One document matched: draft-ietf-kitten-iakerb-01.xml
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<!ENTITY RFC4121 PUBLIC ''
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<!ENTITY RFC6113 PUBLIC '' 'http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6113.xml'> <!-- KRB-PAFW -->
<!ENTITY RFC6112 PUBLIC '' 'http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6112.xml'> <!-- KRB-ANON -->
<!ENTITY RFC6542 PUBLIC '' 'http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6542.xml'> <!-- GSS-EXTS -->
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<rfc ipr="trust200902" updates="4120" category="std" docName="draft-ietf-kitten-iakerb-01">
<front>
<title abbrev="IAKERB">Initial and Pass Through Authentication Using Kerberos V5 and the GSS-API (IAKERB)</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Schaad" fullname="Jim Schaad" role="editor">
<organization>Soaring Hawk Consulting</organization>
<address>
<email>ietf@augustcellars.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="L." surname="Zhu" fullname="Larry Zhu">
<organization>Microsoft Corporation</organization>
<address><postal>
<street>One Microsoft Way</street>
<city>Redmond</city>
<region>WA</region>
<code>98052</code>
<country>US</country>
</postal>
<email>lzhu@microsoft.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Altman" fullname="Jeffery Altman">
<organization>Secure Endpoints</organization> <address>
<postal>
<street> 255 W 94th St </street>
<city>New York</city>
<region>NY</region>
<code>10025</code>
<country>US</country>
</postal>
<email>jaltman@secure-endpoints.com</email></address>
</author>
<date/>
<area>Security</area><workgroup>NETWORK WORKING GROUP</workgroup>
<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>
This document defines extensions to the Kerberos protocol and the GSS-API Kerberos mechanism
that enable a GSS-API Kerberos client to exchange messages with the KDC using
the GSS-API acceptor as the proxy, by encapsulating the Kerberos messages inside GSS-API tokens.
With these extensions a client can obtain Kerberos tickets for services where the KDC is not accessible to the client, but is
accessible to the application server.
</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section anchor="introduction" title="Introduction">
<t>
When authenticating using Kerberos V5, clients obtain tickets from a
KDC and present them to services. This model of operation cannot work if the client does not have
access to the KDC. For example, in remote access scenarios,
the client must initially authenticate to an access point in
order to gain full access to the network. Here the client may be
unable to directly contact the KDC either because it does not have an
IP address, or the access point packet filter does not allow the
client to send packets to the Internet before it authenticates to the
access point.
</t>
<t>
Recent advancements in extending Kerberos permit
Kerberos authentication to complete with the assistance of a proxy. The Kerberos <xref target="RFC4120"/> pre-authentication framework <xref target="RFC6113"/>
prevents the exposure of weak client keys over the open network.
The Kerberos support of anonymity <xref target="RFC6112"/> provides for privacy and further complicates traffic analysis.
The kdc-referrals option defined in <xref target="RFC6113"/> may reduce the number of messages exchanged while obtaining a ticket to exactly two
even in cross-realm authentications.
</t>
<t>
Building upon these Kerberos extensions, this document extends <xref target="RFC4120"/> and
<xref target="RFC4121"/> such that the client can communicate with the KDC using a Generic Security Service
Application Program Interface (GSS-API) <xref target="RFC2743"/> acceptor as the proxy. The GSS-API acceptor relays
the KDC request and reply messages between the client and the KDC.
The GSS-API acceptor, when relaying the Kerberos messages, is called an IAKERB proxy.
Consequently, IAKERB as defined in this document requires the use of GSS-API.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Conventions Used in This Document">
<t>
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in <xref
target="RFC2119" pageno="false" format="default"></xref>.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="defs" title="GSS-API Encapsulation">
<t>
The mechanism Objection Identifier (OID) for GSS-API IAKERB, in accordance
with the mechanism proposed by <xref target="RFC4178"/>
for negotiating protocol variations, is id-kerberos-iakerb:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
id-kerberos-iakerb ::=
{ iso(1) org(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) kerberosV5(2)
iakerb(5) }
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
All context establishment token of IAKERB MUST have the generic token framing described in section 3.1 of
<xref target="RFC2743"/> with the mechanism OID being id-kerberos-iakerb.
MIT implemented an earlier draft of this specification, details on how to inter operate with that implementation can be found in <xref target="MITVersion"/>.
</t>
<t>
The client starts by constructing the ticket request, and if the ticket request
is being made to the KDC, the client, instead of contacting the KDC directly, encapsulates the request message
into the output token of the GSS_Init_security_context() call and returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED <xref target="RFC2743"/> indicating that
at least one more token is required in order to establish the context. The output
token is then passed for use as the input token to the GSS_Accept_sec_context() call in accordance with GSS-API. The GSS-API acceptor extracts
the Kerberos request in the input token, locates the target KDC, and sends the request on behalf of the client.
After receiving the KDC reply, the GSS-API
acceptor then encapsulates the reply message into the output token of GSS_Accept_sec_context(). The GSS-API acceptor returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED <xref target="RFC2743"/> indicating that
at least one more token is required in order to establish the context. The output token is passed to the initiator in accordance with GSS-API.
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
Client <---------> IAKERB proxy <---------> KDC
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
The innerToken described in section 3.1 of
<xref target="RFC2743"/> and subsequent GSS-API mechanism tokens have the following formats: it starts with a two-octet token-identifier
(TOK_ID), followed by an IAKERB message or a Kerberos message.
</t>
<t>
Only one IAKERB specific message, namely the IAKERB_PROXY message, is defined in this document.
The TOK_ID values for Kerberos messages are the
same as defined in <xref target="RFC4121"/>.
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
Token TOK_ID Value in Hex
--------------------------------------
IAKERB_PROXY 05 01
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
The content of the IAKERB_PROXY message is defined as an IAKERB-HEADER structure immediately followed by a Kerberos message.
The Kerberos message can be an AS-REQ, an AS-REP, a TGS-REQ, a TGS-REP, or a KRB-ERROR as defined in <xref target="RFC4120"/>.
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
IAKERB-HEADER ::= SEQUENCE {
target-realm [1] UTF8String,
-- The name of the target realm.
cookie [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- Opaque data, if sent by the server,
-- MUST be copied by the client verbatim into
-- the next IAKRB_PROXY message.
...
}
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
The IAKERB-HEADER structure and all the Kerberos messages MUST
be encoded using Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) <xref target="CCITT.X680.2002"/> <xref target="CCITT.X690.2002"/>.
</t>
<t>
The IAKERB client fills out the IAKERB-HEADER structure as follows:
the target-realm contains the realm name the ticket request is addressed to. In the initial message from the client, the cookie field is absent.
The client MUST specify a target-realm. If the client does not
know the realm of the client's true principal name <xref target="RFC6806"/>, it MUST specify a realm it knows. This can be the realm of the client's host.
<!--
The GSS-API client can retrieve the default realm of the GSS-API server by sending an IAKERB message with an empty target-realm in the IAKERB-HEADER
and no Kerberos message following the IAKERB-HEADER struture. The GSS-API server fills out the traget realm field using the default realm (which could be the realm of the server host),
and sends back the IAKERB message with no Kerberos message following the header. The GSS-API client can use the returned realm in subsequent IAKERB messages. -->
</t>
<t>
Upon receipt of the IAKERB_PROXY message,
the GSS-API acceptor inspects the target-realm field in the IAKERB_HEADER, and locates a KDC of that realm, and sends the ticket request to that KDC.
</t>
<t>
The GSS-API server encapsulates
the KDC reply message in the returned IAKERB message. It fills out the target realm using the realm sent by the client and the KDC reply message is included
immediately following the IAKERB-HEADER header.
</t>
<t>
When the GSS-API acceptor is unable to obtain an IP address for a KDC in the
client's realm, it sends a KRB_ERROR message with the code KRB_AP_ERR_IAKERB_KDC_NOT_FOUND to the client and the context fails to establish. There is no accompanying error data defined in
this document for this error code.
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
KRB_AP_ERR_IAKERB_KDC_NOT_FOUND 85
-- The IAKERB proxy could not find a KDC.
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
When the GSS-API acceptor has an IP address for a KDC in the client realm,
but does not receive a response from any KDC in the realm (including
in response to retries), it sends a KRB_ERROR message with the code KRB_AP_ERR_IAKERB_KDC_NO_RESPONSE to the client and the context fails to establish. There is no accompanying error data defined
in this document for this error code.
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
KRB_AP_ERR_IAKERB_KDC_NO_RESPONSE 86
-- The KDC did not respond to the IAKERB proxy.
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
The IAKERB proxy can send opaque data in the cookie field of the IAKERB-HEADER structure in the server reply to the client,
in order to, for example, minimize the amount of state information kept by the GSS-API acceptor.
The content and the encoding of
the cookie field is a local matter of the IAKERB proxy. The client MUST copy the cookie verbatim
from the previous server response whenever the cookie is present into the subsequent tokens that contains an IAKERB_PROXY message.
</t>
<t>
The client and the server can repeat the sequence of sending and receiving the IAKERB messages as described above, in order to allow the client interact with the KDC
through the IAKERB proxy, and to obtain Kerberos tickets as needed.
</t>
<t>
When obtaining the initial TGT, the client may start with an NT-ENTERPRISE name type and the client host does not have a Kerberos realm. To resolve the NT-ENTERPRISE name type, the client typically starts with the client host realm and then finds out the true realm of the client based on <xref target="RFC6806"/>. In this case the GSS-API client can retrieve the realm of the GSS-API server as follows: the client returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED with the output token containing an IAKERB message with an empty target-realm in the IAKERB-HEADER and no Kerberos message following the IAKERB-HEADER structure. Upon receipt of the realm request, the GSS-API server fills out the target realm field using the realm of the server, and returns GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED with the output token containing the IAKERB message with the server's realm and no Kerberos message following the IAKERB-HEADER header. The GSS-API client can then use the returned realm in subsequent IAKERB messages to resolve the NT-ENTERPRISE name type. Since the GSS-API server can act as a Kerberos acceptor, it always has a Kerberos realm in this case.
</t>
<t>
When the client obtained a service ticket,
the client sends a KRB_AP_REQ message to the server, and performs the client-server application exchange as defined in
<xref target="RFC4120"/> and <xref target="RFC4121"/>.
</t>
<t>
For implementations conforming to this specification, both the authenticator subkey and the GSS_EXTS_FINISHED extension as defined in <xref target="FinishMessage"/> MUST be present in the AP-REQ authenticator.
This checksum provides integrity protection for the messages exchanged including the unauthenticated clear texts in the IAKERB-HEADER structure.
</t>
<t>
If the pre-authentication data is encrypted in the long-term
password-based key of the principal, the risk of security
exposures is significant. Implementations
SHOULD provide the AS_REQ armoring as defined in
<xref target="RFC6113"/> unless an alternative protection is deployed.
In addition, the anonymous
Kerberos FAST option is RECOMMENDED for the client to complicate
traffic analysis.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Finish Message" anchor="FinishMessage">
<t>
For implementations conforming to this specification, the authenticator subkey in the AP-REQ MUST alway be present,
and the Exts field in the GSS-API authenticator [RFC6542] MUST contain an extension of the type GSS_EXTS_IAKERB_FINISHED
and the extension data contains the ASN.1 DER encoding of the structure IAKERB-FINISHED.
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
GSS_EXTS_FINISHED 2
--- Data type for the IAKERB checksum.
KRB-FINISHED ::= {
gss-mic [1] Checksum,
-- Contains the checksum [RFC3961] of the GSS-API tokens
-- exchanged between the initiator and the acceptor,
-- and prior to the containing AP_REQ GSS-API token.
-- The checksum is performed over the GSS-API tokens
-- in the order that the tokens were sent.
...
}
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
pnp The gss-mic field in the KRB-FINISHED structure contains a Kerberos checksum <xref target="RFC3961"/> of all the preceding context tokens of this GSS-API
context (including the InitialContextToken header), concatenated in chronological order (note that GSS-API context token exchanges are synchronous.)
The checksum type is the required checksum type of the enctype of the subkey in the authenticator, the protocol key for the checksum operation is the authenticator subkey, and the key usage number is KEY_USAGE_FINISHED.
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
KEY_USAGE_FINISHED 41
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
The GSS-API acceptor MUST then verify the checksum contained in the GSS_EXTS_FINISHED extension.
This checksum provides integrity protection for the messages exchanged including the unauthenticated clear texts in the IAKERB-HEADER structure.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Addresses in Tickets">
<t>
In IAKERB, the machine sending requests to the KDC is the GSS-API acceptor and
not the client. As a result, the client should not include its
addresses in any KDC requests for two reasons. First, the KDC may
reject the forwarded request as being from the wrong client. Second,
in the case of initial authentication for a dial-up client, the
client machine may not yet possess a network address. Hence, as
allowed by <xref target="RFC4120"/>, the addresses field of the AS-REQ and TGS-REQ
requests SHOULD be blank and the caddr field of the ticket SHOULD
similarly be left blank.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="securityconsideration" title="Security Considerations" toc="default">
<t>
A typical IAKERB client sends the AS_REQ with pre-authentication data
encrypted in the long-term keys of the user before the server is authenticated. This enables offline
attacks by un-trusted servers. To mitigate this threat, the
client SHOULD use Kerberos FAST<xref target="RFC6113"/> and require KDC authentication to protect
the user's credentials.
</t>
<t>
The client name is in clear text in the authentication exchange
messages and ticket granting service exchanges according to
<xref target="RFC4120"/> whereas the client name is encrypted in client-
server application exchange messages. By using the IAKERB proxy
to relay the ticket requests and responses, the client's identity
could be revealed in the client-server traffic where the same identity
could have been concealed if IAKERB were not used.
Hence, to complicate traffic analysis and provide privacy for the IAKERB client,
the IAKERB client SHOULD request the anonymous Kerberos FAST option <xref target="RFC6113"/>.
</t>
<t>
Similar to other network access protocols, IAKERB allows an
unauthenticated client (possibly outside the security perimeter of an
organization) to send messages that are proxied to interior servers.
To reduce attack surface, firewall filters can be applied to allow from which hosts the client requests can be proxied and the proxy can further restrict the set of realms to which the requests can be proxied.
</t>
<t>
In a scenario where DNS SRV RR's are being used to locate the
KDC, IAKERB is being used, and an external attacker can modify DNS
responses to the IAKERB proxy, there are several countermeasures to
prevent arbitrary messages from being sent to internal servers:<vspace blankLines="1"/>
<list style="numbers"><t>
KDC port numbers can be statically configured on the IAKERB
proxy. In this case, the messages will always be sent to KDC's. For
an organization that runs KDC's on a static port (usually port 88)
and does not run any other servers on the same port, this
countermeasure would be easy to administer and should be effective.<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t>
The proxy can do application level sanity checking and filtering.
This countermeasure should eliminate many of the above attacks.<vspace blankLines="1"/>
</t>
<t>
DNS security can be deployed. This countermeasure is probably
overkill for this particular problem, but if an organization has
already deployed DNS security for other reasons, then it might make
sense to leverage it here. Note that Kerberos could be used to
protect the DNS exchanges. The initial DNS SRV KDC lookup by the
proxy will be unprotected, but an attack here is at most a denial of
service (the initial lookup will be for the proxy's KDC to facilitate
Kerberos protection of subsequent DNS exchanges between itself and
the DNS server).
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Acknowledgements">
<t>
Jonathan Trostle, Michael Swift, Bernard Aboba
and Glen Zorn wrote earlier revision of this document.
</t>
<t>
The hallway conversations between Larry Zhu
and Nicolas Williams formed the basis of this document.
</t>
</section>
<section title="IANA Considerations">
<t>IANA is requested to make a modification in the "Kerberos GSS-API Token Type Identifiers" registry.</t>
<t>
The following data to the table:
</t>
<texttable>
<ttcol>ID</ttcol> <ttcol>Description</ttcol> <ttcol>Reference</ttcol>
<c>05 01</c> <c>IAKERB_PROXY</c> <c>[THIS RFC]</c>
</texttable>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
&RFC2119;
&RFC4120;
&RFC4121;
&RFC2743;
&RFC4178;
&RFC3961;
&RFC6542;
</references>
<references title="Informative references">
&RFC6113;
&RFC6112;
&RFC6806;
&X680;
&X690;
</references>
<section title="Interoperate with Previous MIT version" anchor="MITVersion">
<t>
MIT implemented an early draft version of this document, this section gives a method for detecting and interoperating with that version.
</t>
<t>
Initiators behave as follows:
<list style="symbols">
<t>If the acceptor token is framed, then use the protocol as defined above.</t>
<t>
Else
<list style="symbols">
<t>All future tokens sent to the acceptor are to be unframed.</t>
<t>When creating the finish message, the value of one (1) should be used in place of GSS_EXTS_FINISHED.</t>
<t>When computing the checksum, the value of KEY_USAGE_IAKERB_FINISHED should be used in place of KEY_USAGE_FINISHED.</t>
</list>
</t>
</list>
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
KEY_USAGE_IAKERB_FINISHED 42
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
Acceptors behave as follows:
<list style="symbols">
<t>If you framed the response token, use the finish extension processing defined in the main document.</t>
<t>If you did not frame the response token, use the finish extension processing defined in the previous paragraph.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</back>
</rfc>
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