One document matched: draft-ietf-mif-mpvd-ndp-support-02.xml


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<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ietf-mif-mpvd-ndp-support-02"
     ipr="trust200902"
     submissionType="IETF">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="NDP PVD support">Support for multiple provisioning domains in IPv6
     Neighbor Discovery Protocol</title>


  <author fullname="Jouni Korhonen" initials="J." surname="Korhonen" >
   <organization abbrev="Broadcom Corporation">Broadcom Corporation</organization>
   <address>
    <postal>
     <street>3151 Zanker Road</street>
     <city>San Jose</city>
     <code>95134</code>
     <region>CA</region>
     <country>USA</country>
    </postal>
    <email>jouni.nospam@gmail.com</email>
   </address>
  </author>

    <author fullname="Suresh Krishnan" initials="S." surname="Krishnan">
      <organization>Ericsson</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>8400 Decarie Blvd.</street>
          <city>Town of Mount Royal</city>
          <region>QC</region>
          <country>Canada</country>
        </postal>
        <phone>+1 514 345 7900 x42871</phone>
        <email>suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <author fullname="Sri Gundavelli" initials="S.G." surname="Gundavelli">
      <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>

      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>170 West Tasman Drive</street>
          <city>San Jose</city>
          <region>CA</region>
          <code>95134</code>
          <country>USA</country>
        </postal>
        <email>sgundave@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date />
    <workgroup>MIF</workgroup>


  <abstract>
   <t>The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues that
    are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple networks. One
	part of the solution requires associating configuration information with
	provisioning domains. This document details how configuration information
	provided through IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol can be associated with
	provisioning domains.
   </t>
  </abstract>
 </front>

<middle>
 <section anchor="intro" title="Introduction">
  <t>The MIF working group is producing a solution to solve the issues
   that are associated with nodes that can be attached to multiple
   networks based on the Multiple Provisioning Domains (MPVD) architecture 
   work <xref target="RFC7556"/>. One part of the solution
   requires associating configuration information with Provisioning Domains (PVD).
   This document describes an IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) 
   <xref target="RFC4861"/> mechanism
   for explicitly indicating provisioning domain information along with any
   configuration which is associated with that provisioning domain. The proposed
   mechanism uses an NDP option
   that indicates the identity of the provisioning domain and encapsulates the
   options that contain the configuration information as well as any accompanying
   authentication/authorization information. The solution defined in this 
   document aligns as much as possible with the existing IPv6 Neighbor Discovery
   security, namely with Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND) <xref target="RFC3971"/>.
  </t>
 </section>

 <section title="Terminology">
  <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in <xref
   target="RFC2119"></xref>.</t>
 </section>

 <section title="PVD Container option" anchor="opt_pvd_co">
  <t>The PVD container option (PVD_CO) is used to mark the start of the
   configuration options that belong to the explicitly identified provisioning
   domain. The PVD container option MUST encapsulate exactly one PVD identity
   option (PVD_ID, see <xref target="suboptions"/>).
   The PVD container option MAY occur multiple times in a Router Advertisement
   (RA) message. In this case each PVD container MUST belong to a different
   provisioning domain. The PVD container options MUST NOT be nested. The
   PVD Container option is defined only for the RA and Router Solicitation
   (RS) NDP messages, and intended to be only used with IPv6 RA messages.
   However, if a host wants to solicit information for a specific provisioning 
   domain it can include the PVD identity option into an RS message
   and use the PVD container to sign the PVD identity option.
  </t>
  <t>Since implementations are required to ignore any unrecognized
  options <xref target="RFC4861"/>, the backward compatibility and the
  reuse of existing NDP options is implicitly enabled. Implementations that
  do not recognize the PVD container option will ignore it, and any PVD
  container option "encapsulated" NDP options without associating them into
  any provisioning domain (since the implementation has no notion of
  provisioning domains). For example,
  the PVD container could "encapsulate" a Prefix Information Option
  (PIO), which would mark that this certain advertised IPv6 prefix
  belongs and originates from a specific provisioning domain. However,
  if the implementation does not understand provisioning domains, then
  this specific PIO is also skipped and not configured to the
  interface.
  </t>
  <t>
   The optional security for the PVD container is based on X.509
   certificates <xref target="RFC6487"/> and reuses mechanisms already
   defined for SeND <xref target="RFC3971"/> <xref target="RFC6495"/>.
   However, the use of PVD containers does not assume or depend on SeND
   being deployed or even implemented. The PVD containers SHOULD be
   signed per PVD certificates, which provides both integrity protection
   and proves that the configuration information source is authorized
   for advertising the given information. See <xref target="RFC6494"/>
   for discussion how to enable deployments where the certificates
   needed to sign PVD containers belong to different
   administrative domains i.e. to different provisioning
   domains.
  </t>
<figure anchor="fig_pvdco" title="PVD Container Option">
<artwork><![CDATA[
 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  Type=PVD_CO  |    Length     |S|  Reserved   |   Name Type   |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
:                                                               :
:                     Key Hash (optional)                       :
:                                                               :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
:                                                               :
:                Digital Signature (optional)                   :
:                                                               :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|       Possible zero padding to ensure 8 octets alignment      |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork></figure>

  <t><list style="hanging" hangIndent="4">
   <t hangText="Type"><vspace blankLines="1"/>
    PVD Container; Set to TBD1.
   <vspace blankLines="1"/></t>

   <t hangText="Length"><vspace blankLines="1"/>
     Length of the PVD_CO. The actual length depends on the number of "encapsulated"
     NDP options, the length of the PVD identifier option,
	 and the optional Key Hash/Digital Signature/Padding.
   <vspace blankLines="1"/></t>

   <t hangText="S"><vspace blankLines="1"/>
     Security enabled/disabled flag. If S=0 then security (signing) of the
     PVD_CO is disabled. If S=1 then security (signing) is enabled.
   <vspace blankLines="1"/></t>

   <t hangText="Name Type"><vspace blankLines="1"/>
    Names the algorithm used to identify a specific X.509 certificate using
	the method defined for the Subject Key Identifier (SKI) extension for
	the X.509 certificates. The usage and the Name Type registry aligns with
	the mechanism defined for SeND <xref target="RFC6495"/>. Name Type values
	starting from 3 are supported and an implementation MUST at least support
	SHA-1 (value 3). Note that if S=0 the Name field serves no use. 
   <vspace blankLines="1"/></t>
   
   <t hangText="Key Hash"><vspace blankLines="1"/>
    This field is only present when S=1.
    A hash of the public key using the algorithm identified by the Name Type.
	The procedure how the Key Hash is calculated is defined in 
	<xref target="RFC3971"/> and <xref target="RFC6495"/>.
   <vspace blankLines="1"/></t>
   
   <t hangText="Digital Signature"><vspace blankLines="1"/>
    This field is only present when S=1.
    A signature calculated over the PVD_CO option including all option data
	from the beginning of the option until to the end of the container.
	The procedure
	of calculating the signature is identical to the one defined for SeND
	<xref target="RFC3971"/>. During the signature calculation the contents of
	the Digital Signature option MUST be treated as all zero. 
   </t>
  </list>
  </t> 
  <t>Implementations MUST ensure that the PVD container option meets the 8
   octets NDP option alignment requirement as described in <xref target="RFC4861"/>. 
  </t>
  <t>If the PVD_CO does not contain
   a digital signature, then other means to secure the integrity of the
   NDP message SHOULD be provided, such as utilizing SeND. However, the
   security provided by SeND is for the entire NDP message and does not allow
   verifying whether the sender of the NDP message is actually authorized
   for the information for the provisioning domain.
  </t>
  <t>If the PVD_CO contains a signature and the verification fails, then
   the whole PVD_CO, PVD_ID and other NDP options MUST be silently ignored
   and the event SHOULD be logged.
  </t>
</section>


  <section title="PVD Identity option" anchor="suboptions">
   <t>The PVD identity option (PVD_ID) is used to explicitly identity
   a provisioning domain. In an RA message the PVD identity option
   MUST be and in an RS message the PVD identity option SHOULD be
   encapsulated into the associated PVD container option. However, in
   the RS message PVD identity options MAY be included without any PVD
   container options and in this case the PVD identity options serve only
   as a hint for a specific provisioning domains.
   </t>

 <figure anchor="fig_pvdid" title="PVD_ID Option">
 <artwork>
 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  Type=PVD_ID  |    Length     | Identity                      ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
</artwork>
</figure>
  <t><list style="hanging" hangIndent="4">
   <t hangText="Type"><vspace blankLines="1"/>
    PVD identifier; Set to TBD2.
   <vspace blankLines="1"/></t>

   <t hangText="Length"><vspace blankLines="1"/>
     Length of the PVD_ID.
   <vspace blankLines="1"/></t>
   <t hangText="Identity"><vspace blankLines="1"/>
     The provisioning domain identity. The contents of this field is
     defined in a separate document <xref target="I-D.ietf-mif-mpvd-id"/>.
     Note that the Identity field may need to be zero padded at the
     tail to meets the natural NDP option's alignment.
   </t>
  </list>
  </t>
  <t>If the receiver of a PVD identity option does not have one (or more) of the received
     ID-Type format's implemented, then all configuration and options which are associated
     with the unimplemented PVD(s) MUST be silently discarded.
  </t>
  </section>

  <section title="Set of allowable options">
      <t>The PVD container option MAY be used to encapsulate any allocated IPv6
      NDP options, which may appear more than once in a NDP message. The PVD
      container option MUST NOT be used to encapsulate other PVD_CO option(s).
   </t>
  </section>

  <section anchor="security" title="Security Considerations">
   <t>An attacker may attempt to modify the information provided inside the PVD container
	option. These attacks can easily be prevented by using SeND <xref
    target="RFC3971"></xref> or per PVD container signature that would detect any form
	of tampering with the IPv6 NDP message contents.
   </t>
   <t>
	A compromised router may advertise configuration information related
   to provisioning domains it is not authorized to advertise. e.g.  A coffee shop router
   may provide configuration information purporting to be from an
   enterprise and may try to attract enterprise related traffic.  The
   only real way to avoid this is that the provisioning domain container contains
   embedded authentication and authorization information from the owner
   of the provisioning domain.  Then, this attack can be detected by the client by
   verifying the authentication and authorization information provided
   inside the PVD container option after verifying its trust towards the
   provisioning domain owner (e.g. a certificate with a well-known/common
   trust anchor).
   </t>
   <t>
    A compromised configuration source or an on-link attacker may try to
    capture advertised configuration information and replay it on a
    different link or at a future point in time.  This can be avoided by
    including some replay protection mechanism such as a timestamp or a
    nonce inside the PVD container to ensure freshness of the provided
    information. This specification does not define a replay protection
    solution. Rather it is assumed that if replay protection is required, the
    access network and hosts also deploy existing security solutions such as
    SeND <xref target="RFC3971"/>.
   </t>
  </section>

  <section anchor="iana" title="IANA Considerations">
   <t>This document defines two new IPv6 NDP options into the
    "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Option Formats" registry. Options
    TBD1 and TBD2 are described in <xref target="opt_pvd_co"/> and
    <xref target="suboptions"/> respectively.
   </t>
  </section>

  <section anchor="acks" title="Acknowledgements">
      <t>The authors would like to thank the members of the MIF architecture design
	  team for their comments that led to the creation of this draft.</t>
  </section>
 </middle>

 <back>
  <references title="Normative References">
   &rfc2119;
   &rfc4861;
   &rfc6494;
   &rfc6495;
   &I-D.ietf-mif-mpvd-id;
   &rfc3971;
  </references>
  <references title="Informative References">
   &rfc6487;
   &rfc7556;
  </references>

  <section title="Examples">
   <section title="One implicit PVD and one explicit PVD">
    <t><xref target="fig_ex1"/> shows how the NDP options are laid out
      in an RA for
      one implicit provisioning domain and one explicit provisioning domain.
      The example does not include security (and signing of the PVD container).
      The assumption is the PVD identity consumes 14 octets.
    </t>
    <t>The explicit provisioning domain ("starducks.example.com" in a 
     NAI Realm format) contains a specific
     PIO for 2001:db8:abad:cafe::/64 and the MTU of 1337 octets. The implicit
     provisioning domain
     configures a prefix 2001:db8:cafe:babe::/64 and the link MTU of 1500
     octets. There are two cases: 1) the host receiving the RA implements 
     provisioning domains and 2) the host does not understand provisioning
     domains.<vspace blankLines="1"/>
     <list style="numbers">
      <t>The host recognizes the PVD_CO and "starts" a provisioning domain
       specific configuration. Security is disabled, thus there are no
       Key Hash or Digital Signature fields to process. The prefix 
       2001:db8:abad:cafe::/64 is found and configured on the interface.
       Once the PVD_ID option is located the interface prefix configuration
       for 2001:db8:abad:cafe::/64 and the MTU of 1337 octets can be associated
       to the provisioning domain found in the PVD_ID option. 
       <vspace blankLines="1"/>
       The rest of the options are
       parsed and configured into the implicit provisioning domain since there is no
       encapsulating provisioning domain. The interface is configured
       with prefix 2001:db8:cafe:babe::/64. The
       implicit provisioning domain uses the link MTU of 1500 octets, whereas
       the "starducks.example.com" provisioning domain uses the MTU of 1337
       octets (this means when packets are sourced using 2001:db8:abad:cafe::/64
       prefix the link MTU is different than when sourcing packets using 
       2001:db8:cafe:babe::/64 prefix).
      <vspace blankLines="1"/></t>
      <t>The host ignores the PVD_CO (including the PVD_ID and other options)
       and ends up configuring
       one prefix on its interface ( 2001:db8:cafe:babe::/64) with a link
       MTU of 1500 octets.
      </t>
     </list>
    </t>     
<figure anchor="fig_ex1" title="An RA with one implicit PVD and one explicit PVD">
<artwork><![CDATA[    
 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|      134      |       0       |          Checksum             |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cur Hop Limit |0|1|  Reserved |       Router Lifetime         |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                         Reachable Time                        |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                          Retrans Timer                        |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <+
|  Type=PVD_CO  |      10       |0|  Reserved   |      0        |  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
|                               0                               |  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
|       3       |       4       |      64       |1|1| Reserved1 |  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   
|                         Valid Lifetime                        |  P
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  V
|                       Preferred Lifetime                      |  D
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   
|                           Reserved2                           |  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
|                      2001:db8:abad:cafe::                     ~  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
|  Type=PVD_ID  |       4       |   id-type=4   |       21      |  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
~  "starducks.example.com",'\0','\0','\0','\0','\0','\0','\0'   |  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
|        5      |      1        |           Reserved            |  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  |
|                            1337                               |  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ <+
|       3       |       4       | Prefix Length |1|1| Reserved1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                         Valid Lifetime                        |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                       Preferred Lifetime                      |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                           Reserved2                           |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                      2001:db8:cafe:babe::                     ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|        5      |      1        |           Reserved            |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                            1500                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
]]></artwork></figure>    
   </section>
  </section>

 </back>
</rfc>


PAFTECH AB 2003-20262026-04-24 02:59:29