One document matched: draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework-15.xml
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<rfc category="std" ipr="trust200811" updates="4120" docName="draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework-15">
<front>
<title abbrev="Kerberos Preauth Framework ">
A Generalized Framework for Kerberos Pre-Authentication
</title>
<author initials="S" surname="Hartman" fullname="Sam hartman">
<organization>Painless Security</organization>
<address>
<email>hartmans-ietf@mit.edu</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="L." surname="Zhu" fullname="Larry Zhu">
<organization>Microsoft Corporation</organization>
<address><postal>
<street>One Microsoft Way</street>
<city>Redmond</city>
<region>WA</region>
<code>98052</code>
<country>US</country>
</postal>
<email>lzhu@microsoft.com</email></address>
</author>
<date year="2009"/>
<area>Security</area>
<workgroup>Kerberos Working Group</workgroup>
<abstract>
<t>Kerberos is a protocol for verifying the identity of
principals (e.g., a workstation user or a network server) on an
open network. The Kerberos protocol provides a mechanism called
pre-authentication for proving the identity of a principal and for
better protecting the long-term secrets of the principal.</t>
<t>This document describes a model for Kerberos
pre-authentication mechanisms. The model describes what state in the
Kerberos request a pre-authentication mechanism is likely to change.
It also describes how multiple pre-authentication mechanisms used in
the same request will interact.</t>
<t>This document also provides common tools needed by multiple
pre-authentication mechanisms. One of these tools is a secure channel
between the client and the KDC with a reply key strengthening mechanism;
this secure channel can be used to protect the authentication exchange
thus eliminate offline dictionary attacks.
With these tools, it is relatively straightforward to
chain multiple authentication mechanisms, utilize a different key management system,
or support a new key agreement algorithm. </t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section anchor="intro" title="Introduction">
<t>The core Kerberos specification <xref target="RFC4120"/> treats pre-authentication data
as an opaque typed hole in the messages to the KDC that may
influence the reply key used to encrypt the KDC reply. This
generality has been useful: pre-authentication data is used for a
variety of extensions to the protocol, many outside the expectations
of the initial designers. However, this generality makes designing
more common types of pre-authentication mechanisms difficult.
Each mechanism needs to specify how it interacts with other
mechanisms. Also, problems like combining a key with the long-term
secrets or proving the identity of the user are common to multiple
mechanisms.
Where there are generally well-accepted solutions to
these problems, it is desirable to standardize one of these
solutions so mechanisms can avoid duplication of work. In other
cases, a modular approach to these problems is appropriate. The
modular approach will allow new and better solutions to common
pre-authentication problems to be used by existing mechanisms as they are developed.</t>
<t>This document specifies a framework for Kerberos
pre-authentication mechanisms. It defines the common set of
functions that pre-authentication mechanisms perform as well as how these
functions affect the state of the request and reply. In addition
several common tools needed by pre-authentication mechanisms are
provided. Unlike <xref target="RFC3961"/>, this framework is not
complete--it does not describe all the inputs and outputs for the
pre-authentication mechanisms. Pre-Authentication mechanism designers should try to be
consistent with this framework because doing so will make their
mechanisms easier to implement. Kerberos implementations are likely
to have plugin architectures for pre-authentication; such
architectures are likely to support mechanisms that follow this
framework plus commonly used extensions. This framework also facilitates combining multiple pre-authentication mechanisms, each
of which may represent an authentication factor, into a single multi-factor pre-authentication mechanism.</t>
<t> One of these common tools is the flexible
authentication secure tunneling (FAST) padata type. FAST provides a protected
channel between the client and the KDC, and it can optionally deliver
key material used to strengthen the reply key within the protected channel. Based on FAST, pre-authentication
mechanisms can extend Kerberos with ease, to support, for example, password authenticated
key exchange (PAKE) protocols with zero knowledge password proof (ZKPP) [EKE] [IEEE1363.2].
Any pre-authentication mechanism can be encapsulated in the FAST messages as defined in <xref target="fast"/>.
A pre-authentication type carried within FAST is called a FAST factor.
Creating a FAST factor is the easiest path to create a new pre-authentication mechanism. FAST factors are significantly easier to analyze from a security standpoint than other pre-authentication mechanisms.</t>
<t>Mechanism designers should design FAST factors, instead
of new pre-authentication mechanisms outside of FAST.</t>
</section>
<section title="Conventions and Terminology Used in This Document">
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in <xref
target="RFC2119" pageno="false" format="default"></xref>.</t>
<t>This document should be read only after reading the documents
describing the Kerberos cryptography framework <xref
target="RFC3961"/> and the core Kerberos protocol <xref
target="RFC4120"/>. This
document may freely use terminology and notation from these
documents without reference or further explanation.</t>
<t> The word padata is used as a shorthand for pre-authentication data. </t>
<t>A conversation
is the set of all authentication messages exchanged between the client and the client's Authentication Service (AS) in order to authenticate the client principal.
A conversation as defined here consists of all messages that are necessary to complete the authentication
between the client and the client's AS. In the Ticket Exchange Service (TGS) exchange, a conversation consists of the request message and the reply message.
The term conversation is defined here for both AS and TGS for convenience of discussion. See <xref target="kdc-state"/> for specific rules on the extent of a conversation in the AS-REQ case. Prior to this framework, implementations needed to use implementation-specific heuristics to determine the extent of a conversation.</t>
<t>If the KDC reply in an AS exchange is verified, the KDC is authenticated by the client. In this document, verification of the KDC reply is
used as a synonym of authentication of the KDC.</t>
</section>
<section title="Model for Pre-Authentication">
<t>When a Kerberos client wishes to obtain a ticket using the
authentication server, it sends an initial Authentication Service (AS) request. If
pre-authentication is required but not being used, then the KDC will respond with
a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error. Alternatively, if the client
knows what pre-authentication to use, it MAY optimize away a
round-trip and send an initial request with padata included
in the initial request. If
the client includes the padata computed using the wrong pre-authentication mechanism or incorrect keys, the KDC MAY return
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED with no indication of what padata should
have been included. In that case, the client MUST retry with no padata and examine
the error data of the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error.
If the KDC includes pre-authentication information
in the accompanying error data of KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED, the client SHOULD process
the error data, and then retry.</t>
<t>The conventional KDC maintains no state between two requests; subsequent
requests may even be processed by a different KDC. On the other
hand, the client treats a series of exchanges with KDCs as a
single conversation. Each exchange accumulates state
and hopefully brings the client closer to a successful
authentication. </t>
<t>These models for state management are in apparent conflict.
For many of the simpler pre-authentication scenarios, the client
uses one round trip to find out what mechanisms the KDC
supports. Then the next request contains sufficient
pre-authentication for the KDC to be able to return a successful
reply. For these simple scenarios, the client only sends one
request with pre-authentication data and so the conversation is trivial. For more complex conversations,
the KDC needs to provide the client with a cookie to include in
future requests to capture the current state of the
authentication session. Handling of multiple round-trip
mechanisms is discussed in
<xref target="kdc-state"/>.</t>
<t>This framework specifies the behavior of Kerberos
pre-authentication mechanisms used to identify users or to modify
the reply key used to encrypt the KDC reply. The PA-DATA
typed hole may be used to carry extensions to Kerberos that have
nothing to do with proving the identity of the user or
establishing a reply key. Such extensions are outside the
scope of this framework. However mechanisms that do accomplish
these goals should follow this framework.</t>
<t>This framework specifies the minimum state that a Kerberos
implementation needs to maintain while handling a request in
order to process pre-authentication. It also specifies how
Kerberos implementations process the padata at
each step of the AS request process.</t>
<section anchor="state" title="Information Managed by the Pre-authentication Model">
<t> The following information is maintained by the client and KDC as each
request is being processed: <vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="symbols">
<t>The reply key used to encrypt the KDC reply<vspace blankLines="1"/></t>
<t>How strongly the identity of the client has been authenticated<vspace blankLines="1"/></t>
<t>Whether the reply key has been used in this
conversation<vspace blankLines="1"/></t>
<t>Whether the reply key has been replaced in this
conversation<vspace blankLines="1"/></t>
<t>Whether the origin of the KDC reply can be verified by
the client (i.e. whether the KDC is authenticated to the client)<vspace blankLines="1"/></t>
</list>
</t>
<t>Conceptually, the reply key is initially the long-term key
of the principal. However, principals can have multiple
long-term keys because of support for multiple encryption
types, salts and string2key parameters. As described in
Section 5.2.7.5 of the Kerberos protocol <xref
target="RFC4120"/>, the KDC sends PA-ETYPE-INFO2 to notify the
client what types of keys are available. Thus in full
generality, the reply key in the pre-authentication model is actually a
set of keys. At the beginning of a request, it is initialized
to the set of long-term keys advertised in the
PA-ETYPE-INFO2 element on the KDC. If multiple reply keys are
available, the client chooses which one to use. Thus the
client does not need to treat the reply key as a set. At the
beginning of a request, the client picks a
key to use.</t>
<t>KDC implementations MAY choose to offer only one key in the
PA-ETYPE-INFO2 element. Since the KDC already knows the
client's list of supported enctypes from the request, no
interoperability problems are created by choosing a single
possible reply key. This way, the KDC implementation avoids
the complexity of treating the reply key as a set.</t>
<t>When the padata in the request is verified by the KDC,
then the client is known to have that key, therefore the KDC SHOULD pick
the same key as the reply key.</t>
<t>At the beginning of handling a message on both the client
and the KDC, the client's identity is not authenticated. A
mechanism may indicate that it has successfully authenticated
the client's identity. This information is useful to keep
track of on the client in order to know what
pre-authentication mechanisms should be used. The KDC needs to
keep track of whether the client is authenticated because the
primary purpose of pre-authentication is to authenticate the
client identity before issuing a ticket.
The handling of authentication strength using various authentication mechanisms is discussed
in <xref target="auth-strength"/>.</t>
<t>Initially the reply key has not been used. A
pre-authentication mechanism that uses the reply key
to encrypt or checksum some data in the
generation of new keys MUST indicate that the reply key is
used. This state is maintained by the client and the KDC to
enforce the security requirement stated in <xref
target="replace-reply-key"/> that the reply key SHOULD NOT be
replaced after it is used.</t>
<t>Initially the reply key has not been replaced. If a
mechanism implements the Replace Reply Key facility discussed
in <xref target="replace-reply-key"/>, then the state MUST be
updated to indicate that the reply key has been replaced.
Once the reply key has been replaced, knowledge of the reply
key is insufficient to authenticate the client. The reply key
is marked replaced in exactly the same situations as the KDC
reply is marked as not being verified to the client
principal. However, while mechanisms can verify the KDC
reply to the client, once the reply key is replaced, then
the reply key remains replaced for the remainder of the
conversation.</t>
<t>Without pre-authentication, the client knows that the KDC
reply is authentic and has not been modified because it is
encrypted in a long-term key of the client. Only the KDC
and the client know that key. So at the start of a conversation, the KDC reply is presumed to be verified using the
client's long-term key. It should be noted that in this document, verifying the KDC reply means authenticating the KDC,
and these phrases are used interchangeably. Any pre-authentication mechanism that sets a
new reply key not based on the principal's long-term secret
MUST either verify the KDC reply some other way or indicate
that the reply is not verified. If a mechanism indicates
that the reply is not verified then the client
implementation MUST return an error unless a subsequent
mechanism verifies the reply. The KDC needs to track this
state so it can avoid generating a reply that is not verified.</t>
<t>In this specification, KDC verification/authentication refers to the level of authentication of the KDC to the client provided by RFC 4120. There is a stronger form of KDC verification that, while sometimes important in Kerberos deployments is not addressed in this specification: the typical Kerberos request does not provide a way for the
client machine to know that it is talking to the correct KDC.
Someone who can inject packets into the network between the
client machine and the KDC and who knows the password that the
user will give to the client machine can generate a KDC
reply that will decrypt properly. So, if the client
machine needs to authenticate that the user is in fact the
named principal, then the client machine needs to do a TGS
request for itself as a service. Some pre-authentication
mechanisms may provide a way for the client machine to authenticate
the KDC. Examples of this include signing the reply that can be
verified using a well-known public key or providing a ticket for the client
machine as a service. </t>
</section>
<section anchor="preauth-required-error" title="Initial Pre-authentication Required Error">
<t>Typically a client starts a conversation by
sending an initial request with no
pre-authentication. If the KDC requires pre-authentication,
then it returns a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED message.
After the first reply with the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error code,
the KDC returns the error code KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED (defined in <xref target="kdc-state"/>) for pre-authentication
configurations that use multi-round-trip mechanisms; see <xref target="kdc-client"/> for details of that case.
</t>
<t>The KDC needs to choose which mechanisms to offer the
client. The client needs to be able to choose what mechanisms
to use from the first message. For example consider the KDC
that will accept mechanism A followed by mechanism B or
alternatively the single mechanism C. A client that supports
A and C needs to know that it should not bother trying A.</t>
<t> Mechanisms can either be sufficient on their own or can be
part of an authentication set--a group of mechanisms that all
need to successfully complete in order to authenticate a
client. Some mechanisms may only be useful in authentication
sets; others may be useful alone or in authentication sets.
For the second group of mechanisms, KDC policy dictates
whether the mechanism will be part of an authentication set,
offered alone, or both. For each mechanism that is offered alone
(even if it is also offered in an authentication set), the
KDC includes the pre-authentication type ID of the mechanism
in the padata sequence returned in the
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error. Mechanisms that are only offered
as part of an authentication set are not directly represented in the padata
sequence returned in the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error, although
they are represented in the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET sequence.</t>
<t>The KDC SHOULD NOT send data that is
encrypted in the long-term password-based key of the
principal. Doing so has the same security exposures as the
Kerberos protocol without pre-authentication. There are few
situations where the
KDC needs to expose cipher text encrypted in a weak key before
the client has proven knowledge of that key, and pre-authentication is desirable.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="client-request" title="Client to KDC">
<t>This description assumes that a client has already received a
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED from the KDC. If the client performs
optimistic pre-authentication then the client needs to
guess values for the information it would normally receive
from that error response or use cached information obtained in prior interactions with the KDC.</t>
<t>The client starts by
initializing the pre-authentication state as specified. It
then processes the padata in the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED. </t>
<t> When processing the response to the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, the
client MAY ignore any padata it chooses unless doing so violates a
specification to which the client conforms. Clients conforming to
this specification MUST NOT ignore the padata defined in <xref target="kdc-state"/>.
Clients SHOULD choose one authentication set or mechanism that could
lead to authenticating the user and ignore other such mechanisms.
However, this rule does not affect processing of padata unrelated to
this framework; clients SHOULD process such padata normally.
Since
the list of mechanisms offered by the KDC is in the decreasing
preference order, clients
typically choose the first mechanism or authentication set that the client can
usefully perform. If a client chooses to ignore a padata it
MUST NOT process the padata, allow the padata to affect the
pre-authentication state, nor respond to the padata.</t>
<t>For each padata the client chooses to process, the client
processes the padata and modifies the pre-authentication state
as required by that mechanism. Padata are processed in the
order received from the KDC. </t>
<t>After processing the padata in the KDC
error, the client generates a new request. It processes the
pre-authentication mechanisms in the order in which they will
appear in the next request, updating the state as appropriate.
The request is sent when it is complete.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="kdc-client" title="KDC to Client">
<t>When a KDC receives an AS request from a client, it needs
to determine whether it will respond with an error or an AS
reply. There are many causes for an error to be generated
that have nothing to do with pre-authentication; they are
discussed in the core Kerberos specification. </t>
<t>From the standpoint of evaluating the pre-authentication,
the KDC first starts by initializing the pre-authentication
state. If a PA-FX-COOKIE pre-authentication data item is present, it is processed first; see <xref target="kdc-state"/> for a definition. It then processes the padata in the request. As
mentioned in <xref target="client-request"/>, the KDC
MAY ignore padata that is inappropriate for the configuration
and MUST ignore padata of an unknown type. The KDC MUST NOT
ignore padata of types used in previous messages. For example, if
a KDC issues a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error including padata of
type x, then the KDC cannot ignore padata of type x received in an
AS-REQ message from the client.</t>
<t>At this point the KDC decides whether it will issue an
error or a reply. Typically a KDC
will issue a reply if the client's identity has been
authenticated to a sufficient degree. </t>
<t>In the case of a KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED error, the KDC first starts by
initializing the pre-authentication state. Then it processes
any padata in the client's request in the order provided by
the client. Mechanisms that are not understood by the KDC are
ignored. Next, it
generates padata for the error response, modifying the
pre-authentication state appropriately as each mechanism is
processed. The KDC chooses the order in which it will
generate padata (and thus the order of padata in the
response), but it needs to modify the pre-authentication state
consistently with the choice of order. For example, if some
mechanism establishes an authenticated client identity, then
the subsequent mechanisms in the generated response receive
this state as input. After the padata is generated, the error
response is sent. Typically
the errors with the code KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED
in a conversation will
include KDC state as discussed in <xref target="kdc-state"/>.</t>
<t>To generate a final reply, the KDC generates the padata modifying the pre-authentication
state as necessary. Then it generates the final response,
encrypting it in the current pre-authentication reply key.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Pre-Authentication Facilities">
<t>Pre-Authentication mechanisms can be thought of as
providing various conceptual facilities. This serves two
useful purposes. First, mechanism authors can choose only to
solve one specific small problem. It is often useful for a
mechanism designed to offer key management not to directly
provide client authentication but instead to allow one or more
other mechanisms to handle this need. Secondly, thinking about
the abstract services that a mechanism provides yields a
minimum set of security requirements that all mechanisms
providing that facility must meet. These security requirements
are not complete; mechanisms will have additional security
requirements based on the specific protocol they employ. </t>
<t>A mechanism is not constrained to only offering one of these
facilities. While such mechanisms can be designed and are
sometimes useful, many pre-authentication mechanisms implement
several facilities. By combining multiple facilities in a
single mechanism, it is often easier to construct a secure,
simple solution than by solving the problem in full
generality. Even when mechanisms provide multiple facilities,
they need to meet the security requirements for all the
facilities they provide. If the FAST factor approach is used, it is likely that one or a small number of facilities can be provided by a single mechanism without complicating the security analysis.</t>
<t>According to Kerberos extensibility rules (Section 1.5 of
the Kerberos specification <xref target="RFC4120"/>), an
extension MUST NOT change the semantics of a message unless a
recipient is known to understand that extension. Because a
client does not know that the KDC supports a particular
pre-authentication mechanism when it sends an initial request, a pre-authentication
mechanism MUST NOT change the semantics of the request in a
way that will break a KDC that does not understand that
mechanism. Similarly, KDCs MUST NOT send messages to clients
that affect the core semantics unless the client has indicated
support for the message. </t>
<t>The only state in this model that would
break the interpretation of a message is changing the expected
reply key. If one mechanism changed the reply key and a
later mechanism used that reply key, then a KDC that
interpreted the second mechanism but not the first would fail
to interpret the request correctly. In order to avoid this
problem, extensions that change core semantics are typically divided
into two parts. The first part proposes a change to the core
semantic--for example proposes a new reply key. The second part
acknowledges that the extension is understood and that the
change takes effect.
<xref target="strengthen-reply"/> discusses how to design
mechanisms that modify the reply key to be split into a
proposal and acceptance without requiring additional round trips
to use the new reply key in subsequent pre-authentication.
Other changes in the state described in <xref
target="state"/> can safely be ignored by a KDC that does not
understand a mechanism. Mechanisms that modify the behavior
of the request outside the scope of this framework need to
carefully consider the Kerberos extensibility rules to avoid
similar problems.</t>
<section title="Client-authentication Facility">
<t>The client authentication facility proves the identity of a
user to the KDC before a ticket is issued. Examples of
mechanisms implementing this facility include the encrypted
timestamp facility defined in Section 5.2.7.2 of the Kerberos
specification <xref target="RFC4120"/>.
Mechanisms that provide this facility are expected to mark the
client as authenticated.</t>
<t>Mechanisms implementing this facility SHOULD require the
client to prove knowledge of the reply key before
transmitting a successful KDC reply. Otherwise, an attacker
can intercept the pre-authentication exchange and get a reply
to attack. One way of proving the client knows the reply key
is to implement the Replace Reply Key facility along with this
facility. The PKINIT mechanism <xref
target="RFC4556"/> implements Client Authentication
alongside Replace Reply Key. </t>
<t>If the reply key has been replaced, then mechanisms such as
encrypted-timestamp that rely on knowledge of the reply key to
authenticate the client MUST NOT be used.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="strengthen-reply" title="Strengthening-reply-key Facility">
<t>Particularly when dealing with keys based on passwords, it
is desirable to increase the strength of the key by adding
additional secrets to it. Examples of sources of additional
secrets include the results of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange
or key bits from the output of a smart card <xref
target="KRB-WG.SAM"/>. Typically these additional secrets can be
first combined with the existing reply key and
then converted to a protocol key using
tools defined in <xref
target="combine-key"/>.</t>
<t>Typically a mechanism implementing this facility will know that the other side of the exchange supports the facility before the reply key is changed. For example, a mechanism might need to learn the certificate for a KDC before encrypting a new key in the public key belonging to that certificate. However, if a mechanism implementing this facility wishes to modify
the reply key before knowing that the other party in the exchange
supports the mechanism, it proposes modifying the reply key. The
other party then includes a message indicating that the proposal is
accepted if it is understood and meets policy. In many
cases it is desirable to use the new reply key for client
authentication and for other facilities. Waiting for the other party
to accept the proposal and actually modify the reply key state would
add an additional round trip to the exchange. Instead, mechanism
designers are encouraged to include a typed hole for additional
padata in the message that proposes the reply key change. The padata
included in the typed hole are generated assuming the new reply key.
If the other party accepts the proposal, then these padata are
considered as an inner level. As with the outer level, one
authentication set or mechanism is typically chosen for client
authentication, along with auxiliary mechanisms such as KDC cookies,
and other mechanisms are ignored. When mechanisms include such a container, the hint provided for use in authentication sets
(as defined in <xref target="pa-authentication-set"/>) MUST contain a sequence of inner mechanisms along with hints for those mechanisms.
The party generating the proposal can determine whether the
padata were processed based on whether the proposal for the reply key
is accepted. </t>
<t>The specific formats of the proposal message, including
where padata are included is a matter for the mechanism
specification. Similarly, the format of the message accepting the
proposal is mechanism-specific. </t>
<t>Mechanisms implementing this facility and including a typed
hole for additional padata MUST checksum that padata using a keyed
checksum or encrypt the padata. This requirement protects against modification of the contents of the typed hole. By modifying these contents an attacker might be able to choose which mechanism is used to authenticate the client, or to convince a party to provide text encrypted in a key that the attacker had manipulated. It is important that mechanisms strengthen the reply key enough that using it to checksum padata is appropriate. </t>
</section>
<section anchor="replace-reply-key" title="Replacing-reply-key Facility">
<t>The Replace Reply Key facility replaces the key in which a
successful AS reply will be encrypted. This facility can only be
used in cases where knowledge of the reply key is not used to
authenticate the client. The new reply key MUST be communicated to
the client and the KDC in a secure manner. This facility MUST NOT
be used if there can be a man-in-the-middle between the client and the KDC. Mechanisms implementing this
facility MUST mark the reply key as replaced in the
pre-authentication state. Mechanisms implementing this facility MUST
either provide a mechanism to verify the KDC reply to the client or
mark the reply as unverified in the pre-authentication state.
Mechanisms implementing this facility SHOULD NOT be used if a previous
mechanism has used the reply key.</t>
<t>As with the strengthening-reply-key facility, Kerberos
extensibility rules require that the reply key not be changed unless
both sides of the exchange understand the extension. In the case of
this facility it will likely be the case for both sides to know
that the facility is available by the time that the new key is
available to be used. However, mechanism designers can use a
container for padata in a proposal message as discussed in <xref
target="strengthen-reply"/> if appropriate.</t>
</section>
<section title="KDC-authentication Facility">
<t>This facility verifies that the reply comes from the
expected KDC. In traditional Kerberos, the KDC and the client
share a key, so if the KDC reply can be decrypted then the client
knows that a trusted KDC responded. Note that the client
machine cannot trust the client unless the machine is presented with a
service ticket for it (typically the machine can retrieve
this ticket by itself). However, if the reply key is
replaced, some mechanism is required to verify the KDC.
Pre-authentication mechanisms providing this facility allow a
client to determine that the expected KDC has responded even after the reply key is replaced.
They mark the pre-authentication state as having been
verified.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="requirements" title="Requirements for Pre-Authentication Mechanisms">
<t>This section lists requirements for specifications of
pre-authentication mechanisms. </t>
<t>For each message in the pre-authentication mechanism, the
specification describes the pa-type value to be used and the
contents of the message. The processing of the message by the
sender and recipient is also specified. This specification
needs to include all modifications to the pre-authentication
state. </t>
<t>Generally mechanisms have a message that can be sent in the
error data of the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error message or in an
authentication set. If the client needs information such
as trusted certificate authorities in order to determine if it can use the
mechanism, then this information should be in that
message. In addition, such mechanisms should also define a
pa-hint to be included in authentication sets. Often,
the same information included in the padata-value is
appropriate to include in the pa-hint (as defined in <xref target="pa-authentication-set"/>).</t>
<t>In order to ease security analysis the mechanism
specification should describe what facilities from this document
are offered by the mechanism.
For each facility,
the security consideration section of the mechanism specification should
show that the security requirements of that facility are met.
This requirement is applicable to any FAST factor
that provides authentication information.</t>
<t>Significant problems have resulted in the specification of
Kerberos protocols because much of the KDC exchange is not
protected against alteration. The security considerations
section should discuss unauthenticated plaintext attacks. It
should either show that plaintext is protected or discuss what
harm an attacker could do by modifying the plaintext. It is
generally acceptable for an attacker to be able to cause the
protocol negotiation to fail by modifying plaintext. More
significant attacks should be evaluated carefully.</t>
<t>As discussed in <xref target="kdc-state"/>, there is no guarantee that a client will use the same KDCs for all messages in a conversation. The mechanism specification needs to show why the mechanism is secure in this situation. The hardest problem to deal with, especially for challenge/response mechanisms is to make sure that the same response cannot be replayed against two KDCs while allowing the client to talk to any KDC. </t>
<section title="Protecting Requests/Responses">
<t>Mechanism designers SHOULD protect clear text portions of pre-authentication data.
Various denial of service attacks and downgrade attacks against
Kerberos are possible unless plaintexts are somehow protected against
modification. An early design goal of Kerberos Version 5 <xref target="RFC4120"/> was to
avoid encrypting more of the authentication exchange that was
required. (Version 4 doubly-encrypted the encrypted part of a ticket
in a KDC reply, for example.) This minimization of encryption
reduces the load on the KDC and busy servers. Also, during the
initial design of Version 5, the existence of legal restrictions on
the export of cryptography made it desirable to minimize of the
number of uses of encryption in the protocol. Unfortunately,
performing this minimization created numerous instances of
unauthenticated security-relevant plaintext fields.</t>
<t> If there is more than one round trip for an authentication
exchange, mechanism designers need to allow
either the client or the KDC to provide a checksum of all the messages exchanged on the wire in the conversation, and the checksum is then
verified by the receiver.</t>
<t> New mechanisms MUST NOT be hard-wired to use a specific algorithm. </t>
<t>Primitives defined in <xref target="RFC3961"/> are RECOMMENDED for integrity protection and confidentiality.
Mechanisms based on these primitives are crypto-agile as the result of using <xref target="RFC3961"/>
along with <xref target="RFC4120"/>. The advantage afforded by crypto-agility is the ability to incrementally deploy a fix specific to a particular algorithm thus
avoid a multi-year standardization and deployment cycle, when real attacks do arise against that algorithm.
</t>
<t>Note that data used by FAST factors (defined in <xref target="fast"/>) is encrypted in a protected channel, thus they do not share
the un-authenticated-text issues with mechanisms designed as full-blown pre-authentication mechanisms. </t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Tools for Use in Pre-Authentication Mechanisms">
<t>This section describes common tools needed by multiple
pre-authentication mechanisms. By using these tools
mechanism designers can use a modular approach to specify
mechanism details and ease security analysis. </t>
<section anchor="combine-key" title="Combining Keys">
<t> Frequently a weak key needs to be combined with a stronger key before use.
For example, passwords are typically limited in size and insufficiently random,
therefore it is desirable to increase the strength of the keys based on passwords by adding
additional secrets. Additional source of secrecy may come from hardware tokens. </t>
<t>This section provides standard ways to combine two keys into one.</t>
<t>KRB-FX-CF1() is defined to combine two pass-phrases. </t>
<figure>
<artwork>
KRB-FX-CF1(UTF-8 string, UTF-8 string) -> (UTF-8 string)
KRB-FX-CF1(x, y) := x || y
</artwork>
</figure>
<t> Where || denotes concatenation. The strength of the final key is roughly the
total strength of the individual keys being combined assuming that
the string_to_key() function <xref target="RFC3961"/> uses all its input evenly.</t>
<t> An example usage of KRB-FX-CF1() is when a device provides random but short passwords,
the password is often combined with a personal identification number (PIN). The password and the PIN can be combined
using KRB-FX-CF1().</t>
<t> KRB-FX-CF2() combines two protocol keys based on the pseudo-random() function defined in <xref target="RFC3961"/>.</t>
<t> Given two input keys, K1 and K2, where K1 and K2 can be of two different enctypes, the output
key of KRB-FX-CF2(), K3, is derived as follows: </t>
<figure>
<artwork>
KRB-FX-CF2(protocol key, protocol key, octet string,
octet string) -> (protocol key)
PRF+(K1, pepper1) -> octet-string-1
PRF+(K2, pepper2) -> octet-string-2
KRB-FX-CF2(K1, K2, pepper1, pepper2) :=
random-to-key(octet-string-1 ^ octet-string-2)
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>Where ^ denotes the exclusive-OR operation. PRF+() is defined as follows:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
PRF+(protocol key, octet string) -> (octet string)
PRF+(key, shared-info) := pseudo-random( key, 1 || shared-info ) ||
pseudo-random( key, 2 || shared-info ) ||
pseudo-random( key, 3 || shared-info ) || ...
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>Here the counter value 1, 2, 3 and so on are encoded as a one-octet integer.
The pseudo-random() operation is specified by the enctype of the protocol key.
PRF+() uses the counter to generate enough bits as needed by the random-to-key() <xref target="RFC3961"/>
function for the encryption type specified for the resulting key;
unneeded bits are removed from the tail. Unless otherwise specified, the resulting enctype of KRB-FX-CF2 is the enctype of k1. The pseudo-random() operation is the RFC 3961 pseudo-random() operation for the corresponding input key; the random-to-key() operation is the RFC 3961 random-to-key operation for the resulting key.</t>
<t> Mechanism designers MUST
specify the values for the input parameter pepper1 and pepper2 when combining two keys using KRB-FX-CF2(). The pepper1 and pepper2
MUST be distinct so that if the two keys being combined are the same, the resulting
key is not a trivial key. </t>
</section>
<section anchor="kdc-state" title="Managing States for the KDC">
<t> Kerberos KDCs are stateless in that there is no requirement that clients
will choose the same KDC for the second request in a
conversation. Proxies or other intermediate nodes may also
influence KDC selection. So, each request from a client to a
KDC must include sufficient information that the KDC can
regenerate any needed state. This is accomplished by giving
the client a potentially long opaque cookie in responses
to include in future requests in the same conversation. The
KDC MAY respond that a conversation is too old and needs to
restart by responding with a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED error.</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED 90
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>When a client receives this error, the client SHOULD abort the existing conversation, and restart a new one.</t>
<t>
An example, where more than one message from the client is needed, is when
the client is authenticated based on a challenge-response scheme. In that case, the KDC
needs to keep track of the challenge issued for a client authentication request. </t>
<t> The PA-FX-COOKIE padata type is defined in this section to
facilitate state management in the AS exchange. This padata is sent by the KDC when
the KDC requires state for a future transaction. The client includes
this opaque token in the next message in the conversation. The token
may be relatively large; clients MUST be prepared for tokens somewhat
larger than the size of all messages in a conversation.
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
PA-FX-COOKIE 133
-- Stateless cookie that is not tied to a specific KDC.
</artwork>
</figure>
<t> The corresponding padata-value field <xref target="RFC4120"/> contains an opaque token that will be echoed by the client in its response to an error from the KDC.</t>
<t>The cookie token is generated by the KDC and transmitted in a PA-FX-COOKIE pre-authentication data item of a KRB-ERROR message. The client MUST copy the exact cookie encapsulated in a PA-FX-COOKIE data
element into the next message of the same conversation. The content of the cookie field is a local matter of the
KDC. As a result, it is not generally possible to mix KDC implementations from different vendors in the same realm. However the KDC MUST construct the cookie token in such a manner that a
malicious client cannot subvert the authentication process by
manipulating the token. The KDC implementation needs to consider
expiration of tokens, key rollover and other security issues in token
design. The content of the cookie field is likely specific to the pre-authentication
mechanisms used to authenticate the client.
If a client authentication response can be replayed to multiple KDCs via
the PA-FX-COOKIE mechanism, an expiration in the cookie
is RECOMMENDED to prevent the response being presented indefinitely. Implementations need to consider replay both of an entire conversation and of messages within a conversation when designing what information is stored in a cookie and how pre-authentication mechanisms are implemented.</t>
<t>If at least one more message for a mechanism or a mechanism set is expected by the KDC, the KDC returns a KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED error
with a PA-FX-COOKIE to identify the conversation with the client according to <xref target="preauth-required-error"/>. The cookie is not expected to stay constant for a conversation: the KDC is expected to generate a new cookie for each message.</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED 91
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>A client MAY throw away the state associated with a
conversation and begin a new conversation by discarding its
state and not including a cookie in the first message of a
conversation. KDCs that comply with this specification MUST
include a cookie in a response when the client can continue
the conversation. In particular, a KDC MUST include a cookie
in a KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED or
KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED. KDCs SHOULD include a
cookie in errors containing additional information allowing a
client to retry. One reasonable strategy for meeting these
requirements is to always include a cookie in KDC errors.</t>
<t> A KDC MAY indicate that it is terminating a
conversation by not including a cookie in a response. When
FAST is used, clients can assume that the absence of a cookie
means that the KDC is ending the conversation. Similarly, if a cookie is seen at all during a conversation, clients MAY assume that the absence of a cookie in a future message means that the KDC is ending the conversation. Clients also
need to deal with KDCs prior to this specification that do not
include cookies; if neither cookies nor FAST are used in a
conversation, the absence of a cookie is not a strong
indication that the KDC is terminating the conversation.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="pa-authentication-set"
title="Pre-authentication Set">
<t>If all mechanisms in a group need to successfully complete
in order to authenticate a
client, the client and the KDC SHOULD use the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET padata element.</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET 134
</artwork>
</figure>
<t> A PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET padata element contains the ASN.1 DER encoding of the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET
structure:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM
PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM ::= SEQUENCE {
pa-type [0] Int32,
-- same as padata-type.
pa-hint [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
pa-value [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
...
}
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>The pa-type field of the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM structure contains the corresponding value of
padata-type in PA-DATA <xref target="RFC4120"/>. Associated with the pa-type is a pa-hint, which is an octet-string
specified by the pre-authentication mechanism. This hint may
provide information for the client which helps it determine
whether the mechanism can be used. For example a public-key
mechanism might include the certificate authorities it trusts
in the hint info. Most mechanisms today do not specify hint
info; if a mechanism does not specify hint info the KDC MUST
NOT send a hint for that mechanism. To allow future revisions
of mechanism specifications to add hint info, clients MUST
ignore hint info received for mechanisms that the client
believes do not support hint info. The pa-value element of the PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM sequence is included to carry the first padata-value from the KDC to the client. If the client chooses this authentication set then the client MUST process this pa-value. The pa-value element MUST be absent for all but the first entry in the authentication set. Clients MUST ignore pa-value for the second and following entries in the authentication set. </t>
<t>If the client chooses an authentication set, then its
first AS-REQ message MUST contain a PA-AUTH-SET-SELECTED
padata element. This element contains the encoding of the
PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET sequence received from the KDC
corresponding to the authentication set that is chosen. The
client MUST use the same octet values received from the KDC;
it cannot re-encode the sequence. This allows KDCs to use
bit-wise comparison to identify the selected authentication set. Permitting bit-wise comparison may limit the ability to use certain pre-authentication mechanisms that generate a dynamic challenge in an authentication set with optimistic selection of an authentication set. As with other optimistic pre-authentication failures, the KDC MAY return KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED with a new list of pre-authentication mechanisms (including authentication sets) if optimistic pre-authentication fails.
The PA-AUTH-SET-SELECTED padata element MUST come
before any padata elements from the authentication set in the
padata sequence in the AS-REQ message. The client MAY cache
authentication sets from prior messages and use them to
construct an optimistic initial AS-REQ. If the KDC receives a
PA-AUTH-SET-SELECTED padata element that does not
correspond to an authentication set that it would offer, then
the KDC returns the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_SET
error. The e-data in this error contains a sequence of padata
just as for the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error.</t>
<t><figure>
<artwork>
PA-AUTH-SET-SELECTED 135
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_SET 92
</artwork>
</figure>
</t>
<t>The PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET appears only in the first message from the KDC to
the client. In particular, the client MAY fail if the authentication mechanism sets change as the
conversation progresses. Clients MAY assume that the hints provided in the authentication set contain enough information that the
client knows what user interface elements need to be displayed during the entire authentication conversation.
Exceptional circumstances such as expired passwords or expired accounts may require that additional user interface be displayed.
Mechanism designers needs to carefully consider the design of their hints so that the client has this information. This way,
clients can construct necessary dialogue boxes or wizards based on the authentication set and can present a coherent user interface.
Current standards for user interface do not provide an acceptable experience when the client has to ask
additional questions later in the conversation. </t>
<t>When indicating which sets of pre-authentication mechanisms are supported, the KDC includes a PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET padata element
for each pre-authentication mechanism set.</t>
<t> The client sends the
padata-value for the first mechanism it picks in the
pre-authentication set, when the first mechanism completes, the client and the
KDC will proceed with the second mechanism, and so on until all mechanisms complete successfully.
The PA-FX-COOKIE as defined in <xref target="kdc-state"/> MUST
be sent by the KDC. One reason for this requirement is so
that the conversation can continue if the conversation
involves multiple KDCs. KDCs MUST support clients that do not include a cookie because they optimistically choose an authentication set, although they MAY always return KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_SET and include a cookie in that message. Clients that support PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET MUST support PA-FX-COOKIE.</t>
<t>Before the authentication succeeds and
a ticket is returned, the message that the client sends is an AS_REQ and the message that the KDC sends is a KRB-ERROR message.
The error code in the KRB-ERROR message from the KDC is KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED as defined in <xref target="kdc-state"/> and the accompanying e-data contains
the DER encoding of ASN.1 type METHOD-DATA. The KDC includes the padata elements in the METHOD-DATA. If there is no padata, the e-data field is
absent in the KRB-ERROR message.</t>
<t>If the client sends the last message for a given mechanism,
then the KDC sends the first message for the next mechanism.
If the next mechanism does not start with a KDC-side
challenge, then the KDC includes a padata item with the
appropriate pa-type and an empty pa-data. </t>
<t>If the KDC sends the last message for a particular
mechanism, the KDC also includes the first padata for the
next mechanism.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="fast" title="Definition of Kerberos FAST Padata">
<t> As described in <xref target="RFC4120"/>, Kerberos is vulnerable to offline dictionary attacks. An attacker can request an AS-REP
and try various passwords to see if they can decrypt the resulting ticket.
RFC 4120 provides the encrypted timestamp pre-authentication method that ameliorates the situation somewhat
by requiring that an attacker observe a successful authentication. However stronger security is desired in many environments.
The Kerberos FAST pre-authentication padata defined in this section
provides a tool to significantly reduce vulnerability to offline dictionary attack. When combined with encrypted challenge,
FAST requires an attacker to mount a successful man-in-the-middle attack to observe ciphertext. When combined with host keys,
FAST can even protect against active attacks. FAST also provides solutions to common problems
for pre-authentication mechanisms such as binding of the request and the reply and
freshness guarantee of the authentication.
FAST itself, however, does not authenticate the client or the KDC, instead, it provides
a typed hole to allow pre-authentication data be tunneled.
A pre-authentication data element used within FAST is called a FAST factor.
A FAST factor captures the minimal work required for extending Kerberos to support a new pre-authentication scheme. </t>
<t>
A FAST factor MUST NOT be used outside of FAST unless its specification explicitly
allows so. The typed holes in FAST messages can also be
used as generic holes for other padata that are not intended to prove the client's identity, or
establish the reply key.</t>
<t>New pre-authentication mechanisms SHOULD be designed as FAST factors, instead
of full-blown pre-authentication mechanisms. </t>
<t> FAST factors that are pre-authentication mechanisms MUST meet the
requirements in <xref target="requirements"/>.</t>
<t>FAST employs an armoring scheme. The armor can be a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT)
obtained by the client's machine using the host keys to pre-authenticate with the KDC, or an anonymous
TGT obtained based on anonymous PKINIT <xref target="KRB-ANON"/> <xref target="RFC4556"/>. </t>
<t>The rest of this section describes
the types of armors and the syntax of the messages used by FAST.
Conforming implementations MUST support Kerberos FAST padata.</t>
<t>Any FAST armor scheme MUST provide a fresh armor key for
each conversation. Clients and KDCs can assume that if a message is
encrypted and integrity protected with a given armor key then it is
part of the conversation using that armor key. </t>
<t>All KDCs in a realm MUST support FAST if FAST is offered by any KDC as a pre-authentication mechanism.</t>
<section anchor="armor_key" title="FAST Armors">
<t> An armor key is used to encrypt pre-authentication data in the FAST request and the response.
The KrbFastArmor structure is defined to identify the armor key.
This structure contains the following two fields: the armor-type identifies the type of armors, and the armor-value
is an OCTET STRING that contains the description of the armor scheme and the armor key.</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
KrbFastArmor ::= SEQUENCE {
armor-type [0] Int32,
-- Type of the armor.
armor-value [1] OCTET STRING,
-- Value of the armor.
...
}
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>The value of the armor key is a matter of the armor type specification.
Only one armor type is defined in this document.</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST 1
</artwork>
</figure>
<t> The FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST armor is based on Kerberos tickets.</t>
<t>Conforming implementations MUST implement the FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST armor type. If a FAST KDC receives an unknown armor type it MUST respond with KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED.</t>
<t>An armor type may be appropriate for use in armoring AS requests, armoring TGS requests or both. TGS armor types MUST authenticate the client to to the KDC, typically by binding the TGT subsession key to the armor key. As discussed below, it is desirable for AS armor types to authenticate the KDC to the client, but this is not required.</t>
<t>FAST implementations MUST maintain state about whether the armor mechanism authenticates the KDC. If it does not, then a fast factor that authenticates the KDC MUST be used if the reply key is replaced.</t>
<section title="Ticket-based Armors">
<t>This is a ticket-based armoring scheme. The armor-type is FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST, the armor-value contains
an ASN.1 DER encoded AP-REQ. The ticket in the AP-REQ is called an armor ticket or an armor TGT.
The subkey field in the AP-REQ MUST be present.
The armor key is defined by the following function: </t>
<figure>
<artwork>
armor_key = KRB-FX-CF2( subkey, ticket_session_key,
"subkeyarmor", "ticketarmor" )
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>The `ticket_session_key' is the session key from the ticket in the ap-req. The `subkey' is the ap-req subkey. This construction guarantees that both the KDC (through the session key) and the client (through the subkey) contribute to the armor key.</t>
<t> The server name field of the armor ticket MUST identify the TGS of the target realm.
Here are three common ways in the decreasing preference order how an armor TGT SHOULD be obtained:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="numbers">
<t>If the client is authenticating from a host machine whose Kerberos realm has an authentication path to
the client's realm, the host machine obtains a TGT by using the host keys. If the client's realm is different
than the realm of the local host, the machine then obtains a cross-realm TGT to the client's realm as the armor ticket.
Otherwise, the host's primary TGT is the armor ticket.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t>If the client's host machine cannot obtain a host ticket strictly based on RFC4120,
but the KDC has an asymmetric signing key whose binding with the
expected KDC can be verified by the client, the client can use anonymous PKINIT <xref target="KRB-ANON"/> <xref target="RFC4556"/> to authenticate the KDC and obtain an anonymous TGT as the armor ticket.
The armor ticket can also be a cross-realm TGT obtained based on the initial primary TGT obtained using anonymous PKINIT with KDC authentication.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t>Otherwise, the client uses anonymous PKINIT to get an anonymous TGT without KDC authentication and that TGT is the armor ticket.
Note that this mode of operation is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks at the time of obtaining
the initial anonymous armor TGT.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>If anonymous PKINIT is used to obtain the armor ticket,
the KDC cannot know whether its signing key can be verified by the client, hence the KDC MUST be marked as unverified from the KDC's point of view while the client
could be able to authenticate the KDC by verifying the KDC's signing key is bound with the expected KDC.
The client needs to carefully consider the risk and benefit tradeoffs associated with active attacks before exposing cipher text encrypted using the user's long-term secrets when
the armor does not authenticate the KDC.</t>
<t>The TGS MUST reject a request if there is an AD-fx-fast-armor (TBD) element in the authenticator of the pa-tgs-req padata or if the ticket in the authenticator of a pa-tgs-req contains the AD-fx-fast-armor authorization data element. These tickets and authenticators MAY be used as FAST armor tickets but not to obtain a ticket via the TGS. This authorization data is used in a system where the encryption of the user's pre-authentication data is performed in an unprivileged user process. A privileged process can provide to the user process a host ticket, an authenticator for use with that ticket, and the sub session key contained in the authenticator. In order for the host process to ensure that the host ticket is not accidentally or intentionally misused, (i.e. the user process might use the host ticket to authenticate as the host), it MUST include a critical authorization data element of the type AD-fx-fast-armor when providing the authenticator or in the enc-authorization-data field of the TGS request used to obtain the TGT. The corresponding ad-data field of the AD-fx-fast-armor element is empty.
</t>
<t>This armor type is only valid for AS requests; implicit armor, described below in TGS processing, is the only supported way to establish an armor key for the TGS at this time.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="fastreq" title="FAST Request">
<t>A padata type PA-FX-FAST is defined for the Kerberos FAST pre-authentication padata.
The corresponding padata-value field <xref target="RFC4120"/> contains
the DER encoding of the ASN.1 type PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST. As with all
pre-authentication types, the KDC SHOULD advertise PA-FX-FAST in a
PREAUTH_REQUIRED error. KDCs MUST send the advertisement of
pa-fx-fast with an empty pa-value. Clients MUST ignore the pa-value of PA-FX-FAST in an initial PREAUTH_REQUIRED error. FAST is not expected to be used in an authentication set: clients will typically use FAST padata
if available and this decision should not depend on what other pre-authentication methods are available.
As such, no pa-hint is defined for FAST at this time.</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
PA-FX-FAST 136
-- Padata type for Kerberos FAST
PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST ::= CHOICE {
armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredReq,
...
}
KrbFastArmoredReq ::= SEQUENCE {
armor [0] KrbFastArmor OPTIONAL,
-- Contains the armor that identifies the armor key.
-- MUST be present in AS-REQ.
req-checksum [1] Checksum,
-- For AS, contains the checksum performed over the type
-- KDC-REQ-BODY for the req-body field of the KDC-REQ
-- structure;
-- For TGS, contains the checksum performed over the type
-- AP-REQ in the PA-TGS-REQ padata.
-- The checksum key is the armor key, the checksum
-- type is the required checksum type for the enctype of
-- the armor key, and the key usage number is
-- KEY_USAGE_FAST_REQ_CHKSUM.
enc-fast-req [2] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastReq --
-- The encryption key is the armor key, and the key usage
-- number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC.
...
}
KEY_USAGE_FAST_REQ_CHKSUM 50
KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC 51
</artwork>
</figure>
<t> The PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST structure contains a KrbFastArmoredReq type.
The KrbFastArmoredReq encapsulates the encrypted padata.</t>
<t>The enc-fast-req field contains an encrypted KrbFastReq structure. The armor key is used to encrypt the KrbFastReq structure, and
the key usage number for that encryption is KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC. </t>
<t>The armor key is selected as follows:
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="symbols">
<t>In an AS request, the armor field in the KrbFastArmoredReq structure MUST be present and the armor key is
identified according to the specification of the armor type.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t>There are two possibilities for armor for a TGS request. If the ticket presented in the PA-TGS-REQ authenticator is a TGT,
then the client SHOULD NOT include the armor field in the Krbfastreq and a subkey MUST be included in the PA-TGS-REQ authenticator.
In this case, the armor key is the same armor key that would be computed if the TGS-REQ authenticator was used in a FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST armor.
Clients MAY present a non-TGT in the PA-TGS-REQ authenticator and omit the armor field, in which case the armor key is the same that
would be computed if the authenticator were used in a FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST armor.
This is the only case where a ticket other than a TGT can be used to establish an armor key; even though the armor key is computed the same as a
FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST, a non-TGT cannot be used as an armor ticket in FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST. Alternatively, a client MAY use an armor type defined in the future for use with the TGS request.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t> The req-checksum field contains a checksum computed differently for AS and TGS.
For an AS-REQ, it is performed over the type KDC-REQ-BODY for the req-body field of the KDC-REQ
structure of the containing message; for an TGS-REQ, it is performed over the type AP-REQ in the PA-TGS-REQ padata of the TGS request.
The checksum key is the armor key, and the checksum type is the required checksum type for the enctype of the
armor key per <xref target="RFC3961"/>. This checksum MUST be a keyed checksume and it is
included in order to bind the FAST padata to the outer request. A KDC
that implements FAST will ignore the outer request, but including a
checksum is relatively cheap and may prevent confusing behavior. </t>
<t>The KrbFastReq structure contains the following information:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
KrbFastReq ::= SEQUENCE {
fast-options [0] FastOptions,
-- Additional options.
padata [1] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
-- padata typed holes.
req-body [2] KDC-REQ-BODY,
-- Contains the KDC request body as defined in Section
-- 5.4.1 of [RFC4120].
-- This req-body field is preferred over the outer field
-- in the KDC request.
...
}
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>The fast-options field indicates various options that are to modify the behavior of the KDC. The following options are defined:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
FastOptions ::= KerberosFlags
-- reserved(0),
-- hide-client-names(1),
</artwork>
</figure>
<figure>
<artwork>
Bits Name Description
-----------------------------------------------------------------
0 RESERVED Reserved for future expansion of this
field.
1 hide-client-names Requesting the KDC to hide client
names in the KDC response, as
described next in this section.
16 kdc-follow-referrals reserved draft-ietf-krb-wg-referrals
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>Bits 1 through 15 inclusive (with bit 1 and bit 15 included) are critical options. If the KDC does not
support a critical option, it MUST fail the request with KDC_ERR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_FAST_OPTIONS, and
there is no accompanying e-data defined in this document for this error code. Bit 16 and onward (with bit 16 included) are
non-critical options. KDCs conforming to this specification ignore unknown non-critical options.</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
KDC_ERR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_FAST_OPTIONS 93
</artwork>
</figure>
<t><list style="hanging">
<t hangText="The hide-client-names Option"> <vspace blankLines="1"/>
The Kerberos response defined in <xref target="RFC4120"/> contains the client identity in clear text,
This makes traffic analysis straightforward.
The hide-client-names option is designed to complicate traffic analysis.
If the hide-client-names option is set, the KDC implementing PA-FX-FAST MUST identify the client
as the anonymous principal <xref target="KRB-ANON"/> in the KDC reply and the error response.
Hence this option is set by the client if it wishes to conceal the client identity in the KDC response.
A conforming KDC ignores the client principal name in the outer KDC-REQ-BODY field, and identifies the client
using the cname and crealm fields in the req-body field of the KrbFastReq structure.<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t hangText="The kdc-follow-referrals Option"> <vspace blankLines="1"/>
This option is reserved for <xref target="REFERRALS"></xref></t>
</list>
</t>
<t> The padata field contains a list of PA-DATA structures as described in
Section 5.2.7 of <xref target="RFC4120"/>. These PA-DATA structures
can contain FAST factors. They can also be used as generic typed-holes
to contain data not intended for proving the client's identity or establishing a reply key,
but for protocol extensibility. If the KDC supports the PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST padata,
unless otherwise specified, the client MUST place any padata that is otherwise in the outer KDC request body into this field. In a TGS request,
PA-TGS-REQ padata is not included in this field and it is present in the outer KDC request body.</t>
<t> The KDC-REQ-BODY in the FAST structure is used in preference to the KDC-REQ-BODY outside of the FAST pre-authentication.
The outer KDC-REQ-BODY structure SHOULD be filled in for backwards compatibility with KDCs that do not support FAST.
A conforming KDC ignores the outer KDC-REQ-BODY field in the KDC request. Pre-authentication data methods such as <xref target="RFC4556"/> that include a checksum of the KDC-REQ-BODY should checksum the KDC-REQ-BODY in the FAST structure.
</t>
<t>In a TGS request, a client MAY include the
AD-fx-fast-used authdata either in the pa-tgs-req authenticator or in
the authorization data in the pa-tgs-req ticket. If the KDC receives
this authorization data but does not find a FAST padata then it MUST
return KRB_APP_ERR_MODIFIED.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="fastrep" title="FAST Response">
<t> The KDC that supports the PA-FX-FAST padata MUST include a PA-FX-FAST padata element in the KDC reply. In the case of an error,
the PA-FX-FAST padata is included in the KDC responses according to <xref target="err"/>.</t>
<t>The corresponding padata-value field <xref target="RFC4120"/> for the PA-FX-FAST in the KDC response contains
the DER encoding of the ASN.1 type PA-FX-FAST-REPLY.</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
PA-FX-FAST-REPLY ::= CHOICE {
armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredRep,
...
}
KrbFastArmoredRep ::= SEQUENCE {
enc-fast-rep [0] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastResponse --
-- The encryption key is the armor key in the request, and
-- the key usage number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP.
...
}
KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP 52
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>The PA-FX-FAST-REPLY structure contains a KrbFastArmoredRep structure.
The KrbFastArmoredRep structure encapsulates the padata in the KDC reply in the encrypted form.
The KrbFastResponse is encrypted with the armor key used
in the corresponding request, and the key usage number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP.</t>
<t>The Kerberos client MUST support a local policy that rejects the response if PA-FX-FAST-REPLY is not included in the response. Clients MAY
also support policies that fall back to other mechanisms or that do
not use pre-authentication when FAST is unavailable. It is
important to consider the potential downgrade attacks when deploying
such a policy. </t>
<t> The KrbFastResponse structure contains the following information:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
KrbFastResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
padata [0] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
-- padata typed holes.
strengthen-key [1] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
-- This, if present, strengthens the reply key for AS and
-- TGS. MUST be present for TGS.
-- MUST be absent in KRB-ERROR.
finished [2] KrbFastFinished OPTIONAL,
-- Present in AS or TGS reply; absent otherwise.
nonce [3] UInt32,
-- Nonce from the client request.
...
}
</artwork>
</figure>
<t> The padata field in the KrbFastResponse structure contains a list of PA-DATA structures as described in
Section 5.2.7 of <xref target="RFC4120"/>. These PA-DATA structures
are used to carry data advancing the exchange specific for the FAST factors. They can also be used as generic typed-holes
for protocol extensibility. Unless otherwise specified,
the KDC MUST include any padata that is otherwise in the outer KDC-REP or KDC-ERROR structure into this field. The padata field in the KDC reply structure outside of
the PA-FX-FAST-REPLY structure typically includes only the PA-FX- FAST-REPLY padata.
</t>
<t> The strengthen-key field provides a mechanism for the KDC to
strengthen the reply key. If set, the reply key is strengthened after
all padata items are processed. Let padata-reply-key be the reply key
after padata processing.
<figure>
<artwork>
reply-key = KRB-FX-CF2(strengthen-key, padata-reply-key,
"strengthenkey", "replykey")
</artwork>
</figure>
The strengthen-key field MAY be set in an AS reply; it MUST be set in a TGS reply; it must be
absent in an error reply. The strengthen key is required in a TGS reply so that an attacker cannot remove the FAST PADATA from a TGS reply, causing the KDC to appear not to support FAST.
</t>
<t>The finished field contains a KrbFastFinished structure.
It is filled by the KDC in the final message in the conversation.
This field is present in an AS-REP or a TGS-REP when a ticket is returned,
and it is not present in an error reply. </t>
<t>The KrbFastFinished structure contains the following information:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
KrbFastFinished ::= SEQUENCE {
timestamp [0] KerberosTime,
usec [1] Microseconds,
-- timestamp and usec represent the time on the KDC when
-- the reply was generated.
crealm [2] Realm,
cname [3] PrincipalName,
-- Contains the client realm and the client name.
ticket-checksum [4] Checksum,
-- checksum of the ticket in the KDC-REP using the armor
-- and the key usage is KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISH.
-- The checksum type is the required checksum type
-- of the armor key.
...
}
KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISHED 53
</artwork>
</figure>
<t> The timestamp and usec fields represent the time on the KDC when
the reply ticket was generated, these fields have the same semantics as the corresponding-identically-named fields in Section 5.6.1 of
<xref target="RFC4120"/>. The client MUST use the KDC's time in these fields thereafter when using the returned ticket.
The client need not confirm that the timestamp returned is within allowable clock skew: the armor key guarantees that the reply is fresh. The client MAY trust the time stamp returned.</t>
<t> The cname and crealm fields identify the authenticated client. If facilities described in <xref target="REFERRALS"/> are used, the authenticated client may differ from the client in the FAST request.</t>
<t> The ticket-checksum is a checksum of the issued ticket. The checksum key is the armor key, and the checksum type is the required checksum type of the enctype of that key, and
the key usage number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISHED. </t>
<!-- Moved here from the previous section. It's the KDC that needs to generate the cookie. -->
<t>When FAST padata is included, the PA-FX-COOKIE padata as defined in
<xref target="kdc-state"/> MUST be included in the padata sequence in
the KrbFastResponse sequence if the
KDC expects at least one more message from the client in order to complete the authentication.</t>
<t> The nonce field in the KrbFastResponse contains the value of the nonce field in the KDC-REQ of the corresponding client request and it binds
the KDC response with the client request. The client MUST verify that this nonce value in the reply matches with that of the request and reject the KDC reply otherwise. To prevent the response from one message in a conversation from being replayed to a request in another message, clients SHOULD use a new nonce for each message in a conversation.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="err" title="Authenticated Kerberos Error Messages using Kerberos FAST">
<t>If the Kerberos FAST padata was included in the request, unless otherwise specified,
the e-data field of the KRB-ERROR message <xref target="RFC4120"/>
contains the ASN.1 DER encoding of the type METHOD-DATA <xref target="RFC4120"/> and a PA-FX-FAST is included in
the METHOD-DATA. The KDC MUST include all the padata elements such as PA-ETYPE-INFO2 and
padata elements that indicate acceptable pre-authentication mechanisms <xref target="RFC4120"/> in the KrbFastResponse structure.</t>
<t>The KDC MUST also include a PA-FX-ERROR padata item in the KRBFastResponse structure. The padata-value element of this sequence is the ASN.1 DER encoding of the type KRB-ERROR. The e-data field MUST be absent in the PA-FX-ERROR padata. All other fields should be the same as the outer KRB-ERROR. The client ignores the outer error and uses the combination of the padata in the KRBFastResponse and the error information in the PA-FX-ERROR.</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
PA-FX-ERROR 137
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>If the Kerberos FAST padata is included in the request but not included in the error reply, it is a matter of the local
policy on the client to accept the information in the error message without integrity protection. The client SHOULD however process
the KDC errors as the result of the KDC's inability to accept the AP_REQ armor and potentially retry another request with a different armor
when applicable.
The Kerberos client MAY process
an error message without a PA-FX-FAST-REPLY, if that is only intended to return
better error information to the application, typically for trouble-shooting purposes.</t>
<t> In the cases where the e-data field of the KRB-ERROR message is expected to carry a TYPED-DATA <xref target="RFC4120"/> element,
then that information should be transmitted in a pa-data element within the KRBFastResponse structure. The padata-type is the same as the data-type would be in the typed data element and the padata-value is the same as the data-value. As discussed in <xref target="iana"/>,
data-types and padata-types are drawn from the same namespace. For example, the TD_TRUSTED_CERTIFIERS structure is expected to be in the KRB-ERROR message
when the error code is KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE <xref target="RFC4556"/>.</t>
</section>
<section title="Outer and Inner Requests">
<t>Typically, a client will know that FAST is being used before
a request containing PA-FX-FAST is sent. So, the outer AS
request typically only includes one pa-data item: PA-FX-FAST.
The client MAY include additional pa-data, but the KDC MUST
ignore the outer request body and any padata besides PA-FX-FAST
if and only if PA-FX-FAST is processed. In the case of the TGS request, the outer request should include PA-FX-FAST and PA-TGS-REQ.</t>
<t>When an AS generates a response, all padata besides PA-FX-FAST should be included in PA-FX-FAST. The client MUST ignore other padata outside of PA-FX-FAST.</t>
</section>
<section title="The Encrypted Challenge FAST Factor">
<t>The encrypted challenge FAST factor authenticates a client
using the client's long-term key. This factor works similarly to
the encrypted time stamp pre-authentication option described in
<xref target="RFC4120" />. The word challenge is used instead of timestamp because while the timestamp is used as an initial challenge, if the KDC and client do not have synchronized time, then the KDC can provide updated time to the client to use as a challenge. The client encrypts a structure
containing a timestamp in the
challenge key. The challenge key used by the client to send a message to the KDC is
KRB-FX-CF2(armor_key,long_term_key, "clientchallengearmor", "challengelongterm").
The challenge key used by the KDC encrypting to the client is KRB-FX-CF2(armor_key, long_term_key, "kdcchallengearmor", "challengelongterm"). Because the
armor key is fresh and random, the challenge key is fresh and
random. The only purpose of the timestamp is to limit the validity
of the authentication so that a request cannot be replayed. A
client MAY base the timestamp on the KDC time in a KDC error
and need not maintain accurate time synchronization itself. If a
client bases its time on an untrusted source, an attacker may trick
the client into producing an authentication request that is valid
at some future time. The attacker may be able to use this
authentication request to make it appear that a client has
authenticated at that future time. If ticket-based armor is used,
then the lifetime of the ticket will limit the window in which an
attacker can make the client appear to have authenticated. For
many situations, the ability of an attacker to cause a client to
appear to have authenticated is not a significant concern; the
ability to avoid requiring time synchronization on clients is more
valuable.</t>
<t>The client sends a padata of type PA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE. The corresponding
padata-value contains the DER encoding of ASN.1 type EncryptedChallenge. </t>
<figure>
<artwork>
EncryptedChallenge ::= EncryptedData
-- Encrypted PA-ENC-TS-ENC, encrypted in the challenge key
-- using key usage KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT for the
-- client and KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC for the KDC.
PA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE 138
KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT 54
KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC 55
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>The client includes some time stamp reasonably close to
the KDC's current time and encrypts it in the challenge
key in a PA-ENC-TS-ENC structure (Secc section 5.2.7.2 in RFC 4120). Clients MAY use the current time; doing so prevents
the exposure where an attacker can cause a client to appear
to authenticate in the future. The client sends the request
including this factor.</t>
<t>On receiving an AS-REQ containing the
PA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE fast factor, the KDC decrypts the
timestamp. If the decryption fails the KDC SHOULD return
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED, including PA-ETYPE-INFO2 in the KRBFastResponse in the error.
The KDC confirms that the timestamp falls within its
current clock skew returning KRB_APP_ERR_SKEW if not. The
KDC then SHOULD check to see if the encrypted challenge is a
replay. The KDC MUST NOT consider two encrypted challenges
replays simply because the time stamps are the same; to be a
replay, the ciphertext MUST be identical. Allowing clients to re-use time stamps avoids
requiring that clients maintain state about which time stamps
have been used.</t>
<t>If the KDC accepts the encrypted challenge, it MUST
include a padata element of type PA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE. The
KDC encrypts its current time in the challenge key. The KDC
MUST strengthen the reply key before issuing a ticket.
The client MUST check that the timestamp decrypts properly. The
client MAY check that the timestamp is within the window
of acceptable clock skew for the client. The client MUST NOT require that
the timestamp be identical to the timestamp in the issued
credentials or the returned message.</t>
<t> The encrypted challenge FAST factor provides the following facilities:
client-authentication and KDC authentication. This FAST factor also takes advantage of the FAST facility to strengthen the reply key. It does not provide
the replacing-reply-key facility. The security considerations section of this document
provides an explanation why the security requirements are met.</t>
<t>The encrypted challenge FAST factor can be useful in an authentication set. No pa-hint is defined because the only information needed by this mechanism is information contained in the PA-ETYPE-INFO2 pre-authentication data. KDCs are already required to send PA-ETYPE-INFO2. If KDCs were not required to send PA-ETYPE-INFO2 then that information would need to be part of a hint for encrypted challenge.</t>
<t>Conforming implementations MUST support the encrypted challenge FAST factor.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="auth-strength" title="Authentication Strength Indication">
<t> Implementations that
have pre-authentication mechanisms offering significantly
different strengths of client authentication MAY choose to
keep track of the strength of the authentication used as an
input into policy decisions. For example, some principals
might require strong pre-authentication, while less sensitive
principals can use relatively weak forms of pre-authentication
like encrypted timestamp.
</t>
<t> An AuthorizationData data type AD-Authentication-Strength is defined for this purpose.</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
AD-authentication-strength 70
</artwork>
</figure>
<t> The corresponding ad-data field contains the DER encoding of the pre-authentication
data set as defined in <xref target="pa-authentication-set"/>.
This set contains all the pre-authentication mechanisms that were used to authenticate the client. If only
one pre-authentication mechanism was used to authenticate the client,
the pre-authentication set contains one element. Unless otherwise specified, the hint and value fields of the members of this sequence MUST be empty. In order to permit mechanisms to carry additional information about strength in these fields in the future, clients and application servers MUST ignore non-empty hint and value fields for mechanisms unless the implementation is updated with the interpretation of these fields for a given pre-authentication mechanism in this authorization element.</t>
<t>The AD-authentication-strength element
MUST be included in the AD-IF-RELEVANT, thus it can be ignored if it is unknown to the receiver.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Assigned Constants">
<t>The pre-authentication framework and FAST involve using a number of Kerberos protocol constants.
This section lists protocol constants first introduced in this specification drawn from registries not managed by IANA.
Many of these registries would best be managed by IANA; that is a known issue that is out of scope for this document.
The constants described in this section have been accounted for and will appear in the next revision of the Kerberos core specification or in a document creating IANA registries.</t>
<t> <xref target="iana"/> creates IANA registries for a different set of constants used by the extensions described in this document.</t>
<section title="New Errors">
<figure>
<artwork>
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_EXPIRED 90
KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED 91
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_SET 92
KDC_ERR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_FAST_OPTIONS 93
</artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="Key Usage Numbers">
<figure>
<artwork>
KEY_USAGE_FAST_REQ_CHKSUM 50
KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC 51
KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP 52
KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISHED 53
KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT 54
KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC 55
</artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="Authorization Data Elements">
<figure>
<artwork>
AD-authentication-strength 70
AD-fx-fast-armor 71
AD-fx-fast-used 72
</artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="New PA-DATA Types">
<figure>
<artwork>
PA-FX-COOKIE 133
PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET 134
PA-AUTH-SET-SELECTED 135
PA-FX-FAST 136
PA-FX-ERROR 137
PA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE 138
</artwork>
</figure>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="iana" title="IANA Considerations">
<t>This document creates a number of IANA registries. These registries should all be located under http://www.iana.org/assignments/kerberos-parameters. See <xref target="RFC5226"/> for descriptions of the registration policies used in this section.</t>
<section title="Pre-authentication and Typed Data">
<t>RFC 4120 defines pre-authentication data, which can be included in a KDC request or response in order to authenticate the client or extend the protocol. In addition, it defines Typed-Data which is an extension mechanism for errors. Both pre-authentication data and typed data are carried as a 32-bit signed integer along with an octet string. The encoding of typed data and pre-authentication data is slightly different. However the types for pre-authentication data and typed-data are drawn from the same namespace. By convention, registrations starting with TD- are typed data and registration starting with PA- are pre-authentication data. It is important that these data types be drawn from the same namespace, because some errors where it would be desirable to include typed data require the e-data field to be formatted as pre-authentication data.</t>
<t>When Kerberos FAST is used, pre-authentication data encoding is always used.</t>
<t>There is one apparently conflicting registration between typed data and pre-authentication data. PA-GET-FROM-TYPED-DATA and TD-PADATA are both assigned the value 22. However this registration is simply a mechanism to include an element of the other encoding. The use of both should be deprecated.</t>
<t>This document creates a registry for pre-authentication and typed data. The registration procedures are as follows. Expert review for pre-authentication mechanisms designed to
authenticate users, KDCs, or establish the reply key. The expert
first determines that the purpose of the method is to authenticate
clients, KDCs, or to establish the reply key. If so, expert review is
appropriate. The expert evaluates the security and interoperability
of the specification.
</t>
<t>IETF review is required if the expert believes that the
pre-authentication method is broader than these three areas.
Pre-authentication methods that change the Kerberos state machine or
otherwise make significant changes to the Kerberos protocol should be
standards track RFCs. A concern that a particular method needs to be
a standards track RFC may be raised as an objection during IETF
review.
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
Type Value Reference
----------------------------------------------------------------------
PA-TGS-REQ 1 RFC 4120
PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP 2 RFC 4120
PA-PW-SALT 3 RFC 4120
[reserved] 4
PA-ENC-UNIX-TIME 5 (deprecated)
PA-SANDIA-SECUREID 6
PA-SESAME 7
PA-OSF-DCE 8
PA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID 9
PA-AFS3-SALT 10
PA-ETYPE-INFO 11 RFC 4120
PA-SAM-CHALLENGE 12 (sam/otp)
PA-SAM-RESPONSE 13 (sam/otp)
PA-PK-AS-REQ_OLD 14 draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-09
PA-PK-AS-REP_OLD 15 draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-pk-init-09
PA-PK-AS-REQ 16 RFC 4556
PA-PK-AS-REP 17 RFC 4556
PA-PK-OCSP-RESPONSE 18 RFC 4557
PA-ETYPE-INFO2 19 RFC 4120
PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO 20
PA-SVR-REFERRAL-INFO 20 (referrals)
PA-SAM-REDIRECT 21 (sam/otp)
PA-GET-FROM-TYPED-DATA 22 (embedded in typed data)
TD-PADATA 22 (embeds padata)
PA-SAM-ETYPE-INFO 23 (sam/otp)
PA-ALT-PRINC 24 (crawdad@fnal.gov)
PA-SERVER-REFERRAL 25 (referrals)
PA-SAM-CHALLENGE2 30 (kenh@pobox.com)
PA-SAM-RESPONSE2 31 (kenh@pobox.com)
PA-EXTRA-TGT 41 Reserved extra TGT
TD-PKINIT-CMS-CERTIFICATES 101 CertificateSet from CMS
TD-KRB-PRINCIPAL 102 PrincipalName
TD-KRB-REALM 103 Realm
TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS 104 PKINIT
TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX 105 PKINIT
TD-APP-DEFINED-ERROR 106 Application specific
TD-REQ-NONCE 107 INTEGER
TD-REQ-SEQ 108 INTEGER
PA-PAC-REQUEST 128 MS-KILE
PA-FOR_USER 129 MS-KILE
PA-FOR-X509-USER 130 MS-KILE
PA-FOR-CHECK_DUPS 131 MS-KILE
PA-AS-CHECKSUM 132 MS-KILE
PA-FX-COOKIE 133 draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework
PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET 134 draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework
PA-AUTH-SET-SELECTED 135 draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework
PA-FX-FAST 136 draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework
PA-FX-ERROR 137 draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework
PA-ENCRYPTED-CHALLENGE 138 draft-ietf-krb-wg-preauth-framework
PA-OTP-CHALLENGE 141 (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
PA-OTP-REQUEST 142 (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
PA-OTP-CONFIRM 143 (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
PA-OTP-PIN-CHANGE 144 (gareth.richards@rsa.com)
PA-EPAK-AS-REQ 145 (sshock@gmail.com)
PA-EPAK-AS-REP 146 (sshock@gmail.com>)
PA_PKINIT_KX 147 draft-ietf-krb-wg-anon
PA_PKU2U_NAME 148 draft-zhu-pku2u
PA-SUPPORTED-ETYPES 165 MS-KILE
PA-EXTENDED_ERROR 166 MS-KILE
</artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="Fast Armor Types">
<t>FAST armor types are defined in <xref target="armor_key"/>. A FAST armor type is a signed 32-bit integer. FAST armor types are assigned by standards action.</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
Type Name Description
------------------------------------------------------------
0 Reserved.
1 FX_FAST_ARMOR_AP_REQUEST Ticket armor using an ap-req.
</artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="FAST Options">
<t>A FAST request includes a set of bit flags to indicate additional options. Bits 0-15 are critical; other bits are non-critical. Assigning bits greater than 31 may require special support in implementations. Assignment of FAST options requires standards action.</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
Type Name Description
-------------------------------------------------------------------
0 RESERVED Reserved for future expansion of this
field.
1 hide-client-names Requesting the KDC to hide client
names in the KDC response
16 kdc-follow-referrals reserved
</artwork></figure>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="security" title="Security Considerations">
<t> The kdc-referrals option in the Kerberos FAST padata requests the KDC
to act as the client to follow referrals. This can overload the KDC.
To limit the damages of denial of service using this option,
KDCs MAY restrict the number of simultaneous active requests with this option
for any given client principal.</t>
<t>Regarding to the facilities provided by the Encrypted Challenge FAST factor, the challenge key
is derived from the client secrets and
because the client secrets are known only to the client and the KDC,
the verification of the EncryptedChallenge structure proves the client's identity,
the verification of the EncryptedChallenge structure in the KDC reply
proves that the expected KDC responded. Therefore, the Encrypted Challenge FAST factor as
a pre-authentication mechanism offers the following facilities: client-authentication
and KDC-authentication. There is no un-authenticated clear text introduced
by the Encrypted Challenge FAST factor.</t>
<t>FAST provides an encrypted tunnel over which
pre-authentication conversations can take place. In addition,
FAST optionally authenticates the KDC to the client. It is the
responsibility of FAST factors to authenticate the client to the
KDC. Care MUST be taken to design FAST factors such that they are
bound to the conversation. If this is not done, a
man-in-the-middle may be able to cut&paste a fast factor from
one conversation to another. The easiest way to do this is to
bind each fast factor to the armor key which is guaranteed to be
unique for each conversation.</t>
<t>The anonymous pkinit mode for obtaining an armor ticket does
not always authenticate the KDC to the client before the
conversation begins. Tracking the KDC verified state guarantees
that by the end of the conversation, the client has authenticated
the KDC. However fast factor designers need to consider the
implications of using their factor when the KDC has not yet been
authenticated. If this proves problematic in an environment, then
the particular fast factor should not be used with anonymous
PKINIT.</t>
<t>Existing pre-authentication mechanisms are believed to be at
least as secure when used with FAST as they are when used outside
of FAST. One part of this security is making sure that when
pre-authentication methods checksum the request, they checksum the
inner request rather than the outer request. If the mechanism
checksummed the outer request, a man-in-the-middle could observe
it outside a FAST tunnel and then cut&paste it into a FAST
exchange where the inner rather than outer request would be used
to select attributes of the issued ticket. Such attacks would
typically invalidate auditing information or create a situation
where the client and KDC disagree about what ticket is issued.
However, such attacks are unlikely to allow an attacker who would
not be able to authenticate as a principal to do so. Even so,
FAST is believed to defend against these attacks in existing
legacy mechanism. However since there is no standard for how
legacy mechanisms bind the request to the pre-authentication or
provide integrity protection, security analysis can be difficult.
In some cases FAST may significantly improve the integrity
protection of legacy mechanisms.</t>
<t>The security of the TGS exchange depends on authenticating
the client to the KDC. In the AS exchange, this is done using
pre-authentication data or FAST factors. In the TGS exchange,
this is done by presenting a TGT and by using the session (or
sub-session) key in constructing the request. Because FAST uses a
request body in the inner request, encrypted in the armor key,
rather than the request body in the outer request, it is critical
that establishing the armor key be tied to the authentication of
the client to the KDC. If this is not done, an attacker could
manipulate the options requested in the TGS request, for example
requesting a ticket with different validity or addresses. The
easiest way to bind the armor key to the authentication of the
client to the KDC is for the armor key to depend on the
sub-session key of the TGT. This is done with the implicit TGS
armor supported by this specification. Future armor types
designed for use with the TGS MUST either bind their armor keys to
the TGT or provide another mechanism to authenticate the client to
the KDC.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="ack" title="Acknowledgements">
<t>Sam Hartman would like to thank the MIT Kerberos Consortium
for its funding of his time on this project.</t>
<t> Several suggestions from Jeffrey Hutzelman based on early revisions of this documents
led to significant improvements of this document.</t>
<t>The proposal to ask one KDC to chase down the referrals and return the final ticket is based on requirements in <xref target="ID.CROSS"/>.</t>
<t>Joel Weber had a proposal for a mechanism similar to FAST that created a protected tunnel for Kerberos pre-authentication.</t>
<t> Srinivas Cheruku and Greg Hudson provided valuable review comments.</t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
&RFC2119;&RFC4120; &RFC3961; &RFC4556;
<reference anchor="KRB-ANON">
<front>
<title>Kerberos Anonymity Support</title>
<author initials="L." surname="Zhu">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="P." surname="Leach">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date year="2008"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="internet-draft"
value="draft-ietf-krb-wg-anon-10.txt"/>
</reference>
&RFC5226;
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<reference anchor="EKE">
<front>
<title>Augmented
Encrypted Key Exchange: A Password-Based Protocol Secure
Against Dictionary Attacks and Password File Compromise,
Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, ACM Press.</title>
<author initials="S.M." surname="Bellovin">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="M." surname="Merritt">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date month="November" year="1993"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="IEEE1363.2">
<front>
<title> IEEE P1363.2: Password-Based Public-Key Cryptography</title>
<author surname="IEEE">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date year="2004"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="ID.CROSS">
<front>
<title>Problem Statement on the Operation of Kerberos in a Specific System</title>
<author initials="S." surname="Sakane">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="S." surname="Zrelli">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="M." surname="Ishiyama ">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date month="April" year="2007"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="internet-draft" value="draft-sakane-krb-cross-problem-statement-02.txt"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="KRB-WG.SAM">
<front>
<title>Integrating Single-use Authentication Mechanisms with Kerberos</title>
<author initials="K" surname="Hornstein">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="K" surname="Renard">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="C" surname="Neuman">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="G" surname="Zorn">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date month="October" year="2003"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="internet-draft"
value="draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-sam-02.txt"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="REFERRALS">
<front>
<title>Generating KDC Referrals to Locate Kerberos Realms</title>
<author initials="K." surname="Raeburn">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="L." surname="Zhu">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date year="2008"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="internet-draft"
value="draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-referrals-11.txt"/>
</reference>
</references>
<section title="Test Vectors for KRB-FX-CF2">
<t>This informative appendix presents test vectors for the
KRB-FX-CF2 function. Test vectors are presented for several
encryption types. In all cases the first key (k1) is the result of
string-to-key("key1", "key1", default_parameters) and the second key
(k2) is the result of string-to-key("key2", "key2",
default_parameters). Both keys are of the same enctype. The
presented test vector is the hexadecimal encoding of the key
produced by KRB-FX-CF2(k1, k2, "a", "b"). The peppers are
one-octet ASCII strings.</t>
<t>In performing interoperability testing, there was significant
ambiguity surrounding
<xref target="RFC3961" /> pseudo-random operations. These test
vectors assume that the AES pseudo-random operation is
aes-ecb(trunc128(sha-1(input))) where trunc128 truncates its
input to 128-bits. The 3DES pseudo-random operation is assumed
to be des3-cbc(trunc128(sha-1(input))). The DES pseudo-random
operation is assumed to be des-cbc(md5(input)). As
specified in RFC 4757, the RC4 pseudo-random operation is
hmac-sha1(input). </t>
<t>Interoperability testing also demonstrated ambiguity surrounding the DES random-to-key operation. The random-to-key operation is assumed to be distribute 56 bits into high-7-bits of 8 octets and generate parity.</t>
<t>These test vectors were produced with revision 22359 of the
MIT Kerberos sources. The AES 256 and AES 128 test vectors have
been confirmed by multiple other implementors. The RC4 test vectors have been confirmed by one other implementor.
The DES and triple DES test vectors have not been
confirmed.</t>
<t><figure>
<artwork>
aes 128 (enctype 17): 97df97e4b798b29eb31ed7280287a92a
AES256 (enctype 18): 4d6ca4e629785c1f01baf55e2e548566
b9617ae3a96868c337cb93b5e72b1c7b
DES (enctype 1): 43bae3738c9467e6
3DES (enctype 16): e58f9eb643862c13ad38e529313462a7f73e62834fe54a01
RC4 (enctype 23): 24d7f6b6bae4e5c00d2082c5ebab3672
</artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Change History">
<t>RFC editor, please remove this section before publication.</t>
<section title="Changes Since 14">
<t><list>
<t>Remove kdc-follow-referrals option and instead place as a reservations for the referrals draft.</t>
<t>Note that a cookie followed by non-cookie terminates a conversation</t>
<t>Move discussion of protecting cleartext to section 5</t>
<t>Discuss pa-value and pa-hint in the ad element for authentication used</t>
<t>Update rule on handling padata outside this framework</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Changes since 13">
<t><list>
<t>Restore DES test vectors; their removal was not mentioned in 13.</t>
<t>Clarify that only implicit TGS armor is defined at this time. In the future we may define explicit TGS armor.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Changes since 12">
<t><list>
<t>Per comment from Greg Hudson, KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_REQUIRED instead of KDC_ERR_MORE_PREAUTH_DATA_NEEDED</t>
<t>Use pa-authentication-set-selected not pa-auth-set-selected </t>
<t>Update discussion of KDC verification (Love)</t>
<t>Remove explicit TGS armor, note that TGS armor must
authenticate the client to the KDC, describe in security considerations.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Changes since 11">
<t><list>
<t>Checksum the inner request body in methods like PKINIT, not
the outer request body. Per mailing list discussion, this
change addresses a potential security weakness.</t>
<t>Add additional security considerations text</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Changes since 10">
<t><list>
<t>The checksum member of the KrbFastFinished sequence has
been removed. A nonce field has been added to
KrbFastResponse.</t>
<t>The cookie no longer needs to be outside of FAST. In
fact, some security guarantees depend on the cookie being
inside FAST now that the finish checksum has been
removed. Affected that change.</t>
<t>Replace the rep-key field in KrbFastResponse with the
strengthen-key field. Per mailing list discussion, there
are security advantages to strengthening the reply
key.</t>
<t>Clarify handling of authentication sets.</t>
<t>Include the AD-fx-fast-used authorization data type.</t>
<t>Include note about random nonces.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Changes since 09">
<t><list>
<t>Clarify conversations by defining for TGS and by
describing how cookies form conversation boundaries.</t>
<t>Simplify text surrounding when finish is included:
always for AS and TGS reply, never for error.</t>
<t>Fill in IANA and constants</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Changes since 08">
<t><list>
<t>Fix a number of typos</t>
<t>Rename anonymous flag to hide-client-name; rename kdc-referals to kdc-follow-referrals</t>
<t>Clarify how anonymous pkinit interacts with KDC verified.</t>
<t>Introduce AD-fx-fast-armor authorization data to deal with unprivileged processes constructing KDC requests. Note that a TGT is always used for armor tickets if the armor field is present; if you proxy or validate you'll end up with a TGT armor ticket and another ticket in the pa-tgs-req. Alternatively you can simply use the other ticket in the PA-TGS-REQ; weak consensus within WG.</t>
<t>All KDCs in a realm MUST support FAST if it is to be offered.</t>
<t>The cookie message is always generated by the KDC.</t>
<t>Note that the client can trust and need not verify the time stamp in the finish message. This can seed the client's idea of KDC time.</t>
<t>Note that the client name in the finish message may differ from the name in the request if referrals are used.</t>
<t>Note that KDCs should advertize fast in preauth_required errors.</t>
<t>Armor key is constructed using KRB-FX-CF2. This is true even in the TGS case; there is no security reason to do this. Using the subkey as done in draft 08 would be fine, but the current text uses the same procedure both in the TGS and AS case.</t>
<t>Use a different challenge key in each direction in the encrypted challenge option.</t>
<t>Note that the KDC should process PA-FX-COOKIE before other padata.</t>
<t>KRB-FX-CF2 uses k1's enctype for the result; change around calling order so we pass in subkeys and armor keys as k1 in preference to long-term keys or ticket session keys.</t>
<t>Clarify the relationship between authentication sets and cookies. A cookie may not be needed in the first message. Clarify how this interacts with optimistic clients.</t>
<t>Remove text raising a concern that RFC 3961 may permit ciphertext transformations that do not change plaintext: discussion on the list came to the conclusion that RFC 3961 does not permit this.</t>
<t>Remove binding key concept; use the armor key instead. The cookie becomes just an octet string. </t>
<t>Include PA-FX-ERROR to protect the error information per Dublin.</t>
<t>Returning preauth_failed in the failed to decrypt encrypted challenge seems fine; remove the issue marker</t>
<t>Add a section describing what goes in the inner and outer request. I believe it is redundant but found it useful while putting together an implementation proposal.</t>
<t>Use hyphen rather than underscore in the constants for pre-authentication data to be consistent with RFC 4120.</t>
<t>Add a ticket-checksum to the finished message</t>
<t>Remove redundant KEY_USAGE_FAST_ARMOR.</t>
<t>Add protocol constants section for non-IANA registrations and flesh out IANA section.</t>
<t>Clarify that kdc-req-body checksums should always use the outer body even for mechanisms like PKINIT that include their own (now redundant) checksum.</t>
<t>Remove mechanism for encapsulating typed data in padata; just reflect the value.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Changes since 07">
<t><list>
<t>Propose replacement of authenticated timestamp with
encrypted challenge. The desire to avoid clients needing
time synchronization and to simply the factor.</t>
<t>Add a requirement that any FAST armor scheme must
provide a fresh key for each conversation. This allows us
to assume that anything encrypted/integrity protected in
the right key is fresh and not subject to
cross-conversation cut and paste. </t>
<t>Removed heartbeat padata. The KDC will double up
messages if it needs to; the client simply sends its
message and waits for the next response. </t>
<t>Define PA-auth-SET-SELECTED </t>
<t>Clarify a KDC cannot ignore padata is has claimed to
support </t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Changes since 06">
<t><list>
<t>Note that even for replace reply key it is likely that the side using the mechanism will know that the other side supports it. Since it is reasonably unlikely we'll need a container mechanism other than FAST itself, we don't need to optimize for that case. So, we want to optimize for implementation simplicity. Thus if you do have such a container mechanism interacting with authentication sets we'll assume that the hint need to describe hints for all contained mechanisms. This closes out a long-standing issue.</t>
<t>Write up what Sam believes is the consensus on UI and prompts in the authentication set: clients MAY assume that they have all the UI information they need. </t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="ASN.1 module">
<figure>
<artwork>
KerberosPreauthFramework {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) preauth-framework(3)
} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
KerberosTime, PrincipalName, Realm, EncryptionKey, Checksum,
Int32, EncryptedData, PA-ENC-TS-ENC, PA-DATA, KDC-REQ-BODY,
Microseconds, KerberosFlags
FROM KerberosV5Spec2 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2)
modules(4) krb5spec2(2) };
-- as defined in RFC 4120.
PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET ::= SEQUENCE OF PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM
PA-AUTHENTICATION-SET-ELEM ::= SEQUENCE {
pa-type [0] Int32,
-- same as padata-type.
pa-hint [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
pa-value [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
...
}
KrbFastArmor ::= SEQUENCE {
armor-type [0] Int32,
-- Type of the armor.
armor-value [1] OCTET STRING,
-- Value of the armor.
...
}
PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST ::= CHOICE {
armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredReq,
...
}
KrbFastArmoredReq ::= SEQUENCE {
armor [0] KrbFastArmor OPTIONAL,
-- Contains the armor that identifies the armor key.
-- MUST be present in AS-REQ.
req-checksum [1] Checksum,
-- For AS, contains the checksum performed over the type
-- KDC-REQ-BODY for the req-body field of the KDC-REQ
-- structure;
-- For TGS, contains the checksum performed over the type
-- AP-REQ in the PA-TGS-REQ padata.
-- The checksum key is the armor key, the checksum
-- type is the required checksum type for the enctype of
-- the armor key, and the key usage number is
-- KEY_USAGE_FAST_REQ_CHKSUM.
enc-fast-req [2] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastReq --
-- The encryption key is the armor key, and the key usage
-- number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_ENC.
...
}
KrbFastReq ::= SEQUENCE {
fast-options [0] FastOptions,
-- Additional options.
padata [1] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
-- padata typed holes.
req-body [2] KDC-REQ-BODY,
-- Contains the KDC request body as defined in Section
-- 5.4.1 of [RFC4120].
-- This req-body field is preferred over the outer field
-- in the KDC request.
...
}
FastOptions ::= KerberosFlags
-- reserved(0),
-- hide-client-names(1),
-- kdc-follow-referrals(16)
PA-FX-FAST-REPLY ::= CHOICE {
armored-data [0] KrbFastArmoredRep,
...
}
KrbFastArmoredRep ::= SEQUENCE {
enc-fast-rep [0] EncryptedData, -- KrbFastResponse --
-- The encryption key is the armor key in the request, and
-- the key usage number is KEY_USAGE_FAST_REP.
...
}
KrbFastResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
padata [0] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA,
-- padata typed holes.
strengthen-key [1] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
-- This, if present, strengthens the reply key for AS and
-- TGS. MUST be present for TGS
-- MUST be absent in KRB-ERROR.
finished [2] KrbFastFinished OPTIONAL,
-- Present in AS or TGS reply; absent otherwise.
nonce [3] UInt32,
-- Nonce from the client request.
...
}
KrbFastFinished ::= SEQUENCE {
timestamp [0] KerberosTime,
usec [1] Microseconds,
-- timestamp and usec represent the time on the KDC when
-- the reply was generated.
crealm [2] Realm,
cname [3] PrincipalName,
-- Contains the client realm and the client name.
ticket-checksum [4] Checksum,
-- checksum of the ticket in the KDC-REP using the armor
-- and the key usage is KEY_USAGE_FAST_FINISH.
-- The checksum type is the required checksum type
-- of the armor key.
...
}
EncryptedChallenge ::= EncryptedData
-- Encrypted PA-ENC-TS-ENC, encrypted in the challenge key
-- using key usage KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT for the
-- client and KEY_USAGE_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC for the KDC.
END
</artwork>
</figure>
</section>
</back>
</rfc>
<!-- LocalWords: ETYPe ciphertext TBA
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