One document matched: draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-00.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="us-ascii"?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd" [
<!ENTITY RFC2119 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC4107 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4107.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC4949 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4949.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC4960 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4960.xml">
<!ENTITY I-D.ietf-i2rs-problem SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-i2rs-problem-statement.xml">
<!ENTITY I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture.xml">
<!ENTITY I-D.ietf-i2rs-rib-info-model SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-i2rs-rib-info-model.xml">
<!ENTITY I-D.ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-requirements SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-requirements.xml">
<!ENTITY I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability.xml">
<!ENTITY I-D.haas-i2rs-ephemeral-state-reqs SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.haas-i2rs-ephemeral-state-reqs.xml">
]>
<?xml-stylesheet type='text/xsl' href='rfc2629.xslt' ?>
<?rfc toc="yes" ?>
<?rfc symrefs="yes" ?>
<?rfc sortrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc compact="yes" ?>
<?rfc subcompact="no" ?>
<?rfc iprnotified="no" ?>
<?rfc strict="no" ?>
<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ietf-i2rs-protocol-security-requirements-00" ipr="trust200902">
<front>
<title abbrev="I2RS Security Requirements">I2RS Security Related Requirements</title>
<author fullname="Susan Hares" initials="S" surname="Hares">
<organization>Huawei</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>7453 Hickory Hill</street>
<city>Saline</city>
<region>MI</region>
<code>48176</code>
<country>USA</country>
</postal>
<email>shares@ndzh.com</email>
<!-- uri and facsimile elements may also be added -->
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Daniel Migault" initials="D" surname="Migault">
<organization>Ericsson</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>8400 boulevard Decarie</street>
<city>Montreal</city>
<region>QC</region>
<code>HAP 2N2</code>
<country>Canada</country>
</postal>
<email>daniel.migault@ericsson.com</email>
<!-- uri and facsimile elements may also be added -->
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Joel Halpern" initials="J" surname="Halpern">
<organization>Ericsson</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country>US</country>
</postal>
<email>joel.halpern@ericsson.com</email>
<!-- uri and facsimile elements may also be added -->
</address>
</author>
<date year="2015" />
<area>Routing Area</area>
<workgroup>I2RS working group</workgroup>
<keyword>RFC</keyword>
<keyword>Request for Comments</keyword>
<keyword>I-D</keyword>
<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
<keyword>I2RS</keyword>
<abstract>
<t> This presents security-related requirements for the I2RS
protocol for mutual authentication, transport protocols,
data transfer and transactions.
</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section anchor="intro" title="Introduction">
<t>The Interface to the Routing System (I2RS)
provides read and write access to information and state within the
routing process. The I2RS client
interacts with one or more I2RS agents to collect information
from network routing systems. </t>
<t> This document describes the requirements for the
I2RS protocol in the security-related areas of mutual authentication of the
I2RS client and agent, the transport protocol carrying the I2RS
protocol messages, and the atomicity of the transactions.
These requirements align with the description of the I2RS architecture found in
<xref target="I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture"></xref> document. </t>
<t>
<xref target="I-D.haas-i2rs-ephemeral-state-reqs"></xref> discusses I2RS roles-based write
conflict resolution in the ephemeral data store using the I2RS Client Identity, I2RS Secondary Identity
and priority. The draft <xref target="I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability"></xref> describes the traceability
framework and its requirements for I2RS. The draft <xref target="I-D.ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-requirements"></xref>
describes the requirements for I2RS to be able to publish information or have a remote client subscribe to an
information data stream.
</t>
<section title="Conventions used in this document" >
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in <xref target="RFC2119"></xref>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Definitions" >
<t>This document utilizes the definitions found in the
following drafts: <xref target="RFC4949"></xref>, and <xref target="I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture"></xref>
</t>
<t> Specifically, this document utilizes the following definitions:
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="access control"><vspace blankLines="1"/> <xref target="RFC4949" /> defines
access control as the following:
<list>
<t>1)(I))protection of system resources against unauthorized use;
</t>
<t>2)(I)process by which use of system resources is regulated according to a security
policy and is permitted only by authorized entities (users, programs, processes, or other systems) according
to that policy; </t>
<t>3)(I) (formal model) Limitations on interactions between subjects and objects in an information system;
</t>
<t>4)(O) "The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource, including the prevention of use of a resource in an unauthorized
manner."; </t>
<t> 5.(O) /U.S. Government/ A system using physical, electronic, or
human controls to identify or admit personnel with properly authorized access to a SCIF.</t>
</list> </t>
<t hangText="Authentication"><vspace blankLines="1"/> <xref target="RFC4949" />
describes authentication as the process of verifying (i.e., establishing the truth of)
an attribute value claimed by or for a system entity or system resource. Authentication
has two steps: identify and verify. </t>
<t hangText="Data Confidentiality"><vspace blankLines="1"/> <xref target="RFC4949" />
describes data confidentiality as having two properties: a) data is not disclosed to
system entities unless they have been authorized to know, and b) data is not
disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities or processes. The key point is that
confidentiality implies that the originator has the ability to authorize where the
information goes. Confidentiality is important for both read and write scope of the
data.</t>
<t hangText="Data Integrity"><vspace blankLines="1"/> <xref target="RFC4949" />
states data integrity includes
<list>
<t>1. (I)The property that data has not been changed, destroyed, or </t>
<t>2. (O) "The property that information has not been modified or
destroyed in an unauthorized manner." </t>
</list>
</t>
<t hangText="Data Privacy"><vspace blankLines="1"/> <xref target="RFC4949" /> describes
data privacy as a synonym for data confidentiality. This I2RS document will utilize
data privacy as a synonym for data confidentiality. </t>
<t hangText="Mutual Authentication"><vspace blankLines="1"/><xref target="RFC4949" />
implies that mutual authentication exists between two interacting system
entities. Mutual authentication in I2RS implies that both sides move from
a state of mutual suspicion to mutually authenticated communication afte
each system has been identified and validated by its peer system.</t>
<t hangText="role"><vspace blankLines="1"/> <xref target="RFC4949" /> describes role as:
<list>
<t>1) (I) A job function or employment position to which people or
other system entities may be assigned in a system. (See: role-
based access control. Compare: duty, billet, principal, user.)
</t>
<t>2) (O) /Common Criteria/ A pre-defined set of rules establishing
the allowed interactions between a user and the TOE.
</t>
</list>
The I2RS uses the common criteria definition.
</t>
<t hangText="role"><vspace blankLines="1"/> <xref target="RFC4949" /> describes role-based
access control as: (I) A form of identity-based access control wherein the system
entities that are identified and controlled are functional
positions in an organization or process.
</t>
<t hangText="Security audit trail"><vspace blankLines="1"/><xref target="RFC4949" /> (page 254) describes
a security audit trail as a chronological record of system activities that is sufficient
to enable the reconstruction and examination of the sequence
environments and activities surrounding or leading to an
operation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction
from inception to final results. Requirements to support a security audit is
not covered in this document.
The draft <xref target="I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability"></xref> describes traceability for I2RS interface and
protocol. Traceability is not equivalent to a security audit trail. </t>
</list>
</t>
<t>I2RS the following phrase that incorporates an <xref target="RFC4949"/> definition:
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="I2RS protocol data integrity"><vspace blankLines="1" /> The transfer of data via the
I2RS protocol has the property of data integrity described in <xref target="RFC4949"/>.</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Security-Related Requirements" >
<t> The security for the I2RS protocol requires mutually authenticated I2RS clients and I2RS agents.
The I2RS client and I2RS agent using the I2RS protocol MUST be able to exchange
data over a secure transport, but some functions may operate on non-secure
transport. The I2RS protocol MUST BE able to provide atomicity of a transaction, but it is
not required to have multi-message atomicity and rollback mechanism transactions. Multiple messages
transactions may be impacted by the interdependency of data. This section discusses these
details of these security requirements.
</t>
<section title="Mutual authentication of I2RS client and I2RS Agent ">
<t>The I2RS architecture <xref target="I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture"></xref>
sets the following requirements:
<list style="symbols">
<t>SEC-REQ-01: All I2RS clients and I2RS agents MUST have at least one unique identifier that uniquely identifies
each party. </t>
<t>SEC-REQ-02: The I2RS protocol MUST utilize these identifiers for mutual identification of
the I2RS client and I2RS agent. </t>
<t>SEC-REQ-03:An I2RS agent, upon receiving an I2RS message from a
I2RS client, MUST confirm that the I2RS client has a valid identifier. </t>
<t>SEC-REQ-04: The I2RS client, upon receiving an I2RS message from an
I2RS agent, MUST confirm the I2RS agent's identifier . </t>
<t>SEC-REQ-05: Identifier distribution and the loading of these identifiers into I2RS agent
and I2RS Client SHOULD occur outside the I2RS protocol. </t>
<t>SEC-REQ-06: The I2RS protocol SHOULD assume some mechanism (IETF or private) will
distribute or load identifiers so that the I2RS client/agent has these
identifiers prior to the I2RS protocol establishing a connection
between I2RS client and I2RS agent. </t>
<t> SEC-REQ-07: Each Identifier MUST be linked to one priority </t>
<t> SEC-REQ-08: Each Identifier is associated with one secondary identifier during a particular read/write
sequence, but the secondary identifier may vary during the time a connection
between the I2RS client and I2RS agent is active. The variance of the
secondary identifier allows the I2RS client to be associated with multiple
applications and pass along an identifier for these applications in the
secondary identifier. </t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Transport Requirements Based on Mutual Authentication" >
<t> SEC-REQ-09: The I2RS protocol MUST be able to transfer data over a
secure transport and optionally be able to transfer data over a
non-secure transport. A secure transport MUST provide data
confidentiality, data integrity, and replay prevention.
</t>
<t>
Note:The non-secure transport be used for publishing telemetry data that was specifically indicated to
non-confidential in the data model. The configuration of ephemeral data in the I2RS Agent by the
I2RS client SHOULD be done over a secure transport. It is anticipated that the passing of most I2RS
ephemeral state operational status SHOULD be done over a secure transport.
Data models SHOULD clearly annotate what data nodes can be passed over an insecure connection.
The default transport is a secure transport.
</t>
<t>
SEC-REQ-10: A secure transport MUST be associated with a key management
solution that can guarantee that only the entities having sufficient privileges
can get the keys to encrypt/decrypt the sensitive data.
Per <xref target="RFC4107">BCP107</xref> this key management system SHOULD be automatic,
but MAY BE manual if the following constraints from BCP107:
<list>
<t>a)environment has limited bandwidth or high round-trip times, </t>
<t>b)the information being protected has a low value and </t>
<t> c)the total volume over the entire lifetime of the long-term session key will be very low, </t>
<t> d)the scale of the deployment is limited. </t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Most I2RS environments (I2RS Client - I2S Agents) will not have this environment,
but a few I2RS use case provide limited non-secure light-weight telemetry messages
that have these requirements. An I2RS data model must indicate which portions can be
served by manual key management.
</t>
<t> SEC-REQ-11: The I2RS protocol MUST be able to support multiple secure transport
sessions providing protocol and data communication between an I2RS Agent
and an I2RS client. However, a single I2RS Agent to I2RS client connection MAY
elect to use a single secure transport session or a single
non-secure transport session. </t>
<t>SEC-REQ-12: The I2RS Client and I2RS Agent protocol SHOULD implement
mechanisms that mitigate DoS attacks </t>
</section>
<section title="Data Confidentiality Requirements">
<t>SEC-REQ-13: In a critical infrastructure, certain data within routing elements is
sensitive and read/write operations on such data MUST be controlled in order to protect
its confidentiality. For example, most carriers do not want a router's
configuration and data flow statistics known by hackers or their competitors.
While carriers may share peering information, most carriers do not share
configuration and traffic statistics. To achieve this, access control to sensitive
data needs to be provided, and the confidentiality protection on
such data during transportation needs to be enforced. </t>
</section>
<section title="Data Integrity Requirements">
<t> SEC-REQ-14: An integrity protection mechanism for I2RS SHOULD be able to ensure the following:
1) the data being protected is not modified without detection during
its transportation and 2) the data is actually from where it is expected
to come from 3) the data is not repeated from some earlier interaction of the protocol.
That is, when both confidentiality and integrity of data is properly protected, it
is possible to ensure that encrypted data is not modified
or replayed without detection. </t>
<t>SEC-REQ-15: The integrity that the message data is not repeated
means that I2RS client to I2RS agent transport SHOULD protect against replay attack </t>
<t>Requirements SEC-REQ-13 and SEC-REQ-14 are SHOULD requirements only because it is recognized
that some I2RS Client to I2RS agent communication occurs over a non-secure channel.
The I2RS client to I2RS agent over a secure channel would implement these features.
In order to provide some traceability or notification for the non-secure protocol,
SEC-REQ-16 suggests traceability and notification are important to include for
any non-secure protocol.</t>
<t>SEC-REQ-17: The I2RS message traceability and notification requirements
requirements found in <xref target="I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability"></xref> and
<xref target="I-D.ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-requirements"></xref> SHOULD be supported
in communication channel that is non-secure to trace or notify about potential
security issues </t>
</section>
<section title="Role-Based Data Model Security">
<t>The <xref target="I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture"></xref> defines a
role or security role as specifying read, write, or notification access by a I2RS client to
data within an agent's data model.
</t>
<t> SEC-REQ-18: The rules around what role is permitted to access and manipulate what
information plus a secure transport (which protects the data in transit)
SHOULD ensure that data of any level of sensitivity is
reasonably protected from being observed by those without permission
to view it, so that privacy requirements are met.
</t>
<t> SEC-REQ-19: Role security MUST work when multiple transport connections are being used
between the I2RS client and I2RS agent as the <xref target="I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture">I2RS architecture</xref> states.
These transport message streams may start/stop without affecting the existence of the client/agent
data exchange. TCP supports a single stream of data. SCTP <xref target="RFC4960" /> provides
security for multiple streams plus end-to-end transport of data.
</t>
<t> SEC-REQ-20: I2RS clients MAY be used by multiple applications to configure routing
via I2RS agents, receive status reports, turn on the I2RS audit stream, or turn
on I2RS traceability. Application software using I2RS client functions
may host several multiple secure identities, but each connection will use
only one identifier with one priority. Therefore, the security of each
I2RS Client to I2RS Agent connection is unique.
</t>
<t> Please note the security of the application to
I2RS client connection is outside of the I2RS protocol or I2RS interface.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="Acks" title="Acknowledgement">
<t>The author would like to thank Wes George, Ahmed Abro, Qin Wu, Eric Yu,
Joel Halpern, Scott Brim, Nancy Cam-Winget, DaCheng Zhang, Alia Atlas, and Jeff Haas for their
contributions to the I2RS security requirements discussion and this document.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="IANA" title="IANA Considerations">
<t>This draft includes no request to IANA.</t>
</section>
<section title="Security Considerations">
<t>This is a document about security requirements for the I2RS protocol and
data modules. The whole document is security considerations. </t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
&RFC2119;
&RFC4107;
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
&RFC4949;
&RFC4960;
&I-D.ietf-i2rs-problem;
&I-D.ietf-i2rs-architecture;
&I-D.ietf-i2rs-rib-info-model;
&I-D.haas-i2rs-ephemeral-state-reqs;
&I-D.ietf-i2rs-traceability;
&I-D.ietf-i2rs-pub-sub-requirements;
</references>
</back>
</rfc>
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-23 09:22:20 |