One document matched: draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-19.xml
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<rfc obsoletes="2145,2616" updates="2817" category="std" ipr="pre5378Trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-19">
<front>
<title abbrev="HTTP/1.1, Part 1">HTTP/1.1, part 1: URIs, Connections, and Message Parsing</title>
<author initials="R." surname="Fielding" fullname="Roy T. Fielding" role="editor">
<organization abbrev="Adobe">Adobe Systems Incorporated</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>345 Park Ave</street>
<city>San Jose</city>
<region>CA</region>
<code>95110</code>
<country>USA</country>
</postal>
<email>fielding@gbiv.com</email>
<uri>http://roy.gbiv.com/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="Y." surname="Lafon" fullname="Yves Lafon" role="editor">
<organization abbrev="W3C">World Wide Web Consortium</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>W3C / ERCIM</street>
<street>2004, rte des Lucioles</street>
<city>Sophia-Antipolis</city>
<region>AM</region>
<code>06902</code>
<country>France</country>
</postal>
<email>ylafon@w3.org</email>
<uri>http://www.raubacapeu.net/people/yves/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="J. F." surname="Reschke" fullname="Julian F. Reschke" role="editor">
<organization abbrev="greenbytes">greenbytes GmbH</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>Hafenweg 16</street>
<city>Muenster</city><region>NW</region><code>48155</code>
<country>Germany</country>
</postal>
<phone>+49 251 2807760</phone>
<facsimile>+49 251 2807761</facsimile>
<email>julian.reschke@greenbytes.de</email>
<uri>http://greenbytes.de/tech/webdav/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<date month="March" year="2012" day="12"/>
<workgroup>HTTPbis Working Group</workgroup>
<abstract>
<t>
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application-level protocol for
distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. HTTP has been in
use by the World Wide Web global information initiative since 1990. This
document is Part 1 of the seven-part specification that defines the protocol
referred to as "HTTP/1.1" and, taken together, obsoletes
RFC 2616 and moves it to historic
status, along with its predecessor RFC
2068.
</t>
<t>
Part 1 provides an overview of HTTP and its associated terminology, defines
the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes, defines
the generic message syntax and parsing requirements for HTTP message frames,
and describes general security concerns for implementations.
</t>
<t>
This part also obsoletes RFCs 2145
(on HTTP version numbers) and 2817
(on using CONNECT for TLS upgrades) and moves them to historic status.
</t>
</abstract>
<note title="Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)">
<t>
Discussion of this draft should take place on the HTTPBIS working group
mailing list (ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at
<eref target="http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/"/>.
</t>
<t>
The current issues list is at
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/report/3"/> and related
documents (including fancy diffs) can be found at
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/"/>.
</t>
<t>
The changes in this draft are summarized in <xref target="changes.since.18"/>.
</t>
</note>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction" anchor="introduction">
<t>
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application-level
request/response protocol that uses extensible semantics and MIME-like
message payloads for flexible interaction with network-based hypertext
information systems. HTTP relies upon the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)
standard <xref target="RFC3986"/> to indicate the target resource
(<xref target="target-resource"/>) and relationships between resources.
Messages are passed in a format similar to that used by Internet mail
<xref target="RFC5322"/> and the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
(MIME) <xref target="RFC2045"/> (see Appendix A of <xref target="Part3"/> for the differences
between HTTP and MIME messages).
</t>
<t>
HTTP is a generic interface protocol for information systems. It is
designed to hide the details of how a service is implemented by presenting
a uniform interface to clients that is independent of the types of
resources provided. Likewise, servers do not need to be aware of each
client's purpose: an HTTP request can be considered in isolation rather
than being associated with a specific type of client or a predetermined
sequence of application steps. The result is a protocol that can be used
effectively in many different contexts and for which implementations can
evolve independently over time.
</t>
<t>
HTTP is also designed for use as an intermediation protocol for translating
communication to and from non-HTTP information systems.
HTTP proxies and gateways can provide access to alternative information
services by translating their diverse protocols into a hypertext
format that can be viewed and manipulated by clients in the same way
as HTTP services.
</t>
<t>
One consequence of HTTP flexibility is that the protocol cannot be
defined in terms of what occurs behind the interface. Instead, we
are limited to defining the syntax of communication, the intent
of received communication, and the expected behavior of recipients.
If the communication is considered in isolation, then successful
actions ought to be reflected in corresponding changes to the
observable interface provided by servers. However, since multiple
clients might act in parallel and perhaps at cross-purposes, we
cannot require that such changes be observable beyond the scope
of a single response.
</t>
<t>
This document is Part 1 of the seven-part specification of HTTP,
defining the protocol referred to as "HTTP/1.1", obsoleting
<xref target="RFC2616"/> and <xref target="RFC2145"/>.
Part 1 describes the architectural elements that are used or
referred to in HTTP, defines the "http" and "https" URI schemes,
describes overall network operation and connection management,
and defines HTTP message framing and forwarding requirements.
Our goal is to define all of the mechanisms necessary for HTTP message
handling that are independent of message semantics, thereby defining the
complete set of requirements for message parsers and
message-forwarding intermediaries.
</t>
<section title="Requirement Notation" anchor="intro.requirements">
<t>
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in <xref target="RFC2119"/>.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Syntax Notation" anchor="notation">
<iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="ALPHA"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="CR"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="CRLF"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="CTL"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="DIGIT"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="DQUOTE"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="HEXDIG"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="HTAB"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="LF"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="OCTET"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="SP"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="VCHAR"/>
<t>
This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation
of <xref target="RFC5234"/> with the list rule extension defined in
<xref target="abnf.extension"/>. <xref target="collected.abnf"/> shows
the collected ABNF with the list rule expanded.
</t>
<t anchor="core.rules">
The following core rules are included by
reference, as defined in <xref target="RFC5234"/>, Appendix B.1:
ALPHA (letters), CR (carriage return), CRLF (CR LF), CTL (controls),
DIGIT (decimal 0-9), DQUOTE (double quote),
HEXDIG (hexadecimal 0-9/A-F/a-f), HTAB (horizontal tab), LF (line feed),
OCTET (any 8-bit sequence of data), SP (space), and
VCHAR (any visible <xref target="USASCII"/> character).
</t>
<t>
As a convention, ABNF rule names prefixed with "obs-" denote
"obsolete" grammar rules that appear for historical reasons.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Architecture" anchor="architecture">
<t>
HTTP was created for the World Wide Web architecture
and has evolved over time to support the scalability needs of a worldwide
hypertext system. Much of that architecture is reflected in the terminology
and syntax productions used to define HTTP.
</t>
<section title="Client/Server Messaging" anchor="operation">
<iref primary="true" item="client"/>
<iref primary="true" item="server"/>
<iref primary="true" item="connection"/>
<t>
HTTP is a stateless request/response protocol that operates by exchanging
messages (<xref target="http.message"/>) across a reliable
transport or session-layer
"connection". An HTTP "client" is a
program that establishes a connection to a server for the purpose of
sending one or more HTTP requests. An HTTP "server" is a
program that accepts connections in order to service HTTP requests by
sending HTTP responses.
</t>
<iref primary="true" item="user agent"/>
<iref primary="true" item="origin server"/>
<iref primary="true" item="browser"/>
<iref primary="true" item="spider"/>
<iref primary="true" item="sender"/>
<iref primary="true" item="recipient"/>
<t>
Note that the terms client and server refer only to the roles that
these programs perform for a particular connection. The same program
might act as a client on some connections and a server on others. We use
the term "user agent" to refer to the program that initiates a request,
such as a WWW browser, editor, or spider (web-traversing robot), and
the term "origin server" to refer to the program that can originate
authoritative responses to a request. For general requirements, we use
the term "sender" to refer to whichever component sent a given message
and the term "recipient" to refer to any component that receives the
message.
</t>
<t><list>
<t>
Note: The term 'user agent' covers both those situations where
there is a user (human) interacting with the software agent (and for which
user interface or interactive suggestions might be made, e.g., warning the
user or given the user an option in the case of security or privacy
options) and also those where the software agent may act autonomously.
</t>
</list></t>
<t>
Most HTTP communication consists of a retrieval request (GET) for
a representation of some resource identified by a URI. In the
simplest case, this might be accomplished via a single bidirectional
connection (===) between the user agent (UA) and the origin server (O).
</t>
<figure><artwork type="drawing"><![CDATA[
request >
UA ======================================= O
< response
]]></artwork></figure>
<iref primary="true" item="message"/>
<iref primary="true" item="request"/>
<iref primary="true" item="response"/>
<t>
A client sends an HTTP request to the server in the form of a request
message, beginning with a request-line that includes a method, URI, and
protocol version (<xref target="request.line"/>),
followed by MIME-like header fields containing
request modifiers, client information, and representation metadata
(<xref target="header.fields"/>),
an empty line to indicate the end of the header section, and finally
a message body containing the payload body (if any,
<xref target="message.body"/>).
</t>
<t>
A server responds to the client's request by sending one or more HTTP
response
messages, each beginning with a status line that
includes the protocol version, a success or error code, and textual
reason phrase (<xref target="status.line"/>),
possibly followed by MIME-like header fields containing server
information, resource metadata, and representation metadata
(<xref target="header.fields"/>),
an empty line to indicate the end of the header section, and finally
a message body containing the payload body (if any,
<xref target="message.body"/>).
</t>
<t>
The following example illustrates a typical message exchange for a
GET request on the URI "http://www.example.com/hello.txt":
</t>
<figure><preamble>
client request:
</preamble><artwork type="message/http; msgtype="request""><![CDATA[
GET /hello.txt HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: curl/7.16.3 libcurl/7.16.3 OpenSSL/0.9.7l zlib/1.2.3
Host: www.example.com
Accept: */*
]]></artwork></figure>
<figure><preamble>
server response:
</preamble><artwork type="message/http; msgtype="response""><![CDATA[
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2009 12:28:53 GMT
Server: Apache
Last-Modified: Wed, 22 Jul 2009 19:15:56 GMT
ETag: "34aa387-d-1568eb00"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 14
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/plain
Hello World!
]]></artwork></figure>
</section>
<section title="Connections and Transport Independence" anchor="transport-independence">
<t>
HTTP messaging is independent of the underlying transport or
session-layer connection protocol(s). HTTP only presumes a reliable
transport with in-order delivery of requests and the corresponding
in-order delivery of responses. The mapping of HTTP request and
response structures onto the data units of the underlying transport
protocol is outside the scope of this specification.
</t>
<t>
The specific connection protocols to be used for an interaction
are determined by client configuration and the target URI
(<xref target="target-resource"/>).
For example, the "http" URI scheme
(<xref target="http.uri"/>) indicates a default connection of TCP
over IP, with a default TCP port of 80, but the client might be
configured to use a proxy via some other connection port or protocol
instead of using the defaults.
</t>
<t>
A connection might be used for multiple HTTP request/response exchanges,
as defined in <xref target="persistent.connections"/>.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Intermediaries" anchor="intermediaries">
<iref primary="true" item="intermediary"/>
<t>
HTTP enables the use of intermediaries to satisfy requests through
a chain of connections. There are three common forms of HTTP
intermediary: proxy, gateway, and tunnel. In some cases,
a single intermediary might act as an origin server, proxy, gateway,
or tunnel, switching behavior based on the nature of each request.
</t>
<figure><artwork type="drawing"><![CDATA[
> > > >
UA =========== A =========== B =========== C =========== O
< < < <
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The figure above shows three intermediaries (A, B, and C) between the
user agent and origin server. A request or response message that
travels the whole chain will pass through four separate connections.
Some HTTP communication options
might apply only to the connection with the nearest, non-tunnel
neighbor, only to the end-points of the chain, or to all connections
along the chain. Although the diagram is linear, each participant might
be engaged in multiple, simultaneous communications. For example, B
might be receiving requests from many clients other than A, and/or
forwarding requests to servers other than C, at the same time that it
is handling A's request.
</t>
<t>
<iref primary="true" item="upstream"/><iref primary="true" item="downstream"/>
<iref primary="true" item="inbound"/><iref primary="true" item="outbound"/>
We use the terms "upstream" and "downstream"
to describe various requirements in relation to the directional flow of a
message: all messages flow from upstream to downstream.
Likewise, we use the terms inbound and outbound to refer to
directions in relation to the request path:
"inbound" means toward the origin server and
"outbound" means toward the user agent.
</t>
<t><iref primary="true" item="proxy"/>
A "proxy" is a message forwarding agent that is selected by the
client, usually via local configuration rules, to receive requests
for some type(s) of absolute URI and attempt to satisfy those
requests via translation through the HTTP interface. Some translations
are minimal, such as for proxy requests for "http" URIs, whereas
other requests might require translation to and from entirely different
application-layer protocols. Proxies are often used to group an
organization's HTTP requests through a common intermediary for the
sake of security, annotation services, or shared caching.
</t>
<t>
<iref primary="true" item="transforming proxy"/>
<iref primary="true" item="non-transforming proxy"/>
An HTTP-to-HTTP proxy is called a "transforming proxy" if it is designed
or configured to modify request or response messages in a semantically
meaningful way (i.e., modifications, beyond those required by normal
HTTP processing, that change the message in a way that would be
significant to the original sender or potentially significant to
downstream recipients). For example, a transforming proxy might be
acting as a shared annotation server (modifying responses to include
references to a local annotation database), a malware filter, a
format transcoder, or an intranet-to-Internet privacy filter. Such
transformations are presumed to be desired by the client (or client
organization) that selected the proxy and are beyond the scope of
this specification. However, when a proxy is not intended to transform
a given message, we use the term "non-transforming proxy" to target
requirements that preserve HTTP message semantics. See Section 7.2.4 of <xref target="Part2"/> and
Section 3.6 of <xref target="Part6"/> for status and warning codes related to transformations.
</t>
<t><iref primary="true" item="gateway"/><iref primary="true" item="reverse proxy"/>
<iref primary="true" item="accelerator"/>
A "gateway" (a.k.a., "reverse proxy")
is a receiving agent that acts
as a layer above some other server(s) and translates the received
requests to the underlying server's protocol. Gateways are often
used to encapsulate legacy or untrusted information services, to
improve server performance through "accelerator" caching, and to
enable partitioning or load-balancing of HTTP services across
multiple machines.
</t>
<t>
A gateway behaves as an origin server on its outbound connection and
as a user agent on its inbound connection.
All HTTP requirements applicable to an origin server
also apply to the outbound communication of a gateway.
A gateway communicates with inbound servers using any protocol that
it desires, including private extensions to HTTP that are outside
the scope of this specification. However, an HTTP-to-HTTP gateway
that wishes to interoperate with third-party HTTP servers MUST
conform to HTTP user agent requirements on the gateway's inbound
connection and MUST implement the Connection
(<xref target="header.connection"/>) and Via (<xref target="header.via"/>)
header fields for both connections.
</t>
<t><iref primary="true" item="tunnel"/>
A "tunnel" acts as a blind relay between two connections
without changing the messages. Once active, a tunnel is not
considered a party to the HTTP communication, though the tunnel might
have been initiated by an HTTP request. A tunnel ceases to exist when
both ends of the relayed connection are closed. Tunnels are used to
extend a virtual connection through an intermediary, such as when
transport-layer security is used to establish private communication
through a shared firewall proxy.
</t>
<t><iref primary="true" item="interception proxy"/><iref primary="true" item="transparent proxy"/>
<iref primary="true" item="captive portal"/>
In addition, there may exist network intermediaries that are not
considered part of the HTTP communication but nevertheless act as
filters or redirecting agents (usually violating HTTP semantics,
causing security problems, and otherwise making a mess of things).
Such a network intermediary, often referred to as an "interception proxy"
<xref target="RFC3040"/>, "transparent proxy" <xref target="RFC1919"/>,
or "captive portal",
differs from an HTTP proxy because it has not been selected by the client.
Instead, the network intermediary redirects outgoing TCP port 80 packets
(and occasionally other common port traffic) to an internal HTTP server.
Interception proxies are commonly found on public network access points,
as a means of enforcing account subscription prior to allowing use of
non-local Internet services, and within corporate firewalls to enforce
network usage policies.
They are indistinguishable from a man-in-the-middle attack.
</t>
<t>
HTTP is defined as a stateless protocol, meaning that each request message
can be understood in isolation. Many implementations depend on HTTP's
stateless design in order to reuse proxied connections or dynamically
load balance requests across multiple servers. Hence, servers MUST NOT
assume that two requests on the same connection are from the same user
agent unless the connection is secured and specific to that agent.
Some non-standard HTTP extensions (e.g., <xref target="RFC4559"/>) have
been known to violate this requirement, resulting in security and
interoperability problems.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Caches" anchor="caches">
<iref primary="true" item="cache"/>
<t>
A "cache" is a local store of previous response messages and the
subsystem that controls its message storage, retrieval, and deletion.
A cache stores cacheable responses in order to reduce the response
time and network bandwidth consumption on future, equivalent
requests. Any client or server MAY employ a cache, though a cache
cannot be used by a server while it is acting as a tunnel.
</t>
<t>
The effect of a cache is that the request/response chain is shortened
if one of the participants along the chain has a cached response
applicable to that request. The following illustrates the resulting
chain if B has a cached copy of an earlier response from O (via C)
for a request which has not been cached by UA or A.
</t>
<figure><artwork type="drawing"><![CDATA[
> >
UA =========== A =========== B - - - - - - C - - - - - - O
< <
]]></artwork></figure>
<t><iref primary="true" item="cacheable"/>
A response is "cacheable" if a cache is allowed to store a copy of
the response message for use in answering subsequent requests.
Even when a response is cacheable, there might be additional
constraints placed by the client or by the origin server on when
that cached response can be used for a particular request. HTTP
requirements for cache behavior and cacheable responses are
defined in Section 2 of <xref target="Part6"/>.
</t>
<t>
There are a wide variety of architectures and configurations
of caches and proxies deployed across the World Wide Web and
inside large organizations. These systems include national hierarchies
of proxy caches to save transoceanic bandwidth, systems that
broadcast or multicast cache entries, organizations that distribute
subsets of cached data via optical media, and so on.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Conformance and Error Handling" anchor="intro.conformance.and.error.handling">
<t>
This specification targets conformance criteria according to the role of
a participant in HTTP communication. Hence, HTTP requirements are placed
on senders, recipients, clients, servers, user agents, intermediaries,
origin servers, proxies, gateways, or caches, depending on what behavior
is being constrained by the requirement.
</t>
<t>
An implementation is considered conformant if it complies with all of the
requirements associated with the roles it partakes in HTTP.
</t>
<t>
Senders MUST NOT generate protocol elements that do not match the grammar
defined by the ABNF rules for those protocol elements.
</t>
<t>
Unless otherwise noted, recipients MAY attempt to recover a usable
protocol element from an invalid construct. HTTP does not define
specific error handling mechanisms except when they have a direct impact
on security, since different applications of the protocol require
different error handling strategies. For example, a Web browser might
wish to transparently recover from a response where the Location header
field doesn't parse according to the ABNF, whereas a systems control
client might consider any form of error recovery to be dangerous.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Protocol Versioning" anchor="http.version">
<t>
HTTP uses a "<major>.<minor>" numbering scheme to indicate
versions of the protocol. This specification defines version "1.1".
The protocol version as a whole indicates the sender's conformance
with the set of requirements laid out in that version's corresponding
specification of HTTP.
</t>
<t>
The version of an HTTP message is indicated by an HTTP-version field
in the first line of the message. HTTP-version is case-sensitive.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="HTTP-version"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="HTTP-name"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
HTTP-version = HTTP-name "/" DIGIT "." DIGIT
HTTP-name = %x48.54.54.50 ; "HTTP", case-sensitive
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The HTTP version number consists of two decimal digits separated by a "."
(period or decimal point). The first digit ("major version") indicates the
HTTP messaging syntax, whereas the second digit ("minor version") indicates
the highest minor version to which the sender is
conformant and able to understand for future communication. The minor
version advertises the sender's communication capabilities even when the
sender is only using a backwards-compatible subset of the protocol,
thereby letting the recipient know that more advanced features can
be used in response (by servers) or in future requests (by clients).
</t>
<t>
When an HTTP/1.1 message is sent to an HTTP/1.0 recipient
<xref target="RFC1945"/> or a recipient whose version is unknown,
the HTTP/1.1 message is constructed such that it can be interpreted
as a valid HTTP/1.0 message if all of the newer features are ignored.
This specification places recipient-version requirements on some
new features so that a conformant sender will only use compatible
features until it has determined, through configuration or the
receipt of a message, that the recipient supports HTTP/1.1.
</t>
<t>
The interpretation of a header field does not change between minor
versions of the same major HTTP version, though the default
behavior of a recipient in the absence of such a field can change.
Unless specified otherwise, header fields defined in HTTP/1.1 are
defined for all versions of HTTP/1.x. In particular, the Host and
Connection header fields ought to be implemented by all HTTP/1.x
implementations whether or not they advertise conformance with HTTP/1.1.
</t>
<t>
New header fields can be defined such that, when they are
understood by a recipient, they might override or enhance the
interpretation of previously defined header fields. When an
implementation receives an unrecognized header field, the recipient
MUST ignore that header field for local processing regardless of
the message's HTTP version. An unrecognized header field received
by a proxy MUST be forwarded downstream unless the header field's
field-name is listed in the message's Connection header-field
(see <xref target="header.connection"/>).
These requirements allow HTTP's functionality to be enhanced without
requiring prior update of deployed intermediaries.
</t>
<t>
Intermediaries that process HTTP messages (i.e., all intermediaries
other than those acting as tunnels) MUST send their own HTTP-version
in forwarded messages. In other words, they MUST NOT blindly
forward the first line of an HTTP message without ensuring that the
protocol version in that message matches a version to which that
intermediary is conformant for both the receiving and
sending of messages. Forwarding an HTTP message without rewriting
the HTTP-version might result in communication errors when downstream
recipients use the message sender's version to determine what features
are safe to use for later communication with that sender.
</t>
<t>
An HTTP client SHOULD send a request version equal to the highest
version to which the client is conformant and
whose major version is no higher than the highest version supported
by the server, if this is known. An HTTP client MUST NOT send a
version to which it is not conformant.
</t>
<t>
An HTTP client MAY send a lower request version if it is known that
the server incorrectly implements the HTTP specification, but only
after the client has attempted at least one normal request and determined
from the response status or header fields (e.g., Server) that the
server improperly handles higher request versions.
</t>
<t>
An HTTP server SHOULD send a response version equal to the highest
version to which the server is conformant and
whose major version is less than or equal to the one received in the
request. An HTTP server MUST NOT send a version to which it is not
conformant. A server MAY send a 505 (HTTP
Version Not Supported) response if it cannot send a response using the
major version used in the client's request.
</t>
<t>
An HTTP server MAY send an HTTP/1.0 response to an HTTP/1.0 request
if it is known or suspected that the client incorrectly implements the
HTTP specification and is incapable of correctly processing later
version responses, such as when a client fails to parse the version
number correctly or when an intermediary is known to blindly forward
the HTTP-version even when it doesn't conform to the given minor
version of the protocol. Such protocol downgrades SHOULD NOT be
performed unless triggered by specific client attributes, such as when
one or more of the request header fields (e.g., User-Agent) uniquely
match the values sent by a client known to be in error.
</t>
<t>
The intention of HTTP's versioning design is that the major number
will only be incremented if an incompatible message syntax is
introduced, and that the minor number will only be incremented when
changes made to the protocol have the effect of adding to the message
semantics or implying additional capabilities of the sender. However,
the minor version was not incremented for the changes introduced between
<xref target="RFC2068"/> and <xref target="RFC2616"/>, and this revision
is specifically avoiding any such changes to the protocol.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Uniform Resource Identifiers" anchor="uri">
<iref primary="true" item="resource"/>
<t>
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) <xref target="RFC3986"/> are used
throughout HTTP as the means for identifying resources. URI references
are used to target requests, indicate redirects, and define relationships.
HTTP does not limit what a resource might be; it merely defines an interface
that can be used to interact with a resource via HTTP. More information on
the scope of URIs and resources can be found in <xref target="RFC3986"/>.
</t>
<t>
This specification adopts the definitions of "URI-reference",
"absolute-URI", "relative-part", "port", "host",
"path-abempty", "path-absolute", "query", and "authority" from the
URI generic syntax <xref target="RFC3986"/>.
In addition, we define a partial-URI rule for protocol elements
that allow a relative URI but not a fragment.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="URI-reference"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="absolute-URI"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="authority"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="path-absolute"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="port"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="query"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="uri-host"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
URI-reference = <URI-reference, defined in [RFC3986], Section 4.1>
absolute-URI = <absolute-URI, defined in [RFC3986], Section 4.3>
relative-part = <relative-part, defined in [RFC3986], Section 4.2>
authority = <authority, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.2>
path-abempty = <path-abempty, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.3>
path-absolute = <path-absolute, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.3>
port = <port, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.2.3>
query = <query, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.4>
uri-host = <host, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.2.2>
partial-URI = relative-part [ "?" query ]
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Each protocol element in HTTP that allows a URI reference will indicate
in its ABNF production whether the element allows any form of reference
(URI-reference), only a URI in absolute form (absolute-URI), only the
path and optional query components, or some combination of the above.
Unless otherwise indicated, URI references are parsed
relative to the effective request URI
(<xref target="effective.request.uri"/>).
</t>
<section title="http URI scheme" anchor="http.uri">
<iref item="http URI scheme" primary="true"/>
<iref item="URI scheme" subitem="http" primary="true"/>
<t>
The "http" URI scheme is hereby defined for the purpose of minting
identifiers according to their association with the hierarchical
namespace governed by a potential HTTP origin server listening for
TCP connections on a given port.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="http-URI"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
http-URI = "http:" "//" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ]
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The HTTP origin server is identified by the generic syntax's
<xref target="uri" format="none">authority</xref> component, which includes a host identifier
and optional TCP port (<xref target="RFC3986"/>, Section 3.2.2).
The remainder of the URI, consisting of both the hierarchical path
component and optional query component, serves as an identifier for
a potential resource within that origin server's name space.
</t>
<t>
If the host identifier is provided as an IP literal or IPv4 address,
then the origin server is any listener on the indicated TCP port at
that IP address. If host is a registered name, then that name is
considered an indirect identifier and the recipient might use a name
resolution service, such as DNS, to find the address of a listener
for that host.
The host MUST NOT be empty; if an "http" URI is received with an
empty host, then it MUST be rejected as invalid.
If the port subcomponent is empty or not given, then TCP port 80 is
assumed (the default reserved port for WWW services).
</t>
<t>
Regardless of the form of host identifier, access to that host is not
implied by the mere presence of its name or address. The host might or might
not exist and, even when it does exist, might or might not be running an
HTTP server or listening to the indicated port. The "http" URI scheme
makes use of the delegated nature of Internet names and addresses to
establish a naming authority (whatever entity has the ability to place
an HTTP server at that Internet name or address) and allows that
authority to determine which names are valid and how they might be used.
</t>
<t>
When an "http" URI is used within a context that calls for access to the
indicated resource, a client MAY attempt access by resolving
the host to an IP address, establishing a TCP connection to that address
on the indicated port, and sending an HTTP request message
(<xref target="http.message"/>) containing the URI's identifying data
(<xref target="message.routing"/>) to the server.
If the server responds to that request with a non-interim HTTP response
message, as described in Section 4 of <xref target="Part2"/>, then that response
is considered an authoritative answer to the client's request.
</t>
<t>
Although HTTP is independent of the transport protocol, the "http"
scheme is specific to TCP-based services because the name delegation
process depends on TCP for establishing authority.
An HTTP service based on some other underlying connection protocol
would presumably be identified using a different URI scheme, just as
the "https" scheme (below) is used for servers that require an SSL/TLS
transport layer on a connection. Other protocols might also be used to
provide access to "http" identified resources — it is only the
authoritative interface used for mapping the namespace that is
specific to TCP.
</t>
<t>
The URI generic syntax for authority also includes a deprecated
userinfo subcomponent (<xref target="RFC3986"/>, Section 3.2.1)
for including user authentication information in the URI. Some
implementations make use of the userinfo component for internal
configuration of authentication information, such as within command
invocation options, configuration files, or bookmark lists, even
though such usage might expose a user identifier or password.
Senders MUST NOT include a userinfo subcomponent (and its "@"
delimiter) when transmitting an "http" URI in a message. Recipients
of HTTP messages that contain a URI reference SHOULD parse for the
existence of userinfo and treat its presence as an error, likely
indicating that the deprecated subcomponent is being used to obscure
the authority for the sake of phishing attacks.
</t>
</section>
<section title="https URI scheme" anchor="https.uri">
<iref item="https URI scheme"/>
<iref item="URI scheme" subitem="https"/>
<t>
The "https" URI scheme is hereby defined for the purpose of minting
identifiers according to their association with the hierarchical
namespace governed by a potential HTTP origin server listening for
SSL/TLS-secured connections on a given TCP port.
</t>
<t>
All of the requirements listed above for the "http" scheme are also
requirements for the "https" scheme, except that a default TCP port
of 443 is assumed if the port subcomponent is empty or not given,
and the TCP connection MUST be secured for privacy through the
use of strong encryption prior to sending the first HTTP request.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="https-URI"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
https-URI = "https:" "//" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ]
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Unlike the "http" scheme, responses to "https" identified requests
are never "public" and thus MUST NOT be reused for shared caching.
They can, however, be reused in a private cache if the message is
cacheable by default in HTTP or specifically indicated as such by
the Cache-Control header field (Section 3.2 of <xref target="Part6"/>).
</t>
<t>
Resources made available via the "https" scheme have no shared
identity with the "http" scheme even if their resource identifiers
indicate the same authority (the same host listening to the same
TCP port). They are distinct name spaces and are considered to be
distinct origin servers. However, an extension to HTTP that is
defined to apply to entire host domains, such as the Cookie protocol
<xref target="RFC6265"/>, can allow information
set by one service to impact communication with other services
within a matching group of host domains.
</t>
<t>
The process for authoritative access to an "https" identified
resource is defined in <xref target="RFC2818"/>.
</t>
</section>
<section title="http and https URI Normalization and Comparison" anchor="uri.comparison">
<t>
Since the "http" and "https" schemes conform to the URI generic syntax,
such URIs are normalized and compared according to the algorithm defined
in <xref target="RFC3986"/>, Section 6, using the defaults
described above for each scheme.
</t>
<t>
If the port is equal to the default port for a scheme, the normal
form is to elide the port subcomponent. Likewise, an empty path
component is equivalent to an absolute path of "/", so the normal
form is to provide a path of "/" instead. The scheme and host
are case-insensitive and normally provided in lowercase; all
other components are compared in a case-sensitive manner.
Characters other than those in the "reserved" set are equivalent
to their percent-encoded octets (see <xref target="RFC3986"/>, Section 2.1): the normal form is to not encode them.
</t>
<t>
For example, the following three URIs are equivalent:
</t>
<figure><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
http://example.com:80/~smith/home.html
http://EXAMPLE.com/%7Esmith/home.html
http://EXAMPLE.com:/%7esmith/home.html
]]></artwork></figure>
</section>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Message Format" anchor="http.message">
<iref item="header section"/>
<iref item="headers"/>
<iref item="header field"/>
<t>
All HTTP/1.1 messages consist of a start-line followed by a sequence of
octets in a format similar to the Internet Message Format
<xref target="RFC5322"/>: zero or more header fields (collectively
referred to as the "headers" or the "header section"), an empty line
indicating the end of the header section, and an optional message body.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="HTTP-message"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
HTTP-message = start-line
*( header-field CRLF )
CRLF
[ message-body ]
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The normal procedure for parsing an HTTP message is to read the
start-line into a structure, read each header field into a hash
table by field name until the empty line, and then use the parsed
data to determine if a message body is expected. If a message body
has been indicated, then it is read as a stream until an amount
of octets equal to the message body length is read or the connection
is closed.
</t>
<t>
Recipients MUST parse an HTTP message as a sequence of octets in an
encoding that is a superset of US-ASCII <xref target="USASCII"/>.
Parsing an HTTP message as a stream of Unicode characters, without regard
for the specific encoding, creates security vulnerabilities due to the
varying ways that string processing libraries handle invalid multibyte
character sequences that contain the octet LF (%x0A). String-based
parsers can only be safely used within protocol elements after the element
has been extracted from the message, such as within a header field-value
after message parsing has delineated the individual fields.
</t>
<t>
An HTTP message can be parsed as a stream for incremental processing or
forwarding downstream. However, recipients cannot rely on incremental
delivery of partial messages, since some implementations will buffer or
delay message forwarding for the sake of network efficiency, security
checks, or payload transformations.
</t>
<section title="Start Line" anchor="start.line">
<t>
An HTTP message can either be a request from client to server or a
response from server to client. Syntactically, the two types of message
differ only in the start-line, which is either a request-line (for requests)
or a status-line (for responses), and in the algorithm for determining
the length of the message body (<xref target="message.body"/>).
In theory, a client could receive requests and a server could receive
responses, distinguishing them by their different start-line formats,
but in practice servers are implemented to only expect a request
(a response is interpreted as an unknown or invalid request method)
and clients are implemented to only expect a response.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="start-line"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
start-line = request-line / status-line
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
</t>
<t>
Implementations MUST NOT send whitespace between the start-line and
the first header field. The presence of such whitespace in a request
might be an attempt to trick a server into ignoring that field or
processing the line after it as a new request, either of which might
result in a security vulnerability if other implementations within
the request chain interpret the same message differently.
Likewise, the presence of such whitespace in a response might be
ignored by some clients or cause others to cease parsing.
</t>
<section title="Request Line" anchor="request.line">
<t>
A request-line begins with a method token, followed by a single
space (SP), the request-target, another single space (SP), the
protocol version, and ending with CRLF.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="request-line"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
request-line = method SP request-target SP HTTP-version CRLF
]]></artwork></figure>
<iref primary="true" item="method"/>
<t anchor="method">
The method token indicates the request method to be performed on the
target resource. The request method is case-sensitive.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="method"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
method = token
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The methods defined by this specification can be found in
Section 2 of <xref target="Part2"/>, along with information regarding the HTTP method registry
and considerations for defining new methods.
</t>
<iref item="request-target"/>
<t>
The request-target identifies the target resource upon which to apply
the request, as defined in <xref target="request-target"/>.
</t>
<t>
No whitespace is allowed inside the method, request-target, and
protocol version. Hence, recipients typically parse the request-line
into its component parts by splitting on the SP characters.
</t>
<t>
Unfortunately, some user agents fail to properly encode hypertext
references that have embedded whitespace, sending the characters
directly instead of properly percent-encoding the disallowed characters.
Recipients of an invalid request-line SHOULD respond with either a
400 (Bad Request) error or a 301 (Moved Permanently) redirect with the
request-target properly encoded. Recipients SHOULD NOT attempt to
autocorrect and then process the request without a redirect, since the
invalid request-line might be deliberately crafted to bypass
security filters along the request chain.
</t>
<t>
HTTP does not place a pre-defined limit on the length of a request-line.
A server that receives a method longer than any that it implements
SHOULD respond with either a 404 (Not Allowed), if it is an origin
server, or a 501 (Not Implemented) status code.
A server MUST be prepared to receive URIs of unbounded length and
respond with the 414 (URI Too Long) status code if the received
request-target would be longer than the server wishes to handle
(see Section 7.4.12 of <xref target="Part2"/>).
</t>
<t>
Various ad-hoc limitations on request-line length are found in practice.
It is RECOMMENDED that all HTTP senders and recipients support, at a
minimum, request-line lengths of up to 8000 octets.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Status Line" anchor="status.line">
<t>
The first line of a response message is the status-line, consisting
of the protocol version, a space (SP), the status code, another space,
a possibly-empty textual phrase describing the status code, and
ending with CRLF.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="status-line"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
status-line = HTTP-version SP status-code SP reason-phrase CRLF
]]></artwork></figure>
<t anchor="status-code">
The status-code element is a 3-digit integer result code of the attempt to
understand and satisfy the request. See Section 4 of <xref target="Part2"/> for
further information, such as the list of status codes defined by this
specification, the IANA registry, and considerations for new status codes.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="status-code"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
status-code = 3DIGIT
]]></artwork></figure>
<t anchor="reason-phrase">
The reason-phrase element exists for the sole purpose of providing a
textual description associated with the numeric status code, mostly
out of deference to earlier Internet application protocols that were more
frequently used with interactive text clients. A client SHOULD ignore
the reason-phrase content.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="reason-phrase"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
reason-phrase = *( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
]]></artwork></figure>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Header Fields" anchor="header.fields">
<t>
Each HTTP header field consists of a case-insensitive field name
followed by a colon (":"), optional whitespace, and the field value.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="header-field"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="field-name"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="field-value"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="field-content"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="obs-fold"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
header-field = field-name ":" OWS field-value BWS
field-name = token
field-value = *( field-content / obs-fold )
field-content = *( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
obs-fold = CRLF ( SP / HTAB )
; obsolete line folding
; see Section 3.2.2
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The field-name token labels the corresponding field-value as having the
semantics defined by that header field. For example, the Date header field
is defined in Section 10.2 of <xref target="Part2"/> as containing the origination
timestamp for the message in which it appears.
</t>
<t>
HTTP header fields are fully extensible: there is no limit on the
introduction of new field names, each presumably defining new semantics,
or on the number of header fields used in a given message. Existing
fields are defined in each part of this specification and in many other
specifications outside the standards process.
New header fields can be introduced without changing the protocol version
if their defined semantics allow them to be safely ignored by recipients
that do not recognize them.
</t>
<t>
New HTTP header fields SHOULD be registered with IANA according
to the procedures in Section 3.1 of <xref target="Part2"/>.
Unrecognized header fields MUST be forwarded by a proxy unless the
field-name is listed in the Connection header field
(<xref target="header.connection"/>) or the proxy is specifically
configured to block or otherwise transform such fields.
Unrecognized header fields SHOULD be ignored by other recipients.
</t>
<t>
The order in which header fields with differing field names are
received is not significant. However, it is "good practice" to send
header fields that contain control data first, such as Host on
requests and Date on responses, so that implementations can decide
when not to handle a message as early as possible. A server MUST
wait until the entire header section is received before interpreting
a request message, since later header fields might include conditionals,
authentication credentials, or deliberately misleading duplicate
header fields that would impact request processing.
</t>
<t>
Multiple header fields with the same field name MUST NOT be
sent in a message unless the entire field value for that
header field is defined as a comma-separated list [i.e., #(values)].
Multiple header fields with the same field name can be combined into
one "field-name: field-value" pair, without changing the semantics of the
message, by appending each subsequent field value to the combined
field value in order, separated by a comma. The order in which
header fields with the same field name are received is therefore
significant to the interpretation of the combined field value;
a proxy MUST NOT change the order of these field values when
forwarding a message.
</t>
<t><list>
<t>
Note: The "Set-Cookie" header field as implemented in
practice can occur multiple times, but does not use the list syntax, and
thus cannot be combined into a single line (<xref target="RFC6265"/>). (See Appendix A.2.3 of <xref target="Kri2001"/>
for details.) Also note that the Set-Cookie2 header field specified in
<xref target="RFC2965"/> does not share this problem.
</t>
</list></t>
<section title="Whitespace" anchor="whitespace">
<t anchor="rule.LWS">
This specification uses three rules to denote the use of linear
whitespace: OWS (optional whitespace), RWS (required whitespace), and
BWS ("bad" whitespace).
</t>
<t anchor="rule.OWS">
The OWS rule is used where zero or more linear whitespace octets might
appear. OWS SHOULD either not be produced or be produced as a single
SP. Multiple OWS octets that occur within field-content SHOULD either
be replaced with a single SP or transformed to all SP octets (each
octet other than SP replaced with SP) before interpreting the field value
or forwarding the message downstream.
</t>
<t anchor="rule.RWS">
RWS is used when at least one linear whitespace octet is required to
separate field tokens. RWS SHOULD be produced as a single SP.
Multiple RWS octets that occur within field-content SHOULD either
be replaced with a single SP or transformed to all SP octets before
interpreting the field value or forwarding the message downstream.
</t>
<t anchor="rule.BWS">
BWS is used where the grammar allows optional whitespace for historical
reasons but senders SHOULD NOT produce it in messages. HTTP/1.1
recipients MUST accept such bad optional whitespace and remove it before
interpreting the field value or forwarding the message downstream.
</t>
<t anchor="rule.whitespace">
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="OWS"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="RWS"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="BWS"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
OWS = *( SP / HTAB )
; "optional" whitespace
RWS = 1*( SP / HTAB )
; "required" whitespace
BWS = OWS
; "bad" whitespace
]]></artwork></figure>
</section>
<section title="Field Parsing" anchor="field.parsing">
<t>
No whitespace is allowed between the header field-name and colon.
In the past, differences in the handling of such whitespace have led to
security vulnerabilities in request routing and response handling.
Any received request message that contains whitespace between a header
field-name and colon MUST be rejected with a response code of 400
(Bad Request). A proxy MUST remove any such whitespace from a response
message before forwarding the message downstream.
</t>
<t>
A field value MAY be preceded by optional whitespace (OWS); a single SP is
preferred. The field value does not include any leading or trailing white
space: OWS occurring before the first non-whitespace octet of the
field value or after the last non-whitespace octet of the field value
is ignored and SHOULD be removed before further processing (as this does
not change the meaning of the header field).
</t>
<t>
Historically, HTTP header field values could be extended over multiple
lines by preceding each extra line with at least one space or horizontal
tab (obs-fold). This specification deprecates such line
folding except within the message/http media type
(<xref target="internet.media.type.message.http"/>).
HTTP senders MUST NOT produce messages that include line folding
(i.e., that contain any field-value that matches the obs-fold rule) unless
the message is intended for packaging within the message/http media type.
HTTP recipients SHOULD accept line folding and replace any embedded
obs-fold whitespace with either a single SP or a matching number of SP
octets (to avoid buffer copying) prior to interpreting the field value or
forwarding the message downstream.
</t>
<t>
Historically, HTTP has allowed field content with text in the ISO-8859-1
<xref target="ISO-8859-1"/> character encoding and supported other
character sets only through use of <xref target="RFC2047"/> encoding.
In practice, most HTTP header field values use only a subset of the
US-ASCII character encoding <xref target="USASCII"/>. Newly defined
header fields SHOULD limit their field values to US-ASCII octets.
Recipients SHOULD treat other (obs-text) octets in field content as
opaque data.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Field Length" anchor="field.length">
<t>
HTTP does not place a pre-defined limit on the length of header fields,
either in isolation or as a set. A server MUST be prepared to receive
request header fields of unbounded length and respond with a 4xx status
code if the received header field(s) would be longer than the server wishes
to handle.
</t>
<t>
A client that receives response headers that are longer than it wishes to
handle can only treat it as a server error.
</t>
<t>
Various ad-hoc limitations on header length are found in practice. It is
RECOMMENDED that all HTTP senders and recipients support messages whose
combined header fields have 4000 or more octets.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Field value components" anchor="field.components">
<t anchor="rule.token.separators">
Many HTTP/1.1 header field values consist of words (token or quoted-string)
separated by whitespace or special characters. These special characters
MUST be in a quoted string to be used within a parameter value (as defined
in <xref target="transfer.codings"/>).
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="word"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="token"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="tchar"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="special"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
word = token / quoted-string
token = 1*tchar
tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*"
/ "+" / "-" / "." / "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~"
/ DIGIT / ALPHA
; any VCHAR, except special
special = "(" / ")" / "<" / ">" / "@" / ","
/ ";" / ":" / "\" / DQUOTE / "/" / "["
/ "]" / "?" / "=" / "{" / "}"
]]></artwork></figure>
<t anchor="rule.quoted-string">
A string of text is parsed as a single word if it is quoted using
double-quote marks.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="quoted-string"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="qdtext"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="obs-text"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
quoted-string = DQUOTE *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE
qdtext = OWS / %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text
obs-text = %x80-FF
]]></artwork></figure>
<t anchor="rule.quoted-pair">
The backslash octet ("\") can be used as a single-octet
quoting mechanism within quoted-string constructs:
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="quoted-pair"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
quoted-pair = "\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Recipients that process the value of the quoted-string MUST handle a
quoted-pair as if it were replaced by the octet following the backslash.
</t>
<t>
Senders SHOULD NOT escape octets in quoted-strings that do not require
escaping (i.e., other than DQUOTE and the backslash octet).
</t>
<t anchor="rule.comment">
Comments can be included in some HTTP header fields by surrounding
the comment text with parentheses. Comments are only allowed in
fields containing "comment" as part of their field value definition.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="comment"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="ctext"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
comment = "(" *( ctext / quoted-cpair / comment ) ")"
ctext = OWS / %x21-27 / %x2A-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text
]]></artwork></figure>
<t anchor="rule.quoted-cpair">
The backslash octet ("\") can be used as a single-octet
quoting mechanism within comment constructs:
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="quoted-cpair"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
quoted-cpair = "\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Senders SHOULD NOT escape octets in comments that do not require escaping
(i.e., other than the backslash octet "\" and the parentheses "(" and ")").
</t>
</section>
<section title="ABNF list extension: #rule" anchor="abnf.extension">
<t>
A #rule extension to the ABNF rules of <xref target="RFC5234"/> is used to
improve readability in the definitions of some header field values.
</t>
<t>
A construct "#" is defined, similar to "*", for defining comma-delimited
lists of elements. The full form is "<n>#<m>element" indicating
at least <n> and at most <m> elements, each separated by a single
comma (",") and optional whitespace (OWS).
</t>
<figure><preamble>
Thus,
</preamble><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
1#element => element *( OWS "," OWS element )
]]></artwork></figure>
<figure><preamble>
and:
</preamble><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
#element => [ 1#element ]
]]></artwork></figure>
<figure><preamble>
and for n >= 1 and m > 1:
</preamble><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
<n>#<m>element => element <n-1>*<m-1>( OWS "," OWS element )
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
For compatibility with legacy list rules, recipients SHOULD accept empty
list elements. In other words, consumers would follow the list productions:
</t>
<figure><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
#element => [ ( "," / element ) *( OWS "," [ OWS element ] ) ]
1#element => *( "," OWS ) element *( OWS "," [ OWS element ] )
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Note that empty elements do not contribute to the count of elements present,
though.
</t>
<t>
For example, given these ABNF productions:
</t>
<figure><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
example-list = 1#example-list-elmt
example-list-elmt = token ; see Section 3.2.4
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Then these are valid values for example-list (not including the double
quotes, which are present for delimitation only):
</t>
<figure><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
"foo,bar"
"foo ,bar,"
"foo , ,bar,charlie "
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
But these values would be invalid, as at least one non-empty element is
required:
</t>
<figure><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
""
","
", ,"
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
<xref target="collected.abnf"/> shows the collected ABNF, with the list rules
expanded as explained above.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Message Body" anchor="message.body">
<t>
The message body (if any) of an HTTP message is used to carry the
payload body of that request or response. The message body is
identical to the payload body unless a transfer coding has been
applied, as described in <xref target="header.transfer-encoding"/>.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="message-body"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
message-body = *OCTET
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The rules for when a message body is allowed in a message differ for
requests and responses.
</t>
<t>
The presence of a message body in a request is signaled by a
a Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding header field.
Request message framing is independent of method semantics,
even if the method does not define any use for a message body.
</t>
<t>
The presence of a message body in a response depends on both
the request method to which it is responding and the response
status code (<xref target="status-code"/>).
Responses to the HEAD request method never include a message body
because the associated response header fields (e.g., Transfer-Encoding,
Content-Length, etc.) only indicate what their values would have been
if the request method had been GET.
Successful (2xx) responses to CONNECT switch to tunnel mode instead of
having a message body.
All 1xx (Informational), 204 (No Content), and 304 (Not Modified)
responses MUST NOT include a message body.
All other responses do include a message body, although the body
MAY be of zero length.
</t>
<section title="Transfer-Encoding" anchor="header.transfer-encoding">
<iref primary="true" item="Transfer-Encoding header field"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Header Fields" subitem="Transfer-Encoding"/>
<t>
When one or more transfer codings are applied to a payload body in order
to form the message body, a Transfer-Encoding header field MUST be sent
in the message and MUST contain the list of corresponding
transfer-coding names in the same order that they were applied.
Transfer codings are defined in <xref target="transfer.codings"/>.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="Transfer-Encoding"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
Transfer-Encoding = 1#transfer-coding
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Transfer-Encoding is analogous to the Content-Transfer-Encoding field of
MIME, which was designed to enable safe transport of binary data over a
7-bit transport service (<xref target="RFC2045"/>, Section 6).
However, safe transport has a different focus for an 8bit-clean transfer
protocol. In HTTP's case, Transfer-Encoding is primarily intended to
accurately delimit a dynamically generated payload and to distinguish
payload encodings that are only applied for transport efficiency or
security from those that are characteristics of the target resource.
</t>
<t>
The "chunked" transfer-coding (<xref target="chunked.encoding"/>)
MUST be implemented by all HTTP/1.1 recipients because it plays a
crucial role in delimiting messages when the payload body size is not
known in advance.
When the "chunked" transfer-coding is used, it MUST be the last
transfer-coding applied to form the message body and MUST NOT
be applied more than once in a message body.
If any transfer-coding is applied to a request payload body,
the final transfer-coding applied MUST be "chunked".
If any transfer-coding is applied to a response payload body, then either
the final transfer-coding applied MUST be "chunked" or
the message MUST be terminated by closing the connection.
</t>
<figure><preamble>
For example,
</preamble><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
Transfer-Encoding: gzip, chunked
]]></artwork><postamble>
indicates that the payload body has been compressed using the gzip
coding and then chunked using the chunked coding while forming the
message body.
</postamble></figure>
<t>
If more than one Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a message,
the multiple field-values MUST be combined into one field-value,
according to the algorithm defined in <xref target="header.fields"/>,
before determining the message body length.
</t>
<t>
Unlike Content-Encoding (Section 2.2 of <xref target="Part3"/>), Transfer-Encoding is a
property of the message, not of the payload, and thus MAY be added or
removed by any implementation along the request/response chain.
Additional information about the encoding parameters MAY be provided
by other header fields not defined by this specification.
</t>
<t>
Transfer-Encoding MAY be sent in a response to a HEAD request or in a
304 response to a GET request, neither of which includes a message body,
to indicate that the origin server would have applied a transfer coding
to the message body if the request had been an unconditional GET.
This indication is not required, however, because any recipient on
the response chain (including the origin server) can remove transfer
codings when they are not needed.
</t>
<t>
Transfer-Encoding was added in HTTP/1.1. It is generally assumed that
implementations advertising only HTTP/1.0 support will not understand
how to process a transfer-encoded payload.
A client MUST NOT send a request containing Transfer-Encoding unless it
knows the server will handle HTTP/1.1 (or later) requests; such knowledge
might be in the form of specific user configuration or by remembering the
version of a prior received response.
A server MUST NOT send a response containing Transfer-Encoding unless
the corresponding request indicates HTTP/1.1 (or later).
</t>
<t>
A server that receives a request message with a transfer-coding it does
not understand SHOULD respond with 501 (Not Implemented) and then
close the connection.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Content-Length" anchor="header.content-length">
<iref primary="true" item="Content-Length header field"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Header Fields" subitem="Content-Length"/>
<t>
When a message does not have a Transfer-Encoding header field and the
payload body length can be determined prior to being transferred, a
Content-Length header field SHOULD be sent to indicate the length of the
payload body that is either present as the message body, for requests
and non-HEAD responses other than 304, or would have been present had
the request been an unconditional GET. The length is expressed as a
decimal number of octets.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="Content-Length"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
Content-Length = 1*DIGIT
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
An example is
</t>
<figure><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
Content-Length: 3495
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
In the case of a response to a HEAD request, Content-Length indicates
the size of the payload body (without any potential transfer-coding)
that would have been sent had the request been a GET.
In the case of a 304 (Not Modified) response to a GET request,
Content-Length indicates the size of the payload body (without
any potential transfer-coding) that would have been sent in a 200 (OK)
response.
</t>
<t>
HTTP's use of Content-Length is significantly different from how it is
used in MIME, where it is an optional field used only within the
"message/external-body" media-type.
</t>
<t>
Any Content-Length field value greater than or equal to zero is valid.
Since there is no predefined limit to the length of an HTTP payload,
recipients SHOULD anticipate potentially large decimal numerals and
prevent parsing errors due to integer conversion overflows
(<xref target="attack.protocol.element.size.overflows"/>).
</t>
<t>
If a message is received that has multiple Content-Length header fields
(<xref target="header.content-length"/>) with field-values consisting
of the same decimal value, or a single Content-Length header field with
a field value containing a list of identical decimal values (e.g.,
"Content-Length: 42, 42"), indicating that duplicate Content-Length
header fields have been generated or combined by an upstream message
processor, then the recipient MUST either reject the message as invalid
or replace the duplicated field-values with a single valid Content-Length
field containing that decimal value prior to determining the message body
length.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Message Body Length" anchor="message.body.length">
<t>
The length of a message body is determined by one of the following
(in order of precedence):
</t>
<t>
<list style="numbers">
<t>
Any response to a HEAD request and any response with a status
code of 100-199, 204, or 304 is always terminated by the first
empty line after the header fields, regardless of the header
fields present in the message, and thus cannot contain a message body.
</t>
<t>
Any successful (2xx) response to a CONNECT request implies that the
connection will become a tunnel immediately after the empty line that
concludes the header fields. A client MUST ignore any Content-Length
or Transfer-Encoding header fields received in such a message.
</t>
<t>
If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present
and the "chunked" transfer-coding (<xref target="chunked.encoding"/>)
is the final encoding, the message body length is determined by reading
and decoding the chunked data until the transfer-coding indicates the
data is complete.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a response and the
"chunked" transfer-coding is not the final encoding, the message body
length is determined by reading the connection until it is closed by
the server.
If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a request and the
"chunked" transfer-coding is not the final encoding, the message body
length cannot be determined reliably; the server MUST respond with
the 400 (Bad Request) status code and then close the connection.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
If a message is received with both a Transfer-Encoding header field
and a Content-Length header field, the Transfer-Encoding overrides
the Content-Length.
Such a message might indicate an attempt to perform request or response
smuggling (bypass of security-related checks on message routing or content)
and thus ought to be handled as an error. The provided Content-Length MUST
be removed, prior to forwarding the message downstream, or replaced with
the real message body length after the transfer-coding is decoded.
</t>
<t>
If a message is received without Transfer-Encoding and with either
multiple Content-Length header fields having differing field-values or
a single Content-Length header field having an invalid value, then the
message framing is invalid and MUST be treated as an error to
prevent request or response smuggling.
If this is a request message, the server MUST respond with
a 400 (Bad Request) status code and then close the connection.
If this is a response message received by a proxy, the proxy
MUST discard the received response, send a 502 (Bad Gateway)
status code as its downstream response, and then close the connection.
If this is a response message received by a user-agent, it MUST be
treated as an error by discarding the message and closing the connection.
</t>
<t>
If a valid Content-Length header field
is present without Transfer-Encoding, its decimal value defines the
message body length in octets. If the actual number of octets sent in
the message is less than the indicated Content-Length, the recipient
MUST consider the message to be incomplete and treat the connection
as no longer usable.
If the actual number of octets sent in the message is more than the indicated
Content-Length, the recipient MUST only process the message body up to the
field value's number of octets; the remainder of the message MUST either
be discarded or treated as the next message in a pipeline. For the sake of
robustness, a user-agent MAY attempt to detect and correct such an error
in message framing if it is parsing the response to the last request on
a connection and the connection has been closed by the server.
</t>
<t>
If this is a request message and none of the above are true, then the
message body length is zero (no message body is present).
</t>
<t>
Otherwise, this is a response message without a declared message body
length, so the message body length is determined by the number of octets
received prior to the server closing the connection.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Since there is no way to distinguish a successfully completed,
close-delimited message from a partially-received message interrupted
by network failure, implementations SHOULD use encoding or
length-delimited messages whenever possible. The close-delimiting
feature exists primarily for backwards compatibility with HTTP/1.0.
</t>
<t>
A server MAY reject a request that contains a message body but
not a Content-Length by responding with 411 (Length Required).
</t>
<t>
Unless a transfer-coding other than "chunked" has been applied,
a client that sends a request containing a message body SHOULD
use a valid Content-Length header field if the message body length
is known in advance, rather than the "chunked" encoding, since some
existing services respond to "chunked" with a 411 (Length Required)
status code even though they understand the chunked encoding. This
is typically because such services are implemented via a gateway that
requires a content-length in advance of being called and the server
is unable or unwilling to buffer the entire request before processing.
</t>
<t>
A client that sends a request containing a message body MUST include a
valid Content-Length header field if it does not know the server will
handle HTTP/1.1 (or later) requests; such knowledge can be in the form
of specific user configuration or by remembering the version of a prior
received response.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="incomplete.messages" title="Handling Incomplete Messages">
<t>
Request messages that are prematurely terminated, possibly due to a
cancelled connection or a server-imposed time-out exception, MUST
result in closure of the connection; sending an HTTP/1.1 error response
prior to closing the connection is OPTIONAL.
</t>
<t>
Response messages that are prematurely terminated, usually by closure
of the connection prior to receiving the expected number of octets or by
failure to decode a transfer-encoded message body, MUST be recorded
as incomplete. A response that terminates in the middle of the header
block (before the empty line is received) cannot be assumed to convey the
full semantics of the response and MUST be treated as an error.
</t>
<t>
A message body that uses the chunked transfer encoding is
incomplete if the zero-sized chunk that terminates the encoding has not
been received. A message that uses a valid Content-Length is incomplete
if the size of the message body received (in octets) is less than the
value given by Content-Length. A response that has neither chunked
transfer encoding nor Content-Length is terminated by closure of the
connection, and thus is considered complete regardless of the number of
message body octets received, provided that the header block was received
intact.
</t>
<t>
A user agent MUST NOT render an incomplete response message body as if
it were complete (i.e., some indication must be given to the user that an
error occurred). Cache requirements for incomplete responses are defined
in Section 2.1 of <xref target="Part6"/>.
</t>
<t>
A server MUST read the entire request message body or close
the connection after sending its response, since otherwise the
remaining data on a persistent connection would be misinterpreted
as the next request. Likewise,
a client MUST read the entire response message body if it intends
to reuse the same connection for a subsequent request. Pipelining
multiple requests on a connection is described in <xref target="pipelining"/>.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Message Parsing Robustness" anchor="message.robustness">
<t>
Older HTTP/1.0 client implementations might send an extra CRLF
after a POST request as a lame workaround for some early server
applications that failed to read message body content that was
not terminated by a line-ending. An HTTP/1.1 client MUST NOT
preface or follow a request with an extra CRLF. If terminating
the request message body with a line-ending is desired, then the
client MUST include the terminating CRLF octets as part of the
message body length.
</t>
<t>
In the interest of robustness, servers SHOULD ignore at least one
empty line received where a request-line is expected. In other words, if
the server is reading the protocol stream at the beginning of a
message and receives a CRLF first, it SHOULD ignore the CRLF.
Likewise, although the line terminator for the start-line and header
fields is the sequence CRLF, we recommend that recipients recognize a
single LF as a line terminator and ignore any CR.
</t>
<t>
When a server listening only for HTTP request messages, or processing
what appears from the start-line to be an HTTP request message,
receives a sequence of octets that does not match the HTTP-message
grammar aside from the robustness exceptions listed above, the
server MUST respond with an HTTP/1.1 400 (Bad Request) response.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Transfer Codings" anchor="transfer.codings">
<t>
Transfer-coding values are used to indicate an encoding
transformation that has been, can be, or might need to be applied to a
payload body in order to ensure "safe transport" through the network.
This differs from a content coding in that the transfer-coding is a
property of the message rather than a property of the representation
that is being transferred.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="transfer-coding"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="transfer-extension"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
transfer-coding = "chunked" ; Section 4.1
/ "compress" ; Section 4.2.1
/ "deflate" ; Section 4.2.2
/ "gzip" ; Section 4.2.3
/ transfer-extension
transfer-extension = token *( OWS ";" OWS transfer-parameter )
]]></artwork></figure>
<t anchor="rule.parameter">
Parameters are in the form of attribute/value pairs.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="transfer-parameter"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="attribute"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="value"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="date2"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="date3"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
transfer-parameter = attribute BWS "=" BWS value
attribute = token
value = word
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
All transfer-coding values are case-insensitive.
The HTTP Transfer Coding registry is defined in
<xref target="transfer.coding.registry"/>.
HTTP/1.1 uses transfer-coding values in the TE header field
(<xref target="header.te"/>) and in the Transfer-Encoding header field
(<xref target="header.transfer-encoding"/>).
</t>
<section title="Chunked Transfer Coding" anchor="chunked.encoding">
<iref item="chunked (Coding Format)"/>
<iref item="Coding Format" subitem="chunked"/>
<t>
The chunked encoding modifies the body of a message in order to
transfer it as a series of chunks, each with its own size indicator,
followed by an OPTIONAL trailer containing header fields. This
allows dynamically produced content to be transferred along with the
information necessary for the recipient to verify that it has
received the full message.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="chunked-body"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="chunk"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="chunk-size"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="last-chunk"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="chunk-ext"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="chunk-ext-name"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="chunk-ext-val"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="chunk-data"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="trailer-part"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="quoted-str-nf"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="qdtext-nf"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
chunked-body = *chunk
last-chunk
trailer-part
CRLF
chunk = chunk-size [ chunk-ext ] CRLF
chunk-data CRLF
chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG
last-chunk = 1*("0") [ chunk-ext ] CRLF
chunk-ext = *( ";" chunk-ext-name [ "=" chunk-ext-val ] )
chunk-ext-name = token
chunk-ext-val = token / quoted-str-nf
chunk-data = 1*OCTET ; a sequence of chunk-size octets
trailer-part = *( header-field CRLF )
quoted-str-nf = DQUOTE *( qdtext-nf / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE
; like quoted-string, but disallowing line folding
qdtext-nf = HTAB / SP / %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The chunk-size field is a string of hex digits indicating the size of
the chunk-data in octets. The chunked encoding is ended by any chunk whose size is
zero, followed by the trailer, which is terminated by an empty line.
</t>
<t>
The trailer allows the sender to include additional HTTP header
fields at the end of the message. The Trailer header field can be
used to indicate which header fields are included in a trailer (see
<xref target="header.trailer"/>).
</t>
<t>
A server using chunked transfer-coding in a response MUST NOT use the
trailer for any header fields unless at least one of the following is
true:
<list style="numbers">
<t>the request included a TE header field that indicates "trailers" is
acceptable in the transfer-coding of the response, as described in
<xref target="header.te"/>; or,</t>
<t>the trailer fields consist entirely of optional metadata, and the
recipient could use the message (in a manner acceptable to the server where
the field originated) without receiving it. In other words, the server that
generated the header (often but not always the origin server) is willing to
accept the possibility that the trailer fields might be silently discarded
along the path to the client.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
This requirement prevents an interoperability failure when the
message is being received by an HTTP/1.1 (or later) proxy and
forwarded to an HTTP/1.0 recipient. It avoids a situation where
conformance with the protocol would have necessitated a possibly
infinite buffer on the proxy.
</t>
<t>
A process for decoding the "chunked" transfer-coding
can be represented in pseudo-code as:
</t>
<figure><artwork type="code"><![CDATA[
length := 0
read chunk-size, chunk-ext (if any) and CRLF
while (chunk-size > 0) {
read chunk-data and CRLF
append chunk-data to decoded-body
length := length + chunk-size
read chunk-size and CRLF
}
read header-field
while (header-field not empty) {
append header-field to existing header fields
read header-field
}
Content-Length := length
Remove "chunked" from Transfer-Encoding
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
All HTTP/1.1 applications MUST be able to receive and decode the
"chunked" transfer-coding and MUST ignore chunk-ext extensions
they do not understand.
</t>
<t>
Use of chunk-ext extensions by senders is deprecated; they SHOULD NOT be
sent and definition of new chunk-extensions is discouraged.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Compression Codings" anchor="compression.codings">
<t>
The codings defined below can be used to compress the payload of a
message.
</t>
<t><list><t>
Note: Use of program names for the identification of encoding formats
is not desirable and is discouraged for future encodings. Their
use here is representative of historical practice, not good
design.
</t></list></t>
<t><list><t>
Note: For compatibility with previous implementations of HTTP,
applications SHOULD consider "x-gzip" and "x-compress" to be
equivalent to "gzip" and "compress" respectively.
</t></list></t>
<section title="Compress Coding" anchor="compress.coding">
<iref item="compress (Coding Format)"/>
<iref item="Coding Format" subitem="compress"/>
<t>
The "compress" format is produced by the common UNIX file compression
program "compress". This format is an adaptive Lempel-Ziv-Welch
coding (LZW).
</t>
</section>
<section title="Deflate Coding" anchor="deflate.coding">
<iref item="deflate (Coding Format)"/>
<iref item="Coding Format" subitem="deflate"/>
<t>
The "deflate" format is defined as the "deflate" compression mechanism
(described in <xref target="RFC1951"/>) used inside the "zlib"
data format (<xref target="RFC1950"/>).
</t>
<t><list>
<t>
Note: Some incorrect implementations send the "deflate"
compressed data without the zlib wrapper.
</t>
</list></t>
</section>
<section title="Gzip Coding" anchor="gzip.coding">
<iref item="gzip (Coding Format)"/>
<iref item="Coding Format" subitem="gzip"/>
<t>
The "gzip" format is produced by the file compression program
"gzip" (GNU zip), as described in <xref target="RFC1952"/>. This format is a
Lempel-Ziv coding (LZ77) with a 32 bit CRC.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="TE" anchor="header.te">
<iref primary="true" item="TE header field"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Header Fields" subitem="TE"/>
<t>
The "TE" header field indicates what extension transfer-codings
the client is willing to accept in the response, and whether or not it is
willing to accept trailer fields in a chunked transfer-coding.
</t>
<t>
Its value consists of the keyword "trailers" and/or a comma-separated
list of extension transfer-coding names with optional accept
parameters (as described in <xref target="transfer.codings"/>).
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="TE"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="t-codings"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="te-params"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="te-ext"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
TE = #t-codings
t-codings = "trailers" / ( transfer-extension [ te-params ] )
te-params = OWS ";" OWS "q=" qvalue *( te-ext )
te-ext = OWS ";" OWS token [ "=" word ]
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The presence of the keyword "trailers" indicates that the client is
willing to accept trailer fields in a chunked transfer-coding, as
defined in <xref target="chunked.encoding"/>. This keyword is reserved for use with
transfer-coding values even though it does not itself represent a
transfer-coding.
</t>
<t>
Examples of its use are:
</t>
<figure><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
TE: deflate
TE:
TE: trailers, deflate;q=0.5
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The TE header field only applies to the immediate connection.
Therefore, the keyword MUST be supplied within a Connection header
field (<xref target="header.connection"/>) whenever TE is present in an HTTP/1.1 message.
</t>
<t>
A server tests whether a transfer-coding is acceptable, according to
a TE field, using these rules:
<list style="numbers">
<t>The "chunked" transfer-coding is always acceptable. If the
keyword "trailers" is listed, the client indicates that it is
willing to accept trailer fields in the chunked response on
behalf of itself and any downstream clients. The implication is
that, if given, the client is stating that either all
downstream clients are willing to accept trailer fields in the
forwarded response, or that it will attempt to buffer the
response on behalf of downstream recipients.
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
Note: HTTP/1.1 does not define any means to limit the size of a
chunked response such that a client can be assured of buffering
the entire response.</t>
<t>If the transfer-coding being tested is one of the transfer-codings
listed in the TE field, then it is acceptable unless it
is accompanied by a qvalue of 0. (As defined in <xref target="quality.values"/>, a
qvalue of 0 means "not acceptable".)</t>
<t>If multiple transfer-codings are acceptable, then the
acceptable transfer-coding with the highest non-zero qvalue is
preferred. The "chunked" transfer-coding always has a qvalue
of 1.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
If the TE field-value is empty or if no TE field is present, the only
acceptable transfer-coding is "chunked". A message with no transfer-coding is
always acceptable.
</t>
<section title="Quality Values" anchor="quality.values">
<t>
Both transfer codings (TE request header field, <xref target="header.te"/>)
and content negotiation (Section 5 of <xref target="Part3"/>) use short "floating point"
numbers to indicate the relative importance ("weight") of various
negotiable parameters. A weight is normalized to a real number in
the range 0 through 1, where 0 is the minimum and 1 the maximum
value. If a parameter has a quality value of 0, then content with
this parameter is "not acceptable" for the client. HTTP/1.1
applications MUST NOT generate more than three digits after the
decimal point. User configuration of these values SHOULD also be
limited in this fashion.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="qvalue"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
qvalue = ( "0" [ "." 0*3DIGIT ] )
/ ( "1" [ "." 0*3("0") ] )
]]></artwork></figure>
<t><list>
<t>
Note: "Quality values" is a misnomer, since these values merely represent
relative degradation in desired quality.
</t>
</list></t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Trailer" anchor="header.trailer">
<iref primary="true" item="Trailer header field"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Header Fields" subitem="Trailer"/>
<t>
The "Trailer" header field indicates that the given set of
header fields is present in the trailer of a message encoded with
chunked transfer-coding.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="Trailer"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
Trailer = 1#field-name
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
An HTTP/1.1 message SHOULD include a Trailer header field in a
message using chunked transfer-coding with a non-empty trailer. Doing
so allows the recipient to know which header fields to expect in the
trailer.
</t>
<t>
If no Trailer header field is present, the trailer SHOULD NOT include
any header fields. See <xref target="chunked.encoding"/> for restrictions on the use of
trailer fields in a "chunked" transfer-coding.
</t>
<t>
Message header fields listed in the Trailer header field MUST NOT
include the following header fields:
<list style="symbols">
<t>Transfer-Encoding</t>
<t>Content-Length</t>
<t>Trailer</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Message Routing" anchor="message.routing">
<t>
HTTP request message routing is determined by each client based on the
target resource, the client's proxy configuration, and
establishment or reuse of an inbound connection. The corresponding
response routing follows the same connection chain back to the client.
</t>
<section title="Identifying a Target Resource" anchor="target-resource">
<iref primary="true" item="target resource"/>
<iref primary="true" item="target URI"/>
<t>
HTTP is used in a wide variety of applications, ranging from
general-purpose computers to home appliances. In some cases,
communication options are hard-coded in a client's configuration.
However, most HTTP clients rely on the same resource identification
mechanism and configuration techniques as general-purpose Web browsers.
</t>
<t>
HTTP communication is initiated by a user agent for some purpose.
The purpose is a combination of request semantics, which are defined in
<xref target="Part2"/>, and a target resource upon which to apply those
semantics. A URI reference (<xref target="uri"/>) is typically used as
an identifier for the "target resource", which a user agent would resolve
to its absolute form in order to obtain the "target URI". The target URI
excludes the reference's fragment identifier component, if any,
since fragment identifiers are reserved for client-side processing
(<xref target="RFC3986"/>, Section 3.5).
</t>
<t>
HTTP intermediaries obtain the request semantics and target URI
from the request-line of an incoming request message.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Connecting Inbound" anchor="connecting.inbound">
<t>
Once the target URI is determined, a client needs to decide whether
a network request is necessary to accomplish the desired semantics and,
if so, where that request is to be directed.
</t>
<t>
If the client has a response cache and the request semantics can be
satisfied by a cache (<xref target="Part6"/>), then the request is
usually directed to the cache first.
</t>
<t>
If the request is not satisfied by a cache, then a typical client will
check its configuration to determine whether a proxy is to be used to
satisfy the request. Proxy configuration is implementation-dependent,
but is often based on URI prefix matching, selective authority matching,
or both, and the proxy itself is usually identified by an "http" or
"https" URI. If a proxy is applicable, the client connects inbound by
establishing (or reusing) a connection to that proxy.
</t>
<t>
If no proxy is applicable, a typical client will invoke a handler routine,
usually specific to the target URI's scheme, to connect directly
to an authority for the target resource. How that is accomplished is
dependent on the target URI scheme and defined by its associated
specification, similar to how this specification defines origin server
access for resolution of the "http" (<xref target="http.uri"/>) and
"https" (<xref target="https.uri"/>) schemes.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Request Target" anchor="request-target">
<t>
Once an inbound connection is obtained
(<xref target="connection.management"/>),
the client sends an HTTP request message (<xref target="http.message"/>)
with a request-target derived from the target URI.
There are four distinct formats for the request-target, depending on both
the method being requested and whether the request is to a proxy.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="request-target"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="origin-form"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="absolute-form"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="authority-form"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="asterisk-form"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
request-target = origin-form
/ absolute-form
/ authority-form
/ asterisk-form
origin-form = path-absolute [ "?" query ]
absolute-form = absolute-URI
authority-form = authority
asterisk-form = "*"
]]></artwork></figure>
<t anchor="origin-form"><iref item="origin-form (of request-target)"/>
The most common form of request-target is the origin-form.
When making a request directly to an origin server, other than a CONNECT
or server-wide OPTIONS request (as detailed below),
a client MUST send only the absolute path and query components of
the target URI as the request-target.
If the target URI's path component is empty, then the client MUST send
"/" as the path within the origin-form of request-target.
A Host header field is also sent, as defined in
<xref target="header.host"/>, containing the target URI's
authority component (excluding any userinfo).
</t>
<t>
For example, a client wishing to retrieve a representation of the resource
identified as
</t>
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
http://www.example.org/where?q=now
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
directly from the origin server would open (or reuse) a TCP connection
to port 80 of the host "www.example.org" and send the lines:
</t>
<figure><artwork type="message/http; msgtype="request""><![CDATA[
GET /where?q=now HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.org
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
followed by the remainder of the request message.
</t>
<t anchor="absolute-form"><iref item="absolute-form (of request-target)"/>
When making a request to a proxy, other than a CONNECT or server-wide
OPTIONS request (as detailed below), a client MUST send the target URI
in absolute-form as the request-target.
The proxy is requested to either service that request from a valid cache,
if possible, or make the same request on the client's behalf to either
the next inbound proxy server or directly to the origin server indicated
by the request-target. Requirements on such "forwarding" of messages are
defined in <xref target="intermediary.forwarding"/>.
</t>
<t>
An example absolute-form of request-line would be:
</t>
<figure><artwork type="message/http; msgtype="request""><![CDATA[
GET http://www.example.org/pub/WWW/TheProject.html HTTP/1.1
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
To allow for transition to the absolute-form for all requests in some
future version of HTTP, HTTP/1.1 servers MUST accept the absolute-form
in requests, even though HTTP/1.1 clients will only send them in requests
to proxies.
</t>
<t anchor="authority-form"><iref item="authority-form (of request-target)"/>
The authority-form of request-target is only used for CONNECT requests
(Section 6.9 of <xref target="Part2"/>). When making a CONNECT request to establish a tunnel through
one or more proxies, a client MUST send only the target URI's
authority component (excluding any userinfo) as the request-target.
For example,
</t>
<figure><artwork type="message/http; msgtype="request""><![CDATA[
CONNECT www.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1
]]></artwork></figure>
<t anchor="asterisk-form"><iref item="asterisk-form (of request-target)"/>
The asterisk-form of request-target is only used for a server-wide
OPTIONS request (Section 6.2 of <xref target="Part2"/>). When a client wishes to request OPTIONS
for the server as a whole, as opposed to a specific named resource of
that server, the client MUST send only "*" (%x2A) as the request-target.
For example,
</t>
<figure><artwork type="message/http; msgtype="request""><![CDATA[
OPTIONS * HTTP/1.1
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
If a proxy receives an OPTIONS request with an absolute-form of
request-target in which the URI has an empty path and no query component,
then the last proxy on the request chain MUST send a request-target
of "*" when it forwards the request to the indicated origin server.
</t>
<figure><preamble>
For example, the request
</preamble><artwork type="message/http; msgtype="request""><![CDATA[
OPTIONS http://www.example.org:8001 HTTP/1.1
]]></artwork></figure>
<figure><preamble>
would be forwarded by the final proxy as
</preamble><artwork type="message/http; msgtype="request""><![CDATA[
OPTIONS * HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.org:8001
]]></artwork>
<postamble>
after connecting to port 8001 of host "www.example.org".
</postamble>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="Host" anchor="header.host">
<iref primary="true" item="Host header field"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Header Fields" subitem="Host"/>
<t>
The "Host" header field in a request provides the host and port
information from the target URI, enabling the origin
server to distinguish among resources while servicing requests
for multiple host names on a single IP address. Since the Host
field-value is critical information for handling a request, it
SHOULD be sent as the first header field following the request-line.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="Host"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
Host = uri-host [ ":" port ] ; Section 2.7.1
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
A client MUST send a Host header field in all HTTP/1.1 request
messages. If the target URI includes an authority component, then
the Host field-value MUST be identical to that authority component
after excluding any userinfo (<xref target="http.uri"/>).
If the authority component is missing or undefined for the target URI,
then the Host header field MUST be sent with an empty field-value.
</t>
<t>
For example, a GET request to the origin server for
<http://www.example.org/pub/WWW/> would begin with:
</t>
<figure><artwork type="message/http; msgtype="request""><![CDATA[
GET /pub/WWW/ HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.org
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The Host header field MUST be sent in an HTTP/1.1 request even
if the request-target is in the absolute-form, since this
allows the Host information to be forwarded through ancient HTTP/1.0
proxies that might not have implemented Host.
</t>
<t>
When an HTTP/1.1 proxy receives a request with an absolute-form of
request-target, the proxy MUST ignore the received
Host header field (if any) and instead replace it with the host
information of the request-target. If the proxy forwards the request,
it MUST generate a new Host field-value based on the received
request-target rather than forward the received Host field-value.
</t>
<t>
Since the Host header field acts as an application-level routing
mechanism, it is a frequent target for malware seeking to poison
a shared cache or redirect a request to an unintended server.
An interception proxy is particularly vulnerable if it relies on
the Host field-value for redirecting requests to internal
servers, or for use as a cache key in a shared cache, without
first verifying that the intercepted connection is targeting a
valid IP address for that host.
</t>
<t>
A server MUST respond with a 400 (Bad Request) status code to
any HTTP/1.1 request message that lacks a Host header field and
to any request message that contains more than one Host header field
or a Host header field with an invalid field-value.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Effective Request URI" anchor="effective.request.uri">
<iref primary="true" item="effective request URI"/>
<t>
A server that receives an HTTP request message MUST reconstruct
the user agent's original target URI, based on the pieces of information
learned from the request-target, Host, and connection context, in order
to identify the intended target resource and properly service the request.
The URI derived from this reconstruction process is referred to as the
"effective request URI".
</t>
<t>
For a user agent, the effective request URI is the target URI.
</t>
<t>
If the request-target is in absolute-form, then the effective request URI
is the same as the request-target. Otherwise, the effective request URI
is constructed as follows.
</t>
<t>
If the request is received over an SSL/TLS-secured TCP connection,
then the effective request URI's scheme is "https"; otherwise, the
scheme is "http".
</t>
<t>
If the request-target is in authority-form, then the effective
request URI's authority component is the same as the request-target.
Otherwise, if a Host header field is supplied with a non-empty field-value,
then the authority component is the same as the Host field-value.
Otherwise, the authority component is the concatenation of the default
hostname configured for the server, a colon (":"), and the connection's
incoming TCP port number in decimal form.
</t>
<t>
If the request-target is in authority-form or asterisk-form, then the
effective request URI's combined path and query component is empty.
Otherwise, the combined path and query component is the same as the
request-target.
</t>
<t>
The components of the effective request URI, once determined as above,
can be combined into absolute-URI form by concatenating the scheme,
"://", authority, and combined path and query component.
</t>
<figure>
<preamble>
Example 1: the following message received over an insecure TCP connection
</preamble>
<artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
GET /pub/WWW/TheProject.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.org:8080
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<figure>
<preamble>
has an effective request URI of
</preamble>
<artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
http://www.example.org:8080/pub/WWW/TheProject.html
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<figure>
<preamble>
Example 2: the following message received over an SSL/TLS-secured TCP
connection
</preamble>
<artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
OPTIONS * HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.org
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<figure>
<preamble>
has an effective request URI of
</preamble>
<artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
https://www.example.org
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>
An origin server that does not allow resources to differ by requested
host MAY ignore the Host field-value and instead replace it with a
configured server name when constructing the effective request URI.
</t>
<t>
Recipients of an HTTP/1.0 request that lacks a Host header field MAY
attempt to use heuristics (e.g., examination of the URI path for
something unique to a particular host) in order to guess the
effective request URI's authority component.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Intermediary Forwarding" anchor="intermediary.forwarding">
<t>
As described in <xref target="intermediaries"/>, intermediaries can serve
a variety of roles in the processing of HTTP requests and responses.
Some intermediaries are used to improve performance or availability.
Others are used for access control or to filter content.
Since an HTTP stream has characteristics similar to a pipe-and-filter
architecture, there are no inherent limits to the extent an intermediary
can enhance (or interfere) with either direction of the stream.
</t>
<t>
In order to avoid request loops, a proxy that forwards requests to other
proxies MUST be able to recognize and exclude all of its own server
names, including any aliases, local variations, or literal IP addresses.
</t>
<t>
If a proxy receives a request-target with a host name that is not a
fully qualified domain name, it MAY add its domain to the host name
it received when forwarding the request. A proxy MUST NOT change the
host name if it is a fully qualified domain name.
</t>
<t>
A non-transforming proxy MUST NOT rewrite the "path-absolute" and "query"
parts of the received request-target when forwarding it to the next inbound
server, except as noted above to replace an empty path with "/" or "*".
</t>
<t>
Intermediaries that forward a message MUST implement the
Connection header field as specified in <xref target="header.connection"/>.
</t>
<section title="End-to-end and Hop-by-hop Header Fields" anchor="end-to-end.and.hop-by-hop.header-fields">
<!--<t>
<cref anchor="TODO-end-to-end" source="jre">
Restored from <eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-p6-cache-05#section-7.1"/>.
See also <eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/60"/>.
</cref>
</t>-->
<t>
For the purpose of defining the behavior of caches and non-caching
proxies, we divide HTTP header fields into two categories:
<list style="symbols">
<t>End-to-end header fields, which are transmitted to the ultimate
recipient of a request or response. End-to-end header fields in
responses MUST be stored as part of a cache entry and MUST be
transmitted in any response formed from a cache entry.</t>
<t>Hop-by-hop header fields, which are meaningful only for a single
transport-level connection, and are not stored by caches or
forwarded by proxies.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
The following HTTP/1.1 header fields are hop-by-hop header fields:
<list style="symbols">
<t>Connection</t>
<t>Keep-Alive</t>
<t>Proxy-Authenticate</t>
<t>Proxy-Authorization</t>
<t>TE</t>
<t>Trailer</t>
<t>Transfer-Encoding</t>
<t>Upgrade</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
All other header fields defined by HTTP/1.1 are end-to-end header fields.
</t>
<t>
Other hop-by-hop header fields MUST be listed in a Connection header field
(<xref target="header.connection"/>).
</t>
</section>
<section title="Non-modifiable Header Fields" anchor="non-modifiable.header-fields">
<!--<t>
<cref anchor="TODO-non-mod-headers" source="jre">
Restored from <eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-p6-cache-05#section-7.2"/>.
See also <eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/60"/>.
</cref>
</t>-->
<t>
Some features of HTTP/1.1, such as Digest Authentication, depend on the
value of certain end-to-end header fields. A non-transforming proxy SHOULD NOT
modify an end-to-end header field unless the definition of that header field requires
or specifically allows that.
</t>
<t>
A non-transforming proxy MUST NOT modify any of the following fields in a
request or response, and it MUST NOT add any of these fields if not
already present:
<list style="symbols">
<t>Allow</t>
<t>Content-Location</t>
<t>Content-MD5</t>
<t>ETag</t>
<t>Last-Modified</t>
<t>Server</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
A non-transforming proxy MUST NOT modify any of the following fields in a
response:
<list style="symbols">
<t>Expires</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
but it MAY add any of these fields if not already present. If an
Expires header field is added, it MUST be given a field-value identical to
that of the Date header field in that response.
</t>
<t>
A proxy MUST NOT modify or add any of the following fields in a
message that contains the no-transform cache-control directive, or in
any request:
<list style="symbols">
<t>Content-Encoding</t>
<t>Content-Range</t>
<t>Content-Type</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
A transforming proxy MAY modify or add these fields to a message
that does not include no-transform, but if it does so, it MUST add a
Warning 214 (Transformation applied) if one does not already appear
in the message (see Section 3.6 of <xref target="Part6"/>).
</t>
<t><list>
<t>
Warning: Unnecessary modification of end-to-end header fields might
cause authentication failures if stronger authentication
mechanisms are introduced in later versions of HTTP. Such
authentication mechanisms MAY rely on the values of header fields
not listed here.
</t>
</list></t>
<t>
A non-transforming proxy MUST preserve the message payload (<xref target="Part3"/>),
though it MAY change the message body through application or removal
of a transfer-coding (<xref target="transfer.codings"/>).
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Associating a Response to a Request" anchor="associating.response.to.request">
<t>
HTTP does not include a request identifier for associating a given
request message with its corresponding one or more response messages.
Hence, it relies on the order of response arrival to correspond exactly
to the order in which requests are made on the same connection.
More than one response message per request only occurs when one or more
informational responses (1xx, see Section 7.1 of <xref target="Part2"/>) precede a final response
to the same request.
</t>
<t>
A client that uses persistent connections and sends more than one request
per connection MUST maintain a list of outstanding requests in the
order sent on that connection and MUST associate each received response
message to the highest ordered request that has not yet received a final
(non-1xx) response.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Connection Management" anchor="connection.management">
<section title="Connection" anchor="header.connection">
<iref primary="true" item="Connection header field"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Header Fields" subitem="Connection"/>
<t>
The "Connection" header field allows the sender to specify
options that are desired only for that particular connection.
Such connection options MUST be removed or replaced before the
message can be forwarded downstream by a proxy or gateway.
This mechanism also allows the sender to indicate which HTTP
header fields used in the message are only intended for the
immediate recipient ("hop-by-hop"), as opposed to all recipients
on the chain ("end-to-end"), enabling the message to be
self-descriptive and allowing future connection-specific extensions
to be deployed in HTTP without fear that they will be blindly
forwarded by previously deployed intermediaries.
</t>
<t>
The Connection header field's value has the following grammar:
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="Connection"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="connection-token"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
Connection = 1#connection-token
connection-token = token
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
A proxy or gateway MUST parse a received Connection
header field before a message is forwarded and, for each
connection-token in this field, remove any header field(s) from
the message with the same name as the connection-token, and then
remove the Connection header field itself or replace it with the
sender's own connection options for the forwarded message.
</t>
<t>
A sender MUST NOT include field-names in the Connection header
field-value for fields that are defined as expressing constraints
for all recipients in the request or response chain, such as the
Cache-Control header field (Section 3.2 of <xref target="Part6"/>).
</t>
<t>
The connection options do not have to correspond to a header field
present in the message, since a connection-specific header field
might not be needed if there are no parameters associated with that
connection option. Recipients that trigger certain connection
behavior based on the presence of connection options MUST do so
based on the presence of the connection-token rather than only the
presence of the optional header field. In other words, if the
connection option is received as a header field but not indicated
within the Connection field-value, then the recipient MUST ignore
the connection-specific header field because it has likely been
forwarded by an intermediary that is only partially conformant.
</t>
<t>
When defining new connection options, specifications ought to
carefully consider existing deployed header fields and ensure
that the new connection-token does not share the same name as
an unrelated header field that might already be deployed.
Defining a new connection-token essentially reserves that potential
field-name for carrying additional information related to the
connection option, since it would be unwise for senders to use
that field-name for anything else.
</t>
<t>
HTTP/1.1 defines the "close" connection option for the sender to
signal that the connection will be closed after completion of the
response. For example,
</t>
<figure><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
Connection: close
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
in either the request or the response header fields indicates that
the connection SHOULD NOT be considered "persistent" (<xref target="persistent.connections"/>)
after the current request/response is complete.
</t>
<t>
An HTTP/1.1 client that does not support persistent connections MUST
include the "close" connection option in every request message.
</t>
<t>
An HTTP/1.1 server that does not support persistent connections MUST
include the "close" connection option in every response message that
does not have a 1xx (Informational) status code.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Via" anchor="header.via">
<iref primary="true" item="Via header field"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Header Fields" subitem="Via"/>
<t>
The "Via" header field MUST be sent by a proxy or gateway to
indicate the intermediate protocols and recipients between the user
agent and the server on requests, and between the origin server and
the client on responses. It is analogous to the "Received" field
used by email systems (Section 3.6.7 of <xref target="RFC5322"/>)
and is intended to be used for tracking message forwards,
avoiding request loops, and identifying the protocol capabilities of
all senders along the request/response chain.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="Via"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="received-protocol"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="protocol-name"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="protocol-version"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="received-by"/><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="pseudonym"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
Via = 1#( received-protocol RWS received-by
[ RWS comment ] )
received-protocol = [ protocol-name "/" ] protocol-version
received-by = ( uri-host [ ":" port ] ) / pseudonym
pseudonym = token
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The received-protocol indicates the protocol version of the message
received by the server or client along each segment of the
request/response chain. The received-protocol version is appended to
the Via field value when the message is forwarded so that information
about the protocol capabilities of upstream applications remains
visible to all recipients.
</t>
<t>
The protocol-name is excluded if and only if it would be "HTTP". The
received-by field is normally the host and optional port number of a
recipient server or client that subsequently forwarded the message.
However, if the real host is considered to be sensitive information,
it MAY be replaced by a pseudonym. If the port is not given, it MAY
be assumed to be the default port of the received-protocol.
</t>
<t>
Multiple Via field values represent each proxy or gateway that has
forwarded the message. Each recipient MUST append its information
such that the end result is ordered according to the sequence of
forwarding applications.
</t>
<t>
Comments MAY be used in the Via header field to identify the software
of each recipient, analogous to the User-Agent and Server header fields.
However, all comments in the Via field are optional and MAY be removed
by any recipient prior to forwarding the message.
</t>
<t>
For example, a request message could be sent from an HTTP/1.0 user
agent to an internal proxy code-named "fred", which uses HTTP/1.1 to
forward the request to a public proxy at p.example.net, which completes
the request by forwarding it to the origin server at www.example.com.
The request received by www.example.com would then have the following
Via header field:
</t>
<figure><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
Via: 1.0 fred, 1.1 p.example.net (Apache/1.1)
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
A proxy or gateway used as a portal through a network firewall
SHOULD NOT forward the names and ports of hosts within the firewall
region unless it is explicitly enabled to do so. If not enabled, the
received-by host of any host behind the firewall SHOULD be replaced
by an appropriate pseudonym for that host.
</t>
<t>
For organizations that have strong privacy requirements for hiding
internal structures, a proxy or gateway MAY combine an ordered
subsequence of Via header field entries with identical received-protocol
values into a single such entry. For example,
</t>
<figure><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
Via: 1.0 ricky, 1.1 ethel, 1.1 fred, 1.0 lucy
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
could be collapsed to
</t>
<figure><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
Via: 1.0 ricky, 1.1 mertz, 1.0 lucy
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
Senders SHOULD NOT combine multiple entries unless they are all
under the same organizational control and the hosts have already been
replaced by pseudonyms. Senders MUST NOT combine entries which
have different received-protocol values.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Persistent Connections" anchor="persistent.connections">
<section title="Purpose" anchor="persistent.purpose">
<t>
Prior to persistent connections, a separate TCP connection was
established for each request, increasing the load on HTTP servers
and causing congestion on the Internet. The use of inline images and
other associated data often requires a client to make multiple
requests of the same server in a short amount of time. Analysis of
these performance problems and results from a prototype
implementation are available <xref target="Pad1995"/> <xref target="Spe"/>. Implementation experience and
measurements of actual HTTP/1.1 implementations show good
results <xref target="Nie1997"/>. Alternatives have also been explored, for example,
T/TCP <xref target="Tou1998"/>.
</t>
<t>
Persistent HTTP connections have a number of advantages:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
By opening and closing fewer TCP connections, CPU time is saved
in routers and hosts (clients, servers, proxies, gateways,
tunnels, or caches), and memory used for TCP protocol control
blocks can be saved in hosts.
</t>
<t>
HTTP requests and responses can be pipelined on a connection.
Pipelining allows a client to make multiple requests without
waiting for each response, allowing a single TCP connection to
be used much more efficiently, with much lower elapsed time.
</t>
<t>
Network congestion is reduced by reducing the number of packets
caused by TCP opens, and by allowing TCP sufficient time to
determine the congestion state of the network.
</t>
<t>
Latency on subsequent requests is reduced since there is no time
spent in TCP's connection opening handshake.
</t>
<t>
HTTP can evolve more gracefully, since errors can be reported
without the penalty of closing the TCP connection. Clients using
future versions of HTTP might optimistically try a new feature,
but if communicating with an older server, retry with old
semantics after an error is reported.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
HTTP implementations SHOULD implement persistent connections.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Overall Operation" anchor="persistent.overall">
<t>
A significant difference between HTTP/1.1 and earlier versions of
HTTP is that persistent connections are the default behavior of any
HTTP connection. That is, unless otherwise indicated, the client
SHOULD assume that the server will maintain a persistent connection,
even after error responses from the server.
</t>
<t>
Persistent connections provide a mechanism by which a client and a
server can signal the close of a TCP connection. This signaling takes
place using the Connection header field (<xref target="header.connection"/>). Once a close
has been signaled, the client MUST NOT send any more requests on that
connection.
</t>
<section title="Negotiation" anchor="persistent.negotiation">
<t>
An HTTP/1.1 server MAY assume that a HTTP/1.1 client intends to
maintain a persistent connection unless a Connection header field including
the connection-token "close" was sent in the request. If the server
chooses to close the connection immediately after sending the
response, it SHOULD send a Connection header field including the
connection-token "close".
</t>
<t>
An HTTP/1.1 client MAY expect a connection to remain open, but would
decide to keep it open based on whether the response from a server
contains a Connection header field with the connection-token close. In case
the client does not want to maintain a connection for more than that
request, it SHOULD send a Connection header field including the
connection-token close.
</t>
<t>
If either the client or the server sends the close token in the
Connection header field, that request becomes the last one for the
connection.
</t>
<t>
Clients and servers SHOULD NOT assume that a persistent connection is
maintained for HTTP versions less than 1.1 unless it is explicitly
signaled. See <xref target="compatibility.with.http.1.0.persistent.connections"/> for more information on backward
compatibility with HTTP/1.0 clients.
</t>
<t>
Each persistent connection applies to only one transport link.
</t>
<t>
A proxy server MUST NOT establish a HTTP/1.1 persistent connection
with an HTTP/1.0 client (but see Section 19.7.1 of <xref target="RFC2068"/>
for information and discussion of the problems with the Keep-Alive header field
implemented by many HTTP/1.0 clients).
</t>
<t>
In order to remain persistent, all messages on the connection MUST
have a self-defined message length (i.e., one not defined by closure
of the connection), as described in <xref target="message.body"/>.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Pipelining" anchor="pipelining">
<t>
A client that supports persistent connections MAY "pipeline" its
requests (i.e., send multiple requests without waiting for each
response). A server MUST send its responses to those requests in the
same order that the requests were received.
</t>
<t>
Clients which assume persistent connections and pipeline immediately
after connection establishment SHOULD be prepared to retry their
connection if the first pipelined attempt fails. If a client does
such a retry, it MUST NOT pipeline before it knows the connection is
persistent. Clients MUST also be prepared to resend their requests if
the server closes the connection before sending all of the
corresponding responses.
</t>
<t>
Clients SHOULD NOT pipeline requests using non-idempotent request methods or
non-idempotent sequences of request methods (see Section 6.1.2 of <xref target="Part2"/>). Otherwise, a
premature termination of the transport connection could lead to
indeterminate results. A client wishing to send a non-idempotent
request SHOULD wait to send that request until it has received the
response status line for the previous request.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Practical Considerations" anchor="persistent.practical">
<t>
Servers will usually have some time-out value beyond which they will
no longer maintain an inactive connection. Proxy servers might make
this a higher value since it is likely that the client will be making
more connections through the same server. The use of persistent
connections places no requirements on the length (or existence) of
this time-out for either the client or the server.
</t>
<t>
When a client or server wishes to time-out it SHOULD issue a graceful
close on the transport connection. Clients and servers SHOULD both
constantly watch for the other side of the transport close, and
respond to it as appropriate. If a client or server does not detect
the other side's close promptly it could cause unnecessary resource
drain on the network.
</t>
<t>
A client, server, or proxy MAY close the transport connection at any
time. For example, a client might have started to send a new request
at the same time that the server has decided to close the "idle"
connection. From the server's point of view, the connection is being
closed while it was idle, but from the client's point of view, a
request is in progress.
</t>
<t>
Clients (including proxies) SHOULD limit the number of simultaneous
connections that they maintain to a given server (including proxies).
</t>
<t>
Previous revisions of HTTP gave a specific number of connections as a
ceiling, but this was found to be impractical for many applications. As a
result, this specification does not mandate a particular maximum number of
connections, but instead encourages clients to be conservative when opening
multiple connections.
</t>
<t>
In particular, while using multiple connections avoids the "head-of-line
blocking" problem (whereby a request that takes significant server-side
processing and/or has a large payload can block subsequent requests on the
same connection), each connection used consumes server resources (sometimes
significantly), and furthermore using multiple connections can cause
undesirable side effects in congested networks.
</t>
<t>
Note that servers might reject traffic that they deem abusive, including an
excessive number of connections from a client.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Retrying Requests" anchor="persistent.retrying.requests">
<t>
Senders can close the transport connection at any time. Therefore,
clients, servers, and proxies MUST be able to recover
from asynchronous close events. Client software MAY reopen the
transport connection and retransmit the aborted sequence of requests
without user interaction so long as the request sequence is
idempotent (see Section 6.1.2 of <xref target="Part2"/>). Non-idempotent request methods or sequences
MUST NOT be automatically retried, although user agents MAY offer a
human operator the choice of retrying the request(s). Confirmation by
user-agent software with semantic understanding of the application
MAY substitute for user confirmation. The automatic retry SHOULD NOT
be repeated if the second sequence of requests fails.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Message Transmission Requirements" anchor="message.transmission.requirements">
<section title="Persistent Connections and Flow Control" anchor="persistent.flow">
<t>
HTTP/1.1 servers SHOULD maintain persistent connections and use TCP's
flow control mechanisms to resolve temporary overloads, rather than
terminating connections with the expectation that clients will retry.
The latter technique can exacerbate network congestion.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Monitoring Connections for Error Status Messages" anchor="persistent.monitor">
<t>
An HTTP/1.1 (or later) client sending a message body SHOULD monitor
the network connection for an error status code while it is transmitting
the request. If the client sees an error status code, it SHOULD
immediately cease transmitting the body. If the body is being sent
using a "chunked" encoding (<xref target="transfer.codings"/>), a zero length chunk and
empty trailer MAY be used to prematurely mark the end of the message.
If the body was preceded by a Content-Length header field, the client MUST
close the connection.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Use of the 100 (Continue) Status" anchor="use.of.the.100.status">
<t>
The purpose of the 100 (Continue) status code (see Section 7.1.1 of <xref target="Part2"/>) is to
allow a client that is sending a request message with a request body
to determine if the origin server is willing to accept the request
(based on the request header fields) before the client sends the request
body. In some cases, it might either be inappropriate or highly
inefficient for the client to send the body if the server will reject
the message without looking at the body.
</t>
<t>
Requirements for HTTP/1.1 clients:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
If a client will wait for a 100 (Continue) response before
sending the request body, it MUST send an Expect header
field (Section 10.3 of <xref target="Part2"/>) with the "100-continue" expectation.
</t>
<t>
A client MUST NOT send an Expect header field (Section 10.3 of <xref target="Part2"/>)
with the "100-continue" expectation if it does not intend
to send a request body.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Because of the presence of older implementations, the protocol allows
ambiguous situations in which a client might send "Expect: 100-continue"
without receiving either a 417 (Expectation Failed)
or a 100 (Continue) status code. Therefore, when a client sends this
header field to an origin server (possibly via a proxy) from which it
has never seen a 100 (Continue) status code, the client SHOULD NOT
wait for an indefinite period before sending the request body.
</t>
<t>
Requirements for HTTP/1.1 origin servers:
<list style="symbols">
<t> Upon receiving a request which includes an Expect header
field with the "100-continue" expectation, an origin server MUST
either respond with 100 (Continue) status code and continue to read
from the input stream, or respond with a final status code. The
origin server MUST NOT wait for the request body before sending
the 100 (Continue) response. If it responds with a final status
code, it MAY close the transport connection or it MAY continue
to read and discard the rest of the request. It MUST NOT
perform the request method if it returns a final status code.
</t>
<t> An origin server SHOULD NOT send a 100 (Continue) response if
the request message does not include an Expect header
field with the "100-continue" expectation, and MUST NOT send a
100 (Continue) response if such a request comes from an HTTP/1.0
(or earlier) client. There is an exception to this rule: for
compatibility with <xref target="RFC2068"/>, a server MAY send a 100 (Continue)
status code in response to an HTTP/1.1 PUT or POST request that does
not include an Expect header field with the "100-continue"
expectation. This exception, the purpose of which is
to minimize any client processing delays associated with an
undeclared wait for 100 (Continue) status code, applies only to
HTTP/1.1 requests, and not to requests with any other HTTP-version
value.
</t>
<t> An origin server MAY omit a 100 (Continue) response if it has
already received some or all of the request body for the
corresponding request.
</t>
<t> An origin server that sends a 100 (Continue) response MUST
ultimately send a final status code, once the request body is
received and processed, unless it terminates the transport
connection prematurely.
</t>
<t> If an origin server receives a request that does not include an
Expect header field with the "100-continue" expectation,
the request includes a request body, and the server responds
with a final status code before reading the entire request body
from the transport connection, then the server SHOULD NOT close
the transport connection until it has read the entire request,
or until the client closes the connection. Otherwise, the client
might not reliably receive the response message. However, this
requirement ought not be construed as preventing a server from
defending itself against denial-of-service attacks, or from
badly broken client implementations.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Requirements for HTTP/1.1 proxies:
<list style="symbols">
<t> If a proxy receives a request that includes an Expect header
field with the "100-continue" expectation, and the proxy
either knows that the next-hop server complies with HTTP/1.1 or
higher, or does not know the HTTP version of the next-hop
server, it MUST forward the request, including the Expect header
field.
</t>
<t> If the proxy knows that the version of the next-hop server is
HTTP/1.0 or lower, it MUST NOT forward the request, and it MUST
respond with a 417 (Expectation Failed) status code.
</t>
<t> Proxies SHOULD maintain a record of the HTTP version
numbers received from recently-referenced next-hop servers.
</t>
<t> A proxy MUST NOT forward a 100 (Continue) response if the
request message was received from an HTTP/1.0 (or earlier)
client and did not include an Expect header field with
the "100-continue" expectation. This requirement overrides the
general rule for forwarding of 1xx responses (see Section 7.1 of <xref target="Part2"/>).
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Closing Connections on Error" anchor="closing.connections.on.error">
<t>
If the client is sending data, a server implementation using TCP
SHOULD be careful to ensure that the client acknowledges receipt of
the packet(s) containing the response, before the server closes the
input connection. If the client continues sending data to the server
after the close, the server's TCP stack will send a reset packet to
the client, which might erase the client's unacknowledged input buffers
before they can be read and interpreted by the HTTP application.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Upgrade" anchor="header.upgrade">
<iref primary="true" item="Upgrade header field"/>
<iref primary="true" item="Header Fields" subitem="Upgrade"/>
<t>
The "Upgrade" header field allows the client to specify what
additional communication protocols it would like to use, if the server
chooses to switch protocols. Servers can use it to indicate what protocols
they are willing to switch to.
</t>
<figure><iref primary="true" item="Grammar" subitem="Upgrade"/><artwork type="abnf2616"><![CDATA[
Upgrade = 1#protocol
protocol = protocol-name ["/" protocol-version]
protocol-name = token
protocol-version = token
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
For example,
</t>
<figure><artwork type="example"><![CDATA[
Upgrade: HTTP/2.0, SHTTP/1.3, IRC/6.9, RTA/x11
]]></artwork></figure>
<t>
The Upgrade header field is intended to provide a simple mechanism
for transitioning from HTTP/1.1 to some other, incompatible protocol. It
does so by allowing the client to advertise its desire to use another
protocol, such as a later version of HTTP with a higher major version
number, even though the current request has been made using HTTP/1.1.
This eases the difficult transition between incompatible protocols by
allowing the client to initiate a request in the more commonly
supported protocol while indicating to the server that it would like
to use a "better" protocol if available (where "better" is determined
by the server, possibly according to the nature of the request method
or target resource).
</t>
<t>
The Upgrade header field only applies to switching application-layer
protocols upon the existing transport-layer connection. Upgrade
cannot be used to insist on a protocol change; its acceptance and use
by the server is optional. The capabilities and nature of the
application-layer communication after the protocol change is entirely
dependent upon the new protocol chosen, although the first action
after changing the protocol MUST be a response to the initial HTTP
request containing the Upgrade header field.
</t>
<t>
The Upgrade header field only applies to the immediate connection.
Therefore, the upgrade keyword MUST be supplied within a Connection
header field (<xref target="header.connection"/>) whenever Upgrade is present in an
HTTP/1.1 message.
</t>
<t>
The Upgrade header field cannot be used to indicate a switch to a
protocol on a different connection. For that purpose, it is more
appropriate to use a 3xx redirection response (Section 7.3 of <xref target="Part2"/>).
</t>
<t>
Servers MUST include the "Upgrade" header field in 101 (Switching
Protocols) responses to indicate which protocol(s) are being switched to,
and MUST include it in 426 (Upgrade Required) responses to indicate
acceptable protocols to upgrade to. Servers MAY include it in any other
response to indicate that they are willing to upgrade to one of the
specified protocols.
</t>
<t>
This specification only defines the protocol name "HTTP" for use by
the family of Hypertext Transfer Protocols, as defined by the HTTP
version rules of <xref target="http.version"/> and future updates to this
specification. Additional tokens can be registered with IANA using the
registration procedure defined in <xref target="upgrade.token.registry"/>.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="IANA Considerations" anchor="IANA.considerations">
<section title="Header Field Registration" anchor="header.field.registration">
<t>
HTTP header fields are registered within the Message Header Field Registry
<xref target="RFC3864"/> maintained by IANA at
<eref target="http://www.iana.org/assignments/message-headers/message-header-index.html"/>.
</t>
<t>
This document defines the following HTTP header fields, so their
associated registry entries shall be updated according to the permanent
registrations below:
</t>
<!--AUTOGENERATED FROM extract-header-defs.xslt, do not edit manually-->
<texttable align="left" suppress-title="true" anchor="iana.header.registration.table">
<ttcol>Header Field Name</ttcol>
<ttcol>Protocol</ttcol>
<ttcol>Status</ttcol>
<ttcol>Reference</ttcol>
<c>Connection</c>
<c>http</c>
<c>standard</c>
<c>
<xref target="header.connection"/>
</c>
<c>Content-Length</c>
<c>http</c>
<c>standard</c>
<c>
<xref target="header.content-length"/>
</c>
<c>Host</c>
<c>http</c>
<c>standard</c>
<c>
<xref target="header.host"/>
</c>
<c>TE</c>
<c>http</c>
<c>standard</c>
<c>
<xref target="header.te"/>
</c>
<c>Trailer</c>
<c>http</c>
<c>standard</c>
<c>
<xref target="header.trailer"/>
</c>
<c>Transfer-Encoding</c>
<c>http</c>
<c>standard</c>
<c>
<xref target="header.transfer-encoding"/>
</c>
<c>Upgrade</c>
<c>http</c>
<c>standard</c>
<c>
<xref target="header.upgrade"/>
</c>
<c>Via</c>
<c>http</c>
<c>standard</c>
<c>
<xref target="header.via"/>
</c>
</texttable>
<!--(END)-->
<t>
Furthermore, the header field-name "Close" shall be registered as
"reserved", since using that name as an HTTP header field might
conflict with the "close" connection option of the "Connection"
header field (<xref target="header.connection"/>).
</t>
<texttable align="left" suppress-title="true">
<ttcol>Header Field Name</ttcol>
<ttcol>Protocol</ttcol>
<ttcol>Status</ttcol>
<ttcol>Reference</ttcol>
<c>Close</c>
<c>http</c>
<c>reserved</c>
<c>
<xref target="header.field.registration"/>
</c>
</texttable>
<t>
The change controller is: "IETF (iesg@ietf.org) - Internet Engineering Task Force".
</t>
</section>
<section title="URI Scheme Registration" anchor="uri.scheme.registration">
<t>
IANA maintains the registry of URI Schemes <xref target="RFC4395"/> at
<eref target="http://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes.html"/>.
</t>
<t>
This document defines the following URI schemes, so their
associated registry entries shall be updated according to the permanent
registrations below:
</t>
<texttable align="left" suppress-title="true">
<ttcol>URI Scheme</ttcol>
<ttcol>Description</ttcol>
<ttcol>Reference</ttcol>
<c>http</c>
<c>Hypertext Transfer Protocol</c>
<c><xref target="http.uri"/></c>
<c>https</c>
<c>Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure</c>
<c><xref target="https.uri"/></c>
</texttable>
</section>
<section title="Internet Media Type Registrations" anchor="internet.media.type.http">
<t>
This document serves as the specification for the Internet media types
"message/http" and "application/http". The following is to be registered with
IANA (see <xref target="RFC4288"/>).
</t>
<section title="Internet Media Type message/http" anchor="internet.media.type.message.http">
<iref item="Media Type" subitem="message/http" primary="true"/>
<iref item="message/http Media Type" primary="true"/>
<t>
The message/http type can be used to enclose a single HTTP request or
response message, provided that it obeys the MIME restrictions for all
"message" types regarding line length and encodings.
</t>
<t>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="Type name:">
message
</t>
<t hangText="Subtype name:">
http
</t>
<t hangText="Required parameters:">
none
</t>
<t hangText="Optional parameters:">
version, msgtype
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="version:">
The HTTP-version number of the enclosed message
(e.g., "1.1"). If not present, the version can be
determined from the first line of the body.
</t>
<t hangText="msgtype:">
The message type — "request" or "response". If not
present, the type can be determined from the first
line of the body.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t hangText="Encoding considerations:">
only "7bit", "8bit", or "binary" are permitted
</t>
<t hangText="Security considerations:">
none
</t>
<t hangText="Interoperability considerations:">
none
</t>
<t hangText="Published specification:">
This specification (see <xref target="internet.media.type.message.http"/>).
</t>
<t hangText="Applications that use this media type:">
</t>
<t hangText="Additional information:">
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="Magic number(s):">none</t>
<t hangText="File extension(s):">none</t>
<t hangText="Macintosh file type code(s):">none</t>
</list>
</t>
<t hangText="Person and email address to contact for further information:">
See Authors Section.
</t>
<t hangText="Intended usage:">
COMMON
</t>
<t hangText="Restrictions on usage:">
none
</t>
<t hangText="Author/Change controller:">
IESG
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Internet Media Type application/http" anchor="internet.media.type.application.http">
<iref item="Media Type" subitem="application/http" primary="true"/>
<iref item="application/http Media Type" primary="true"/>
<t>
The application/http type can be used to enclose a pipeline of one or more
HTTP request or response messages (not intermixed).
</t>
<t>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="Type name:">
application
</t>
<t hangText="Subtype name:">
http
</t>
<t hangText="Required parameters:">
none
</t>
<t hangText="Optional parameters:">
version, msgtype
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="version:">
The HTTP-version number of the enclosed messages
(e.g., "1.1"). If not present, the version can be
determined from the first line of the body.
</t>
<t hangText="msgtype:">
The message type — "request" or "response". If not
present, the type can be determined from the first
line of the body.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t hangText="Encoding considerations:">
HTTP messages enclosed by this type
are in "binary" format; use of an appropriate
Content-Transfer-Encoding is required when
transmitted via E-mail.
</t>
<t hangText="Security considerations:">
none
</t>
<t hangText="Interoperability considerations:">
none
</t>
<t hangText="Published specification:">
This specification (see <xref target="internet.media.type.application.http"/>).
</t>
<t hangText="Applications that use this media type:">
</t>
<t hangText="Additional information:">
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="Magic number(s):">none</t>
<t hangText="File extension(s):">none</t>
<t hangText="Macintosh file type code(s):">none</t>
</list>
</t>
<t hangText="Person and email address to contact for further information:">
See Authors Section.
</t>
<t hangText="Intended usage:">
COMMON
</t>
<t hangText="Restrictions on usage:">
none
</t>
<t hangText="Author/Change controller:">
IESG
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Transfer Coding Registry" anchor="transfer.coding.registry">
<t>
The HTTP Transfer Coding Registry defines the name space for transfer
coding names.
</t>
<t>
Registrations MUST include the following fields:
<list style="symbols">
<t>Name</t>
<t>Description</t>
<t>Pointer to specification text</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Names of transfer codings MUST NOT overlap with names of content codings
(Section 2.2 of <xref target="Part3"/>) unless the encoding transformation is identical, as it
is the case for the compression codings defined in
<xref target="compression.codings"/>.
</t>
<t>
Values to be added to this name space require IETF Review (see
Section 4.1 of <xref target="RFC5226"/>), and MUST
conform to the purpose of transfer coding defined in this section.
</t>
<t>
The registry itself is maintained at
<eref target="http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-parameters"/>.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Transfer Coding Registrations" anchor="transfer.coding.registration">
<t>
The HTTP Transfer Coding Registry shall be updated with the registrations
below:
</t>
<texttable align="left" suppress-title="true" anchor="iana.transfer.coding.registration.table">
<ttcol>Name</ttcol>
<ttcol>Description</ttcol>
<ttcol>Reference</ttcol>
<c>chunked</c>
<c>Transfer in a series of chunks</c>
<c>
<xref target="chunked.encoding"/>
</c>
<c>compress</c>
<c>UNIX "compress" program method</c>
<c>
<xref target="compress.coding"/>
</c>
<c>deflate</c>
<c>"deflate" compression mechanism (<xref target="RFC1951"/>) used inside
the "zlib" data format (<xref target="RFC1950"/>)
</c>
<c>
<xref target="deflate.coding"/>
</c>
<c>gzip</c>
<c>Same as GNU zip <xref target="RFC1952"/></c>
<c>
<xref target="gzip.coding"/>
</c>
</texttable>
</section>
<section title="Upgrade Token Registry" anchor="upgrade.token.registry">
<t>
The HTTP Upgrade Token Registry defines the name space for protocol-name
tokens used to identify protocols in the Upgrade header field.
Each registered protocol-name is associated with contact information and
an optional set of specifications that details how the connection
will be processed after it has been upgraded.
</t>
<t>
Registrations require IETF Review (see
Section 4.1 of <xref target="RFC5226"/>) and are subject to the
following rules:
<list style="numbers">
<t>A protocol-name token, once registered, stays registered forever.</t>
<t>The registration MUST name a responsible party for the
registration.</t>
<t>The registration MUST name a point of contact.</t>
<t>The registration MAY name a set of specifications associated with
that token. Such specifications need not be publicly available.</t>
<t>The registration SHOULD name a set of expected "protocol-version"
tokens associated with that token at the time of registration.</t>
<t>The responsible party MAY change the registration at any time.
The IANA will keep a record of all such changes, and make them
available upon request.</t>
<t>The IESG MAY reassign responsibility for a protocol token.
This will normally only be used in the case when a
responsible party cannot be contacted.</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
This registration procedure for HTTP Upgrade Tokens replaces that
previously defined in Section 7.2 of <xref target="RFC2817"/>.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Upgrade Token Registration" anchor="upgrade.token.registration">
<t>
The HTTP Upgrade Token Registry shall be updated with the registration
below:
</t>
<texttable align="left" suppress-title="true">
<ttcol>Value</ttcol>
<ttcol>Description</ttcol>
<ttcol>Expected Version Tokens</ttcol>
<ttcol>Reference</ttcol>
<c>HTTP</c>
<c>Hypertext Transfer Protocol</c>
<c>any DIGIT.DIGIT (e.g, "2.0")</c>
<c><xref target="http.version"/></c>
</texttable>
<t>
The responsible party is: "IETF (iesg@ietf.org) - Internet Engineering Task Force".
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Security Considerations" anchor="security.considerations">
<t>
This section is meant to inform application developers, information
providers, and users of the security limitations in HTTP/1.1 as
described by this document. The discussion does not include
definitive solutions to the problems revealed, though it does make
some suggestions for reducing security risks.
</t>
<section title="Personal Information" anchor="personal.information">
<t>
HTTP clients are often privy to large amounts of personal information
(e.g., the user's name, location, mail address, passwords, encryption
keys, etc.), and SHOULD be very careful to prevent unintentional
leakage of this information.
We very strongly recommend that a convenient interface be provided
for the user to control dissemination of such information, and that
designers and implementors be particularly careful in this area.
History shows that errors in this area often create serious security
and/or privacy problems and generate highly adverse publicity for the
implementor's company.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Abuse of Server Log Information" anchor="abuse.of.server.log.information">
<t>
A server is in the position to save personal data about a user's
requests which might identify their reading patterns or subjects of
interest. In particular, log information gathered at an intermediary
often contains a history of user agent interaction, across a multitude
of sites, that can be traced to individual users.
</t>
<t>
HTTP log information is confidential in nature; its handling is often
constrained by laws and regulations. Log information needs to be securely
stored and appropriate guidelines followed for its analysis.
Anonymization of personal information within individual entries helps,
but is generally not sufficient to prevent real log traces from being
re-identified based on correlation with other access characteristics.
As such, access traces that are keyed to a specific client should not
be published even if the key is pseudonymous.
</t>
<t>
To minimize the risk of theft or accidental publication, log information
should be purged of personally identifiable information, including
user identifiers, IP addresses, and user-provided query parameters,
as soon as that information is no longer necessary to support operational
needs for security, auditing, or fraud control.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Attacks Based On File and Path Names" anchor="attack.pathname">
<t>
Implementations of HTTP origin servers SHOULD be careful to restrict
the documents returned by HTTP requests to be only those that were
intended by the server administrators. If an HTTP server translates
HTTP URIs directly into file system calls, the server MUST take
special care not to serve files that were not intended to be
delivered to HTTP clients. For example, UNIX, Microsoft Windows, and
other operating systems use ".." as a path component to indicate a
directory level above the current one. On such a system, an HTTP
server MUST disallow any such construct in the request-target if it
would otherwise allow access to a resource outside those intended to
be accessible via the HTTP server. Similarly, files intended for
reference only internally to the server (such as access control
files, configuration files, and script code) MUST be protected from
inappropriate retrieval, since they might contain sensitive
information. Experience has shown that minor bugs in such HTTP server
implementations have turned into security risks.
</t>
</section>
<section title="DNS-related Attacks" anchor="dns.related.attacks">
<t>
HTTP clients rely heavily on the Domain Name Service (DNS), and are thus
generally prone to security attacks based on the deliberate misassociation
of IP addresses and DNS names not protected by DNSSec. Clients need to be
cautious in assuming the validity of an IP number/DNS name association unless
the response is protected by DNSSec (<xref target="RFC4033"/>).
</t>
</section>
<section title="Intermediaries and Caching" anchor="attack.intermediaries">
<t>
By their very nature, HTTP intermediaries are men-in-the-middle, and
represent an opportunity for man-in-the-middle attacks. Compromise of
the systems on which the intermediaries run can result in serious security
and privacy problems. Intermediaries have access to security-related
information, personal information about individual users and
organizations, and proprietary information belonging to users and
content providers. A compromised intermediary, or an intermediary
implemented or configured without regard to security and privacy
considerations, might be used in the commission of a wide range of
potential attacks.
</t>
<t>
Intermediaries that contain a shared cache are especially vulnerable
to cache poisoning attacks.
</t>
<t>
Implementors need to consider the privacy and security
implications of their design and coding decisions, and of the
configuration options they provide to operators (especially the
default configuration).
</t>
<t>
Users need to be aware that intermediaries are no more trustworthy than
the people who run them; HTTP itself cannot solve this problem.
</t>
<t>
The judicious use of cryptography, when appropriate, might suffice to
protect against a broad range of security and privacy attacks. Such
cryptography is beyond the scope of the HTTP/1.1 specification.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Protocol Element Size Overflows" anchor="attack.protocol.element.size.overflows">
<t>
Because HTTP uses mostly textual, character-delimited fields, attackers can
overflow buffers in implementations, and/or perform a Denial of Service
against implementations that accept fields with unlimited lengths.
</t>
<t>
To promote interoperability, this specification makes specific
recommendations for minimum size limits on request-line
(<xref target="request.line"/>)
and blocks of header fields (<xref target="header.fields"/>). These are
minimum recommendations, chosen to be supportable even by implementations
with limited resources; it is expected that most implementations will
choose substantially higher limits.
</t>
<t>
This specification also provides a way for servers to reject messages that
have request-targets that are too long (Section 7.4.12 of <xref target="Part2"/>) or request entities
that are too large (Section 7.4 of <xref target="Part2"/>).
</t>
<t>
Other fields (including but not limited to request methods, response status
phrases, header field-names, and body chunks) SHOULD be limited by
implementations carefully, so as to not impede interoperability.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Acknowledgments" anchor="acks">
<t>
This edition of HTTP builds on the many contributions that went into
<xref target="RFC1945" format="none">RFC 1945</xref>,
<xref target="RFC2068" format="none">RFC 2068</xref>,
<xref target="RFC2145" format="none">RFC 2145</xref>, and
<xref target="RFC2616" format="none">RFC 2616</xref>, including
substantial contributions made by the previous authors, editors, and
working group chairs: Tim Berners-Lee, Ari Luotonen, Roy T. Fielding,
Henrik Frystyk Nielsen, Jim Gettys, Jeffrey C. Mogul, Larry Masinter,
Paul J. Leach, and Mark Nottingham.
See Section 16 of <xref target="RFC2616"/> for additional
acknowledgements from prior revisions.
</t>
<t>
Since 1999, the following contributors have helped improve the HTTP
specification by reporting bugs, asking smart questions, drafting or
reviewing text, and evaluating open issues:
</t>
<t>Adam Barth,
Adam Roach,
Addison Phillips,
Adrian Chadd,
Adrien de Croy,
Alan Ford,
Alan Ruttenberg,
Albert Lunde,
Alex Rousskov,
Alexey Melnikov,
Alisha Smith,
Amichai Rothman,
Amit Klein,
Amos Jeffries,
Andreas Maier,
Andreas Petersson,
Anne van Kesteren,
Anthony Bryan,
Asbjorn Ulsberg,
Balachander Krishnamurthy,
Barry Leiba,
Ben Laurie,
Benjamin Niven-Jenkins,
Bil Corry,
Bill Burke,
Bjoern Hoehrmann,
Bob Scheifler,
Boris Zbarsky,
Brett Slatkin,
Brian Kell,
Brian McBarron,
Brian Pane,
Brian Smith,
Bryce Nesbitt,
Cameron Heavon-Jones,
Carl Kugler,
Carsten Bormann,
Charles Fry,
Chris Newman,
Cyrus Daboo,
Dale Robert Anderson,
Dan Winship,
Daniel Stenberg,
Dave Cridland,
Dave Crocker,
Dave Kristol,
David Booth,
David Singer,
David W. Morris,
Diwakar Shetty,
Dmitry Kurochkin,
Drummond Reed,
Duane Wessels,
Edward Lee,
Eliot Lear,
Eran Hammer-Lahav,
Eric D. Williams,
Eric J. Bowman,
Eric Lawrence,
Eric Rescorla,
Erik Aronesty,
Florian Weimer,
Frank Ellermann,
Fred Bohle,
Geoffrey Sneddon,
Gervase Markham,
Greg Wilkins,
Harald Tveit Alvestrand,
Harry Halpin,
Helge Hess,
Henrik Nordstrom,
Henry S. Thompson,
Henry Story,
Herbert van de Sompel,
Howard Melman,
Hugo Haas,
Ian Hickson,
Ingo Struck,
J. Ross Nicoll,
James H. Manger,
James Lacey,
James M. Snell,
Jamie Lokier,
Jan Algermissen,
Jeff Hodges (for coming up with the term 'effective Request-URI'),
Jeff Walden,
Jim Luther,
Joe D. Williams,
Joe Gregorio,
Joe Orton,
John C. Klensin,
John C. Mallery,
John Cowan,
John Kemp,
John Panzer,
John Schneider,
John Stracke,
Jonas Sicking,
Jonathan Billington,
Jonathan Moore,
Jonathan Rees,
Jordi Ros,
Joris Dobbelsteen,
Josh Cohen,
Julien Pierre,
Jungshik Shin,
Justin Chapweske,
Justin Erenkrantz,
Justin James,
Kalvinder Singh,
Karl Dubost,
Keith Hoffman,
Keith Moore,
Koen Holtman,
Konstantin Voronkov,
Kris Zyp,
Lisa Dusseault,
Maciej Stachowiak,
Marc Schneider,
Marc Slemko,
Mark Baker,
Mark Pauley,
Markus Lanthaler,
Martin J. Duerst,
Martin Thomson,
Matt Lynch,
Matthew Cox,
Max Clark,
Michael Burrows,
Michael Hausenblas,
Mike Amundsen,
Mike Belshe,
Mike Kelly,
Mike Schinkel,
Miles Sabin,
Mykyta Yevstifeyev,
Nathan Rixham,
Nicholas Shanks,
Nico Williams,
Nicolas Alvarez,
Nicolas Mailhot,
Noah Slater,
Pablo Castro,
Pat Hayes,
Patrick R. McManus,
Paul E. Jones,
Paul Hoffman,
Paul Marquess,
Peter Saint-Andre,
Peter Watkins,
Phil Archer,
Phillip Hallam-Baker,
Poul-Henning Kamp,
Preethi Natarajan,
Ray Polk,
Reto Bachmann-Gmuer,
Richard Cyganiak,
Robert Brewer,
Robert Collins,
Robert O'Callahan,
Robert Olofsson,
Robert Sayre,
Robert Siemer,
Robert de Wilde,
Roberto Javier Godoy,
Ronny Widjaja,
S. Mike Dierken,
Salvatore Loreto,
Sam Johnston,
Sam Ruby,
Scott Lawrence (for maintaining the original issues list),
Sean B. Palmer,
Shane McCarron,
Stefan Eissing,
Stefan Tilkov,
Stefanos Harhalakis,
Stephane Bortzmeyer,
Stephen Farrell,
Stuart Williams,
Subbu Allamaraju,
Sylvain Hellegouarch,
Tapan Divekar,
Ted Hardie,
Thomas Broyer,
Thomas Nordin,
Thomas Roessler,
Tim Morgan,
Tim Olsen,
Travis Snoozy,
Tyler Close,
Vincent Murphy,
Wenbo Zhu,
Werner Baumann,
Wilbur Streett,
Wilfredo Sanchez Vega,
William A. Rowe Jr.,
William Chan,
Willy Tarreau,
Xiaoshu Wang,
Yaron Goland,
Yngve Nysaeter Pettersen,
Yogesh Bang,
Yutaka Oiwa,
Zed A. Shaw, and
Zhong Yu.
</t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<reference anchor="ISO-8859-1">
<front>
<title>
Information technology -- 8-bit single-byte coded graphic character sets -- Part 1: Latin alphabet No. 1
</title>
<author>
<organization>International Organization for Standardization</organization>
</author>
<date year="1998"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="8859-1:1998"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Part2">
<front>
<title abbrev="HTTP/1.1">HTTP/1.1, part 2: Message Semantics</title>
<author initials="R." surname="Fielding" fullname="Roy T. Fielding" role="editor">
<organization abbrev="Adobe">Adobe Systems Incorporated</organization>
<address><email>fielding@gbiv.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="Y." surname="Lafon" fullname="Yves Lafon" role="editor">
<organization abbrev="W3C">World Wide Web Consortium</organization>
<address><email>ylafon@w3.org</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="J. F." surname="Reschke" fullname="Julian F. Reschke" role="editor">
<organization abbrev="greenbytes">greenbytes GmbH</organization>
<address><email>julian.reschke@greenbytes.de</email></address>
</author>
<date month="March" year="2012"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-19"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Part3">
<front>
<title abbrev="HTTP/1.1">HTTP/1.1, part 3: Message Payload and Content Negotiation</title>
<author initials="R." surname="Fielding" fullname="Roy T. Fielding" role="editor">
<organization abbrev="Adobe">Adobe Systems Incorporated</organization>
<address><email>fielding@gbiv.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="Y." surname="Lafon" fullname="Yves Lafon" role="editor">
<organization abbrev="W3C">World Wide Web Consortium</organization>
<address><email>ylafon@w3.org</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="J. F." surname="Reschke" fullname="Julian F. Reschke" role="editor">
<organization abbrev="greenbytes">greenbytes GmbH</organization>
<address><email>julian.reschke@greenbytes.de</email></address>
</author>
<date month="March" year="2012"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-httpbis-p3-payload-19"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Part6">
<front>
<title abbrev="HTTP/1.1">HTTP/1.1, part 6: Caching</title>
<author initials="R." surname="Fielding" fullname="Roy T. Fielding" role="editor">
<organization abbrev="Adobe">Adobe Systems Incorporated</organization>
<address><email>fielding@gbiv.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="Y." surname="Lafon" fullname="Yves Lafon" role="editor">
<organization abbrev="W3C">World Wide Web Consortium</organization>
<address><email>ylafon@w3.org</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="M." surname="Nottingham" fullname="Mark Nottingham" role="editor">
<organization>Rackspace</organization>
<address><email>mnot@mnot.net</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="J. F." surname="Reschke" fullname="Julian F. Reschke" role="editor">
<organization abbrev="greenbytes">greenbytes GmbH</organization>
<address><email>julian.reschke@greenbytes.de</email></address>
</author>
<date month="March" year="2012"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-httpbis-p6-cache-19"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC5234">
<front>
<title abbrev="ABNF for Syntax Specifications">Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF</title>
<author initials="D." surname="Crocker" fullname="Dave Crocker" role="editor">
<organization>Brandenburg InternetWorking</organization>
<address>
<email>dcrocker@bbiw.net</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="P." surname="Overell" fullname="Paul Overell">
<organization>THUS plc.</organization>
<address>
<email>paul.overell@thus.net</email>
</address>
</author>
<date month="January" year="2008"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="STD" value="68"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5234"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2119">
<front>
<title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
<author initials="S." surname="Bradner" fullname="Scott Bradner">
<organization>Harvard University</organization>
<address><email>sob@harvard.edu</email></address>
</author>
<date month="March" year="1997"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC3986">
<front>
<title abbrev="URI Generic Syntax">Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
<author initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee" fullname="Tim Berners-Lee">
<organization abbrev="W3C/MIT">World Wide Web Consortium</organization>
<address>
<email>timbl@w3.org</email>
<uri>http://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="R." surname="Fielding" fullname="Roy T. Fielding">
<organization abbrev="Day Software">Day Software</organization>
<address>
<email>fielding@gbiv.com</email>
<uri>http://roy.gbiv.com/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="L." surname="Masinter" fullname="Larry Masinter">
<organization abbrev="Adobe Systems">Adobe Systems Incorporated</organization>
<address>
<email>LMM@acm.org</email>
<uri>http://larry.masinter.net/</uri>
</address>
</author>
<date month="January" year="2005"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="USASCII">
<front>
<title>Coded Character Set -- 7-bit American Standard Code for Information Interchange</title>
<author>
<organization>American National Standards Institute</organization>
</author>
<date year="1986"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="ANSI" value="X3.4"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC1950">
<front>
<title>ZLIB Compressed Data Format Specification version 3.3</title>
<author initials="L.P." surname="Deutsch" fullname="L. Peter Deutsch">
<organization>Aladdin Enterprises</organization>
<address><email>ghost@aladdin.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="J-L." surname="Gailly" fullname="Jean-Loup Gailly"/>
<date month="May" year="1996"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1950"/>
<!--<annotation>
RFC 1950 is an Informational RFC, thus it might be less stable than
this specification. On the other hand, this downward reference was
present since the publication of <xref target="RFC2068" x:fmt="none">RFC 2068</xref> in 1997,
therefore it is unlikely to cause problems in practice. See also
<xref target="BCP97"/>.
</annotation>-->
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC1951">
<front>
<title>DEFLATE Compressed Data Format Specification version 1.3</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Deutsch" fullname="L. Peter Deutsch">
<organization>Aladdin Enterprises</organization>
<address><email>ghost@aladdin.com</email></address>
</author>
<date month="May" year="1996"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1951"/>
<!--<annotation>
RFC 1951 is an Informational RFC, thus it might be less stable than
this specification. On the other hand, this downward reference was
present since the publication of <xref target="RFC2068" x:fmt="none">RFC 2068</xref> in 1997,
therefore it is unlikely to cause problems in practice. See also
<xref target="BCP97"/>.
</annotation>-->
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC1952">
<front>
<title>GZIP file format specification version 4.3</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Deutsch" fullname="L. Peter Deutsch">
<organization>Aladdin Enterprises</organization>
<address><email>ghost@aladdin.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="J-L." surname="Gailly" fullname="Jean-Loup Gailly">
<address><email>gzip@prep.ai.mit.edu</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="M." surname="Adler" fullname="Mark Adler">
<address><email>madler@alumni.caltech.edu</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="L.P." surname="Deutsch" fullname="L. Peter Deutsch">
<address><email>ghost@aladdin.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="G." surname="Randers-Pehrson" fullname="Glenn Randers-Pehrson">
<address><email>randeg@alumni.rpi.edu</email></address>
</author>
<date month="May" year="1996"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1952"/>
<!--<annotation>
RFC 1952 is an Informational RFC, thus it might be less stable than
this specification. On the other hand, this downward reference was
present since the publication of <xref target="RFC2068" x:fmt="none">RFC 2068</xref> in 1997,
therefore it is unlikely to cause problems in practice. See also
<xref target="BCP97"/>.
</annotation>-->
</reference>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<reference anchor="Nie1997" target="http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/263105.263157">
<front>
<title>Network Performance Effects of HTTP/1.1, CSS1, and PNG</title>
<author initials="H." surname="Frystyk" fullname="Henrik Frystyk Nielsen"/>
<author initials="J." surname="Gettys" fullname="J. Gettys"/>
<author initials="E." surname="Prud'hommeaux" fullname="E. Prud'hommeaux"/>
<author initials="H." surname="Lie" fullname="H. Lie"/>
<author initials="C." surname="Lilley" fullname="C. Lilley"/>
<date year="1997" month="September"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="ACM" value="Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM '97 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication SIGCOMM '97"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Pad1995" target="http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=219094">
<front>
<title>Improving HTTP Latency</title>
<author initials="V.N." surname="Padmanabhan" fullname="Venkata N. Padmanabhan"/>
<author initials="J.C." surname="Mogul" fullname="Jeffrey C. Mogul"/>
<date year="1995" month="December"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="Computer Networks and ISDN Systems" value="v. 28, pp. 25-35"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC1919">
<front>
<title>Classical versus Transparent IP Proxies</title>
<author initials="M." surname="Chatel" fullname="Marc Chatel">
<address><email>mchatel@pax.eunet.ch</email></address>
</author>
<date year="1996" month="March"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1919"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC1945">
<front>
<title abbrev="HTTP/1.0">Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.0</title>
<author initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee" fullname="Tim Berners-Lee">
<organization>MIT, Laboratory for Computer Science</organization>
<address><email>timbl@w3.org</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="R.T." surname="Fielding" fullname="Roy T. Fielding">
<organization>University of California, Irvine, Department of Information and Computer Science</organization>
<address><email>fielding@ics.uci.edu</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="H.F." surname="Nielsen" fullname="Henrik Frystyk Nielsen">
<organization>W3 Consortium, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science</organization>
<address><email>frystyk@w3.org</email></address>
</author>
<date month="May" year="1996"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1945"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2045">
<front>
<title abbrev="Internet Message Bodies">Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message Bodies</title>
<author initials="N." surname="Freed" fullname="Ned Freed">
<organization>Innosoft International, Inc.</organization>
<address><email>ned@innosoft.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="N.S." surname="Borenstein" fullname="Nathaniel S. Borenstein">
<organization>First Virtual Holdings</organization>
<address><email>nsb@nsb.fv.com</email></address>
</author>
<date month="November" year="1996"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2045"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2047">
<front>
<title abbrev="Message Header Extensions">MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) Part Three: Message Header Extensions for Non-ASCII Text</title>
<author initials="K." surname="Moore" fullname="Keith Moore">
<organization>University of Tennessee</organization>
<address><email>moore@cs.utk.edu</email></address>
</author>
<date month="November" year="1996"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2047"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2068">
<front>
<title abbrev="HTTP/1.1">Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1</title>
<author initials="R." surname="Fielding" fullname="Roy T. Fielding">
<organization>University of California, Irvine, Department of Information and Computer Science</organization>
<address><email>fielding@ics.uci.edu</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Gettys" fullname="Jim Gettys">
<organization>MIT Laboratory for Computer Science</organization>
<address><email>jg@w3.org</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Mogul" fullname="Jeffrey C. Mogul">
<organization>Digital Equipment Corporation, Western Research Laboratory</organization>
<address><email>mogul@wrl.dec.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="H." surname="Nielsen" fullname="Henrik Frystyk Nielsen">
<organization>MIT Laboratory for Computer Science</organization>
<address><email>frystyk@w3.org</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee" fullname="Tim Berners-Lee">
<organization>MIT Laboratory for Computer Science</organization>
<address><email>timbl@w3.org</email></address>
</author>
<date month="January" year="1997"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2068"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2145">
<front>
<title abbrev="HTTP Version Numbers">Use and Interpretation of HTTP Version Numbers</title>
<author initials="J.C." surname="Mogul" fullname="Jeffrey C. Mogul">
<organization>Western Research Laboratory</organization>
<address><email>mogul@wrl.dec.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="R.T." surname="Fielding" fullname="Roy T. Fielding">
<organization>Department of Information and Computer Science</organization>
<address><email>fielding@ics.uci.edu</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Gettys" fullname="Jim Gettys">
<organization>MIT Laboratory for Computer Science</organization>
<address><email>jg@w3.org</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="H.F." surname="Nielsen" fullname="Henrik Frystyk Nielsen">
<organization>W3 Consortium</organization>
<address><email>frystyk@w3.org</email></address>
</author>
<date month="May" year="1997"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2145"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2616">
<front>
<title>Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1</title>
<author initials="R." surname="Fielding" fullname="R. Fielding">
<organization>University of California, Irvine</organization>
<address><email>fielding@ics.uci.edu</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Gettys" fullname="J. Gettys">
<organization>W3C</organization>
<address><email>jg@w3.org</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Mogul" fullname="J. Mogul">
<organization>Compaq Computer Corporation</organization>
<address><email>mogul@wrl.dec.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="H." surname="Frystyk" fullname="H. Frystyk">
<organization>MIT Laboratory for Computer Science</organization>
<address><email>frystyk@w3.org</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="L." surname="Masinter" fullname="L. Masinter">
<organization>Xerox Corporation</organization>
<address><email>masinter@parc.xerox.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="P." surname="Leach" fullname="P. Leach">
<organization>Microsoft Corporation</organization>
<address><email>paulle@microsoft.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee" fullname="T. Berners-Lee">
<organization>W3C</organization>
<address><email>timbl@w3.org</email></address>
</author>
<date month="June" year="1999"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2616"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2817">
<front>
<title>Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1</title>
<author initials="R." surname="Khare" fullname="R. Khare">
<organization>4K Associates / UC Irvine</organization>
<address><email>rohit@4K-associates.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="S." surname="Lawrence" fullname="S. Lawrence">
<organization>Agranat Systems, Inc.</organization>
<address><email>lawrence@agranat.com</email></address>
</author>
<date year="2000" month="May"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2817"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2818">
<front>
<title>HTTP Over TLS</title>
<author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="Eric Rescorla">
<organization>RTFM, Inc.</organization>
<address><email>ekr@rtfm.com</email></address>
</author>
<date year="2000" month="May"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2818"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2965">
<front>
<title>HTTP State Management Mechanism</title>
<author initials="D. M." surname="Kristol" fullname="David M. Kristol">
<organization>Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies</organization>
<address><email>dmk@bell-labs.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="L." surname="Montulli" fullname="Lou Montulli">
<organization>Epinions.com, Inc.</organization>
<address><email>lou@montulli.org</email></address>
</author>
<date year="2000" month="October"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2965"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC3040">
<front>
<title>Internet Web Replication and Caching Taxonomy</title>
<author initials="I." surname="Cooper" fullname="I. Cooper">
<organization>Equinix, Inc.</organization>
</author>
<author initials="I." surname="Melve" fullname="I. Melve">
<organization>UNINETT</organization>
</author>
<author initials="G." surname="Tomlinson" fullname="G. Tomlinson">
<organization>CacheFlow Inc.</organization>
</author>
<date year="2001" month="January"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3040"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC3864">
<front>
<title>Registration Procedures for Message Header Fields</title>
<author initials="G." surname="Klyne" fullname="G. Klyne">
<organization>Nine by Nine</organization>
<address><email>GK-IETF@ninebynine.org</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="M." surname="Nottingham" fullname="M. Nottingham">
<organization>BEA Systems</organization>
<address><email>mnot@pobox.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Mogul" fullname="J. Mogul">
<organization>HP Labs</organization>
<address><email>JeffMogul@acm.org</email></address>
</author>
<date year="2004" month="September"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="90"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3864"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC4033">
<front>
<title>DNS Security Introduction and Requirements</title>
<author initials="R." surname="Arends" fullname="R. Arends"/>
<author initials="R." surname="Austein" fullname="R. Austein"/>
<author initials="M." surname="Larson" fullname="M. Larson"/>
<author initials="D." surname="Massey" fullname="D. Massey"/>
<author initials="S." surname="Rose" fullname="S. Rose"/>
<date year="2005" month="March"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4033"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC4288">
<front>
<title>Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures</title>
<author initials="N." surname="Freed" fullname="N. Freed">
<organization>Sun Microsystems</organization>
<address>
<email>ned.freed@mrochek.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Klensin" fullname="J. Klensin">
<address>
<email>klensin+ietf@jck.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date year="2005" month="December"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="13"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4288"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC4395">
<front>
<title>Guidelines and Registration Procedures for New URI Schemes</title>
<author initials="T." surname="Hansen" fullname="T. Hansen">
<organization>AT&T Laboratories</organization>
<address>
<email>tony+urireg@maillennium.att.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="T." surname="Hardie" fullname="T. Hardie">
<organization>Qualcomm, Inc.</organization>
<address>
<email>hardie@qualcomm.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="L." surname="Masinter" fullname="L. Masinter">
<organization>Adobe Systems</organization>
<address>
<email>LMM@acm.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<date year="2006" month="February"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="115"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4395"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC4559">
<front>
<title>SPNEGO-based Kerberos and NTLM HTTP Authentication in Microsoft Windows</title>
<author initials="K." surname="Jaganathan" fullname="K. Jaganathan"/>
<author initials="L." surname="Zhu" fullname="L. Zhu"/>
<author initials="J." surname="Brezak" fullname="J. Brezak"/>
<date year="2006" month="June"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4559"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC5226">
<front>
<title>Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title>
<author initials="T." surname="Narten" fullname="T. Narten">
<organization>IBM</organization>
<address><email>narten@us.ibm.com</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="H." surname="Alvestrand" fullname="H. Alvestrand">
<organization>Google</organization>
<address><email>Harald@Alvestrand.no</email></address>
</author>
<date year="2008" month="May"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="26"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5226"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC5322">
<front>
<title>Internet Message Format</title>
<author initials="P." surname="Resnick" fullname="P. Resnick">
<organization>Qualcomm Incorporated</organization>
</author>
<date year="2008" month="October"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5322"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6265">
<front>
<title>HTTP State Management Mechanism</title>
<author initials="A." surname="Barth" fullname="Adam Barth">
<organization abbrev="U.C. Berkeley">
University of California, Berkeley
</organization>
<address><email>abarth@eecs.berkeley.edu</email></address>
</author>
<date year="2011" month="April"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6265"/>
</reference>
<!--<reference anchor='BCP97'>
<front>
<title>Handling Normative References to Standards-Track Documents</title>
<author initials='J.' surname='Klensin' fullname='J. Klensin'>
<address>
<email>klensin+ietf@jck.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials='S.' surname='Hartman' fullname='S. Hartman'>
<organization>MIT</organization>
<address>
<email>hartmans-ietf@mit.edu</email>
</address>
</author>
<date year='2007' month='June' />
</front>
<seriesInfo name='BCP' value='97' />
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4897' />
</reference>-->
<reference anchor="Kri2001" target="http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.SE/0105018">
<front>
<title>HTTP Cookies: Standards, Privacy, and Politics</title>
<author initials="D." surname="Kristol" fullname="David M. Kristol"/>
<date year="2001" month="November"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="ACM Transactions on Internet Technology" value="Vol. 1, #2"/>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Spe" target="http://sunsite.unc.edu/mdma-release/http-prob.html">
<front>
<title>Analysis of HTTP Performance Problems</title>
<author initials="S." surname="Spero" fullname="Simon E. Spero"/>
<date/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Tou1998" target="http://www.isi.edu/touch/pubs/http-perf96/">
<front>
<title>Analysis of HTTP Performance</title>
<author initials="J." surname="Touch" fullname="Joe Touch">
<organization>USC/Information Sciences Institute</organization>
<address><email>touch@isi.edu</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="J." surname="Heidemann" fullname="John Heidemann">
<organization>USC/Information Sciences Institute</organization>
<address><email>johnh@isi.edu</email></address>
</author>
<author initials="K." surname="Obraczka" fullname="Katia Obraczka">
<organization>USC/Information Sciences Institute</organization>
<address><email>katia@isi.edu</email></address>
</author>
<date year="1998" month="Aug"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="ISI Research Report" value="ISI/RR-98-463"/>
<annotation>(original report dated Aug. 1996)</annotation>
</reference>
</references>
<section title="HTTP Version History" anchor="compatibility">
<t>
HTTP has been in use by the World-Wide Web global information initiative
since 1990. The first version of HTTP, later referred to as HTTP/0.9,
was a simple protocol for hypertext data transfer across the Internet
with only a single request method (GET) and no metadata.
HTTP/1.0, as defined by <xref target="RFC1945"/>, added a range of request
methods and MIME-like messaging that could include metadata about the data
transferred and modifiers on the request/response semantics. However,
HTTP/1.0 did not sufficiently take into consideration the effects of
hierarchical proxies, caching, the need for persistent connections, or
name-based virtual hosts. The proliferation of incompletely-implemented
applications calling themselves "HTTP/1.0" further necessitated a
protocol version change in order for two communicating applications
to determine each other's true capabilities.
</t>
<t>
HTTP/1.1 remains compatible with HTTP/1.0 by including more stringent
requirements that enable reliable implementations, adding only
those new features that will either be safely ignored by an HTTP/1.0
recipient or only sent when communicating with a party advertising
conformance with HTTP/1.1.
</t>
<t>
It is beyond the scope of a protocol specification to mandate
conformance with previous versions. HTTP/1.1 was deliberately
designed, however, to make supporting previous versions easy.
We would expect a general-purpose HTTP/1.1 server to understand
any valid request in the format of HTTP/1.0 and respond appropriately
with an HTTP/1.1 message that only uses features understood (or
safely ignored) by HTTP/1.0 clients. Likewise, we would expect
an HTTP/1.1 client to understand any valid HTTP/1.0 response.
</t>
<t>
Since HTTP/0.9 did not support header fields in a request,
there is no mechanism for it to support name-based virtual
hosts (selection of resource by inspection of the Host header
field). Any server that implements name-based virtual hosts
ought to disable support for HTTP/0.9. Most requests that
appear to be HTTP/0.9 are, in fact, badly constructed HTTP/1.x
requests wherein a buggy client failed to properly encode
linear whitespace found in a URI reference and placed in
the request-target.
</t>
<section title="Changes from HTTP/1.0" anchor="changes.from.1.0">
<t>
This section summarizes major differences between versions HTTP/1.0
and HTTP/1.1.
</t>
<section title="Multi-homed Web Servers" anchor="changes.to.simplify.multi-homed.web.servers.and.conserve.ip.addresses">
<t>
The requirements that clients and servers support the Host header
field (<xref target="header.host"/>), report an error if it is
missing from an HTTP/1.1 request, and accept absolute URIs (<xref target="request-target"/>)
are among the most important changes defined by HTTP/1.1.
</t>
<t>
Older HTTP/1.0 clients assumed a one-to-one relationship of IP
addresses and servers; there was no other established mechanism for
distinguishing the intended server of a request than the IP address
to which that request was directed. The Host header field was
introduced during the development of HTTP/1.1 and, though it was
quickly implemented by most HTTP/1.0 browsers, additional requirements
were placed on all HTTP/1.1 requests in order to ensure complete
adoption. At the time of this writing, most HTTP-based services
are dependent upon the Host header field for targeting requests.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Keep-Alive Connections" anchor="compatibility.with.http.1.0.persistent.connections">
<t>
In HTTP/1.0, each connection is established by the client prior to the
request and closed by the server after sending the response. However, some
implementations implement the explicitly negotiated ("Keep-Alive") version
of persistent connections described in Section 19.7.1 of <xref target="RFC2068"/>.
</t>
<t>
Some clients and servers might wish to be compatible with these previous
approaches to persistent connections, by explicitly negotiating for them
with a "Connection: keep-alive" request header field. However, some
experimental implementations of HTTP/1.0 persistent connections are faulty;
for example, if a HTTP/1.0 proxy server doesn't understand Connection, it
will erroneously forward that header to the next inbound server, which
would result in a hung connection.
</t>
<t>
One attempted solution was the introduction of a Proxy-Connection header,
targeted specifically at proxies. In practice, this was also unworkable,
because proxies are often deployed in multiple layers, bringing about the
same problem discussed above.
</t>
<t>
As a result, clients are encouraged not to send the Proxy-Connection header
in any requests.
</t>
<t>
Clients are also encouraged to consider the use of Connection: keep-alive
in requests carefully; while they can enable persistent connections with
HTTP/1.0 servers, clients using them need will need to monitor the
connection for "hung" requests (which indicate that the client ought stop
sending the header), and this mechanism ought not be used by clients at all
when a proxy is being used.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Changes from RFC 2616" anchor="changes.from.rfc.2616">
<t>
Clarify that the string "HTTP" in the HTTP-version ABFN production is case
sensitive. Restrict the version numbers to be single digits due to the fact
that implementations are known to handle multi-digit version numbers
incorrectly.
(<xref target="http.version"/>)
</t>
<t>
Update use of abs_path production from RFC 1808 to the path-absolute + query
components of RFC 3986. State that the asterisk form is allowed for the OPTIONS
request method only.
(<xref target="request-target"/>)
</t>
<t>
Require that invalid whitespace around field-names be rejected.
(<xref target="header.fields"/>)
</t>
<t>
Rules about implicit linear whitespace between certain grammar productions
have been removed; now whitespace is only allowed where specifically
defined in the ABNF.
(<xref target="whitespace"/>)
</t>
<t>
The NUL octet is no longer allowed in comment and quoted-string
text. The quoted-pair rule no longer allows escaping control characters other than HTAB.
Non-ASCII content in header fields and reason phrase has been obsoleted and
made opaque (the TEXT rule was removed).
(<xref target="field.components"/>)
</t>
<t>
Empty list elements in list productions have been deprecated.
(<xref target="abnf.extension"/>)
</t>
<t>
Require recipients to handle bogus Content-Length header fields as errors.
(<xref target="message.body"/>)
</t>
<t>
Remove reference to non-existent identity transfer-coding value tokens.
(Sections <xref format="counter" target="message.body"/> and
<xref format="counter" target="transfer.codings"/>)
</t>
<t>
Clarification that the chunk length does not include the count of the octets
in the chunk header and trailer. Furthermore disallowed line folding
in chunk extensions, and deprecate their use.
(<xref target="chunked.encoding"/>)
</t>
<t>
Registration of Transfer Codings now requires IETF Review
(<xref target="transfer.coding.registry"/>)
</t>
<t>
Remove hard limit of two connections per server.
Remove requirement to retry a sequence of requests as long it was idempotent.
Remove requirements about when servers are allowed to close connections
prematurely.
(<xref target="persistent.practical"/>)
</t>
<t>
Remove requirement to retry requests under certain cirumstances when the
server prematurely closes the connection.
(<xref target="message.transmission.requirements"/>)
</t>
<t>
Change ABNF productions for header fields to only define the field value.
</t>
<t>
Clarify exactly when close connection options must be sent.
(<xref target="header.connection"/>)
</t>
<t>
Define the semantics of the "Upgrade" header field in responses other than
101 (this was incorporated from <xref target="RFC2817"/>).
(<xref target="header.upgrade"/>)
</t>
</section>
<section title="Changes from RFC 2817" anchor="changes.from.rfc.2817">
<t>
Registration of Upgrade tokens now requires IETF Review
(<xref target="upgrade.token.registry"/>)
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Collected ABNF" anchor="collected.abnf">
<figure>
<artwork type="abnf" name="p1-messaging.parsed-abnf"><![CDATA[
BWS = OWS
Connection = *( "," OWS ) connection-token *( OWS "," [ OWS
connection-token ] )
Content-Length = 1*DIGIT
HTTP-message = start-line *( header-field CRLF ) CRLF [ message-body
]
HTTP-name = %x48.54.54.50 ; HTTP
HTTP-version = HTTP-name "/" DIGIT "." DIGIT
Host = uri-host [ ":" port ]
OWS = *( SP / HTAB )
RWS = 1*( SP / HTAB )
TE = [ ( "," / t-codings ) *( OWS "," [ OWS t-codings ] ) ]
Trailer = *( "," OWS ) field-name *( OWS "," [ OWS field-name ] )
Transfer-Encoding = *( "," OWS ) transfer-coding *( OWS "," [ OWS
transfer-coding ] )
URI-reference = <URI-reference, defined in [RFC3986], Section 4.1>
Upgrade = *( "," OWS ) protocol *( OWS "," [ OWS protocol ] )
Via = *( "," OWS ) received-protocol RWS received-by [ RWS comment ]
*( OWS "," [ OWS received-protocol RWS received-by [ RWS comment ] ]
)
absolute-URI = <absolute-URI, defined in [RFC3986], Section 4.3>
absolute-form = absolute-URI
asterisk-form = "*"
attribute = token
authority = <authority, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.2>
authority-form = authority
chunk = chunk-size [ chunk-ext ] CRLF chunk-data CRLF
chunk-data = 1*OCTET
chunk-ext = *( ";" chunk-ext-name [ "=" chunk-ext-val ] )
chunk-ext-name = token
chunk-ext-val = token / quoted-str-nf
chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG
chunked-body = *chunk last-chunk trailer-part CRLF
comment = "(" *( ctext / quoted-cpair / comment ) ")"
connection-token = token
ctext = OWS / %x21-27 ; '!'-'''
/ %x2A-5B ; '*'-'['
/ %x5D-7E ; ']'-'~'
/ obs-text
field-content = *( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
field-name = token
field-value = *( field-content / obs-fold )
header-field = field-name ":" OWS field-value BWS
http-URI = "http://" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ]
https-URI = "https://" authority path-abempty [ "?" query ]
last-chunk = 1*"0" [ chunk-ext ] CRLF
message-body = *OCTET
method = token
obs-fold = CRLF ( SP / HTAB )
obs-text = %x80-FF
origin-form = path-absolute [ "?" query ]
partial-URI = relative-part [ "?" query ]
path-abempty = <path-abempty, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.3>
path-absolute = <path-absolute, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.3>
port = <port, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.2.3>
protocol = protocol-name [ "/" protocol-version ]
protocol-name = token
protocol-version = token
pseudonym = token
qdtext = OWS / "!" / %x23-5B ; '#'-'['
/ %x5D-7E ; ']'-'~'
/ obs-text
qdtext-nf = HTAB / SP / "!" / %x23-5B ; '#'-'['
/ %x5D-7E ; ']'-'~'
/ obs-text
query = <query, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.4>
quoted-cpair = "\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
quoted-pair = "\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
quoted-str-nf = DQUOTE *( qdtext-nf / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE
quoted-string = DQUOTE *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE
qvalue = ( "0" [ "." *3DIGIT ] ) / ( "1" [ "." *3"0" ] )
reason-phrase = *( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
received-by = ( uri-host [ ":" port ] ) / pseudonym
received-protocol = [ protocol-name "/" ] protocol-version
relative-part = <relative-part, defined in [RFC3986], Section 4.2>
request-line = method SP request-target SP HTTP-version CRLF
request-target = origin-form / absolute-form / authority-form /
asterisk-form
special = "(" / ")" / "<" / ">" / "@" / "," / ";" / ":" / "\" /
DQUOTE / "/" / "[" / "]" / "?" / "=" / "{" / "}"
start-line = request-line / status-line
status-code = 3DIGIT
status-line = HTTP-version SP status-code SP reason-phrase CRLF
t-codings = "trailers" / ( transfer-extension [ te-params ] )
tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*" / "+" / "-" / "." /
"^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~" / DIGIT / ALPHA
te-ext = OWS ";" OWS token [ "=" word ]
te-params = OWS ";" OWS "q=" qvalue *te-ext
token = 1*tchar
trailer-part = *( header-field CRLF )
transfer-coding = "chunked" / "compress" / "deflate" / "gzip" /
transfer-extension
transfer-extension = token *( OWS ";" OWS transfer-parameter )
transfer-parameter = attribute BWS "=" BWS value
uri-host = <host, defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.2.2>
value = word
word = token / quoted-string
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<figure><preamble>ABNF diagnostics:</preamble><artwork type="inline"><![CDATA[
; Connection defined but not used
; Content-Length defined but not used
; HTTP-message defined but not used
; Host defined but not used
; TE defined but not used
; Trailer defined but not used
; Transfer-Encoding defined but not used
; URI-reference defined but not used
; Upgrade defined but not used
; Via defined but not used
; chunked-body defined but not used
; http-URI defined but not used
; https-URI defined but not used
; partial-URI defined but not used
; special defined but not used
]]></artwork></figure></section>
<section title="Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)" anchor="change.log">
<section title="Since RFC 2616">
<t>
Extracted relevant partitions from <xref target="RFC2616"/>.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-00">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/1"/>:
"HTTP Version should be case sensitive"
(<eref target="http://purl.org/NET/http-errata#verscase"/>)
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/2"/>:
"'unsafe' characters"
(<eref target="http://purl.org/NET/http-errata#unsafe-uri"/>)
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/3"/>:
"Chunk Size Definition"
(<eref target="http://purl.org/NET/http-errata#chunk-size"/>)
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/4"/>:
"Message Length"
(<eref target="http://purl.org/NET/http-errata#msg-len-chars"/>)
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/8"/>:
"Media Type Registrations"
(<eref target="http://purl.org/NET/http-errata#media-reg"/>)
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/11"/>:
"URI includes query"
(<eref target="http://purl.org/NET/http-errata#uriquery"/>)
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/15"/>:
"No close on 1xx responses"
(<eref target="http://purl.org/NET/http-errata#noclose1xx"/>)
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/16"/>:
"Remove 'identity' token references"
(<eref target="http://purl.org/NET/http-errata#identity"/>)
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/26"/>:
"Import query BNF"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/31"/>:
"qdtext BNF"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/35"/>:
"Normative and Informative references"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/42"/>:
"RFC2606 Compliance"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/45"/>:
"RFC977 reference"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/46"/>:
"RFC1700 references"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/47"/>:
"inconsistency in date format explanation"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/48"/>:
"Date reference typo"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/65"/>:
"Informative references"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/66"/>:
"ISO-8859-1 Reference"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/86"/>:
"Normative up-to-date references"
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Other changes:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
Update media type registrations to use RFC4288 template.
</t>
<t>
Use names of RFC4234 core rules DQUOTE and HTAB,
fix broken ABNF for chunk-data
(work in progress on <eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36"/>)
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-01">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/19"/>:
"Bodies on GET (and other) requests"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/55"/>:
"Updating to RFC4288"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/57"/>:
"Status Code and Reason Phrase"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/82"/>:
"rel_path not used"
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Ongoing work on ABNF conversion (<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36"/>):
<list style="symbols">
<t>
Get rid of duplicate BNF rule names ("host" -> "uri-host", "trailer" ->
"trailer-part").
</t>
<t>
Avoid underscore character in rule names ("http_URL" ->
"http-URL", "abs_path" -> "path-absolute").
</t>
<t>
Add rules for terms imported from URI spec ("absoluteURI", "authority",
"path-absolute", "port", "query", "relativeURI", "host) — these will
have to be updated when switching over to RFC3986.
</t>
<t>
Synchronize core rules with RFC5234.
</t>
<t>
Get rid of prose rules that span multiple lines.
</t>
<t>
Get rid of unused rules LOALPHA and UPALPHA.
</t>
<t>
Move "Product Tokens" section (back) into Part 1, as "token" is used
in the definition of the Upgrade header field.
</t>
<t>
Add explicit references to BNF syntax and rules imported from other parts of the specification.
</t>
<t>
Rewrite prose rule "token" in terms of "tchar", rewrite prose rule "TEXT".
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-02" anchor="changes.since.02">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/51"/>:
"HTTP-date vs. rfc1123-date"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/64"/>:
"WS in quoted-pair"
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Ongoing work on IANA Message Header Field Registration (<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/40"/>):
<list style="symbols">
<t>
Reference RFC 3984, and update header field registrations for headers defined
in this document.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Ongoing work on ABNF conversion (<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36"/>):
<list style="symbols">
<t>
Replace string literals when the string really is case-sensitive (HTTP-version).
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-03" anchor="changes.since.03">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/28"/>:
"Connection closing"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/97"/>:
"Move registrations and registry information to IANA Considerations"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/120"/>:
"need new URL for PAD1995 reference"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/127"/>:
"IANA Considerations: update HTTP URI scheme registration"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/128"/>:
"Cite HTTPS URI scheme definition"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/129"/>:
"List-type headers vs Set-Cookie"
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Ongoing work on ABNF conversion (<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36"/>):
<list style="symbols">
<t>
Replace string literals when the string really is case-sensitive (HTTP-Date).
</t>
<t>
Replace HEX by HEXDIG for future consistence with RFC 5234's core rules.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-04" anchor="changes.since.04">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/34"/>:
"Out-of-date reference for URIs"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/132"/>:
"RFC 2822 is updated by RFC 5322"
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Ongoing work on ABNF conversion (<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36"/>):
<list style="symbols">
<t>
Use "/" instead of "|" for alternatives.
</t>
<t>
Get rid of RFC822 dependency; use RFC5234 plus extensions instead.
</t>
<t>
Only reference RFC 5234's core rules.
</t>
<t>
Introduce new ABNF rules for "bad" whitespace ("BWS"), optional
whitespace ("OWS") and required whitespace ("RWS").
</t>
<t>
Rewrite ABNFs to spell out whitespace rules, factor out
header field value format definitions.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-05" anchor="changes.since.05">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/30"/>:
"Header LWS"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/52"/>:
"Sort 1.3 Terminology"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/63"/>:
"RFC2047 encoded words"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/74"/>:
"Character Encodings in TEXT"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/77"/>:
"Line Folding"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/83"/>:
"OPTIONS * and proxies"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/94"/>:
"reason-phrase BNF"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/111"/>:
"Use of TEXT"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/118"/>:
"Join "Differences Between HTTP Entities and RFC 2045 Entities"?"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/134"/>:
"RFC822 reference left in discussion of date formats"
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Final work on ABNF conversion (<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/36"/>):
<list style="symbols">
<t>
Rewrite definition of list rules, deprecate empty list elements.
</t>
<t>
Add appendix containing collected and expanded ABNF.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Other changes:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
Rewrite introduction; add mostly new Architecture Section.
</t>
<t>
Move definition of quality values from Part 3 into Part 1;
make TE request header field grammar independent of accept-params (defined in Part 3).
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-06" anchor="changes.since.06">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/161"/>:
"base for numeric protocol elements"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/162"/>:
"comment ABNF"
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Partly resolved issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/88"/>:
"205 Bodies" (took out language that implied that there might be
methods for which a request body MUST NOT be included)
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/163"/>:
"editorial improvements around HTTP-date"
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-07" anchor="changes.since.07">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/93"/>:
"Repeating single-value headers"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/131"/>:
"increase connection limit"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/157"/>:
"IP addresses in URLs"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/172"/>:
"take over HTTP Upgrade Token Registry"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/173"/>:
"CR and LF in chunk extension values"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/184"/>:
"HTTP/0.9 support"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/188"/>:
"pick IANA policy (RFC5226) for Transfer Coding / Content Coding"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/189"/>:
"move definitions of gzip/deflate/compress to part 1"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/194"/>:
"disallow control characters in quoted-pair"
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Partly resolved issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/148"/>:
"update IANA requirements wrt Transfer-Coding values" (add the
IANA Considerations subsection)
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-08" anchor="changes.since.08">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/201"/>:
"header parsing, treatment of leading and trailing OWS"
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Partly resolved issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/60"/>:
"Placement of 13.5.1 and 13.5.2"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/200"/>:
"use of term "word" when talking about header structure"
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-09" anchor="changes.since.09">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/73"/>:
"Clarification of the term 'deflate'"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/83"/>:
"OPTIONS * and proxies"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/122"/>:
"MIME-Version not listed in P1, general header fields"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/143"/>:
"IANA registry for content/transfer encodings"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/165"/>:
"Case-sensitivity of HTTP-date"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/200"/>:
"use of term "word" when talking about header structure"
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Partly resolved issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/196"/>:
"Term for the requested resource's URI"
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-10" anchor="changes.since.10">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/28"/>:
"Connection Closing"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/90"/>:
"Delimiting messages with multipart/byteranges"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/95"/>:
"Handling multiple Content-Length headers"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/109"/>:
"Clarify entity / representation / variant terminology"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/220"/>:
"consider removing the 'changes from 2068' sections"
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Partly resolved issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/159"/>:
"HTTP(s) URI scheme definitions"
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-11" anchor="changes.since.11">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/193"/>:
"Trailer requirements"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/204"/>:
"Text about clock requirement for caches belongs in p6"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/221"/>:
"effective request URI: handling of missing host in HTTP/1.0"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/248"/>:
"confusing Date requirements for clients"
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Partly resolved issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/95"/>:
"Handling multiple Content-Length headers"
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-12" anchor="changes.since.12">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/75"/>:
"RFC2145 Normative"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/159"/>:
"HTTP(s) URI scheme definitions" (tune the requirements on userinfo)
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/210"/>:
"define 'transparent' proxy"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/224"/>:
"Header Classification"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/233"/>:
"Is * usable as a request-uri for new methods?"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/240"/>:
"Migrate Upgrade details from RFC2817"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/276"/>:
"untangle ABNFs for header fields"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/279"/>:
"update RFC 2109 reference"
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-13" anchor="changes.since.13">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/53"/>:
"Allow is not in 13.5.2"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/95"/>:
"Handling multiple Content-Length headers"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/276"/>:
"untangle ABNFs for header fields"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/286"/>:
"Content-Length ABNF broken"
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-14" anchor="changes.since.14">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/273"/>:
"HTTP-version should be redefined as fixed length pair of DIGIT . DIGIT"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/282"/>:
"Recommend minimum sizes for protocol elements"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/283"/>:
"Set expectations around buffering"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/288"/>:
"Considering messages in isolation"
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-15" anchor="changes.since.15">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/100"/>:
"DNS Spoofing / DNS Binding advice"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/254"/>:
"move RFCs 2145, 2616, 2817 to Historic status"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/270"/>:
"\-escaping in quoted strings"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/305"/>:
"'Close' should be reserved in the HTTP header field registry"
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-16" anchor="changes.since.16">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/186"/>:
"Document HTTP's error-handling philosophy"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/215"/>:
"Explain header registration"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/219"/>:
"Revise Acknowledgements Sections"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/297"/>:
"Retrying Requests"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/318"/>:
"Closing the connection on server error"
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-17" anchor="changes.since.17">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/166"/>:
"Clarify 'User Agent'"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/300"/>:
"Define non-final responses"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/323"/>:
"intended maturity level vs normative references"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/324"/>:
"Intermediary rewriting of queries"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/158"/>:
"Proxy-Connection and Keep-Alive"
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Since draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-18" anchor="changes.since.18">
<t>
Closed issues:
<list style="symbols">
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/250"/>:
"message-body in CONNECT response"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/302"/>:
"Misplaced text on connection handling in p2"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/335"/>:
"wording of line folding rule"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/343"/>:
"chunk-extensions"
</t>
<t>
<eref target="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/trac/ticket/346"/>:
"make IANA policy definitions consistent"
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
</back>
</rfc>| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-23 04:43:57 |