One document matched: draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-16.xml
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<rfc category="std" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-16">
<front>
<title>JSON Web Signature (JWS)</title>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization>Microsoft</organization>
<address>
<email>mbj@microsoft.com</email>
<uri>http://self-issued.info/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="John Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley">
<organization abbrev="Ping Identity">Ping Identity</organization>
<address>
<email>ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Nat Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura">
<organization abbrev="NRI">Nomura Research Institute</organization>
<address>
<email>n-sakimura@nri.co.jp</email>
</address>
</author>
<date day="15" month="September" year="2013" />
<area>Security</area>
<workgroup>JOSE Working Group</workgroup>
<keyword>RFC</keyword>
<keyword>Request for Comments</keyword>
<keyword>I-D</keyword>
<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
<keyword>JavaScript Object Notation</keyword>
<keyword>JSON</keyword>
<keyword>JSON Object Signing and Encryption</keyword>
<keyword>JOSE</keyword>
<keyword>JSON Web Signature</keyword>
<keyword>JWS</keyword>
<keyword>JSON Web Encryption</keyword>
<keyword>JWE</keyword>
<keyword>JSON Web Key</keyword>
<keyword>JWK</keyword>
<keyword>JSON Web Algorithms</keyword>
<keyword>JWA</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>
JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents
content secured with digital signatures or
Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) based data structures.
Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this
specification are described in the separate
JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification
and an IANA registry defined by that specification.
Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate
JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.
</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction" anchor="Introduction">
<t>
JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents
content secured with digital signatures or
Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) <xref target="RFC4627"/>
based data structures.
The JWS cryptographic mechanisms provide integrity protection for
an arbitrary sequence of octets.
</t>
<t>
Two closely related serializations for JWS objects are defined.
The JWS Compact Serialization is a compact, URL-safe representation
intended for space constrained environments such as HTTP
Authorization headers and URI query parameters.
The JWS JSON Serialization represents JWS objects as JSON objects and
enables multiple signatures and/or MACs to be applied to the same content.
Both share the same cryptographic underpinnings.
</t>
<t>
Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this
specification are described in the separate
JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) <xref target="JWA" /> specification
and an IANA registry defined by that specification.
Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate
JSON Web Encryption (JWE) <xref target="JWE" /> specification.
</t>
<t>
Names defined by this specification are short because a core goal is
for the resulting representations to be compact.
</t>
<section title="Notational Conventions" anchor="NotationalConventions">
<t>
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL",
"SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in
Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels <xref target='RFC2119' />.
If these words are used without being spelled in uppercase then
they are to be interpreted with their normal natural language meanings.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Terminology" anchor="Terminology">
<t>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="JSON Web Signature (JWS)">
A data structure representing a digitally signed or MACed message.
The structure represents three values:
the JWS Header,
the JWS Payload, and
the JWS Signature.
</t>
<t hangText="JSON Text Object">
A UTF-8 <xref target="RFC3629"/>
encoded text string representing a JSON object;
the syntax of JSON objects is defined in
Section 2.2 of <xref target="RFC4627"/>.
</t>
<t hangText="JWS Header">
A JSON Text Object
(or JSON Text Objects, when using the JWS JSON Serialization)
that describes the
digital signature or MAC operation applied to
create the JWS Signature value.
The members of the JWS Header object(s) are Header Parameters.
</t>
<t hangText="JWS Payload">
The sequence of octets to be secured -- a.k.a., the message.
The payload can contain an arbitrary sequence of octets.
</t>
<t hangText="JWS Signature">
A sequence of octets containing the cryptographic material that
ensures the integrity of
the JWS Protected Header
and the JWS Payload.
The JWS Signature value is a digital signature or MAC value
calculated over the JWS Signing Input using the parameters
specified in the JWS Header.
</t>
<t hangText="JWS Protected Header">
A JSON Text Object that contains the portion of the
JWS Header that is integrity protected.
For the JWS Compact Serialization, this comprises the entire JWS Header.
For the JWS JSON Serialization, this is one component of the JWS Header.
</t>
<t hangText="Header Parameter">
A name/value pair that is member of the JWS Header.
</t>
<t hangText="Header Parameter Name">
The name of a member of the JWS Header.
</t>
<t hangText="Header Parameter Value">
The value of a member of the JWS Header.
</t>
<t hangText="Base64url Encoding">
Base64 encoding using the URL- and filename-safe
character set defined in Section 5 of <xref target="RFC4648">RFC 4648</xref>,
with all trailing '=' characters omitted (as permitted by Section 3.2).
(See <xref target="base64urlnotes" /> for notes on
implementing base64url encoding without padding.)
</t>
<t hangText="Encoded JWS Header">
Base64url encoding of the JWS Protected Header.
</t>
<t hangText="Encoded JWS Payload">
Base64url encoding of the JWS Payload.
</t>
<t hangText="Encoded JWS Signature">
Base64url encoding of the JWS Signature.
</t>
<t hangText="JWS Signing Input">
The concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.')
character, and the Encoded JWS Payload.
</t>
<t hangText="JWS Compact Serialization">
A representation of the JWS as the concatenation of
the Encoded JWS Header,
the Encoded JWS Payload, and
the Encoded JWS Signature
in that order, with the three strings being separated
by two period ('.') characters.
This representation is compact and URL-safe.
</t>
<t hangText="JWS JSON Serialization">
A representation of the JWS as a JSON structure containing
JWS Header,
Encoded JWS Payload, and
Encoded JWS Signature values.
Unlike the JWS Compact Serialization,
the JWS JSON Serialization
enables multiple digital signatures and/or MACs to
be applied to the same content.
This representation is neither compact nor URL-safe.
</t>
<t hangText="Collision Resistant Name">
A name in a namespace that enables names to be allocated in a manner
such that they are highly unlikely to collide with other names.
Examples of collision resistant namespaces include:
Domain Names,
Object Identifiers (OIDs) as defined in the ITU-T X.660
and X.670 Recommendation series, and
Universally Unique IDentifiers (UUIDs)
<xref target="RFC4122"/>.
When using an administratively delegated namespace,
the definer of a name needs to take
reasonable precautions to ensure they are in control of
the portion of the namespace they use to define the name.
</t>
<t hangText="StringOrURI">
A JSON string value, with the additional requirement that
while arbitrary string values MAY be used, any value
containing a ":" character MUST be a URI
<xref target="RFC3986"/>.
StringOrURI values are compared as case-sensitive strings
with no transformations or canonicalizations applied.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="JSON Web Signature (JWS) Overview" anchor="Overview">
<t>
JWS represents digitally signed or MACed content using JSON data
structures and base64url encoding.
Three values are represented in a JWS:
the JWS Header,
the JWS Payload, and
the JWS Signature.
In the Compact Serialization, the three values are
base64url-encoded for transmission, and represented
as the concatenation of the encoded strings in that order,
with the three strings being separated by two period ('.') characters.
A JSON Serialization for this information is also defined in
<xref target="JSONSerialization"/>.
</t>
<t>
The JWS Header describes the signature or MAC method and parameters employed.
The JWS Payload is the message content to be secured.
The JWS Signature ensures the integrity of
both the JWS Protected Header and the JWS Payload.
</t>
<section title="Example JWS" anchor="ExampleJWS">
<t>
This section provides an example of a JWS.
Its computation is described in more detail in <xref target="HS256Example"/>,
including specifying the exact octet sequences representing the JSON values used
and the key value used.
</t>
<t>
The following example JWS Header declares that the
encoded object is a JSON Web Token (JWT) <xref target="JWT" />
and the JWS Header and the JWS Payload are
secured using the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"typ":"JWT",
"alg":"HS256"}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Base64url encoding the octets of the UTF-8 representation of
the JWS Header yields this Encoded JWS Header value:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The UTF-8 representation of following JSON object is used as the JWS Payload.
(Note that the payload can be any
content, and need not be a representation of a JSON object.)
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Base64url encoding the JWS Payload yields this Encoded JWS Payload
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Computing the HMAC of the octets of the ASCII <xref target="USASCII"/>
representation of the JWS Signing Input
(the concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.')
character, and the Encoded JWS Payload)
with the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm
using the key specified in <xref target="HS256Example" />
and base64url encoding the result
yields this Encoded JWS Signature value:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Concatenating these values in the order
Header.Payload.Signature with period ('.') characters between the
parts yields this complete JWS representation
using the JWS Compact Serialization
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
.
dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
See <xref target="JWSExamples"/> for additional examples.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="JWS Header" anchor="Header">
<t>
The members of the JSON object(s) representing the JWS Header describe the
digital signature or MAC applied to the
Encoded JWS Header and the Encoded JWS Payload and optionally
additional properties of the JWS.
The Header Parameter Names within the JWS Header MUST be unique;
recipients MUST either reject JWSs with duplicate Header Parameter Names
or use a JSON parser that returns only the lexically last duplicate member name,
as specified in Section 15.12 (The JSON Object) of
ECMAScript 5.1 <xref target="ECMAScript"/>.
</t>
<t>
Implementations are required to understand
the specific header parameters defined by this specification
that are designated as "MUST be understood"
and process them in the manner defined in this specification.
All other header parameters defined by this specification that
are not so designated MUST be ignored when not understood.
Unless listed as a critical header parameter, per <xref target="critDef"/>,
all header parameters not defined by this specification
MUST be ignored when not understood.
</t>
<t>
There are three classes of Header Parameter Names:
Registered Header Parameter Names, Public Header Parameter Names,
and Private Header Parameter Names.
</t>
<section title="Registered Header Parameter Names" anchor="RegisteredHeaderParameterName">
<t>
The following Header Parameter Names are registered
in the IANA
JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry
defined in
<xref target="HdrReg"/>,
with meanings as defined below.
</t>
<t>
As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a
common header parameter space; when a parameter is used by
both specifications, its usage must be compatible
between the specifications.
</t>
<section title='"alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter' anchor="algDef">
<t>
The <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> (algorithm) header
parameter identifies the cryptographic algorithm used to
secure the JWS.
The signature, MAC, or plaintext value is not valid if the <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx>
value does not represent a supported algorithm, or if there is not a
key for use with that algorithm associated with the
party that digitally signed or MACed the content.
<spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> values SHOULD either be
registered in the IANA
JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry
defined in
<xref target="JWA" /> or be
a value that contains a Collision Resistant Name.
The <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> value is a case sensitive string
containing a StringOrURI value.
Use of this header parameter is REQUIRED.
This header parameter MUST be understood and processed by implementations.
</t>
<t>
A list of defined <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> values can be found
in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry
defined in
<xref target="JWA" />;
the initial contents of this registry are the values defined in
Section 3.1 of the
JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) <xref target="JWA" /> specification.
</t>
</section>
<section title='"jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter' anchor="jkuDef">
<t>
The <spanx style="verb">jku</spanx> (JWK Set URL)
header parameter is a URI <xref target="RFC3986"/> that refers to a
resource for a set of JSON-encoded public keys, one of which
corresponds to the key
used to digitally sign the JWS.
The keys MUST be encoded as a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) <xref target="JWK" />.
The protocol used to acquire the resource MUST provide
integrity protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve the
JWK Set MUST use TLS <xref target="RFC2818"/> <xref target="RFC5246"/>;
the identity of the server MUST be validated, as per
Section 3.1 of HTTP Over TLS <xref target='RFC2818'/>.
Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
</t>
</section>
<section title='"jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter' anchor="jwkDef">
<t>
The <spanx style="verb">jwk</spanx> (JSON Web Key)
header parameter is the public key
that corresponds to the key
used to digitally sign the JWS.
This key is represented as a JSON Web Key <xref target="JWK" />.
Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
</t>
</section>
<section title='"x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter' anchor="x5uDef">
<t>
The <spanx style="verb">x5u</spanx> (X.509 URL) header
parameter is a URI <xref target="RFC3986"/> that refers to a resource for
the X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain <xref target="RFC5280"/>
corresponding to the key
used to digitally sign the JWS.
The identified resource MUST provide a representation of
the certificate or certificate chain that conforms to
<xref target="RFC5280">RFC 5280</xref> in PEM encoded form
<xref target="RFC1421"/>.
The certificate containing the public key
corresponding to the key
used to digitally sign the JWS
MUST be the first certificate.
This MAY be followed by additional certificates, with each
subsequent certificate being the one used to certify the
previous one.
The protocol used to acquire the resource MUST provide
integrity protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve the
certificate MUST use TLS <xref target="RFC2818"/> <xref target="RFC5246"/>;
the identity of the server MUST be validated, as per
Section 3.1 of HTTP Over TLS <xref target='RFC2818'/>.
Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
</t>
</section>
<section title='"x5t" (X.509 Certificate SHA-1 Thumbprint) Header Parameter' anchor="x5tDef">
<t>
The <spanx style="verb">x5t</spanx> (X.509 Certificate SHA-1 Thumbprint)
header parameter is a base64url encoded
SHA-1 thumbprint (a.k.a. digest) of the DER encoding of
the X.509 certificate <xref target="RFC5280"/>
corresponding to the key
used to digitally sign the JWS.
Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
</t>
<t>
If, in the future, certificate thumbprints need to be
computed using hash functions other than SHA-1, it is
suggested that additional related header parameters be
defined for that purpose. For example, it is suggested
that a new <spanx style="verb">x5t#S256</spanx>
(X.509 Certificate Thumbprint using SHA-256) header parameter
could be defined by registering it in the IANA
JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry
defined in
<xref target="HdrReg" />.
</t>
</section>
<section title='"x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header Parameter' anchor="x5cDef">
<t>
The <spanx style="verb">x5c</spanx> (X.509 Certificate Chain)
header parameter contains the X.509 public key
certificate or certificate chain <xref target="RFC5280"/>
corresponding to the key
used to digitally sign the JWS.
The certificate or certificate chain is represented as
a JSON array of certificate value strings.
Each string in the array is a base64 encoded
(<xref target="RFC4648"/> Section 4 -- not base64url encoded)
DER <xref target="ITU.X690.1994"/> PKIX certificate value.
The certificate containing the public key
corresponding to the key
used to digitally sign the JWS
MUST be the first certificate.
This MAY be followed by additional certificates, with each
subsequent certificate being the one used to certify the
previous one.
The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according
to <xref target="RFC5280"/> and reject the signature if any
validation failure occurs.
Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
</t>
<t>
See <xref target="x5cExample"/> for an example
<spanx style="verb">x5c</spanx> value.
</t>
</section>
<section title='"kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter' anchor="kidDef">
<t>
The <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> (key ID) header
parameter is a hint indicating which key
was used to secure the JWS.
This parameter allows originators to explicitly signal a change of
key to recipients.
Should the recipient be unable to locate a key
corresponding to the <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx>
value, they SHOULD treat that condition as an error.
The interpretation of the
<spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> value is unspecified.
Its value MUST be a string.
Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
</t>
<t>
When used with a JWK, the <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx>
value can be used to match a JWK <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx>
parameter value.
</t>
</section>
<section title='"typ" (Type) Header Parameter' anchor="typDef">
<t>
The <spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> (type) header
parameter is used to declare the type of
this complete JWS object
in an application-specific manner
in contexts where this is useful to the application.
This parameter has no effect upon the JWS processing.
The type value <spanx style="verb">JOSE</spanx> can be used
by applications
to indicate that this object is a JWS or JWE using
the JWS Compact Serialization or the JWE Compact Serialization.
The type value <spanx style="verb">JOSE+JSON</spanx> can be used
by applications
to indicate that this object is a JWS or JWE using
the JWS JSON Serialization or the JWE JSON Serialization.
Other type values can also be used by applications.
The <spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> value is a case sensitive string.
Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
</t>
<t>
MIME Media Type <xref target="RFC2046"/>
values MAY be used as <spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> values.
When MIME Media Type values are used, it is RECOMMENDED that
they be spelled using the exact character case used in the
MIME Media Types registry <xref target="IANA.MediaTypes"/>,
since this field is case sensitive,
whereas MIME Media Type values are case insensitive.
</t>
<t>
<spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> values SHOULD either be
registered in the IANA
JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values registry
defined in
<xref target="TypReg" /> or be
a value that contains a Collision Resistant Name.
</t>
</section>
<section title='"cty" (Content Type) Header Parameter' anchor="ctyDef">
<t>
The <spanx style="verb">cty</spanx> (content type) header
parameter is used to declare the type of
the secured content (the payload)
in an application-specific manner
in contexts where this is useful to the application.
This parameter has no effect upon the JWS processing.
The <spanx style="verb">cty</spanx> value is a case sensitive string.
Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
</t>
<t>
The values used for the <spanx style="verb">cty</spanx>
header parameter come from the same value space as the
<spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> header parameter,
with the same rules applying.
</t>
</section>
<section title='"crit" (Critical) Header Parameter' anchor="critDef">
<t>
The <spanx style="verb">crit</spanx> (critical) header parameter
indicates that extensions to [[ this specification ]] are being used
that MUST be understood and processed.
Its value is an array listing the header parameter names defined
by those extensions that are used in the JWS Header.
If any of the listed extension header parameters are not
understood and supported by the receiver, it MUST reject the JWS.
Senders MUST NOT include header parameter names defined by
[[ this specification ]] or by <xref target="JWA" /> for use with JWS,
duplicate names, or
names that do not occur as header parameter names within the JWS Header
in the <spanx style="verb">crit</spanx> list.
Senders MUST not use the empty list <spanx style="verb">[]</spanx>
as the <spanx style="verb">crit</spanx> value.
Recipients MAY reject the JWS if the critical list
contains any header parameter names defined by [[ this specification ]]
or by <xref target="JWA" /> for use with JWS,
or any other constraints on its use are violated.
This header parameter MUST be integrity protected, and therefore
MUST occur only with the JWS Protected Header, when used.
Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
This header parameter MUST be understood and processed by implementations.
</t>
<t>
<figure>
<preamble>
An example use, along with a hypothetical
<spanx style="verb">exp</spanx> (expiration-time) field is:
</preamble>
<artwork><![CDATA[
{"alg":"ES256",
"crit":["exp"],
"exp":1363284000
}
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Public Header Parameter Names" anchor="PublicHeaderParameterName">
<t>
Additional Header Parameter Names can be defined by those
using JWSs. However, in order to prevent collisions, any new
Header Parameter Name SHOULD either be registered in the IANA
JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry
defined in
<xref target="HdrReg" /> or be a Public Name:
a value that contains a Collision Resistant Name.
In each case, the definer of the name
or value needs to take reasonable precautions to make sure they
are in control of the part of the namespace they use to
define the Header Parameter Name.
</t>
<t>
New header parameters should be introduced sparingly, as
they can result in non-interoperable JWSs.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Private Header Parameter Names" anchor="PrivateHeaderParameterName">
<t>
A producer and consumer of a JWS may agree to use Header Parameter Names
that are Private Names: names that are
not Registered Header Parameter Names <xref target="RegisteredHeaderParameterName"></xref>
or Public Header Parameter Names <xref target="PublicHeaderParameterName"></xref>.
Unlike Public Header Parameter Names,
Private Header Parameter Names are subject to collision and
should be used with caution.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Producing and Consuming JWSs" anchor="JWSRules">
<section title="Message Signing or MACing" anchor="MessageSigning">
<t>
To create a JWS, one MUST perform these steps.
The order of the steps is not significant in cases where
there are no dependencies between the inputs and outputs of the steps.
<list style="numbers">
<t>
Create the content to be used as the JWS Payload.
</t>
<t>
Base64url encode the octets of the JWS Payload. This
encoding becomes the Encoded JWS Payload.
</t>
<t>
Create a JWS Header containing the desired set of header
parameters. Note that white space is explicitly allowed
in the representation and no canonicalization need be performed
before encoding.
</t>
<t>
Base64url encode the octets of the UTF-8 representation of
the JWS Protected Header to create the Encoded JWS Header.
If the JWS Protected Header is not present
(which can only happen when using the JWS JSON Serialization
and no <spanx style="verb">protected</spanx> member is present),
let the Encoded JWS Header be the empty string.
</t>
<t>
Compute the JWS Signature in the manner defined for
the particular algorithm being used over the JWS Signing Input
(the concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header,
a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload).
The <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> (algorithm) header parameter MUST be
present in the JWS Header, with the algorithm value
accurately representing the algorithm used to construct
the JWS Signature.
</t>
<t>
Base64url encode the representation of the JWS Signature
to create the Encoded JWS Signature.
</t>
<t>
The three encoded parts are result values used in both the
JWS Compact Serialization and the JWS JSON Serialization representations.
</t>
<t>
If the JWS JSON Serialization is being used, repeat this process
for each digital signature or MAC value being applied.
</t>
<t>
Create the desired serialized output.
The JWS Compact Serialization of this result is the
concatenation of
the Encoded JWS Header,
the Encoded JWS Payload, and
the Encoded JWS Signature
in that order, with the three strings
being separated by two period ('.') characters.
The JWS JSON Serialization is described in <xref target="JSONSerialization"/>.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Message Signature or MAC Validation" anchor="MessageValidation">
<t>
When validating a JWS, the following steps MUST be taken.
The order of the steps is not significant in cases where
there are no dependencies between the inputs and outputs of the steps.
If any of the listed steps fails, then the signature or MAC cannot be validated.
</t>
<t>
It is an application decision which signatures, MACs, or plaintext values
must successfully validate for the JWS to be accepted.
In some cases, all must successfully validate or the JWS will be rejected.
In other cases, only a specific signature, MAC, or plaintext value
needs to be successfully validated.
However, in all cases, at least one signature, MAC, or plaintext value
MUST successfully validate or the JWS MUST be rejected.
</t>
<t>
<list style="numbers">
<t>
Parse the serialized input to determine the values of
the JWS Header,
the Encoded JWS Payload, and
the Encoded JWS Signature.
When using the JWS Compact Serialization,
the Encoded JWS Header,
the Encoded JWS Payload, and
the Encoded JWS Signature
are represented as text strings in that order,
separated by two period ('.') characters.
The JWS JSON Serialization
is described in <xref target="JSONSerialization"/>.
</t>
<t>
The Encoded JWS Header MUST be successfully base64url
decoded following the restriction given in this specification that
no padding characters have been used.
</t>
<t>
Let the JWS Protected Header value be the result of
base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header.
</t>
<t>
The resulting JWS Protected Header MUST be a completely valid
JSON object conforming to <xref target="RFC4627">RFC 4627</xref>.
</t>
<t>
If using the JWS Compact Serialization, let the JWS Header be the
JWS Protected Header;
otherwise, when using the JWS JSON Serialization,
let the JWS Header be the union of
the members of the corresponding <spanx style="verb">protected</spanx>
and <spanx style="verb">header</spanx> header parameter values,
all of which must be completely valid JSON objects.
</t>
<t>
The resulting JWS Header MUST NOT contain duplicate
Header Parameter Names.
When using the JWS JSON Serialization, this restriction includes
that the same Header Parameter Name also MUST NOT occur in
distinct JSON Text Object values that together comprise the JWS Header.
</t>
<t>
The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include
parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
understood and supported
or that are specified as being ignored when not understood.
</t>
<t>
The Encoded JWS Payload MUST be successfully base64url
decoded following the restriction given in this specification that
no padding characters have been used.
</t>
<t>
The Encoded JWS Signature MUST be successfully base64url
decoded following the restriction given in this specification that
no padding characters have been used.
</t>
<t>
The JWS Signature MUST be successfully validated
against the JWS Signing Input (the concatenation of the
Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and the
Encoded JWS Payload)
in the manner defined for the algorithm being used, which
MUST be accurately represented by the value of the <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> (algorithm)
header parameter, which MUST be present.
</t>
<t>
If the JWS JSON Serialization is being used, repeat this process
for each digital signature or MAC value contained in the representation.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="String Comparison Rules" anchor="StringComparison">
<t>
Processing a JWS inevitably requires comparing known strings
to values in JSON objects. For example, in checking what the
algorithm is, the Unicode string encoding
<spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> will be
checked against the member names in the JWS Header
to see if there is a matching Header Parameter Name.
A similar process occurs when determining if the value
of the <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> header parameter
represents a supported algorithm.
</t>
<t>
Comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings
MUST be performed as specified below:
<list style="numbers">
<t>
Remove any JSON escaping from the input JSON string and
convert the string into a sequence of Unicode code points.
</t>
<t>
Likewise, convert the string to be compared against into
a sequence of Unicode code points.
</t>
<t>
Unicode Normalization <xref target="USA15"/> MUST NOT
be applied at any point to either the JSON string or to
the string it is to be compared against.
</t>
<t>
Comparisons between the two strings MUST be performed as a
Unicode code point to code point equality comparison.
(Note that values that originally used different Unicode encodings
(UTF-8, UTF-16, etc.) may result in the same code point values.)
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Also, see the JSON security considerations in <xref target="JSONSecCon"/> and
the Unicode security considerations in <xref target="UnicodeSecCon"/>.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Key Identification" anchor="IDingKeys">
<t>
It is necessary for the recipient of a JWS to be able to determine
the key that was employed for the digital signature or MAC operation.
The key employed can be identified using the
Header Parameter methods described in <xref
target="RegisteredHeaderParameterName" /> or can be identified
using methods that are outside the scope of this specification.
Specifically, the Header Parameters
<spanx style="verb">jku</spanx>,
<spanx style="verb">jwk</spanx>,
<spanx style="verb">x5u</spanx>,
<spanx style="verb">x5t</spanx>,
<spanx style="verb">x5c</spanx>,
and <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx>
can be used to identify the key used.
These header parameters MUST be integrity protected if the
information that they convey is to be utilized in a trust decision.
</t>
<t>
The sender SHOULD include sufficient information in the Header Parameters
to identify the key used, unless the application uses another means
or convention to determine the key used.
Validation of the signature or MAC fails when
the algorithm used requires a key
(which is true of all algorithms except for <spanx style="verb">none</spanx>) and
the key used cannot be determined.
</t>
<t>
The means of exchanging any shared symmetric keys used
is outside the scope of this specification.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Serializations" anchor="Serializations">
<t>
JWS objects use one of two serializations, the
JWS Compact Serialization
or the
JWS JSON Serialization.
The JWS Compact Serialization is mandatory to implement.
Implementation of the JWS JSON Serialization is OPTIONAL.
</t>
<section title="JWS Compact Serialization" anchor="CompactSerialization">
<t>
The JWS Compact Serialization represents digitally signed or MACed
content as a compact URL-safe string.
This string is
the concatenation of
the Encoded JWS Header,
the Encoded JWS Payload, and
the Encoded JWS Signature
in that order, with the three strings being separated
by two period ('.') characters.
Only one signature/MAC is supported by the JWS Compact Serialization.
</t>
</section>
<section title="JWS JSON Serialization" anchor="JSONSerialization">
<t>
The JWS JSON Serialization represents digitally signed or MACed
content as a JSON object.
Unlike the JWS Compact Serialization, content using
the JWS JSON Serialization can be secured with more than one
digital signature and/or MAC value.
</t>
<t>
The representation is closely related to that used in the
JWS Compact Serialization,
with the following differences for the
JWS JSON Serialization:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
Values in the JWS JSON Serialization are represented as members of
a JSON object, rather than as base64url encoded strings
separated by period ('.') characters.
(However binary values and values that are integrity protected
are still base64url encoded.)
</t>
<t>
The Encoded JWS Payload value is stored in the
<spanx style="verb">payload</spanx> member.
</t>
<t>
There can be multiple signature and/or MAC values, rather than just one.
A JSON array in the <spanx style="verb">signatures</spanx> member
is used to hold values that are specific to a particular
signature or MAC computation,
with one array element per signature/MAC represented.
These array elements are JSON objects.
</t>
<t>
Each Encoded JWS Signature value, if non-empty, is stored in the
<spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> member of a JSON object
that is an element of the <spanx style="verb">signatures</spanx> array.
</t>
<t>
Each Encoded JWS Header value,
which is a base64url encoded set of header parameter values
that are included in the signature/MAC computation,
if non-empty, is stored in the
<spanx style="verb">protected</spanx> member of the corresponding
element of the <spanx style="verb">signatures</spanx> array.
</t>
<t>
Unlike the JWS Compact Serialization, in the JWS JSON Serialization
there can also be header parameter values that are not included
in the signature/MAC computation.
If present, unprotected header parameter values are
represented as an unencoded JSON Text Object in the
<spanx style="verb">header</spanx> member of the corresponding
element of the <spanx style="verb">signatures</spanx> array.
</t>
<t>
The header parameter values used when creating or validating
individual signature or MAC values are
the union of the two sets of header parameter values that may be present:
(1) the integrity-protected per-signature/MAC values
represented in the <spanx style="verb">protected</spanx>
member of the signature/MAC's array element, and
(2) the non-integrity-protected per-signature/MAC values
in the <spanx style="verb">header</spanx>
member of the signature/MAC's array element.
The union of these sets of header parameters comprises the JWS Header.
The header parameter names in the two locations MUST be disjoint.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<figure>
<preamble>
The syntax of a JWS using the JWS JSON Serialization is as follows:
</preamble>
<artwork><![CDATA[
{
"payload":"<payload contents>"
"signatures":[
{"protected":<integrity-protected header 1 contents>",
"header":"<non-integrity-protected header 1 contents>",
"signature":"<signature 1 contents>"},
...
{"protected":<integrity-protected header N contents>",
"header":"<non-integrity-protected header N contents>",
"signature":"<signature N contents>"}],
}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Of these members, only the
<spanx style="verb">payload</spanx>,
<spanx style="verb">signatures</spanx>,
and <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx>
members MUST be present.
At least one of the
<spanx style="verb">protected</spanx> and
<spanx style="verb">header</spanx>
members MUST be present for each signature/MAC computation
so that an <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx>
header parameter value is conveyed.
</t>
<t>
The contents of the
Encoded JWS Payload and
Encoded JWS Signature
values are exactly as defined in the rest of this specification.
They are interpreted and validated in the same manner,
with each corresponding
Encoded JWS Signature and
set of header parameter values
being created and validated together.
The JWS Header values used are the union of the header parameters in the
corresponding <spanx style="verb">protected</spanx> and
<spanx style="verb">header</spanx> members,
as described earlier.
</t>
<t>
Each JWS Signature value is computed on the
JWS Signing Input using the
parameters of the corresponding JWS Header value
in the same manner as for the JWS Compact Serialization.
This has the desirable property that each
Encoded JWS Signature value
in the <spanx style="verb">signatures</spanx> array
is identical to the value
that would have been computed for the same parameter
in the JWS Compact Serialization,
provided that the Encoded JWS Header value
for that signature/MAC computation
(which represents the integrity-protected header parameter values)
matches that used in
the JWS Compact Serialization.
</t>
<t>
See <xref target="JSONSerializationExample"/> for an example
of computing a JWS using the JWS JSON Serialization.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="IANA Considerations" anchor="IANA">
<t>
The following registration procedure is used for all the
registries established by this specification.
</t>
<t>
Values are registered with a Specification Required
<xref target="RFC5226"/> after a two-week review period on the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing
list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the
allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) may approve
registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published.
</t>
<t>
Registration requests must be sent to the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list for review and
comment, with an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request for access token type: example").
[[ Note to the RFC Editor:
The name of the mailing list should be determined in consultation
with the IESG and IANA. Suggested name: jose-reg-review. ]]
</t>
<t>
Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either approve or
deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA.
Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make
the request successful.
Registration requests that are undetermined for
a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention
(using the iesg@iesg.org mailing list) for resolution.
</t>
<t>
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Expert(s) includes
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality,
determining whether it is likely to be of general applicability
or whether it is useful only for a single application,
and whether the registration makes sense.
</t>
<t>
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) and should direct
all requests for registration to the review mailing list.
</t>
<t>
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are able to
represent the perspectives of different applications using this specification,
in order to enable broadly-informed review of registration decisions.
In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as
creating a conflict of interest for a particular Expert,
that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Expert(s).
</t>
<section title="JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters Registry" anchor="HdrReg">
<t>
This specification establishes the
IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry
for JWS and JWE Header Parameter Names.
The registry records the Header Parameter Name
and a reference to the specification that defines it.
The same Header Parameter Name MAY be registered multiple times,
provided that the parameter usage is compatible
between the specifications.
Different registrations of the same Header Parameter Name
will typically use different
Header Parameter Usage Location(s) values.
</t>
<section title="Registration Template" anchor="HdrTemplate">
<t>
<list style='hanging'>
<t hangText='Header Parameter Name:'>
<vspace />
The name requested (e.g., "example").
Because a core goal of this specification is for the resulting
representations to be compact, it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short
-- not to exceed 8 characters without a compelling reason to do so.
This name is case sensitive.
Names may not match other registered names in a case insensitive manner
unless the Designated Expert(s) state that there is a compelling reason
to allow an exception in this particular case.
</t>
<t hangText='Header Parameter Usage Location(s):'>
<vspace />
The header parameter usage locations, which should be one or more of the values
<spanx style="verb">JWS</spanx> or
<spanx style="verb">JWE</spanx>.
</t>
<t hangText='Change Controller:'>
<vspace />
For Standards Track RFCs, state "IESG". For others, give the name of the
responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page
URI) may also be included.
</t>
<t hangText='Specification Document(s):'>
<vspace />
Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter, preferably including URI(s) that
can be used to retrieve copies of the document(s). An indication of the relevant
sections may also be included but is not required.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Initial Registry Contents" anchor="HdrContents">
<t>
This specification registers the Header Parameter Names defined in
<xref target="RegisteredHeaderParameterName"/> in this registry.
</t>
<t> <?rfc subcompact="yes"?>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Header Parameter Name: <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="algDef"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Header Parameter Name: <spanx style="verb">jku</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="jkuDef"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Header Parameter Name: <spanx style="verb">jwk</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification document(s): <xref target="jwkDef"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Header Parameter Name: <spanx style="verb">x5u</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="x5uDef"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Header Parameter Name: <spanx style="verb">x5t</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="x5tDef"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Header Parameter Name: <spanx style="verb">x5c</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="x5cDef"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Header Parameter Name: <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="kidDef"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Header Parameter Name: <spanx style="verb">typ</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="typDef"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Header Parameter Name: <spanx style="verb">cty</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="ctyDef"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Header Parameter Name: <spanx style="verb">crit</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="critDef"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
</section>
<section title="JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values Registry" anchor="TypReg">
<t>
This specification establishes the
IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values registry
for values of the JWS and JWE
<spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> (type)
header parameter.
It is RECOMMENDED that all registered <spanx
style="verb">typ</spanx> values also include a
MIME Media Type <xref target="RFC2046"/>
value that the registered value is a short name for.
The registry records the
<spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> value,
the MIME type value that it is an abbreviation for (if any),
and a reference to the specification that defines it.
</t>
<t>
MIME Media Type <xref target="RFC2046"/>
values MUST NOT be directly registered as
<spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> values; rather,
<spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> values MAY be registered
as short names for MIME types.
</t>
<section title="Registration Template" anchor="TypTemplate">
<t>
<list style='hanging'>
<t hangText='"typ" Header Parameter Value:'>
<vspace />
The name requested (e.g., "example").
Because a core goal of this specification is for the resulting
representations to be compact, it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short
-- not to exceed 8 characters without a compelling reason to do so.
This name is case sensitive.
Names may not match other registered names in a case insensitive manner
unless the Designated Expert(s) state that there is a compelling reason
to allow an exception in this particular case.
</t>
<t hangText='Abbreviation for MIME Type:'>
<vspace />
The MIME type that this name is an abbreviation for (e.g., "application/example").
</t>
<t hangText='Change Controller:'>
<vspace />
For Standards Track RFCs, state "IESG". For others, give the name of the
responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page
URI) may also be included.
</t>
<t hangText='Specification Document(s):'>
<vspace />
Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter, preferably including URI(s) that
can be used to retrieve copies of the document(s). An indication of the relevant
sections may also be included but is not required.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Initial Registry Contents" anchor="TypContents">
<t>
This specification registers the <spanx style='verb'>JOSE</spanx>
and <spanx style='verb'>JOSE+JSON</spanx>
type values in this registry:
</t>
<t> <?rfc subcompact="yes"?>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
"typ" Header Parameter Value: <spanx style='verb'>JOSE</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Abbreviation for MIME type: application/jose
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="typDef"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
"typ" Header Parameter Value: <spanx style='verb'>JOSE+JSON</spanx>
</t>
<t>
Abbreviation for MIME type: application/jose+json
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
<t>
Specification Document(s): <xref target="typDef"/> of [[ this document ]]
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
</section>
<section title="Media Type Registration" anchor="MediaReg">
<section title="Registry Contents" anchor="MediaContents">
<t>
This specification registers the
<spanx style="verb">application/jose</spanx>
Media Type <xref target="RFC2046"/>
in the MIME Media Types registry <xref target="IANA.MediaTypes"/>,
which can be used to indicate that the content is
a JWS or JWE object using
the JWS Compact Serialization or the JWE Compact Serialization
and the
<spanx style="verb">application/jose+json</spanx>
Media Type in the MIME Media Types registry,
which can be used to indicate that the content is
a JWS or JWE object using
the JWS JSON Serialization or the JWE JSON Serialization.
</t>
<t> <?rfc subcompact="yes"?>
<list style="symbols">
<t>
Type name: application
</t>
<t>
Subtype name: jose
</t>
<t>
Required parameters: n/a
</t>
<t>
Optional parameters: n/a
</t>
<t>
Encoding considerations: 8bit;
application/jose values are encoded as a
series of base64url encoded values (some of which may be the
empty string) separated by period ('.') characters.
</t>
<t>
Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[ this document ]]
</t>
<t>
Interoperability considerations: n/a
</t>
<t>
Published specification: [[ this document ]]
</t>
<t>
Applications that use this media type:
OpenID Connect, Mozilla Persona, Salesforce, Google, numerous others that use signed JWTs
</t>
<t>
Additional information:
Magic number(s): n/a,
File extension(s): n/a,
Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
</t>
<t>
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
</t>
<t>
Intended usage: COMMON
</t>
<t>
Restrictions on usage: none
</t>
<t>
Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>
Type name: application
</t>
<t>
Subtype name: jose+json
</t>
<t>
Required parameters: n/a
</t>
<t>
Optional parameters: n/a
</t>
<t>
Encoding considerations: 8bit;
application/jose+json values are represented as a JSON Object;
UTF-8 encoding SHOULD be employed for the JSON object.
</t>
<t>
Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[ this document ]]
</t>
<t>
Interoperability considerations: n/a
</t>
<t>
Published specification: [[ this document ]]
</t>
<t>
Applications that use this media type:
TBD
</t>
<t>
Additional information:
Magic number(s): n/a,
File extension(s): n/a,
Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
</t>
<t>
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
</t>
<t>
Intended usage: COMMON
</t>
<t>
Restrictions on usage: none
</t>
<t>
Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
</t>
<t>
Change Controller: IESG
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Security Considerations" anchor="Security">
<section title="Cryptographic Security Considerations" anchor="CryptoSecCon">
<t>
All of the security issues faced by any cryptographic application
must be faced by a JWS/JWE/JWK agent. Among these issues are protecting
the user's private and symmetric keys, preventing various attacks, and helping the
user avoid mistakes such as inadvertently encrypting a message for
the wrong recipient. The entire list of security considerations is
beyond the scope of this document, but some significant concerns are
listed here.
</t>
<t>
All the security considerations in
<xref target="W3C.CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124">XML DSIG 2.0</xref>,
also apply to this specification, other than those that are XML specific.
Likewise, many of the best practices documented in
<xref target="W3C.WD-xmldsig-bestpractices-20110809">XML Signature Best Practices</xref>
also apply to this specification,
other than those that are XML specific.
</t>
<t>
Keys are only as strong as the amount of entropy used to
generate them. A minimum of 128 bits of entropy should be
used for all keys, and depending upon the application context,
more may be required.
In particular, it may be difficult to generate sufficiently
random values in some browsers and application environments.
</t>
<t>
Creators of JWSs should not allow third parties to insert
arbitrary content into the message without adding entropy
not controlled by the third party.
</t>
<t>
When utilizing TLS to retrieve information, the authority
providing the resource MUST be authenticated and the
information retrieved MUST be free from modification.
</t>
<t>
When cryptographic algorithms are implemented in such a way
that successful operations take a different amount of time
than unsuccessful operations, attackers may be able to
use the time difference to obtain information about the keys
employed. Therefore, such timing differences must be avoided.
</t>
<t>
A SHA-1 hash is used when computing
<spanx style="verb">x5t</spanx> (x.509 certificate thumbprint) values,
for compatibility reasons. Should an effective means of producing
SHA-1 hash collisions be developed, and should an attacker wish to
interfere with the use of a known certificate on a given system,
this could be accomplished by creating another certificate whose
SHA-1 hash value is the same and adding it to the certificate
store used by the intended victim. A prerequisite to this
attack succeeding is the attacker having write access to the
intended victim's certificate store.
</t>
<t>
If, in the future, certificate thumbprints need to be
computed using hash functions other than SHA-1, it is
suggested that additional related header parameters be
defined for that purpose. For example, it is suggested
that a new <spanx style="verb">x5t#S256</spanx>
(X.509 Certificate Thumbprint using SHA-256) header parameter
could be defined and used.
</t>
</section>
<section title="JSON Security Considerations" anchor="JSONSecCon">
<t>
Strict JSON validation is a security requirement.
If malformed JSON is received, then the intent of the sender
is impossible to reliably discern.
Ambiguous and potentially exploitable situations could arise
if the JSON parser used does not reject malformed JSON syntax.
</t>
<t>
Section 2.2 of the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)
specification <xref target="RFC4627"/> states "The names
within an object SHOULD be unique", whereas this specification states that
"Header Parameter Names within this object MUST be unique;
recipients MUST either reject JWSs with duplicate Header Parameter Names
or use a JSON parser that returns only the lexically last duplicate member name,
as specified in Section 15.12 (The JSON Object) of
ECMAScript 5.1 <xref target="ECMAScript"/>".
Thus, this specification requires that the Section 2.2 "SHOULD"
be treated as a "MUST" by senders
and that it be either treated as a "MUST" or in the manner specified in
ECMAScript 5.1 by receivers.
Ambiguous and potentially exploitable situations could arise
if the JSON parser used does not enforce the uniqueness of member names
or returns an unpredictable value for duplicate member names.
</t>
<t>
Some JSON parsers might not reject input that contains extra
significant characters after a valid input. For instance,
the input <spanx style="verb">{"tag":"value"}ABCD</spanx>
contains a valid JSON object followed by
the extra characters <spanx style="verb">ABCD</spanx>.
Such input MUST be rejected in its entirety.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Unicode Comparison Security Considerations" anchor="UnicodeSecCon">
<t>
Header Parameter Names and algorithm names are Unicode strings. For
security reasons, the representations of these names must be
compared verbatim after performing any escape processing (as
per <xref target="RFC4627">RFC 4627</xref>, Section 2.5).
This means, for instance, that these JSON strings must
compare as being equal ("sig", "\u0073ig"), whereas these
must all compare as being not equal to the first set or to
each other ("SIG", "Sig", "si\u0047").
</t>
<t>
JSON strings can contain characters outside the Unicode
Basic Multilingual Plane. For instance, the G clef
character (U+1D11E) may be represented in a JSON string as
"\uD834\uDD1E". Ideally, JWS implementations SHOULD ensure
that characters outside the Basic Multilingual Plane are
preserved and compared correctly; alternatively, if this is
not possible due to these characters exercising limitations
present in the underlying JSON implementation, then input
containing them MUST be rejected.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="TLS_requirements" title="TLS Requirements">
<t>
Implementations MUST support TLS.
Which version(s) ought to be implemented will vary over
time, and depend on the widespread deployment and known
security vulnerabilities at the time of implementation.
At the time of this writing,
TLS version 1.2 <xref target='RFC5246' />
is the most recent version, but has very limited actual
deployment, and might not be readily available in
implementation toolkits.
TLS version 1.0 <xref target='RFC2246' />
is the most widely deployed version, and will give the
broadest interoperability.
</t>
<t>
To protect against information disclosure and tampering,
confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS
with a ciphersuite that provides confidentiality and
integrity protection.
</t>
<t>
Whenever TLS is used, a TLS server certificate check
MUST be performed, per <xref target="RFC6125">RFC 6125</xref>.
</t>
</section>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.1421.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2046.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2246.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2818.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3629.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3986.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4627.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4648.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5226.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5246.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6125.xml' ?>
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml2/reference.ITU.X690.1994.xml' ?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml4/reference.W3C.WD-xmldsig-bestpractices-20110809.xml" ?>
<reference anchor="USA15">
<front>
<title>Unicode Normalization Forms</title>
<author fullname="Mark Davis" initials="M." surname="Davis">
<address>
<email>markdavis@google.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Ken Whistler" initials="K." surname="Whistler">
<address>
<email>ken@unicode.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Martin Deurst" initials="M."
surname="Deurst"></author>
<date day="03" month="09" year="2009" />
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Unicode Standard Annex" value="15" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="JWK">
<front>
<title>JSON Web Key (JWK)</title>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization>Microsoft</organization>
<address>
<email>mbj@microsoft.com</email>
<uri>http://self-issued.info/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<date day="15" month="September" year="2013" />
</front>
<seriesInfo value="draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key" name="Internet-Draft"/>
<format target="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key" type="HTML" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="JWA">
<front>
<title>JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)</title>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization>Microsoft</organization>
<address>
<email>mbj@microsoft.com</email>
<uri>http://self-issued.info/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<date day="15" month="September" year="2013" />
</front>
<seriesInfo value="draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms" name="Internet-Draft"/>
<format target="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms" type="HTML" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="USASCII">
<front>
<title>Coded Character Set -- 7-bit American Standard Code for Information Interchange</title>
<author>
<organization>American National Standards Institute</organization>
</author>
<date year="1986"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="ANSI" value="X3.4"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="ECMAScript">
<front>
<title>ECMAScript Language Specification, 5.1 Edition</title>
<author>
<organization>Ecma International</organization>
</author>
<date month="June" year="2011"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="ECMA" value="262"/>
<format target="http://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/5.1/" type="HTML" />
<format target="http://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/5.1/ECMA-262.pdf" type="PDF" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="IANA.MediaTypes">
<front>
<title>MIME Media Types</title>
<author>
<organization>Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)</organization>
</author>
<date year="2005"/>
</front>
<format target="http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types"
type="HTML" />
</reference>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<?rfc include='http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4122.xml' ?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml4/reference.W3C.CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124.xml" ?>
<reference anchor="JWT">
<front>
<title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization>Microsoft</organization>
<address>
<email>mbj@microsoft.com</email>
<uri>http://self-issued.info/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="John Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley">
<organization abbrev="Ping Identity">Ping Identity</organization>
<address>
<email>ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Nat Sakimura" initials="N." surname="Sakimura">
<organization abbrev="NRI">Nomura Research Institute</organization>
<address>
<email>n-sakimura@nri.co.jp</email>
</address>
</author>
<date day="29" month="July" year="2013" />
</front>
<seriesInfo value="draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token" name="Internet-Draft"/>
<format target="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token" type="HTML" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="MagicSignatures">
<front>
<title>Magic Signatures</title>
<author fullname="John Panzer (editor)" initials="J." surname="Panzer (editor)"></author>
<author fullname="Ben Laurie" initials="B." surname="Laurie"></author>
<author fullname="Dirk Balfanz" initials="D." surname="Balfanz"></author>
<date day="7" month="January" year="2011" />
</front>
<format target="http://salmon-protocol.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/draft-panzer-magicsig-01.html" type="HTML" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="JSS">
<front>
<title>JSON Simple Sign</title>
<author fullname="John Bradley" initials="J." surname="Bradley">
<organization>independent</organization>
</author>
<author fullname="Nat Sakimura (editor)" initials="N. " surname="Sakimura (editor)">
<organization abbrev="NRI">Nomura Research Institute</organization>
</author>
<date month="September" year="2010" />
</front>
<format target="http://jsonenc.info/jss/1.0/" type="HTML" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="CanvasApp">
<front>
<title>Canvas Applications</title>
<author fullname="Facebook" surname="Facebook"></author>
<date year="2010" />
</front>
<format target="http://developers.facebook.com/docs/authentication/canvas" type="HTML" />
</reference>
<reference anchor="JWE">
<front>
<title>JSON Web Encryption (JWE)</title>
<author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M.B." surname="Jones">
<organization>Microsoft</organization>
<address>
<email>mbj@microsoft.com</email>
<uri>http://self-issued.info/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Eric Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla">
<organization abbrev="RTFM">RTFM, Inc.</organization>
<address>
<email>ekr@rtfm.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Joe Hildebrand" initials="J." surname="Hildebrand">
<organization abbrev="Cisco">Cisco Systems, Inc.</organization>
<address>
<email>jhildebr@cisco.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date day="15" month="September" year="2013" />
</front>
<seriesInfo value="draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption" name="Internet-Draft"/>
<format target="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption" type="HTML" />
</reference>
</references>
<section title="JWS Examples" anchor="JWSExamples">
<t>
This section provides several examples of JWSs.
While the first three
examples all represent JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) <xref
target="JWT" />, the payload can be any
octet sequence, as shown in <xref target="ES512Example"/>.
</t>
<section title="Example JWS using HMAC SHA-256" anchor="HS256Example">
<section title="Encoding" anchor="HS256Encoding">
<t>
The following example JWS Header declares that the
data structure is a JSON Web Token (JWT) <xref target="JWT" />
and the JWS Signing Input is secured using
the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm.
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"typ":"JWT",
"alg":"HS256"}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The following octet sequence contains the UTF-8 representation of
the JWS Header:
</t>
<t>
[123, 34, 116, 121, 112, 34, 58, 34, 74, 87, 84, 34, 44, 13, 10, 32, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 72, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125]
</t>
<t>
Base64url encoding these octets yields this
Encoded JWS Header value:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The JWS Payload used in this example
is the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JSON object below.
(Note that the payload can be any base64url
encoded octet sequence, and need not be a base64url encoded JSON
object.)
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The following octet sequence, which is the UTF-8 representation
of the JSON object above, is the JWS Payload:
</t>
<t>
[123, 34, 105, 115, 115, 34, 58, 34, 106, 111, 101, 34, 44, 13, 10, 32, 34, 101, 120, 112, 34, 58, 49, 51, 48, 48, 56, 49, 57, 51, 56, 48, 44, 13, 10, 32, 34, 104, 116, 116, 112, 58, 47, 47, 101, 120, 97, 109, 112, 108, 101, 46, 99, 111, 109, 47, 105, 115, 95, 114, 111, 111, 116, 34, 58, 116, 114, 117, 101, 125]
</t>
<t>
Base64url encoding the JWS Payload yields this Encoded JWS Payload value
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character,
and the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Signing Input
value (with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input
is the following octet sequence:
</t>
<t>
[101, 121, 74, 48, 101, 88, 65, 105, 79, 105, 74, 75, 86, 49, 81, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 73, 85, 122, 73, 49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51, 77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 108, 101, 72, 65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84, 107, 122, 79, 68, 65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100, 72, 65, 54, 76, 121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76, 109, 78, 118, 98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73, 106, 112, 48, 99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81]
</t>
<t>
HMACs are generated using keys.
This example uses the symmetric key
represented in JSON Web Key <xref target="JWK" /> format below
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"kty":"oct",
"k":"AyM1SysPpbyDfgZld3umj1qzKObwVMkoqQ-EstJQLr_T-1qS0gZH75
aKtMN3Yj0iPS4hcgUuTwjAzZr1Z9CAow"
}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Running the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm on the octets of the ASCII representation
of the JWS Signing Input
with this key yields this octet sequence:
</t>
<t>
[116, 24, 223, 180, 151, 153, 224, 37, 79, 250, 96, 125, 216, 173, 187, 186, 22, 212, 37, 77, 105, 214, 191, 240, 91, 88, 5, 88, 83, 132, 141, 121]
</t>
<t>
Base64url encoding the above HMAC output yields this
Encoded JWS Signature value:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Concatenating these values in the order
Header.Payload.Signature with period ('.') characters between the
parts yields this complete JWS representation
using the JWS Compact Serialization
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
.
dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
]]></artwork></figure>
</section>
<section title="Decoding" anchor="HS256Decoding">
<t>
Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header,
Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the
JWS Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature octet sequences.
The octet sequence containing the UTF-8 representation
of the JWS Header is decoded into the JWS Header string.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Validating" anchor="HS256Validating">
<t>
Next we validate the decoded results. Since the <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx>
parameter in the header is <spanx style="verb">HS256</spanx>, we validate the HMAC SHA-256
value contained in the JWS Signature.
</t>
<t>
First, we validate that the JWS Header
string is legal JSON.
</t>
<t>
To validate the HMAC value, we repeat the previous process
of using the correct key and the ASCII representation of
the JWS Signing Input
as input to the HMAC SHA-256 function
and then taking the output and determining if it matches
the JWS Signature. If it matches exactly,
the HMAC has been validated.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Example JWS using RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 SHA-256" anchor="RS256Example">
<section title="Encoding" anchor="RS256Encoding">
<t>
The JWS Header in this example is different
from the previous example in two ways: First, because a
different algorithm is being used, the <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> value is
different. Second, for illustration purposes only, the
optional "typ" parameter is not used. (This difference is
not related to the algorithm employed.) The
JWS Header used is:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"alg":"RS256"}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The following octet sequence contains the UTF-8 representation of
the JWS Header:
</t>
<t>
[123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 82, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125]
</t>
<t>
Base64url encoding these octets yields this
Encoded JWS Header value:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The JWS Payload used in this example, which
follows, is the same as in the previous example. Since
the Encoded JWS Payload will therefore be the same, its
computation is not repeated here.
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character,
and the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Signing Input
value (with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input
is the following octet sequence:
</t>
<t>
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 83, 85, 122, 73, 49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51, 77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 108, 101, 72, 65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84, 107, 122, 79, 68, 65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100, 72, 65, 54, 76, 121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76, 109, 78, 118, 98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73, 106, 112, 48, 99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81]
</t>
<t>
This example uses the RSA key
represented in JSON Web Key <xref target="JWK" /> format below
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"kty":"RSA",
"n":"ofgWCuLjybRlzo0tZWJjNiuSfb4p4fAkd_wWJcyQoTbji9k0l8W26mPddx
HmfHQp-Vaw-4qPCJrcS2mJPMEzP1Pt0Bm4d4QlL-yRT-SFd2lZS-pCgNMs
D1W_YpRPEwOWvG6b32690r2jZ47soMZo9wGzjb_7OMg0LOL-bSf63kpaSH
SXndS5z5rexMdbBYUsLA9e-KXBdQOS-UTo7WTBEMa2R2CapHg665xsmtdV
MTBQY4uDZlxvb3qCo5ZwKh9kG4LT6_I5IhlJH7aGhyxXFvUK-DWNmoudF8
NAco9_h9iaGNj8q2ethFkMLs91kzk2PAcDTW9gb54h4FRWyuXpoQ",
"e":"AQAB",
"d":"Eq5xpGnNCivDflJsRQBXHx1hdR1k6Ulwe2JZD50LpXyWPEAeP88vLNO97I
jlA7_GQ5sLKMgvfTeXZx9SE-7YwVol2NXOoAJe46sui395IW_GO-pWJ1O0
BkTGoVEn2bKVRUCgu-GjBVaYLU6f3l9kJfFNS3E0QbVdxzubSu3Mkqzjkn
439X0M_V51gfpRLI9JYanrC4D4qAdGcopV_0ZHHzQlBjudU2QvXt4ehNYT
CBr6XCLQUShb1juUO1ZdiYoFaFQT5Tw8bGUl_x_jTj3ccPDVZFD9pIuhLh
BOneufuBiB4cS98l2SR_RQyGWSeWjnczT0QU91p1DhOVRuOopznQ"
}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The RSA private key is then passed to the RSA
signing function, which also takes the hash type, SHA-256,
and the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input
as inputs. The result of the digital signature is an octet sequence,
which represents a big endian integer. In this example, it
is:
</t>
<t>
[112, 46, 33, 137, 67, 232, 143, 209, 30, 181, 216, 45, 191, 120, 69, 243, 65, 6, 174, 27, 129, 255, 247, 115, 17, 22, 173, 209, 113, 125, 131, 101, 109, 66, 10, 253, 60, 150, 238, 221, 115, 162, 102, 62, 81, 102, 104, 123, 0, 11, 135, 34, 110, 1, 135, 237, 16, 115, 249, 69, 229, 130, 173, 252, 239, 22, 216, 90, 121, 142, 232, 198, 109, 219, 61, 184, 151, 91, 23, 208, 148, 2, 190, 237, 213, 217, 217, 112, 7, 16, 141, 178, 129, 96, 213, 248, 4, 12, 167, 68, 87, 98, 184, 31, 190, 127, 249, 217, 46, 10, 231, 111, 36, 242, 91, 51, 187, 230, 244, 74, 230, 30, 177, 4, 10, 203, 32, 4, 77, 62, 249, 18, 142, 212, 1, 48, 121, 91, 212, 189, 59, 65, 238, 202, 208, 102, 171, 101, 25, 129, 253, 228, 141, 247, 127, 55, 45, 195, 139, 159, 175, 221, 59, 239, 177, 139, 93, 163, 204, 60, 46, 176, 47, 158, 58, 65, 214, 18, 202, 173, 21, 145, 18, 115, 160, 95, 35, 185, 232, 56, 250, 175, 132, 157, 105, 132, 41, 239, 90, 30, 136, 121, 130, 54, 195, 212, 14, 96, 69, 34, 165, 68, 200, 242, 122, 122, 45, 184, 6, 99, 209, 108, 247, 202, 234, 86, 222, 64, 92, 178, 33, 90, 69, 178, 194, 85, 102, 181, 90, 193, 167, 72, 160, 112, 223, 200, 163, 42, 70, 149, 67, 208, 25, 238, 251, 71]
</t>
<t>
Base64url encoding the digital signature produces this value for
the Encoded JWS Signature
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
cC4hiUPoj9Eetdgtv3hF80EGrhuB__dzERat0XF9g2VtQgr9PJbu3XOiZj5RZmh7
AAuHIm4Bh-0Qc_lF5YKt_O8W2Fp5jujGbds9uJdbF9CUAr7t1dnZcAcQjbKBYNX4
BAynRFdiuB--f_nZLgrnbyTyWzO75vRK5h6xBArLIARNPvkSjtQBMHlb1L07Qe7K
0GarZRmB_eSN9383LcOLn6_dO--xi12jzDwusC-eOkHWEsqtFZESc6BfI7noOPqv
hJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AXLIhWkWywlVmtVrB
p0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Concatenating these values in the order
Header.Payload.Signature with period ('.') characters between the
parts yields this complete JWS representation
using the JWS Compact Serialization
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
.
cC4hiUPoj9Eetdgtv3hF80EGrhuB__dzERat0XF9g2VtQgr9PJbu3XOiZj5RZmh7
AAuHIm4Bh-0Qc_lF5YKt_O8W2Fp5jujGbds9uJdbF9CUAr7t1dnZcAcQjbKBYNX4
BAynRFdiuB--f_nZLgrnbyTyWzO75vRK5h6xBArLIARNPvkSjtQBMHlb1L07Qe7K
0GarZRmB_eSN9383LcOLn6_dO--xi12jzDwusC-eOkHWEsqtFZESc6BfI7noOPqv
hJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AXLIhWkWywlVmtVrB
p0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw
]]></artwork></figure>
</section>
<section title="Decoding" anchor="RS256Decoding">
<t>
Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header,
Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the
JWS Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature octet sequences.
The octet sequence containing the UTF-8 representation
of the JWS Header is decoded into the JWS Header string.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Validating" anchor="RS256Validating">
<t>
Since the <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> parameter in the header is <spanx style="verb">RS256</spanx>, we
validate the RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 SHA-256 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature.
</t>
<t>
First, we validate that the JWS Header
string is legal JSON.
</t>
<t>
Validating the JWS Signature is a little different
from the previous example. First, we base64url decode the
Encoded JWS Signature to produce a digital signature S to check. We
then pass (n, e), S and the octets of the ASCII representation of the
JWS Signing Input
to an RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 signature verifier that has
been configured to use the SHA-256 hash function.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Example JWS using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256" anchor="ES256Example">
<section title="Encoding" anchor="ES256Encoding">
<t>
The JWS Header for this example differs from
the previous example because a different algorithm is
being used. The JWS Header used is:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"alg":"ES256"}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The following octet sequence contains the UTF-8 representation of
the JWS Header:
</t>
<t>
[123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 69, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125]
</t>
<t>
Base64url encoding these octets yields this
Encoded JWS Header value:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The JWS Payload used in this example, which
follows, is the same as in the previous examples. Since
the Encoded JWS Payload will therefore be the same, its
computation is not repeated here.
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character,
and the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Signing Input
value (with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input
is the following octet sequence:
</t>
<t>
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 70, 85, 122, 73, 49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51, 77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 108, 101, 72, 65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84, 107, 122, 79, 68, 65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100, 72, 65, 54, 76, 121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76, 109, 78, 118, 98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73, 106, 112, 48, 99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81]
</t>
<t>
This example uses the elliptic curve key
represented in JSON Web Key <xref target="JWK" /> format below:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"kty":"EC",
"crv":"P-256",
"x":"f83OJ3D2xF1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8Tus9uPHvRVEU",
"y":"x_FEzRu9m36HLN_tue659LNpXW6pCyStikYjKIWI5a0",
"d":"jpsQnnGQmL-YBIffH1136cspYG6-0iY7X1fCE9-E9LI"
}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The ECDSA private part d is then passed to an ECDSA
signing function, which also takes the curve type, P-256,
the hash type, SHA-256, and the octets of the ASCII representation of
the JWS Signing Input
as inputs. The result of the
digital signature is the EC point (R, S), where R and S are
unsigned integers. In this example, the R and S values,
given as octet sequences representing big endian integers are:
</t>
<texttable>
<ttcol align="left">Result Name</ttcol>
<ttcol align="left">Value</ttcol>
<c>R</c>
<c>
[14, 209, 33, 83, 121, 99, 108, 72, 60, 47, 127, 21, 88, 7, 212, 2, 163, 178, 40, 3, 58, 249, 124, 126, 23, 129, 154, 195, 22, 158, 166, 101]
</c>
<c>S</c>
<c>
[197, 10, 7, 211, 140, 60, 112, 229, 216, 241, 45, 175, 8, 74, 84, 128, 166, 101, 144, 197, 242, 147, 80, 154, 143, 63, 127, 138, 131, 163, 84, 213]
</c>
</texttable>
<t>
Concatenating the S array to the end of the R array and
base64url encoding the result produces this value for the
Encoded JWS Signature
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8ISlSA
pmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Concatenating these values in the order
Header.Payload.Signature with period ('.') characters between the
parts yields this complete JWS representation
using the JWS Compact Serialization
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
.
DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8ISlSA
pmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q
]]></artwork></figure>
</section>
<section title="Decoding" anchor="ES256Decoding">
<t>
Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header,
Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the
JWS Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature octet sequences.
The octet sequence containing the UTF-8 representation
of the JWS Header is decoded into the JWS Header string.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Validating" anchor="ES256Validating">
<t>
Since the <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> parameter in the header is <spanx style="verb">ES256</spanx>, we
validate the ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature contained in
the JWS Signature.
</t>
<t>
First, we validate that the JWS Header
string is legal JSON.
</t>
<t>
Validating the JWS Signature is a little different
from the first example. First, we base64url decode the Encoded JWS Signature as in the previous examples but we then
need to split the 64 member octet sequence that must result
into two 32 octet sequences, the first R and the second S. We
then pass (x, y), (R, S) and the octets of the ASCII representation of
the JWS Signing Input
to an ECDSA signature verifier that
has been configured to use the P-256 curve with the
SHA-256 hash function.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Example JWS using ECDSA P-521 SHA-512" anchor="ES512Example">
<section title="Encoding" anchor="ES512Encoding">
<t>
The JWS Header for this example differs from
the previous example because different ECDSA curves
and hash functions are used. The JWS Header used is:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"alg":"ES512"}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The following octet sequence contains the UTF-8 representation of
the JWS Header:
</t>
<t>
[123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 69, 83, 53, 49, 50, 34, 125]
</t>
<t>
Base64url encoding these octets yields this
Encoded JWS Header value:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The JWS Payload used in this example, is the ASCII string "Payload".
The representation of this string is the octet sequence:
</t>
<t>
[80, 97, 121, 108, 111, 97, 100]
</t>
<t>
Base64url encoding these octets yields this Encoded JWS Payload value:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
UGF5bG9hZA
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character,
and the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Signing Input
value:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9.UGF5bG9hZA
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input
is the following octet sequence:
</t>
<t>
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 70, 85, 122, 85, 120, 77, 105, 74, 57, 46, 85, 71, 70, 53, 98, 71, 57, 104, 90, 65]
</t>
<t>
This example uses the elliptic curve key
represented in JSON Web Key <xref target="JWK" /> format below
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"kty":"EC",
"crv":"P-521",
"x":"AekpBQ8ST8a8VcfVOTNl353vSrDCLLJXmPk06wTjxrrjcBpXp5EOnYG_
NjFZ6OvLFV1jSfS9tsz4qUxcWceqwQGk",
"y":"ADSmRA43Z1DSNx_RvcLI87cdL07l6jQyyBXMoxVg_l2Th-x3S1WDhjDl
y79ajL4Kkd0AZMaZmh9ubmf63e3kyMj2",
"d":"AY5pb7A0UFiB3RELSD64fTLOSV_jazdF7fLYyuTw8lOfRhWg6Y6rUrPA
xerEzgdRhajnu0ferB0d53vM9mE15j2C"
}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The ECDSA private part d is then passed to an ECDSA
signing function, which also takes the curve type, P-521,
the hash type, SHA-512, and the octets of the ASCII representation of
the JWS Signing Input
as inputs. The result of the
digital signature is the EC point (R, S), where R and S are
unsigned integers. In this example, the R and S values,
given as octet sequences representing big endian integers are:
</t>
<texttable>
<ttcol align="left">Result Name</ttcol>
<ttcol align="left">Value</ttcol>
<c>R</c>
<c>
[1, 220, 12, 129, 231, 171, 194, 209, 232, 135, 233, 117, 247, 105, 122, 210,
26, 125, 192, 1, 217, 21, 82, 91, 45, 240, 255, 83, 19, 34, 239, 71,
48, 157, 147, 152, 105, 18, 53, 108, 163, 214, 68, 231, 62, 153, 150, 106,
194, 164, 246, 72, 143, 138, 24, 50, 129, 223, 133, 206, 209, 172, 63, 237,
119, 109]
</c>
<c>S</c>
<c>
[0, 111, 6, 105, 44, 5, 41, 208, 128, 61, 152, 40, 92, 61,
152, 4, 150, 66, 60, 69, 247, 196, 170, 81, 193, 199, 78, 59, 194, 169,
16, 124, 9, 143, 42, 142, 131, 48, 206, 238, 34, 175, 83, 203, 220, 159,
3, 107, 155, 22, 27, 73, 111, 68, 68, 21, 238, 144, 229, 232, 148, 188,
222, 59, 242, 103]
</c>
</texttable>
<t>
Concatenating the S array to the end of the R array and
base64url encoding the result produces this value for the
Encoded JWS Signature
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
AdwMgeerwtHoh-l192l60hp9wAHZFVJbLfD_UxMi70cwnZOYaRI1bKPWROc-mZZq
wqT2SI-KGDKB34XO0aw_7XdtAG8GaSwFKdCAPZgoXD2YBJZCPEX3xKpRwcdOO8Kp
EHwJjyqOgzDO7iKvU8vcnwNrmxYbSW9ERBXukOXolLzeO_Jn
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Concatenating these values in the order
Header.Payload.Signature with period ('.') characters between the
parts yields this complete JWS representation
using the JWS Compact Serialization
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9
.
UGF5bG9hZA
.
AdwMgeerwtHoh-l192l60hp9wAHZFVJbLfD_UxMi70cwnZOYaRI1bKPWROc-mZZq
wqT2SI-KGDKB34XO0aw_7XdtAG8GaSwFKdCAPZgoXD2YBJZCPEX3xKpRwcdOO8Kp
EHwJjyqOgzDO7iKvU8vcnwNrmxYbSW9ERBXukOXolLzeO_Jn
]]></artwork></figure>
</section>
<section title="Decoding" anchor="ES512Decoding">
<t>
Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header,
Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the
JWS Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature octet sequences.
The octet sequence containing the UTF-8 representation
of the JWS Header is decoded into the JWS Header string.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Validating" anchor="ES512Validating">
<t>
Since the <spanx style="verb">alg</spanx> parameter in the header is <spanx style="verb">ES512</spanx>, we
validate the ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 digital signature contained in
the JWS Signature.
</t>
<t>
First, we validate that the JWS Header
string is legal JSON.
</t>
<t>
Validating the JWS Signature is similar to the previous example.
First, we base64url decode the Encoded JWS Signature as in the previous examples but we then
need to split the 132 member octet sequence that must result
into two 66 octet sequences, the first R and the second S. We
then pass (x, y), (R, S) and the octets of the ASCII representation of
the JWS Signing Input
to an ECDSA signature verifier that
has been configured to use the P-521 curve with the
SHA-512 hash function.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Example Plaintext JWS" anchor="ExamplePlaintextJWS">
<t>
The following example JWS Header declares that the
encoded object is a Plaintext JWS:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"alg":"none"}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Base64url encoding the octets of the UTF-8 representation of
the JWS Header yields this Encoded JWS Header:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The JWS Payload used in this example, which
follows, is the same as in the previous examples. Since
the Encoded JWS Payload will therefore be the same, its
computation is not repeated here.
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The Encoded JWS Signature is the empty string.
</t>
<t>
Concatenating these parts in the order
Header.Payload.Signature with period ('.') characters between the
parts yields this complete JWS (with line breaks for
display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
.
]]></artwork></figure>
</section>
<section title="Example JWS Using JWS JSON Serialization" anchor="JSONSerializationExample">
<t>
This section contains an example using the JWS JSON Serialization.
This example demonstrates the capability for
conveying multiple digital signatures and/or MACs for the
same payload.
</t>
<t>
The Encoded JWS Payload used in this example is the same as
that used in the examples in <xref target="RS256Example"/>
and <xref target="ES256Example"/>
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Two digital signatures are used in this example:
the first using RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 SHA-256 and
the second using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256.
For the first, the JWS Protected Header and key
are the same as in <xref target="RS256Example"/>,
resulting in the same JWS Signature value;
therefore, its computation is not repeated here.
For the second, the JWS Protected Header and key
are the same as in <xref target="ES256Example"/>,
resulting in the same JWS Signature value;
therefore, its computation is not repeated here.
</t>
<section title="JWS Per-Signature Protected Headers" anchor="JSProtectedHeader">
<t>
The JWS Protected Header value used for the first signature is:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"alg":"RS256"}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Base64url encoding these octets yields this
Encoded JWS Header value:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The JWS Protected Header value used for the second signature is:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"alg":"ES256"}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Base64url encoding these octets yields this
Encoded JWS Header value:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9
]]></artwork></figure>
</section>
<section title="JWS Per-Signature Unprotected Headers" anchor="JSRecipientHeaders">
<t>
Key ID values are supplied for both keys using per-signature
header parameters.
The two values used to represent these Key IDs are:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"kid":"2010-12-29"}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
and
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d"}
]]></artwork></figure>
</section>
<section title="Complete JWS Header Values" anchor="JSHeader">
<t>
Combining the protected and unprotected header values
supplied, the JWS Header values used for the first and second
signatures respectively are:
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"alg":"RS256",
"kid":"2010-12-29"}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
and
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"alg":"ES256",
"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d"}
]]></artwork></figure>
</section>
<section title="Complete JWS JSON Serialization Representation" anchor="JSComplete">
<t>
The complete JSON Web Signature JSON Serialization
for these values is as follows
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
{"payload":
"eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGF
tcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ",
"signatures":[
{"protected":"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9",
"header":
{"kid":"2010-12-29"},
"signature":
"cC4hiUPoj9Eetdgtv3hF80EGrhuB__dzERat0XF9g2VtQgr9PJbu3XOiZj5RZ
mh7AAuHIm4Bh-0Qc_lF5YKt_O8W2Fp5jujGbds9uJdbF9CUAr7t1dnZcAcQjb
KBYNX4BAynRFdiuB--f_nZLgrnbyTyWzO75vRK5h6xBArLIARNPvkSjtQBMHl
b1L07Qe7K0GarZRmB_eSN9383LcOLn6_dO--xi12jzDwusC-eOkHWEsqtFZES
c6BfI7noOPqvhJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AX
LIhWkWywlVmtVrBp0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw"},
{"protected":"eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9",
"header":
{"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d"},
"signature":
"DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8IS
lSApmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q"}]
}
]]></artwork></figure>
</section>
</section>
</section>
<section title='"x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Example' anchor="x5cExample">
<t>
The JSON array below is an example of a certificate chain
that could be used as the value of an
<spanx style="verb">x5c</spanx> (X.509 Certificate Chain) header parameter,
per <xref target="x5cDef"/>.
Note that since these strings contain base64 encoded (not base64url encoded)
values, they are allowed to contain white space and line breaks.
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
["MIIE3jCCA8agAwIBAgICAwEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwYzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVM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",
"MIIE+zCCBGSgAwIBAgICAQ0wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwgbsxJDAiBgNVBAcTG1Z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",
"MIIC5zCCAlACAQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwgbsxJDAiBgNVBAcTG1ZhbGlDZXJ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"]
]]></artwork></figure>
</section>
<section title="Notes on implementing base64url encoding without padding" anchor="base64urlnotes">
<t>
This appendix describes how to implement base64url encoding
and decoding functions without padding based upon standard
base64 encoding and decoding functions that do use padding.
</t>
<t>
To be concrete, example C# code implementing these functions
is shown below. Similar code could be used in other
languages.
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
static string base64urlencode(byte [] arg)
{
string s = Convert.ToBase64String(arg); // Regular base64 encoder
s = s.Split('=')[0]; // Remove any trailing '='s
s = s.Replace('+', '-'); // 62nd char of encoding
s = s.Replace('/', '_'); // 63rd char of encoding
return s;
}
static byte [] base64urldecode(string arg)
{
string s = arg;
s = s.Replace('-', '+'); // 62nd char of encoding
s = s.Replace('_', '/'); // 63rd char of encoding
switch (s.Length % 4) // Pad with trailing '='s
{
case 0: break; // No pad chars in this case
case 2: s += "=="; break; // Two pad chars
case 3: s += "="; break; // One pad char
default: throw new System.Exception(
"Illegal base64url string!");
}
return Convert.FromBase64String(s); // Standard base64 decoder
}
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
As per the example code above, the number of '=' padding
characters that needs to be added to the end of a base64url
encoded string without padding to turn it into one with
padding is a deterministic function of the length of the
encoded string. Specifically,
if the length mod 4 is 0, no padding is added;
if the length mod 4 is 2, two '=' padding characters are added;
if the length mod 4 is 3, one '=' padding character is added;
if the length mod 4 is 1, the input is malformed.
</t>
<t>
An example correspondence between unencoded and encoded values
follows. The octet sequence below encodes into the string
below, which when decoded, reproduces the octet sequence.
</t>
<figure><artwork>3 236 255 224 193</artwork></figure>
<figure><artwork>A-z_4ME</artwork></figure>
</section>
<section title='Negative Test Case for "crit" Header Parameter' anchor="critTest">
<t>
Conforming implementations must reject input containing critical extensions
that are not understood or cannot be processed. The following JWS must
be rejected by all implementations, because it uses an extension
header parameter name <spanx style="verb">http://example.invalid/UNDEFINED</spanx>
that they do not understand.
Any other similar input, in which the use of the value
<spanx style="verb">http://example.invalid/UNDEFINED</spanx> is substituted for
any other header parameter name not understood by the implementation,
must also be rejected.
<figure>
<preamble>
The JWS Header value for this JWS is:
</preamble>
<artwork><![CDATA[
{"alg":"none",
"crit":["http://example.invalid/UNDEFINED"],
"http://example.invalid/UNDEFINED":true
}
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<figure>
<preamble>
The complete JWS that must be rejected is as follows
(with line breaks for display purposes only):
</preamble>
<artwork><![CDATA[
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwNCiAiY3JpdCI6WyJodHRwOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVU5ERU
ZJTkVEIl0sDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9VTkRFRklORUQiOnRydWUNCn0.
RkFJTA.
]]></artwork>
</figure>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Acknowledgements" anchor="Acknowledgements">
<t>
Solutions for signing JSON content were previously explored by
<xref target="MagicSignatures">Magic Signatures</xref>, <xref
target="JSS">JSON Simple Sign</xref>, and <xref
target="CanvasApp">Canvas Applications</xref>, all of which
influenced this draft.
</t>
<t>
Thanks to Axel Nennker for his early implementation
and feedback on the JWS and JWE specifications.
</t>
<t>
This specification is the work of the JOSE Working Group,
which includes dozens of active and dedicated participants.
In particular, the following individuals contributed ideas,
feedback, and wording that influenced this specification:
</t>
<t>
Dirk Balfanz,
Richard Barnes,
Brian Campbell,
Breno de Medeiros,
Dick Hardt,
Joe Hildebrand,
Jeff Hodges,
Edmund Jay,
Yaron Y. Goland,
Ben Laurie,
James Manger,
Matt Miller,
Tony Nadalin,
Axel Nennker,
John Panzer,
Emmanuel Raviart,
Eric Rescorla,
Jim Schaad,
Paul Tarjan,
Hannes Tschofenig,
and Sean Turner.
</t>
<t>
Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and
Sean Turner and Stephen Farrell served as Security area directors
during the creation of this specification.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Document History" anchor="History">
<t>
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
</t>
<t>
-16
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Changes to address editorial and minor issues
#50, #98, #99, #102, #104, #106, #107, #111, and #112.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-15
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Clarified that it is an application decision which
signatures, MACs, or plaintext values
must successfully validate for the JWS to be accepted,
addressing issue #35.
</t>
<t>
Corrected editorial error in <spanx style="verb">ES512</spanx> example.
</t>
<t>
Changes to address editorial and minor issues
#34, #96, #100, #101, #104, #105, and #106.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-14
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Stated that the <spanx style="verb">signature</spanx> parameter
is to be omitted in the JWS JSON Serialization
when its value would be empty
(which is only the case for a Plaintext JWS).
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-13
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Made all header parameter values be per-signature/MAC,
addressing issue #24.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-12
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Clarified that the <spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> and
<spanx style="verb">cty</spanx> header parameters are used
in an application-specific manner
and have no effect upon the JWS processing.
</t>
<t>
Replaced the MIME types
<spanx style="verb">application/jws+json</spanx> and
<spanx style="verb">application/jws</spanx> with
<spanx style="verb">application/jose+json</spanx> and
<spanx style="verb">application/jose</spanx>.
</t>
<t>
Stated that recipients MUST either reject JWSs with
duplicate Header Parameter Names
or use a JSON parser that returns only
the lexically last duplicate member name.
</t>
<t>
Added a Serializations section with parallel treatment of the
JWS Compact Serialization
and the
JWS JSON Serialization
and also moved the former Implementation Considerations content there.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-11
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Added Key Identification section.
</t>
<t>
For the JWS JSON Serialization, enable header parameter values
to be specified in any of three parameters:
the <spanx style="verb">protected</spanx> member that is
integrity protected and shared among all recipients,
the <spanx style="verb">unprotected</spanx> member that is
not integrity protected and shared among all recipients,
and the <spanx style="verb">header</spanx> member that is
not integrity protected and specific to a particular recipient.
(This does not affect the JWS Compact Serialization, in which all
header parameter values are in a single integrity protected JWE Header value.)
</t>
<t>
Removed suggested compact serialization for multiple
digital signatures and/or MACs.
</t>
<t>
Changed the MIME type name <spanx style="verb">application/jws-js</spanx>
to <spanx style="verb">application/jws+json</spanx>,
addressing issue #22.
</t>
<t>
Tightened the description of the
<spanx style="verb">crit</spanx> (critical) header parameter.
</t>
<t>
Added a negative test case for the
<spanx style="verb">crit</spanx> header parameter
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-10
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Added an appendix suggesting a possible compact serialization
for JWSs with multiple digital signatures and/or MACs.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-09
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Added JWS JSON Serialization, as specified by
draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization-04.
</t>
<t>
Registered <spanx style="verb">application/jws-js</spanx> MIME type
and <spanx style="verb">JWS-JS</spanx> typ header parameter value.
</t>
<t>
Defined that the default action for header parameters that
are not understood is to ignore them unless specifically
designated as "MUST be understood" or included in the new
<spanx style="verb">crit</spanx> (critical) header parameter list.
This addressed issue #6.
</t>
<t>
Changed term "JWS Secured Input" to "JWS Signing Input".
</t>
<t>
Changed from using the term "byte" to "octet" when referring to 8 bit values.
</t>
<t>
Changed member name from <spanx style="verb">recipients</spanx> to
<spanx style="verb">signatures</spanx> in the JWS JSON Serialization.
</t>
<t>
Added complete values using the JWS Compact Serialization
for all examples.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-08
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Applied editorial improvements suggested by
Jeff Hodges and Hannes Tschofenig.
Many of these simplified the terminology used.
</t>
<t>
Clarified statements of the form "This header parameter is OPTIONAL"
to "Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL".
</t>
<t>
Added a Header Parameter Usage Location(s) field to the
IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry.
</t>
<t>
Added seriesInfo information to Internet Draft references.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-07
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Updated references.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-06
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Changed <spanx style="verb">x5c</spanx> (X.509 Certificate Chain)
representation from being a single string to being an array of strings,
each containing a single base64 encoded DER certificate value,
representing elements of the certificate chain.
</t>
<t>
Applied changes made by the RFC Editor to RFC 6749's registry language
to this specification.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-05
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Added statement that
"StringOrURI values are compared as case-sensitive strings
with no transformations or canonicalizations applied".
</t>
<t>
Indented artwork elements to better distinguish them from the body text.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-04
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Completed JSON Security Considerations section, including
considerations about rejecting input with duplicate member names.
</t>
<t>
Completed security considerations on the use of a SHA-1 hash when computing
<spanx style="verb">x5t</spanx> (x.509 certificate thumbprint) values.
</t>
<t>
Refer to the registries as the primary sources of defined
values and then secondarily reference the sections
defining the initial contents of the registries.
</t>
<t>
Normatively reference
<xref target="W3C.CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124">XML DSIG 2.0</xref>
for its security considerations.
</t>
<t>
Added this language to Registration Templates:
"This name is case sensitive. Names that match other registered names
in a case insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted."
</t>
<t>
Reference draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization
instead of draft-jones-json-web-signature-json-serialization.
</t>
<t>
Described additional open issues.
</t>
<t>
Applied editorial suggestions.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-03
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Added the <spanx style="verb">cty</spanx> (content type) header parameter
for declaring type information about the secured content,
as opposed to the <spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> (type) header parameter,
which declares type information about this object.
</t>
<t>
Added "Collision Resistant Namespace" to the terminology section.
</t>
<t>
Reference ITU.X690.1994 for DER encoding.
</t>
<t>
Added an example JWS using ECDSA P-521 SHA-512. This has particular
illustrative value because of the use of the 521 bit integers
in the key and signature values.
This is also an example in which the payload is not a base64url
encoded JSON object.
</t>
<t>
Added an example <spanx style="verb">x5c</spanx> value.
</t>
<t>
No longer say "the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Secured Input
(which is the same as the ASCII representation)". Just call it
"the ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input".
</t>
<t>
Added Registration Template sections for defined registries.
</t>
<t>
Added Registry Contents sections to populate registry values.
</t>
<t>
Changed name of the JSON Web Signature and Encryption "typ" Values registry
to be the JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values registry, since
it is used for more than just values of the
<spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> parameter.
</t>
<t>
Moved registries
JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters and
JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values
to the JWS specification.
</t>
<t>
Numerous editorial improvements.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-02
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Clarified that it is an error when a <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx>
value is included and no matching key is found.
</t>
<t>
Removed assumption that <spanx style="verb">kid</spanx> (key ID)
can only refer to an asymmetric key.
</t>
<t>
Clarified that JWSs with duplicate Header Parameter Names
MUST be rejected.
</t>
<t>
Clarified the relationship between
<spanx style="verb">typ</spanx> header parameter values
and MIME types.
</t>
<t>
Registered application/jws MIME type and "JWS" typ header parameter value.
</t>
<t>
Simplified JWK terminology to get replace the "JWK Key Object" and
"JWK Container Object" terms with simply "JSON Web Key (JWK)"
and "JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set)" and to eliminate potential
confusion between single keys and sets of keys.
As part of this change, the Header Parameter Name for a
public key value was changed from
<spanx style="verb">jpk</spanx> (JSON Public Key) to
<spanx style="verb">jwk</spanx> (JSON Web Key).
</t>
<t>
Added suggestion on defining additional header parameters
such as <spanx style="verb">x5t#S256</spanx> in the future
for certificate thumbprints using hash algorithms other
than SHA-1.
</t>
<t>
Specify RFC 2818 server identity validation, rather than
RFC 6125 (paralleling the same decision in the OAuth specs).
</t>
<t>
Generalized language to refer to Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
rather than Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs)
unless in a context specific to HMAC algorithms.
</t>
<t>
Reformatted to give each header parameter its own section heading.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-01
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Moved definition of Plaintext JWSs (using "alg":"none")
here from the JWT specification since this functionality is
likely to be useful in more contexts that just for JWTs.
</t>
<t>
Added <spanx style="verb">jpk</spanx> and <spanx
style="verb">x5c</spanx> header parameters for including
JWK public keys and X.509 certificate chains directly in
the header.
</t>
<t>
Clarified that this specification is defining the JWS
Compact Serialization. Referenced the new JWS-JS spec,
which defines the JWS JSON Serialization.
</t>
<t>
Added text "New header parameters should be introduced
sparingly since an implementation that does not understand
a parameter MUST reject the JWS".
</t>
<t>
Clarified that the order of the creation and validation
steps is not significant in cases where there are no
dependencies between the inputs and outputs of the steps.
</t>
<t>
Changed "no canonicalization is performed" to "no
canonicalization need be performed".
</t>
<t>
Corrected the Magic Signatures reference.
</t>
<t>
Made other editorial improvements suggested by JOSE
working group participants.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
-00
<list style='symbols'>
<t>
Created the initial IETF draft based upon
draft-jones-json-web-signature-04 with no normative
changes.
</t>
<t>
Changed terminology to no longer call both digital
signatures and HMACs "signatures".
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</back>
</rfc>
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