One document matched: draft-ietf-homenet-hncp-01.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-homenet-hncp-00.txt
Homenet Working Group M. Stenberg
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track S. Barth
Expires: December 27, 2014
June 25, 2014
Home Networking Control Protocol
draft-ietf-homenet-hncp-01
Abstract
This document describes the Home Networking Control Protocol (HNCP),
a minimalist state synchronization protocol for Homenet routers.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 27, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Data model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Trickle-Driven Status Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Protocol Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2.1. Network State Update (NetState) . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2.2. Network State Request, (NetState-Req) . . . . . . . . 5
4.2.3. Node Data Request (Node-Req) . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.4. Network and Node State Reply (NetNode-Reply) . . . . 6
4.3. HNCP Protocol Message Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. Adding and Removing Neighbors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.5. Purging Unreachable Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Type-Length-Value objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Request TLVs (for use within unicast requests) . . . . . 9
5.1.1. Request Network State TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.2. Request Node Data TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Data TLVs (for use in both multi- and unicast data) . . . 10
5.2.1. Node Link TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.2. Network State TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.3. Node State TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.4. Node Data TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2.5. Node Public Key TLV (within
Node Data TLV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2.6. Neighbor TLV (within Node Data TLV) . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3. Custom TLV (within/without Node Data TLV) . . . . . . . . 12
5.4. Version TLV (within Node Data TLV) . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.5. Authentication TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.5.1. Certificate-related TLVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.5.2. Signature TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Border Discovery and Prefix Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. DNS-based Service Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1. DNS Delegated Zone TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.2. Domain Name TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3. Router Name TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. Routing support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.1. Protocol Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.2. Announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.3. Protocol Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.4. Fallback Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
11.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
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Appendix A. Some Outstanding Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix B. Some Obvious Questions and Answers . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix C. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix D. Draft source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix E. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1. Introduction
HNCP is designed to synchronize state across a Homenet (or other
small site) in order to facilitate automated configuration within the
site, integration with trusted bootstrapping
[I-D.behringer-homenet-trust-bootstrap] and default perimeter
detection [I-D.kline-homenet-default-perimeter], automatic IP prefix
distribution [I-D.pfister-homenet-prefix-assignment], and service
discovery across multiple links within the homenet as defined in
[I-D.stenberg-homenet-dnssd-hybrid-proxy-zeroconf].
HNCP is designed to provide enough information for a routing protocol
to operate without homenet-specific extensions. In homenet
environments where multiple IPv6 prefixes are present, routing based
on source and destination address is necessary
[I-D.troan-homenet-sadr]. Routing protocol requirements for source
and destination routing are described in section 3 of
[I-D.baker-rtgwg-src-dst-routing-use-cases].
A GPLv2-licensed implementation of the HNCP protocol is currently
under development at https://github.com/sbyx/hnetd/ and the binaries
are available in the routing feed of OpenWrt [2] trunk release. Some
information how to get started with it is available at [3]. Comments
and/or pull requests are welcome.
2. Requirements language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Data model
The data model of the HNCP protocol is simple: Every participating
node has (and also knows for every other participating node):
A unique node identifier. It may be a public key, unique hardware
ID, or some other unique blob of binary data which HNCP can run a
hash upon to obtain a node identifier that is very likely unique
among the set of routers in the Homenet.
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A set of Type-Length-Value (TLV) data it wants to share with other
routers. The set of TLVs have a well-defined order based on
ascending binary content that is used to quickly identify changes
in the set as they occur.
Latest update sequence number. A 32 bit number that is
incremented anytime TLV data changes are detected.
Relative time, in milliseconds, since last publishing of the
current TLV data set. It is also 32 bit number on the wire.
If HNCP security is enabled, each node will have a public/private key
pair defined. The private key is used to create signatures for
messages and node state updates and never sent across the network by
HNCP. The public key is used to verify signatures of messages and
node state updates.
4. Operation
HNCP is designed to run on UDP port IANA-UDP-PORT, using both link-
local scoped IPv6 unicast and link-local scoped IPv6 multicast
messages to address IANA-MULTICAST-ADDRESS for transport. The
protocol consists of Trickle [RFC6206] driven multicast status
messages to indicate changes in shared TLV data, and unicast state
synchronization message exchanges when the Trickle state is found to
be inconsistent.
4.1. Trickle-Driven Status Updates
Each node MUST send link-local multicast NetState Messages
(Section 4.2.1) each time the Trickle algorithm [RFC6206] indicates
they should on each link the protocol is active on. When the locally
stored network state hash changes (either by a local node event that
affects the TLV data, or upon receipt of more recent data from
another node), all Trickle instances MUST be reset. Trickle state
MUST be maintained separately for each link.
Trickle algorithm has 3 parameters; Imin, Imax and k. Imin and Imax
represent minimum and maximum values for I, which is the time
interval during which at least k Trickle updates must be seen on a
link to prevent local state transmission. Bounds for recommended
Trickle values are described below.
k=1 SHOULD be used, as given the timer reset on data updates,
retransmissions should handle packet loss.
Imax MUST be at least one minute.
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Imin MUST be at least 200 milliseconds (earliest transmissions may
occur at Imin/2 = 100 milliseconds given minimum values as per the
Trickle algorithm).
4.2. Protocol Messages
Protocol messages are encoded as purely as a sequence of TLV objects
(Section 5). This section describes which set of TLVs MUST or MAY be
present in a given message.
In order to facilitate fast comparing of local state with that in a
received message update, all TLVs in every encoding scope (either
root level, within the message itself, or within a container TLV)
MUST be placed in ascending order based on the binary comparison of
both TLV header and value. By design, the TLVs which MUST be present
have the lowest available type values, ensuring they will naturally
occur at the start of the Protocol Message, resembling a fixed format
preamble.
4.2.1. Network State Update (NetState)
This Message SHOULD be sent as a multicast message.
The following TLVs MUST be present at the start of the message:
Node Link TLV (Section 5.2.1).
Network State TLV (Section 5.2.2).
The NetState Message MAY contain Node State TLV(s) (Section 5.2.3).
If so, either all Node State TLVs are included (referred to as a
"long" NetState Message), or none are included (referred to as a
"short" NetState Message). The NetState Message MUST NOT contain
only a portion of Node State TLVs as this could cause problems with
the Protocol Message Processing (Section 4.3) algorithm. Finally, if
the long version of the NetState message would exceed the minimum
IPv6 MTU when sent, the short version of the NetState message MUST be
used instead.
If HNCP security is enabled, authentication TLVs (Section 5.5) MUST
be present.
4.2.2. Network State Request, (NetState-Req)
This Message MUST be sent as a unicast message.
The following TLVs MUST be present at the start of the message:
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Node Link TLV (Section 5.2.1).
Request Network State TLV (Section 5.1.1).
If HNCP security is enabled, authentication TLVs (Section 5.5) MUST
be present.
4.2.3. Node Data Request (Node-Req)
This Message MUST be sent as a unicast message.
MUST be present:
Node Link TLV (Section 5.2.1).
one or more Request Node Data TLVs (Section 5.1.2).
If HNCP security is enabled, authentication TLVs (Section 5.5) MUST
be present.
4.2.4. Network and Node State Reply (NetNode-Reply)
This Message MUST be sent as a unicast message.
MUST be present:
Node Link TLV (Section 5.2.1).
Network State TLV (Section 5.2.2) and Node State TLV
(Section 5.2.3) for every known node by the sender, or
one or more combinations of Node State and Node Data TLVs
(Section 5.2.4).
If HNCP security is enabled, authentication TLVs (Section 5.5) MUST
be present.
4.3. HNCP Protocol Message Processing
The majority of status updates among known nodes are handled via the
Trickle-driven updates (Section 4.1). This section describes
processing of messages as received, along with associated actions or
responses.
HNCP is designed to operate between directly connected neighbors on a
shared link using link-local IPv6 addresses. If the source address
of a received HNCP packet is not an IPv6 link-local unicast address,
the packet SHOULD be dropped. Similarly, if the destination address
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is not IPv6 link-local unicast or IPv6 link-local multicast address,
packet SHOULD be dropped.
Upon receipt of:
NetState Message (Section 4.2.1): If the network state hash within
the message matches the hash of the locally stored network state,
consider Trickle state as consistent with no further processing
required. If the hashes do not match, consider Trickle state as
inconsistent. In this case, if the message is "short" (contains
zero Node State TLVs), reply with a NetState-Req Message
(Section 4.2.2). If the message was in long format (contained all
Node State TLVs), reply with NodeState-Req (Section 4.2.3) for any
nodes for which local information is outdated (local update number
is lower than that within the message), potentially incorrect
(local update number is same and the hash of node data TLV
differs) or missing. Note that if local information is more
recent than that of the neighbor, there is no need to send a
message.
NetState-Req (Section 4.2.2): Provide requested data in a NetNode-
Reply Message containing Network State TLV and all Node State
TLVs.
NodeState-Req (Section 4.2.3): Provide requested data in a
NetNode-Reply containing Node State and Node Data TLVs.
State-Reply (Section 4.2.4): If the message contains Node State
TLVs that are more recent than local state (higher update number,
different node data TLV hash, or we lack the node data
altogether), and if the message also contains corresponding Node
Data TLVs, update local state and reset Trickle. If the message
is lacking Node Data TLVs for some Node State TLVs which are more
recent than local state, reply with a NodeState-Req
(Section 4.2.3) for the corresponding nodes.
Each node is responsible for publishing a valid set of data TLVs.
When there is a change in a node's set of data TLVs, the update
number MUST be incremented accordingly.
If a message containing Node State TLVs (Section 5.2.3) is received
via unicast or multicast with the node's own node identifier and a
higher update number than current local value, or the same update
number and different hash, there is an error somewhere. A
recommended default way to handle this is to attempt to assert local
state by increasing the local update number to a value higher than
that received and republish node data using the same node identifier.
If this happens more than 3 times in 60 seconds and the local node
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identifier is not globally unique, there may be more than one router
with the same node identifier on the network. If HNCP security is
not enabled, a new node identifier SHOULD be generated and node data
republished accordingly. If HNCP security is enabled, this is event
is highly unlikely to occur as collision of identifier hashes for
public keys is highly unlikely.
In all cases, if node data for any node changes, all Trickle
instances MUST be considered inconsistent (I=Imin + timer reset).
4.4. Adding and Removing Neighbors
Whenever multicast message or unicast reply is received on a link
from another node, the node should be added as Neighbor TLV
(Section 5.2.6) for current node. If nothing (for example - no
router advertisements, no HNCP traffic) is received from that
neighbor in Imax seconds and the neighbor is not in neighbor
discovery cache, and no layer 2 indication of presence is available,
at least 3 attempts to ping it with request network state message
(Section 4.2.2) SHOULD be sent with increasing timeouts (e.g. 1, 2, 4
seconds). If even after suitable period after the last message
nothing is received, the Neighbor TLV MUST be removed so that there
are no dangling neighbors. As an alternative, if there is a layer 2
unreachability notification of some sort available for either whole
link or for individual neighbor, it MAY be used to immediately
trigger removal of corresponding Neighbor TLV(s).
4.5. Purging Unreachable Nodes
When node data has changed, the neighbor graph SHOULD be traversed
for each node following the bidirectional neighbor relationships.
These are identified by looking for neighbor TLVs on both nodes, that
have the remote node's identifier hash as h(neighbor node
identifier), and local and neighbor link identifiers swapped. After
the traverse, unreachable nodes SHOULD be purged after some grace
period. During the grace period, the unreachable nodes MUST NOT be
used for calculation of network state hash, or even be provided to
any applications that need to use the whole TLV graph.
5. Type-Length-Value objects
Every TLV is encoded as 2 octet type, followed by 2 octet length (of
the whole TLV, including header; 4 means no value), and then the
value itself (if any). The actual length of TLV MUST be always
divisible by 4; if the length of the value is not, zeroed padding
bytes MUST be inserted at the end of TLV. The padding bytes MUST NOT
be included in the length field.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value |
| (variable # of bytes) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Encoding of type=123 (0x7b) TLV with value 'x' (120 = 0x78): 007B
0005 7800 0000
Notation:
.. = octet string concatenation operation
H(x) = MD5 hash of x
H-64(x) = H(x) truncated by taking just first 64 bits of the
result.
5.1. Request TLVs (for use within unicast requests)
5.1.1. Request Network State TLV
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: REQ-NETWORK-STATE (2) | Length: 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
5.1.2. Request Node Data TLV
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: REQ-NODE-DATA (3) | Length: 20 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| H(node identifier) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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5.2. Data TLVs (for use in both multi- and unicast data)
5.2.1. Node Link TLV
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: NODE-LINK (1) | Length: 24 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| H(node identifier) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Link-Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
5.2.2. Network State TLV
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: NETWORK-STATE (4) | Length: 20 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| H(H(node data TLV 1) .. H(node data TLV N)) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The Node Data TLVs are ordered for hashing by octet comparison of the
corresponding node identifier hashes in ascending order.
5.2.3. Node State TLV
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: NODE-STATE (5) | Length: 44 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| H(node identifier) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Update Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Milliseconds since Origination |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| H(node data TLV) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The whole network should have roughly the same idea about the time
since origination, i.e. even the originating router should increment
the time whenever it needs to send a new Node State TLV regarding
itself without changing the corresponding Node Data TLV. This age
value is not included within the Node Data TLV, however, as that is
immutable and potentially signed by the originating node at the time
of origination.
5.2.4. Node Data TLV
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: NODE-DATA (6) | Length: >= 24 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| H(node identifier) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Update Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Nested TLVs containing node information |
The Node Public Key TLV (Section 5.2.5) SHOULD be always included if
signatures are ever used.
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If signatures are in use, the Node Data TLV SHOULD also contain the
originator's own Signature TLV (Section 5.5.2).
5.2.5. Node Public Key TLV (within Node Data TLV)
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: PUBLIC-KEY (7) | Length: >= 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Public Key (raw node identifier) |
Public key data for the node. Only relevant if signatures are used.
Can be used to verify that H(node identifier) in the received data
for the node equals H(public key), and that the Signature TLVs are
signed by appropriate public keys.
5.2.6. Neighbor TLV (within Node Data TLV)
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: NEIGHBOR (8) | Length: 28 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| H(neighbor node identifier) |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Neighbor Link Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Local Link Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
This TLV indicates that the node in question vouches that the
specified neighbor is reachable by it on the local link id given.
This reachability may be unidirectional (if no unicast exchanges have
been performed with the neighbor). The presence of this TLV at least
guarantees that the node publishing it has received traffic from the
neighbor recently. For guaranteed bidirectional reachability,
existence of both nodes' matching Neighbor TLVs should be checked.
5.3. Custom TLV (within/without Node Data TLV)
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: CUSTOM-DATA (9) | Length: >= 12 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| H-64(URI) |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Opaque Data |
This TLV can be used to contain anything; the URI used should be
under control of the author of that specification. For example:
V=H-64('http://example.com/author/json-for-hncp') .. '{"cool": "json
extension!"}'
or
V=H-64('mailto:author@example.com') .. '{"cool": "json extension!"}'
5.4. Version TLV (within Node Data TLV)
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: VERSION (10) | Length: >= 8 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Version |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| User-agent |
This TLV indicates which version of HNCP TLV binary structures is in
use by this particular node. All TLVs within node data from nodes
that do not publish version TLV, or with different Version value than
locally supported one MUST be ignored (but forwarded). The user-
agent is an optional human-readable UTF-8 string that can describe
e.g. current hnetd version. This draft describes Version=1 TLVs.
5.5. Authentication TLVs
5.5.1. Certificate-related TLVs
TBD; should be probably some sort of certificate ID to be used in a
lookup at most, as raw certificates will overflow easily IPv6 minimum
MTU.
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5.5.2. Signature TLV
TLV with T=0xFFFF, V=(TBD) public key algorithm based signature of
all TLVs within current scope as well as the parent TLV header, if
any. The assumed signature key is private key matching the public
key of the the originator of node link TLV (if signature TLV is
within main body of message), or that of the originator of the node
data TLV (if signature TLV is within Node Data TLV)..
Given the ordering of TLVs, this TLV should be last one processed
within current scope.
6. Border Discovery and Prefix Assignment
Using Default Border Definition [I-D.kline-homenet-default-perimeter]
as a basis, this section defines border discovery algorithm specifics
derived from the edge router interactions described in the Basic
Requirements for IPv6 Customer Edge Routers [RFC7084]. The algorithm
is designed to work for both IPv4 and IPv6 (single or dual-stack).
In order to avoid conflicts between border discovery and homenet
routers running DHCP [RFC2131] or DHCPv6-PD [RFC3633] servers each
router MUST implement the following mechanism based on The User Class
Option for DHCP [RFC3004] or its DHCPv6 counterpart [RFC3315]
respectively into its DHCP and DHCPv6-logic:
A homenet router running a DHCP-client on a homenet-interface MUST
include a DHCP User-Class consisting of the ASCII-String
"HOMENET".
A homenet router running a DHCP-server on a homenet-interface MUST
ignore or reject DHCP-Requests containing a DHCP User-Class
consisting of the ASCII-String "HOMENET".
The border discovery auto-detection algorithm works as follows, with
evaluation stopping at first match:
1. If a fixed category is set for an interface, it MUST be used.
2. Any of the following conditions indicate an interface MUST be
considered external:
1. A delegated prefix could be acquired by running a
DHCPv6-client on the interface.
2. An IPv4-address could be acquired by running a DHCP-client on
the interface.
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3. HNCP security is enabled and there are routers on the
interface which could not be authenticated.
3. As default fallback, interface MUST be considered internal.
A router SHOULD allow setting a category of either auto-detected,
internal or external for each interface which is suitable for both
internal and external connections. In addition it MAY offer further
categories which modify the local router behavior, such as:
Guest category: This is a specialization of the internal category
which declares an interface used for untrusted clients. The
router MUST NOT send or accept HNCP messages on these interfaces.
Clients connected to these interfaces MUST NOT be able to reach
devices inside the home network by default and instead SHOULD only
be able to reach the internet.
Ad-hoc category: This is a specialization of the internal category
which declares an interface to be in ad-hoc mode. This indicates
to HNCP applications such as prefix assignment that links on this
interface are potentially non-transitive.
Hybrid category: This is a specialization of the internal category
in which the router still accepts external connections but does
not do border discovery. It is assumed that the link is under
control of a legacy, trustworthy non-HNCP router, still within the
same home network. Detection of this category automatically is
out of scope for this document, and therefore it MAY be supported
only via manual configuration on a per-router basis.
A homenet router SHOULD provide basic connectivity to legacy CERs
[RFC7084] connected to internal interfaces in order to allow
coexistence with existing devices.
Each router MUST continuously scan each active interface that does
not have a fixed category in order to dynamically reclassify it if
necessary. The router therefore runs an appropriately configured
DHCP and DHCPv6-client as long as the interface is active including
states where it considers the interface to be internal. The router
SHOULD wait for a reasonable time period (5 seconds as a possible
default) in which the DHCP-clients can acquire a lease before
treating a newly activated or previously external interface as
internal. Once it treats a certain interface as internal it MUST
start forwarding traffic with appropriate source addresses between
its internal interfaces and allow internal traffic to reach external
networks. Once a router detects an interface to be external it MUST
stop any previously enabled internal forwarding. In addition it
SHOULD announce the acquired information for use in the homenet as
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described in later sections of this draft if the interface appears to
be connected to an external network.
To distribute an external connection in the homenet an edge router
announces one or more delegated prefixes and associated DHCP(v6)-
encoded auxiliary information like recursive DNS-servers. Each
external connection is announced using one container-TLV as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: EXTERNAL-CONNECTION (41)| Length: > 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Nested TLVs |
Auxiliary connectivity information is encoded as a stream of
DHCPv6-attributes or DHCP-attributes placed inside a TLV of type
EXTERNAL-CONNECTION or DELEGATED-PREFIX (for IPv6 prefix-specific
information). There MUST NOT be more than one instance of this TLV
inside a container and the order of the DHCP(v6)-attributes contained
within it MUST be preserved as long as the information contained does
not change. The TLVs are encoded as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: DHCPV6-DATA (45) | Length: > 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| DHCPv6 attribute stream |
and
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: DHCP-DATA (44) | Length: > 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| DHCP attribute stream |
Each delegated prefix is encoded using one TLV inside an EXTERNAL-
CONNECTION TLV. For external IPv4 connections the prefix is encoded
in the form of an IPv4-mapped address [RFC4291] and is usually from a
private address range [RFC1918]. The related TLV is defined as
follows.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: DELEGATED-PREFIX (42) | Length: >= 13 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Valid until (milliseconds) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Preferred until (milliseconds) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Prefix Length | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Prefix Address [+ nested TLVs] +
| |
Valid until is the time in milliseconds the delegated prefix is
valid. The value is relative to the point in time the TLV is
first announced.
Preferred until is the time in milliseconds the delegated prefix
is preferred. The value is relative to the point in time the TLV
is first announced.
Prefix length specifies the number of significant bits in the
prefix.
Prefix address is of variable length and contains the significant
bits of the prefix padded with zeroes up to the next byte
boundary.
Nested TLVs might contain prefix-specific information like
DHCPv6-options.
In order for routers to use the distributed information, prefixes and
addresses have to be assigned to the interior links of the homenet.
A router MUST therefore implement the algorithm defined in Prefix and
Address Assignment in a Home Network
[I-D.pfister-homenet-prefix-assignment]. In order to announce the
assigned prefixes the following TLVs are defined.
Each assigned prefix is given to an interior link and is encoded
using one TLVs. Assigned IPv4 prefixes are stored as mapped
IPv4-addresses. The TLV is defined as follows:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: ASSIGNED-PREFIX (43) | Length: >= 9 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Link Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| R. |A| Pref. | Prefix Length | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Prefix Address +
| |
Link Identifier is the local HNCP identifier of the link the
prefix is assigned to.
R. is reserved for future additions and MUST be set to 0 when
creating TLVs and ignored when parsing them.
A is the authoritative flag which indicates that an assignment is
enforced and ignores usual collision detection rules.
Pref. describes the preference of the assignment and can be used
to differentiate the importance of a given assignment over others.
Prefix length specifies the number of significant bits in the
prefix.
Prefix address is of variable length and contains the significant
bits of the prefix padded with zeroes up to the next byte
boundary.
In some cases (e.g. IPv4) the set of addresses is very limited and
stateless mechanisms are not really suitable for address assignment.
Therefore HNCP can manage router address in these cases by itself.
Each router assigning an address to one of its interfaces announces
one TLV of the following kind:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: ROUTER-ADDRESS (46) | Length: 24 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Link Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Router Address |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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Link Identifier is the local HNCP identifier of the link the
address is assigned to.
Router Address is the address assigned to one of the router
interfaces.
7. DNS-based Service Discovery
Service discovery is generally limited to a local link.
[I-D.stenberg-homenet-dnssd-hybrid-proxy-zeroconf] defines a
mechanism to automatically extended DNS-based service discovery
across multiple links within the home automatically. Following TLVs
MAY be used to provide transport for that specification.
7.1. DNS Delegated Zone TLV
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: DNS-DELEGATED-ZONE (50) | Length: >= 21 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Address |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |S|B| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Zone (DNS label sequence - variable length) |
| |
7.2. Domain Name TLV
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: DOMAIN-NAME (51) | Length: >= 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Domain (DNS label sequence - variable length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
7.3. Router Name TLV
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: ROUTER-NAME (52) | Length: >= 4 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Name (not null-terminated - variable length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
8. Routing support
8.1. Protocol Requirements
In order to be advertised for use within the Homenet, a routing
protocol MUST:
Comply with Requirements and Use Cases for Source/Destination
Routing [I-D.baker-rtgwg-src-dst-routing-use-cases].
Be configured with suitable defaults or have an auto-configuration
mechanism (e.g. [I-D.acee-ospf-ospfv3-autoconfig]) such that it
will run in a Homenet without requiring specific configuration
from the Home user.
A router MUST NOT announce that it supports a certain routing
protocol if its implementation of the routing protocol does not meet
these requirements, e.g. it does not implement extensions that are
necessary for compliance.
8.2. Announcement
Each router SHOULD announce all routing protocols that it is capable
of supporting in the Homenet. It SHOULD assign a preference value
for each protocol that indicates its desire to use said protocol over
other protocols it supports and SHOULD make these values
configurable.
Each router includes one HNCP TLV of type ROUTING-PROTOCOL for every
such routing protocol. This TLV is defined as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type: ROUTING-PROTOCOL (60) | Length: 6 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Protocol ID | Preference |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Protocol ID is one of:
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0 = reserved
1 = Babel (dual-stack)
2 = OSPFv3 (dual-stack)
3 = IS-IS (dual-stack)
4 = RIP (dual-stack)
Preference is a value from 0 to 255. If a router is neutral about
a routing protocol it SHOULD use the value 128, otherwise a lower
value indicating lower preference or a higher value indicating
higher preference respectively.
8.3. Protocol Selection
When HNCP detects that a router has joined or left the Homenet it
MUST examine all advertised routing protocols and preference values
from all routers in the Homenet in order to find the one routing
protocol which:
1. Is understood by all routers in the homenet
2. Has the highest preference value among all routers (calculated as
sum of preference values)
3. Has the highest protocol ID among those with the highest
preference
If the router protocol selection results in the need to change from
one routing protocol to another on the homenet, the router MUST stop
the previously running protocol, remove associated routes, and start
the new protocol in a graceful manner. If there is no common routing
protocol available among all Homenet routers, routers MUST utilize
the Fallback Mechanism (Section 8.4).
8.4. Fallback Mechanism
In cases where there is no commonly supported routing protocol
available the following fallback algorithm is run to setup routing
and preserve interoperability among the homenet. While not intended
to replace a routing protocol, this mechanism provides a valid - but
not necessarily optimal - routing topology. This algorithm uses the
node and neighbor state already synchronized by HNCP, and therefore
does not require any additional protocol message exchange.
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1. Interpret the neighbor information received via HNCP as a graph
of connected routers.
2. Use breadth-first traversal to determine the next-hop and hop-
count in the path to each router in the homenet:
1. Start the traversal with the immediate neighbors of the
router running the algorithm.
2. Always visit the immediate neighbors of a router in ascending
order of their router ID.
3. Never visit a router more often than once.
3. For each delegated prefix P of any router R in the homenet:
Create a default route via the next-hop for R acquired in #2.
Each such route MUST be source-restricted to only apply to
traffic with a source address within P and its metric MUST
reflect the hop-count to R.
4. For each assigned prefix A of a router R: Create a route to A via
the next-hop for R acquired in #2. Each such route MUST NOT be
source-restricted.
5. For the first router R visited in the traversal announcing an
IPv4-uplink: Create a default IPv4-route via the next-hop for R
acquired in #2.
6. For each assigned IPv4-prefix A of a router R: Create an
IPv4-route to A via the next-hop for R acquired in #2.
9. Security Considerations
General security issues for Home Networks are discussed at length in
[I-D.ietf-homenet-arch]. The protocols used to setup IP in home
networks today have very little security enabled within the control
protocol itself. For example, DHCP has defined [RFC3118] to
authenticate DHCP messages, but this is very rarely implemented in
large or small networks. Further, while PPP can provide secure
authentication of both sides of a point to point link, it is most
often deployed with one-way authentication of the subscriber to the
ISP, not the ISP to the subscriber. HNCP aims to make security as
easy as possible for the implementer by including built-in
capabilities for authentication of node data being exchanged as well
as the protocol messages themselves, but it is ultimately up to the
shipping system to take advantage of the protocol constructs defined.
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HNCP is designed to integrate with trusted bootstrapping
[I-D.behringer-homenet-trust-bootstrap] including the ability to
authenticate messages between nodes. This authentication can be used
to securely define a border as well as protect against malicious
attacks and spoofing attempts from inside or outside the border.
HNCP itself sends messages as (possibly authenticated) clear text
which is as secure, or insecure, as the security of the link below as
discussed in [I-D.kline-homenet-default-perimeter]. When no unique
public key is available, a hardware fingerprint or equivalent to
identify routers must be available for use by HNCP.
As HNCP messages are sent over UDP/IP, IPsec may be used for
confidentiality or additional message authentication. However, this
requires manually keyed IPsec per-port granularity for port IANA-UDP-
PORT UDP traffic. Also, a pre-shared key has to be utilized in this
case given IKE cannot be used with multicast traffic.
If no router can be trusted and additional guarantees about source of
node status updates is necessary, real public and private keys should
be used to create signatures and verify them in HNCP on both on per-
node data TLVs as well as across the entire HNCP message. In this
mode, care must be taken in rate limiting verification of invalid
packets, as otherwise denial of service may occur due to exhaustion
of computation resources.
As a performance optimization, instead of providing signatures for
actual node data and the protocol messages themselves, it is also
possible to provide signatures just for protocol messages. While
this means it is no longer possible to verify the original source of
the node data itself, as long as the set of routers is trusted (i.e.,
no router in the set has itself been hacked to provide malicious node
data) then one can assume the node data is trusted because the router
is trusted and the data arrived in a protected protocol message.
10. IANA Considerations
IANA should set up a registry (policy TBD) for HNCP TLV types, with
following initial contents:
0: Reserved (should not happen on wire)
1: Node link
2: Request network state
3: Request node data
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4: Network state
5: Node state
6: Node data
7: Node public key
8: Neighbor
9: Custom
10: Version
41: External connection
42: Delegated prefix
43: Assigned prefix
44: DHCP-data
45: DHCPv6-data
46: Router-address
50: DNS Delegated Zone
51: Domain name
52: Node name
60: Routing protocol
65535: Signature
HNCP will also require allocation of a UDP port number IANA-UDP-PORT,
as well as IPv6 link-local multicast address IANA-MULTICAST-ADDRESS.
11. References
11.1. Normative references
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC6206] Levis, P., Clausen, T., Hui, J., Gnawali, O., and J. Ko,
"The Trickle Algorithm", RFC 6206, March 2011.
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[I-D.pfister-homenet-prefix-assignment]
Pfister, P., Paterson, B., and J. Arkko, "Prefix and
Address Assignment in a Home Network", draft-pfister-
homenet-prefix-assignment-01 (work in progress), May 2014.
[I-D.stenberg-homenet-dnssd-hybrid-proxy-zeroconf]
Stenberg, M., "Auto-Configuration of a Network of Hybrid
Unicast/Multicast DNS-Based Service Discovery Proxy
Nodes", draft-stenberg-homenet-dnssd-hybrid-proxy-
zeroconf-01 (work in progress), June 2014.
11.2. Informative references
[RFC7084] Singh, H., Beebee, W., Donley, C., and B. Stark, "Basic
Requirements for IPv6 Customer Edge Routers", RFC 7084,
November 2013.
[RFC3004] Stump, G., Droms, R., Gu, Y., Vyaghrapuri, R., Demirtjis,
A., Beser, B., and J. Privat, "The User Class Option for
DHCP", RFC 3004, November 2000.
[RFC3118] Droms, R. and W. Arbaugh, "Authentication for DHCP
Messages", RFC 3118, June 2001.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC
2131, March 1997.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[RFC3633] Troan, O. and R. Droms, "IPv6 Prefix Options for Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) version 6", RFC 3633,
December 2003.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", BCP
5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.
[I-D.ietf-homenet-arch]
Chown, T., Arkko, J., Brandt, A., Troan, O., and J. Weil,
"IPv6 Home Networking Architecture Principles", draft-
ietf-homenet-arch-13 (work in progress), March 2014.
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[I-D.troan-homenet-sadr]
Troan, O. and L. Colitti, "IPv6 Multihoming with Source
Address Dependent Routing (SADR)", draft-troan-homenet-
sadr-01 (work in progress), September 2013.
[I-D.behringer-homenet-trust-bootstrap]
Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., and S. Bjarnason,
"Bootstrapping Trust on a Homenet", draft-behringer-
homenet-trust-bootstrap-02 (work in progress), February
2014.
[I-D.baker-rtgwg-src-dst-routing-use-cases]
Baker, F., "Requirements and Use Cases for Source/
Destination Routing", draft-baker-rtgwg-src-dst-routing-
use-cases-00 (work in progress), August 2013.
[I-D.kline-homenet-default-perimeter]
Kline, E., "Default Border Definition", draft-kline-
homenet-default-perimeter-00 (work in progress), March
2013.
[I-D.acee-ospf-ospfv3-autoconfig]
Lindem, A. and J. Arkko, "OSPFv3 Auto-Configuration",
draft-acee-ospf-ospfv3-autoconfig-03 (work in progress),
July 2012.
11.3. URIs
[2] http://www.openwrt.org
[3] http://www.homewrt.org/doku.php?id=run-conf
Appendix A. Some Outstanding Issues
Should we use MD5 hashes, or EUI-64 node identifier to identify
nodes?
Is there a case for non-link-local unicast? Currently explicitly
stating this is link-local only protocol.
Consider if using Trickle with k=1 really pays off, as we need to do
reachability checks if layer 2 does not provide them periodically in
any case. Using Trickle with k=inf would remove the need for unicast
reachability checks, but at cost of extra multicast traffic. On the
other hand, N*(N-1)/2 unicast reachability checks when lot of routers
share a link is not appealing either.
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Should we use something else than MD5 as hash? It IS somewhat
insecure; however signature stuff (TBD) should rely on it mainly for
security in any case, and MD5 is used in a non-security role.
Valid and preferred are now 32 bit millisecond and you cannot even
represent a month in them; is this enough? Or should we switch to 32
bit seconds (or 64 bit milliseconds)?
Appendix B. Some Obvious Questions and Answers
Q: Why not use TCP?
A: It does not address the node discovery problem. It also leads to
N*(N-1)/2 connections when N nodes share a link, which is awkward.
Q: Why not multicast-only?
A: It would require defining application level fragmentation scheme.
Hopefully the data amounts used will stay small so we just trust
unicast UDP to handle 'big enough' packets to contain single node's
TLV data. On some link layers unicast is also much more reliable
than multicast, especially for large packets.
Q: Why so long IDs? Why real hash even in insecure mode?
A: Scalability of protocol is not really affected by using real
(=cryptographic) hash function.
Q: Why trust IPv6 fragmentation in unicast case? Why not do L7
fragmentation?
A: Because it will be there for a while at least. And while PMTU et
al may be problems on open internet, in a home network environment
UDP fragmentation should NOT be broken in the foreseeable future.
Q: Should there be nested container syntax that is actually self-
describing? (i.e. type flag that indicates container, no body except
sub-TLVs?)
A: Not for now, but perhaps valid design.. TBD.
Q: Why not doing (performance thing X, Y or Z)?
A: This is designed mostly to be minimal (only timers Trickle ones;
everything triggered by Trickle-driven messages or local state
changes). However, feel free to suggest better (even more minimal)
design which works.
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Appendix C. Changelog
draft-ietf-homenet-hncp-01: Added (MAY) guest, ad-hoc, hybrid
categories for interfaces. Removed old hnetv2 reference, and now
pointing just to OpenWrt + github. Fixed synchronization algorithm
to spread also same update number, but different data hash case.
Made purge step require bidirectional connectivity between nodes when
traversing the graph. Edited few other things to be hopefully
slightly clearer without changing their meaning.
draft-ietf-homenet-hncp-00: Added version TLV to allow for TLV
content changes pre-RFC without changing IDs. Added link id to
assigned address TLV.
Appendix D. Draft source
As usual, this draft is available at https://github.com/fingon/ietf-
drafts/ in source format (with nice Makefile too). Feel free to send
comments and/or pull requests if and when you have changes to it!
Appendix E. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Ole Troan, Pierre Pfister, Mark Baugher, Mark Townsley and
Juliusz Chroboczek for their contributions to the draft.
Authors' Addresses
Markus Stenberg
Helsinki 00930
Finland
Email: markus.stenberg@iki.fi
Steven Barth
Email: cyrus@openwrt.org
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