents and their extensions.
Additionally, some worldwide CERT organizations are already able to
use receive incident information in IODEF.
</t>
<!-- 03 update -->
<t>Future use-cases of IODEF could be:
<list style="format (%d)">
<t>ISP notifying a national CERT or organization when it identifies and acts upon an incident and CERTs notifying ISPs when they are aware of incidents.</t>
<t>Suspected phishing emails could be shared amongst organizations and national agencies. Automation could validate web content that the suspicious emails are pointing to. Identified malicious content linked in a phishing email could then be shared using IODEF. Phishing campaigns could thus be subverted much faster by automating information sharing using IODEF.</t>
<t>When finding a certificate that should be revoked, a thrid-party would forward an automated IODEF message to the CA with the full context of the certificate and the CA could act accordingly after checking its validity. Alternatively, in the event of a compromise of the private key of a certificate, a third-party could alert the certificate owner about the compromise using IODEF.</t>
</list>
</t>
<!-- 03 update end -->
</section>
</section>
<section title="Updates">
<t>version -05 updates:
<list style="format (%d)">
<t>Changed section title from "Restrictions in IODEF" to "Disclosure level of IODEF" and added some description</t>
<t>Mixed "Recommended classes to implement" section with "Unnecessary Fields" section into "Minimal IODEF document" section</t>
<t>Added description to "Decide what IODEF will be used for" section, "Implementations" section, and "Security Considerations" section</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>version -04 updates:
<list style="format (%d)">
<t>Expanded on the Extensions section using Take's suggestion.</t>
<t>Moved Future use-cases under the Other section.</t>
<t>CIF and APWG were consolidated in one "Implementation" section</t>
<t>Added abstract of RFC7495 to the "External References" section</t>
<t>Added Kathleen's example of malware delivery URL to "Appendix"</t>
<t>Added a little description to "Recommended classes to implement" section</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>version -03 updates:
<list style="format (%d)">
<t>Added "Updates" section.</t>
<t>Added details about the flow of information exchanges in
"Inter-vendor and Service Provider Exercise" section. Also updated
the usecases with more background information.</t>
<t>Added future use-cases in the "Collective Intelligence Framework"
section</t>
<t>Updated Perl and Python references with the actual module names.
Added IODEF implementation reference "implementations".</t>
<t>Added Predicate logic section</t>
<t>Updated Logic of watchlist of indicators section to simplify the logic and include examples.</t>
<t>Renamed Externally defined indicators section to Indicator reference and elaborated on the use of indicator-uid and indicator-set-uid attribute use.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>version -02 updates:
<list style="format (%d)">
<t>Updated the "Logic for watchlist of indications" section to
clarify the logic based on community feedback.</t>
<t>Added "Inter-vendor and Service Provider Exercise" section.</t>
<t>Added Appendix to include actual use-case IODEF examples.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Acknowledgements">
<t> </t>
</section>
<section title="Security Considerations">
<t>This document does not incur any new security issues, since it only talks
about the usage of IODEF, which is defined in RFC 5070 <xref target="RFC5070"/>.
Nevertheless, readers of this document SHOULD refer to the security
consideration section of RFC 5070. </t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title='Normative References'>
&rfc2119;
<?rfc include="http://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5070"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5901"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6545"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6546"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7203"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7495"?>
</references>
<references title='Informative References'>
<?rfc include="http://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.draft-ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis-18.xml"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.draft-ietf-mile-implementreport-06.xml"?>
<reference anchor="APWG" target="http://apwg.org/">
<front>
<title>APWG</title>
<author initials="" surname="" fullname="">
<organization />
</author>
<date year="" />
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="CIF" target="http://csirtgadgets.org/collective-intelligence-framework/">
<front>
<title>CIF</title>
<author initials="" surname="" fullname="">
<organization />
</author>
<date year="" />
</front>
</reference>
<!-- 03 update -->
<reference anchor="implementations" target="http://siis.realmv6.org/implementations/">
<front>
<title>Implementations on IODEF</title>
<author initials="" surname="" fullname="">
<organization />
</author>
<date year="" />
</front>
</reference>
<!-- 03 update end -->
</references>
<!-- 02 update -->
<section anchor="appendix" title="Inter-vendor and Service Provider Exercise Examples">
<t>Below some of the incident IODEF example information that was exchanged by
the vendors as part of this proof-of-concept Inter-vendor and Service Provider
Exercise.</t>
<section title="Malware">
<t>In this test, malware information was exchanged using RID and IODEF.
The information included file hashes, registry setting changes and the
C&C servers the malware uses.
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<iodef:IODEF-Document xmlns:ds="
http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.41">
<iodef:Incident purpose="reporting">
<iodef:ReportID name="EXAMPLE CSIRT">
189234
</iodef:ReportID>
<iodef:ReportTime>
2013-03-07T16:14:56.757+05:30
</iodef:ReportTime>
<iodef:Description>
Malware and related indicators identified
</iodef:Description>
<iodef:Assessment occurrence="potential">
<iodef:Impact severity="medium" type="info-leak">
Malware with Command and Control Server
and System Changes
</iodef:Impact>
</iodef:Assessment>
<iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
<iodef:ContactName>EXAMPLE CSIRT</iodef:ContactName>
<iodef:Email>emccirt@emc.com</iodef:Email>
</iodef:Contact>
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:Method>
<iodef:Reference>
<iodef:ReferenceName>Zeus</iodef:ReferenceName>
<iodef:URL>
http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?
md5=e2710ceb088dacdcb03678db250742b7
</iodef:URL>
</iodef:Reference>
</iodef:Method>
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="watchlist-source">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
192.168.2.200
</iodef:Address>
<iodef:Address category="site-uri">
http://zeus.556677889900.com/log-bin/
lunch_install.php?aff_id=1&
lunch_id=1&maddr=&
action=install
</iodef:Address>
<iodef:NodeRole attacktype="c2-server"/>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
<iodef:Record>
<iodef:RecordData>
<iodef:HashData>
<ds:Reference>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>
MHg2NzUxQTI1MzQ4M0E2N0Q4NkUwRjg0NzYwRj
YxRjEwQkJDQzJFREZG</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</iodef:HashData>
<iodef:HashData>
<ds:Reference>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#md5"/>
<ds:DigestValue>
MHgyRTg4ODA5ODBENjI0NDdFOTc5MEFGQTg5NTE
zRjBBNA==
</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</iodef:HashData>
<iodef:WindowsRegistryKeysModified>
<iodef:Key registryaction="add_value">
<iodef:KeyName>
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Run\tamg
</iodef:KeyName>
<iodef:Value>
?\?\?%System%\wins\mc.exe\?\??
</iodef:Value>
</iodef:Key>
<iodef:Key registryaction="modify_value">
<iodef:KeyName>HKLM\Software\Microsoft\
Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\dqo
</iodef:KeyName>
<iodef:Value>"\"\"%Windir%\Resources\
Themes\Luna\km.exe\?\?"
</iodef:Value>
</iodef:Key>
</iodef:WindowsRegistryKeysModified>
</iodef:RecordData>
</iodef:Record>
</iodef:EventData>
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:Method>
<iodef:Reference>
<iodef:ReferenceName>Cridex</iodef:ReferenceName>
<iodef:URL>
http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?
md5=c3c528c939f9b176c883ae0ce5df0001
</iodef:URL>
</iodef:Reference>
</iodef:Method>
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="watchlist-source">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
10.10.199.100
</iodef:Address>
<iodef:NodeRole attacktype="c2-server"/>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Service ip_protocol="6">
<iodef:Port>8080</iodef:Port>
</iodef:Service>
</iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
<iodef:Record>
<iodef:RecordData>
<iodef:HashData>
<ds:Reference>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>
MHg3MjYzRkUwRDNBMDk1RDU5QzhFMEM4OTVBOUM
1ODVFMzQzRTcxNDFD
</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#md5"/>
<ds:DigestValue>MHg0M0NEODUwRkNEQURFNDMzMEE1
QkVBNkYxNkVFOTcxQw==</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</iodef:HashData>
<iodef:HashData>
<ds:Reference>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#md5"/>
<ds:DigestValue>MHg0M0NEODUwRkNEQURFNDMzMEE
1QkVBNkYxNkVFOTcxQw==</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/
2001/04/xmlenc#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>MHg3MjYzRkUwRDNBMDk1RDU5QzhFME
M4OTVBOUM1ODVFMzQzRTcxNDFD</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</iodef:HashData>
<iodef:WindowsRegistryKeysModified>
<iodef:Key registryaction="add_value">
<iodef:KeyName>
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Run\KB00121600.exe
</iodef:KeyName>
<iodef:Value>
\?\?%AppData%\KB00121600.exe\?\?
</iodef:Value>
</iodef:Key>
</iodef:WindowsRegistryKeysModified>
</iodef:RecordData>
</iodef:Record>
</iodef:EventData>
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:Expectation action="other"/>
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="source"
indicator-set-id="91011">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="url"
indicator-uid="qrst">
http://foo.com:12345/evil/cc.php
</iodef:Address>
<iodef:NodeName indicator-uid="rstu">
evil.com
</iodef:NodeName>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr"
indicator-uid="stuv">
1.2.3.4</iodef:Address>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr"
indicator-uid="tuvw">
5.6.7.8 </iodef:Address>
<iodef:Address category="ipv6-addr"
indicator-uid="uvwx">
2001:dead:beef::</iodef:Address>
<iodef:NodeRole category="c2-server"/>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
<iodef:Record>
<iodef:RecordData indicator-set-id="91011">
<iodef:HashData>
<ds:Reference>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc
#sha256"/>
<ds:DigestValue>
141accec23e7e5157de60853cb1e01bc3804
2d08f9086040815300b7fe75c184
</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</iodef:HashData>
<iodef:WindowsRegistryKeysModified
indicator-set-id="91011">
<iodef:Key registryaction="add_key"
indicator-uid="vwxy">
<iodef:KeyName>
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\
Services\.Net CLR
</iodef:KeyName>
</iodef:Key>
<iodef:Key registryaction="add_key"
indicator-uid="wxyz">
<iodef:KeyName>
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\
Services\.Net CLR\Parameters
</iodef:KeyName>
<iodef:Value>
\”\”%AppData%\KB00121600.exe\”\”
</iodef:Value>
</iodef:Key>
<iodef:Key registryaction="add_value"
indicator-uid="xyza">
<iodef:KeyName>
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\
.Net CLR\Parameters\ServiceDll
</iodef:KeyName>
<iodef:Value>C:\bad.exe</iodef:Value>
</iodef:Key>
<iodef:Key registryaction="modify_value"
indicator-uid="zabc">
<iodef:KeyName>
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\
Services\.Net CLR\Parameters\Bar
</iodef:KeyName>
<iodef:Value>Baz</iodef:Value>
</iodef:Key>
</iodef:WindowsRegistryKeysModified>
</iodef:RecordData>
</iodef:Record>
</iodef:EventData>
</iodef:Incident>
</iodef:IODEF-Document>
]]></artwork></figure></t>
</section>
<!-- 04 update by mio -->
<section title="Malware Delivery URL">
<t>This example indicates malware and related URL for file delivery.
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<IODEF-Document version="2.00"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-2.0"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-2.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<iodef:Incident purpose="reporting">
<iodef:IncidentID name="csirt.example.com">
189801
</iodef:IncidentID>
<iodef:RelatedActivity>
<iodef:URL>http://zeus.556677889900.example.com/log-bin/lunch_install.php?aff_id=1&lunch_id=1&maddr=&action=install
</iodef:URL>
</iodef:RelatedActivity>
<iodef:ReportTime>2012-12-05T12:20:00+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
<iodef:GenerationTime>2012-12-05T12:20:00+00:00</iodef:GenerationTime>
<iodef:Description>Malware and related indicators</iodef:Description>
<iodef:Assessment occurrence="potential">
<iodef:SystemImpact severity="medium" type="breach-privacy">Malware with C&C </iodef:SystemImpact>
</iodef:Assessment>
<iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
<iodef:ContactName>example.com CSIRT
</iodef:ContactName>
<iodef:Email>contact@csirt.example.com</iodef:Email>
</iodef:Contact>
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="source">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.200</iodef:Address>
<iodef:NodeRole category="www"/>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
</iodef:EventData>
</iodef:Incident>
</IODEF-Document>
]]></artwork></figure></t>
</section>
<!-- 04 update end by mio -->
<section title="DDoS">
<t>The DDoS test exchanged information that described a DDoS including
protocols and ports, bad IP addresses and HTTP User-Agent fields. The
IODEF version used for the data representation was based on
<xref target="I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis"/>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<IODEF-Document version="1.00" lang="en"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.41"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.41"
xmlns:iodef-sci="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-sci-1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<iodef:Incident purpose="reporting" restriction="default">
<iodef:IncidentID name="csirt.example.com">
189701
</iodef:IncidentID>
<iodef:StartTime>2013-02-05T00:34:45+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
<iodef:DetectTime>2013-02-05T01:15:45+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
<iodef:ReportTime>2013-02-05T01:34:45+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
<iodef:description>DDoS Traffic Seen</iodef:description>
<iodef:Assessment occurrence="actual">
<iodef:Impact severity="medium" type="dos">
DDoS Traffic</iodef:Impact>
<iodef:Confidence rating="numeric">90
</iodef:Confidence>
</iodef:Assessment>
<iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
<iodef:ContactName>Dummy Test</iodef:ContactName>
<iodef:Email>contact@dummytest.com</iodef:Email>
</iodef:Contact>
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:Description>
Dummy Test sharing with ISP1
</iodef:Description>
<iodef:Expectation action="other"/>
<iodef:Method>
<iodef:Reference>
<iodef:ReferenceName>
Low Orbit Ion Cannon User Agent
</iodef:ReferenceName>
<iodef:URL>
http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2011/01/loic-ddos-
analysis-and-detection.html
</iodef:URL>
<iodef:URL>
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_Orbit_Ion_Cannon
</iodef:URL>
</iodef:Reference>
</iodef:Method>
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="watchlist-source" spoofed="no">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
10.10.10.104</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
10.10.10.106</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-net">
172.16.66.0/24</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv6-addr">
2001:db8:dead:beef::</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Service ip_protocol="6">
<iodef:Port>1337</iodef:Port>
<iodef:Application user-agent="Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U;
Intel Mac OS X 10.5; en-US; rv:1.9.2.12) Gecko/
20101026 Firefox/3.6.12">
</iodef:Application>
</iodef:Service>
</iodef:System>
<iodef:System category="target">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
10.1.1.1</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Service ip_protocol="6">
<iodef:Port>80</iodef:Port>
</iodef:Service>
</iodef:System>
<iodef:System category="sensor"><iodef:Description>
Information provided in FLow class instance is from
Inspection of traffic from network tap
</iodef:Description></iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
</iodef:EventData>
</iodef:Incident>
</IODEF-Document>
]]></artwork></figure></t>
</section>
<section title="Spear-Phishing">
<t>The Spear-Phishing test exchanged information that described a Spear-Phishing
email including DNS records and addresses about the sender, malicious attached
file information and email data. The IODEF version used for the data
representation was based on <xref target="I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis"/>.
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<IODEF-Document version="1.00" lang="en"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.41"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.41"
xmlns:iodef-sci="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-sci-1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<iodef:Incident purpose="reporting">
<iodef:IncidentID name="csirt.example.com">
189601
</iodef:IncidentID>
<iodef:StartTime>2013-01-04T08:01:34+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
<iodef:StopTime>2013-01-04T08:31:27+00:00</iodef:StopTime>
<iodef:DetectTime>2013-01-04T08:06:12+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
<iodef:ReportTime>2013-01-04T09:15:45+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
<iodef:description>
Zeus Spear Phishing E-mail with Malware Attachment
</iodef:description>
<iodef:Assessment occurrence="potential">
<iodef:Impact severity="medium" type="info-leak">
Malware with Command and Control Server and System
Changes</iodef:Impact>
</iodef:Assessment>
<iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
<iodef:ContactName>example.com CSIRT
</iodef:ContactName>
<iodef:Email>contact@csirt.example.com</iodef:Email>
</iodef:Contact>
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:Description>Targeting Defense Contractors,
specifically board members attending Dummy Con
</iodef:Description>
<iodef:Expectation action="other"/>
<iodef:Method>
<iodef:Reference indicator_uid="1234">
<iodef:ReferenceName>Zeus</iodef:ReferenceName>
</iodef:Reference>
</iodef:Method>
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="source">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="url">
http://www.zeusevil.com</iodef:Address>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
10.10.10.166</iodef:Address>
<iodef:Address category="as">
225</iodef:Address>
<iodef:Address category="ext-value"
ext-category="as-name">
EXAMPLE-AS - University of Example”
</iodef:Address>
<iodef:Address category="ext-value"
ext-category="as-prefix">
172.16..0.0/16
</iodef:Address>
<iodef:NodeRole category="www"
attacktype="malware-distribution"/>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="source">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:NodeName>mail1.evildave.com</iodef:NodeName>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">
172.16.55.6</iodef:Address>
<iodef:Address category="asn">
225</iodef:Address>
<iodef:Address category="ext-value"
ext-category="as-name">
EXAMPLE-AS - University of Example
</iodef:Address>
<iodef:DomainData>
<iodef:Name>evildaveexample.com</iodef:Name>
<iodef:DateDomainWasChecked>2013-01-04T09:10:24+00:00
</iodef:DateDomainWasChecked>
<iodef:RelatedDNS RecordType="MX">
evildaveexample.com MX prefernce = 10, mail exchanger
= mail1.evildave.com</iodef:RelatedDNS>
<iodef:RelatedDNS RecordType="A">
mail1.evildaveexample.com
internet address = 172.16.55.6</iodef:RelatedDNS>
<iodef:RelatedDNS RecordType="SPF">
zuesevil.com. IN TXT \"v=spf1 a mx –all\"
</iodef:RelatedDNS>
</iodef:DomainData>
<iodef:NodeRole category="mail"
attacktype="spear-phishing"/>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Service>
<iodef:EmailInfo>
<iodef:Email>emaildave@evildaveexample.com
</iodef:Email>
<iodef:EmailSubject>Join us at Dummy Con
</iodef:EmailSubject>
<iodef:X-Mailer>StormRider 4.0
</iodef:X-Mailer>
</iodef:EmailInfo>
</iodef:Service>
</iodef:System>
<iodef:System category="target">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4">
192.168.54.2</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
<iodef:Record>
<iodef:RecordData>
<iodef:HashData type="file_hash"
indicator_uid="1234">
<iodef:FileName>Dummy Con Sign Up Sheet.txt
</iodef:FileName>
<iodef:FileSize>152</iodef:FileSize>
<ds:Reference>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
<ds:DigestValue>
141accec23e7e5157de60853cb1e01bc38042d
08f9086040815300b7fe75c184
</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</iodef:HashData>
</iodef:RecordData>
<iodef:RecordData>
<iodef:HashData type="PKI_email_ds" valid="0">
<ds:Signature>
<ds:KeyInfo>
<ds:X509Data>
<ds:X509IssuerSerial>
<ds:X509IssuerName>FakeCA
</ds:X509IssuerName>
</ds:X509IssuerSerial>
<ds:X509SubjectName>EvilDaveExample
</ds:X509SubjectName>
</ds:X509Data>
</ds:KeyInfo>
<ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:Reference>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
<ds:DigestValue>
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</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo>
</ds:Signature>
</iodef:HashData>
</iodef:RecordData>
</iodef:Record>
</iodef:EventData>
</iodef:Incident>
</IODEF-Document>
]]></artwork></figure></t>
</section>
<!-- 02 update end -->
</section>
</back>
</rfc>
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-24 06:53:43 |