One document matched: draft-ietf-hokey-reauth-ps-08.txt
Differences from draft-ietf-hokey-reauth-ps-07.txt
HOKEY Working Group T. Clancy
Internet-Draft LTS
Intended status: Informational M. Nakhjiri
Expires: August 13, 2008 Motorola
V. Narayanan
L. Dondeti
Qualcomm
February 10, 2008
Handover Key Management and Re-authentication Problem Statement
draft-ietf-hokey-reauth-ps-08
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 13, 2008.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract
This document describes the Handover Keying (HOKEY) re-authentication
problem statement. The current Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) keying framework is not designed to support re-authentication
and handovers without re-executing an EAP method. This often causes
Clancy, et al. Expires August 13, 2008 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft HOKEY Re-auth PS February 2008
unacceptable latency in various mobile wireless environments. This
document details the problem and defines design goals for a generic
mechanism to reuse derived EAP keying material for handover.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Design Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Security Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Key Context and Domino Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Key Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.4. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.5. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.6. Transport Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Use Cases and Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Method-Specific EAP Re-authentication . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. IEEE 802.11r Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.3. CAPWAP Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15
Clancy, et al. Expires August 13, 2008 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft HOKEY Re-auth PS February 2008
1. Introduction
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), specified in RFC 3748
[RFC3748] is a generic framework supporting multiple authentication
methods. The primary purpose of EAP is network access control. It
also supports exporting session keys derived during the
authentication. The EAP keying hierarchy defines two keys that are
derived at the top level, the Master Session Key (MSK) and the
Extended Master Session Key (EMSK).
In many common deployment scenario, an EAP peer and EAP server
authenticate each other through a third party known as the pass-
through authenticator (hereafter referred to as simply
"authenticator"). The authenticator is responsible for encapsulating
EAP packets from a network access technology lower layer within the
Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) protocol. The
authenticator does not directly participate in the EAP exchange, and
simply acts as a gateway during the EAP method execution.
After successful authentication, the EAP server transports the MSK to
the authenticator. Note that this is performed using AAA protocols,
not EAP itself. The underlying L2 or L3 protocol uses the MSK to
derive additional keys, including the transient session keys (TSKs)
used for per-packet encryption and authentication.
Note that while the authenticator is one logical device, there can be
multiple physical devices involved. For example, the CAPWAP model
[RFC3990] splits authenticators into two logical devices: Wireless
Termination Points (WTPs) and Access Controllers (ACs). Depending on
the configuration, authenticator features can be split in a variety
of ways between physical devices, however from the EAP perspective
there is only one logical authenticator.
The current models of EAP authentication and keying are frequently
not efficient in cases where the peer is a mobile device
[MSA03][KP01]. In existing implementations, when a peer arrives at
the new authenticator, it runs an EAP method irrespective of whether
it has been authenticated to the network recently and has unexpired
keying material. A full EAP method execution involves an EAP-
Response/Identity message from the peer to server, followed by one or
more round trips between the EAP server and peer to perform the
authentication, followed by the EAP-Success or EAP-Failure message
from the EAP server to peer. At a minimum, the peer has 2 round
trips with the EAP server.
There have been attempts to solve the problem of efficient re-
authentication in various ways. However, those solutions are either
EAP-method specific or EAP lower-layer specific. Furthermore, these
Clancy, et al. Expires August 13, 2008 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft HOKEY Re-auth PS February 2008
solutions do not deal with scenarios involving handovers to new
authenticators, or do not conform to the AAA keying requirements
specified in [RFC4962].
This document provides a detailed description of efficient EAP-based
re-authentication protocol design goals. The scope of this protocol
is specifically re-authentication and handover between authenticators
within a single administrative domain. Inter-technology handover and
inter-administrative-domain handover are outside the scope of this
protocol.
2. Terminology
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key
words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119], with the
qualification that unless otherwise stated they apply to the design
of the re-authentication protocol, not its implementation or
application.
With respect to EAP, this document follows the terminology that has
been defined in [RFC3748] and [I-D.ietf-eap-keying].
3. Problem Statement
Under the existing model, any re-authentication requires a full EAP
exchange with the EAP server to which the peer initially
authenticated [RFC3748]. This introduces handover latency from both
network transit time and processing delay. In service provider
networks, the home EAP server for a peer could be on the other side
of the world, and typical intercontinental latencies across the
Internet are 100 to 300 milliseconds per round trip [LGS07].
Processing delays average a couple of milliseconds for symmetric-key
operations and hundreds of milliseconds for public-key operations.
An EAP conversation with a full EAP method run can take two or more
round trips and to complete, causing delays in re-authentication and
handover times. Some methods specify the use of keys and state from
the initial authentication to finish subsequent authentications in
fewer round trips and without using public-key operations (detailed
Section 6.1). However, even in those cases, multiple round trips to
the EAP server are required, resulting in unacceptable handover
times.
Clancy, et al. Expires August 13, 2008 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft HOKEY Re-auth PS February 2008
In summary, it is undesirable to run an EAP Identity and complete EAP
method exchange each time a peer authenticates to a new authenticator
or needs to extend its current authentication with the same
authenticator. Furthermore, it is desirable to specify a method-
independent, efficient, re-authentication protocol. Keying material
from the initial authentication can be used to enable efficient re-
authentication. It is also desirable to have a local server with
low-latency connectivity to the peer that can facilitate re-
authentication. Lastly, a re-authentication protocol should also be
capable of supporting scenarios where an EAP server passes
authentication information to a remote re-authentication server,
allowing a peer to re-authenticate locally without having to
communicate with its home re-authentication server.
These problems are the primary issues to be resolved. In solving
them, there are a number of constraints to conform to and those
result in some additional work to be done in the area of EAP keying.
4. Design Goals
The following are the goals and constraints in designing the EAP re-
authentication and key management protocol:
Lower latency operation: The protocol MUST be responsive to handover
and re-authentication latency performance objectives within a
mobile access network. A solution that reduces latency as
compared to a full EAP authentication will be most favorable,
since in networks that rely on reactive re-authentication this
will directly impact handover times.
EAP lower-layer independence: Any keying hierarchy and protocol
defined MUST be lower layer independent in order to provide
capabilities over heterogeneous technologies. The defined
protocols MAY require some additional support from the lower
layers that use it, but should not require any particular lower
layer.
EAP method independence: Changes to existing EAP methods MUST NOT be
required as a result of the re-authentication protocol. There
MUST be no requirements imposed on future EAP methods, provided
they satisfy [I-D.ietf-eap-keying] and [RFC4017]. Note that the
only EAP methods for which independence is required are those that
currently conform to the specifications of [I-D.ietf-eap-keying]
and [RFC4017]. In particular, methods that do not generate the
keys required by [I-D.ietf-eap-keying] need not be supported by
the re-authentication protocol.
Clancy, et al. Expires August 13, 2008 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft HOKEY Re-auth PS February 2008
AAA protocol compatibility and keying: Any modifications to EAP and
EAP keying MUST be compatible with RADIUS [I-D.ietf-radext-design]
and Diameter [I-D.ietf-dime-app-design-guide]. Extensions to both
RADIUS and Diameter to support these EAP modifications are
acceptable. The designs and protocols must be configurable to
satisfy the AAA key management requirements specified in RFC 4962
[RFC4962].
Compatibility: Compatibility and co-existence with compliant
([RFC3748] [I-D.ietf-eap-keying]) EAP deployments SHOULD be
provided. Specifically, the protocol should be designed such that
fall back to EAP authentication occurs if not all devices in the
network support fast re-authentication.
Cryptographic Agility: Any re-authentication protocol MUST support
cryptographic algorithm agility, to avoid hard-coded primitives
whose security may eventually prove to be compromised. The
protocol MAY support cryptographic algorithm negotiation, provided
it does not adversely affect overall performance (i.e. by
requiring additional round trips).
5. Security Goals
The section draws from the guidance provided in [RFC4962] to further
define the security goals to be achieved by a complete re-
authentication keying solution.
5.1. Key Context and Domino Effect
Any key must have a well-defined scope and must be used in a specific
context and for the intended use. This specifically means the
lifetime and scope of each key must be defined clearly so that all
entities that are authorized to have access to the key have the same
context during the validity period. In a hierarchical key structure,
the lifetime of lower level keys must not exceed the lifetime of
higher level keys. This requirement may imply that the context and
the scope parameters have to be exchanged. Furthermore, the
semantics of these parameters must be defined to provide proper
channel binding specifications. The definition of exact parameter
syntax definition is part of the design of the transport protocol
used for the parameter exchange and that may be outside scope of this
protocol.
If a key hierarchy is deployed, compromising lower level keys must
not result in a compromise of higher level keys which were used to
derive the lower level keys. The compromise of keys at each level
must not result in compromise of other keys at the same level. The
same principle applies to entities that hold and manage a particular
Clancy, et al. Expires August 13, 2008 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft HOKEY Re-auth PS February 2008
key defined in the key hierarchy. Compromising keys on one
authenticator must not reveal the keys of another authenticator.
Note that the compromise of higher-level keys has security
implications on lower levels.
Guidance on parameters required, caching, storage and deletion
procedures to ensure adequate security and authorization provisioning
for keying procedures must be defined in a solution document.
All the keying material must be uniquely named so that it can be
managed effectively.
5.2. Key Freshness
As [RFC4962] defines, a fresh key is one that is generated for the
intended use. This would mean the key hierarchy must provide for
creation of multiple cryptographically separate child keys from a
root key at higher level. Furthermore, the keying solution needs to
provide mechanisms for refreshing each of the keys within the key
hierarchy.
5.3. Authentication
Each handover keying participant must be authenticated to any other
party with whom it communicates to the extent it is necessary to
ensure proper key scoping, and securely provide its identity to any
other entity that may require the identity for defining the key
scope.
5.4. Authorization
The EAP Key management document [I-D.ietf-eap-keying] discusses
several vulnerabilities that are common to handover mechanisms. One
important issue arises from the way the authorization decisions might
be handled at the AAA server during network access authentication.
For example, if AAA proxies are involved, they may influence
authorization decisions. Furthermore, the reasons for making a
particular authorization decision are not communicated to the
authenticator. In fact, the authenticator only knows the final
authorization result. The proposed solution must make efforts to
document and mitigate authorization attacks.
5.5. Channel Binding
Channel Binding procedures are needed to avoid a compromised
intermediate authenticator providing unverified and conflicting
service information to each of the peer and the EAP server. To
support fast re-authentication, there will be intermediate entities
Clancy, et al. Expires August 13, 2008 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft HOKEY Re-auth PS February 2008
between the peer and the back-end EAP server. Various keys need to
be established and scoped between these parties and some of these
keys may be parents to other keys. Hence the channel binding for
this architecture will need to consider layering intermediate
entities at each level to make sure that an entity with higher level
of trust can examine the truthfulness of the claims made by
intermediate parties.
5.6. Transport Aspects
Depending on the physical architecture and the functionality of the
elements involved, there may be a need for multiple protocols to
perform the key transport between entities involved in the handover
keying architecture. Thus, a set of requirements for each of these
protocols, and the parameters they will carry, must be developed.
The use of existing AAA protocols for carrying EAP messages and
keying material between the AAA server and AAA clients that have a
role within the architecture considered for the keying problem will
be carefully examined. Definition of specific parameters, required
for keying procedures and to be transferred over any of the links in
the architecture, are part of the scope. The relation of the
identities used by the transport protocol and the identities used for
keying also needs to be explored.
6. Use Cases and Related Work
In order to further clarify the items listed in scope of the proposed
work, this section provides some background on related work and the
use cases envisioned for the proposed work.
6.1. Method-Specific EAP Re-authentication
A number of EAP methods support fast re-authentication. In this
section we examine their properties in further detail.
EAP-SIM [RFC4186] and EAP-AKA [RFC4187] supports fast re-
authentication, bootstrapped by the keys generated during an initial
full authentication. In response to the typical EAP-Request/
Identity, the peer sends a specially formatted identity indicating a
desire to perform a fast re-authentication. A single round-trip
occurs to verify knowledge of the existing keys and provide fresh
nonces for generating new keys. This is followed by an EAP success.
In the end, it requires a single local round trip between the peer
and authenticator, followed by another round trip between the peer
and EAP server. AKA is based on symmetric-key cryptography, so
processing latency is minimal.
Clancy, et al. Expires August 13, 2008 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft HOKEY Re-auth PS February 2008
EAP-TTLS [I-D.funk-eap-ttls-v0] and PEAP
[I-D.josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap] support using TLS session
resumption for fast re-authentication. During the TLS handshake, the
client includes the message ID of the previous session he wishes to
resume, and the server can echo that ID back if it agrees to resume
the session. EAP-FAST [RFC4851] also supports TLS session
resumption, but additionally allows stateless session resumption as
defined in [RFC4507]. Overall, for all three protocols there are
still two round trips between the peer and EAP server, in addition to
the local round trip for the Identity request and response.
To improve performance, fast re-authentication needs to reduce the
number of overall round trips. Optimal performance could result from
eliminating the EAP-Request/Identity and EAP-Response/Identity
messages observed in typical EAP method execution, and allowing a
single round trip between the peer and a local re-authentication
server.
6.2. IEEE 802.11r Applicability
One of the EAP lower layers, IEEE 802.11 [IEEE.802-11R-D9.0], is in
the process of specifying a mechanism to avoid the problem of
repeated full EAP exchanges in a limited setting, by introducing a
two-level key hierarchy. The EAP authenticator is collocated with
what is known as an R0 Key Holder (R0-KH), which receives the MSK
from the EAP server. A pairwise master key (PMK-R0) is derived from
the last 32 octets of the MSK. Subsequently, the R0-KH derives an
PMK-R1 to be handed out to the attachment point of the peer. When
the peer moves from one R1-KH to another, a new PMK-R1 is generated
by the R0-KH and handed out to the new R1-KH. The transport protocol
used between the R0-KH and the R1-KH is not specified.
In some cases, a mobile may seldom move beyond the domain of the
R0-KH and this model works well. A full EAP authentication will
generally be repeated when the PMK-R0 expires. However, in general
cases mobiles may roam beyond the domain of R0-KHs (or EAP
authenticators), and the latency of full EAP authentication remains
an issue.
Another consideration is that there needs to be a key transfer
protocol between the R0-KH and the R1-KH; in other words, there is
either a star configuration of security associations between the key
holder and a centralized entity that serves as the R0-KH, or if the
first authenticator is the default R0-KH, there will be a full-mesh
of security associations between all authenticators. This is
undesirable.
The proposed work on EAP efficient re-authentication protocol aims at
Clancy, et al. Expires August 13, 2008 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft HOKEY Re-auth PS February 2008
addressing re-authentication in a lower layer agnostic manner that
also can fill some of the gaps in IEEE 802.11r.
6.3. CAPWAP Applicability
The CAPWAP protocol [I-D.ietf-capwap-protocol-specification] allows
the functionality of an IEEE 802.11 access point to be split into two
physical devices in enterprise deployments. Wireless Termination
Points (WTPs) implement the physical and low-level MAC layers, while
a centralized Access Controller (AC) provides higher-level management
and protocol execution. Client authentication is handled by the AC,
which acts as the AAA authenticator.
One of the many features provided by CAPWAP is the ability to roam
between WTPs without executing an EAP authentication. To accomplish
this, the AC caches the MSK from an initial EAP authentication, and
uses it to execute a separate four-way handshake with the station as
it moves between WTPs. The keys resulting from the four-way
handshake are then distributed to the WTP to which the station is
associated. CAPWAP is transparent to the station.
CAPWAP currently has no means to support roaming between ACs in an
enterprise network. The proposed work on EAP efficient re-
authentication addresses an inter-authenticator handover problem from
an EAP perspective, which applies during handover between ACs.
Inter-AC handover is a topic yet to be addressed in great detail and
the re-authentication work can potentially address it in an effective
manner.
7. Security Considerations
This document details the HOKEY problem statement. Since HOKEY is an
authentication protocol, there are a myriad of security-related
issues surrounding its development and deployment.
In this document, we have detailed a variety of security properties
inferred from [RFC4962] to which HOKEY must conform, including the
management of key context, scope, freshness, and transport;
resistance to attacks based on the domino effect; and authentication
and authorization. See section Section 5 for further details.
8. IANA Considerations
This document does not introduce any new IANA considerations.
Clancy, et al. Expires August 13, 2008 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft HOKEY Re-auth PS February 2008
9. Contributors
This document represents the synthesis of two problem statement
documents. In this section, we acknowledge their contributions, and
involvement in the early documents.
Mohan Parthasarathy
Nokia
Email: mohan.parthasarathy@nokia.com
Julien Bournelle
France Telecom R&D
Email: julien.bournelle@orange-ftgroup.com
Hannes Tschofenig
Siemens
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
Rafael Marin Lopez
Universidad de Murcia
Email: rafa@dif.um.es
10. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the participants of the HOKEY working
group for their review and comments, including Glen Zorn, Dan
Harkins, Joe Salowey, and Yoshi Ohba. The authors would also like to
thank those that provided last call reviews, including Bernard Aboba,
Alan DeKok, and Hannes Tschofenig.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4017] Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for
Wireless LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005.
[RFC4962] Housley, R. and B. Aboba, "Guidance for Authentication,
Clancy, et al. Expires August 13, 2008 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft HOKEY Re-auth PS February 2008
Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Key Management",
BCP 132, RFC 4962, July 2007.
11.2. Informative References
[I-D.funk-eap-ttls-v0]
Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "EAP Tunneled TLS
Authentication Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)",
draft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-02 (work in progress),
November 2007.
[I-D.ietf-capwap-protocol-specification]
Calhoun, P., "CAPWAP Protocol Specification",
draft-ietf-capwap-protocol-specification-08 (work in
progress), November 2007.
[I-D.ietf-dime-app-design-guide]
Fajardo, V., Asveren, T., Tschofenig, H., McGregor, G.,
and J. Loughney, "Diameter Applications Design
Guidelines", draft-ietf-dime-app-design-guide-06 (work in
progress), January 2008.
[I-D.ietf-eap-keying]
Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
draft-ietf-eap-keying-22 (work in progress),
November 2007.
[I-D.ietf-radext-design]
Weber, G. and A. DeKok, "RADIUS Design Guidelines",
draft-ietf-radext-design-02 (work in progress),
December 2007.
[I-D.josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap]
Josefsson, S., Palekar, A., Simon, D., and G. Zorn,
"Protected EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version 2",
draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-10 (work in progress),
October 2004.
[RFC3990] O'Hara, B., Calhoun, P., and J. Kempf, "Configuration and
Provisioning for Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) Problem
Statement", RFC 3990, February 2005.
[RFC4186] Haverinen, H. and J. Salowey, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Method for Global System for Mobile
Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules (EAP-
SIM)", RFC 4186, January 2006.
Clancy, et al. Expires August 13, 2008 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft HOKEY Re-auth PS February 2008
[RFC4187] Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key
Agreement (EAP-AKA)", RFC 4187, January 2006.
[RFC4507] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 4507, May 2006.
[RFC4851] Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou, "The
Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling Extensible
Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)", RFC 4851,
May 2007.
[IEEE.802-11R-D9.0]
"Information technology - Telecommunications and
information exchange between systems - Local and
metropolitan area networks - Specific requirements - Part
11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical
Layer (PHY) specifications - Amendment 2: Fast BSS
Transition", IEEE Standard 802.11r, January 2008.
[KP01] Koodli, R. and C. Perkins, "Fast Handover and Context
Relocation in Mobile Networks", ACM SIGCOMM Computer and
Communications Review, October 2001.
[LGS07] Ledlie, J., Gardner, P., and M. Selter, "Network
Coordinates in the Wild", USENIX Symposium on Networked
System Design and Implementation, April 2007.
[MSA03] Mishra, A., Shin, M., and W. Arbaugh, "An Empirical
Analysis of the IEEE 802.11 MAC-Layer Handoff Process",
ACM SIGCOMM Computer and Communications Review,
April 2003.
Authors' Addresses
T. Charles Clancy, Editor
Laboratory for Telecommunications Sciences
US Department of Defense
College Park, MD
USA
Email: clancy@LTSnet.net
Clancy, et al. Expires August 13, 2008 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft HOKEY Re-auth PS February 2008
Madjid Nakhjiri
Motorola
Email: madjid.nakhjiri@motorola.com
Vidya Narayanan
Qualcomm, Inc.
San Diego, CA
USA
Email: vidyan@qualcomm.com
Lakshminath Dondeti
Qualcomm, Inc.
San Diego, CA
USA
Email: ldondeti@qualcomm.com
Clancy, et al. Expires August 13, 2008 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft HOKEY Re-auth PS February 2008
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
Clancy, et al. Expires August 13, 2008 [Page 15]
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-23 06:07:08 |