One document matched: draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-01.xml
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<front>
<title abbrev="DOTS Use cases">Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling</title>
<author fullname="Roland Dobbins" initials="R." surname="Dobbins" role="editor">
<organization>Arbor Networks</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>30 Raffles Place</street>
<street>Level 17 Chevron House</street>
<city>Singapore 048622</city>
<country>Singapore</country>
</postal>
<email>rdobbins@arbor.net</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Stefan Fouant" initials="S." surname="Fouant">
<organization> Corero Network Security </organization>
<address>
<email> Stefan.Fouant@corero.com </email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Daniel Migault" initials="D." surname="Migault">
<organization> Ericsson </organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street> 8400 boulevard Decarie</street>
<city> Montreal</city>
<region>QC</region>
<code> H4P 2N2 </code>
<country>Canada</country>
</postal>
<phone> +1 514-452-2160 </phone>
<email> daniel.migault@ericsson.com </email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Robert Moskowitz" initials="R." surname="Moskowitz">
<organization>HTT Consulting
</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city>Oak Park</city>
<region>MI</region>
<code>48237</code>
<country>USA</country>
</postal>
<email>rgm@labs.htt-consult.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Nik Teague" initials="N." surname="Teague">
<organization>Verisign Inc</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>12061 Bluemont Way</street>
<city>Reston</city>
<region>VA</region>
<code>20190</code>
<country>USA</country>
</postal>
<phone>+44 791 763 5384</phone>
<email>nteague@verisign.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Liang Xia" initials="L." surname="Xia">
<organization>Huawei</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>No. 101, Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District</street>
<city>Nanjing</city>
<country>China</country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<email>Frank.xialiang@huawei.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date year="2016" />
<area>Security Area</area>
<workgroup> DOTS WG</workgroup>
<keyword>RFC</keyword>
<keyword>Request for Comments</keyword>
<keyword>I-D</keyword>
<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>
This document delineates principal and ancillary use cases for DDoS
Open Threat Signaling (DOTS), a communications protocol intended to
facilitate the programmatic, coordinated mitigation of Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks via a standards-based mechanism.
DOTS is purposely designed to support requests for DDoS mitigation
services and status updates across inter-organizational
administrative boundaries.
</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction" anchor="intro">
<t>
Currently, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack mitigation
solutions/services are largely based upon siloed, proprietary
communications paradigms which result in vendor/service lock-in, and
as a side-effect make the configuration, provisioning, operation,
and activation of these solutions a highly manual and often time-
consuming process. Additionally, coordination of multiple DDoS
mitigation solutions/services simultaneously engaged in defending
the same organization against DDoS attacks is fraught with both
technical and process-related hurdles which greatly increase
operational complexity and often result in suboptimal DDoS attack
mitigation efficacy.
</t>
<t>
The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to
facilitate interoperability between DDoS solutions/services by
providing a standards-based, programmatic communications mechanism
for the invitation and termination of heterogeneous DDoS attack
mitigation systems and services. This allows for a much higher
degree of automation and concomitant efficacy and rapidity of DDoS
attack mitigation involving multiple DDoS mitigation systems and
services than is currently the norm, as well as providing additional
benefits such as automatic DDoS mitigation service registration and
provisioning. It should be noted that DOTS is not in and of itself
intended to perform orchestration functions duplicative of the
functionality being developed by the [I2NSF] WG; rather, DOTS is
intended to allow devices, services, and applications to request
mitigation assistance and receive mitigation status updates from
systems of this nature.
</t>
<t>
This document provides an overview of common DDoS mitigation system/
service deployment and operational models which are in use today,
but which are currently limited in scope to a single vendor or
service provider and are often highly manual in nature, which can
lead to miscommunications, misconfigurations, and delays in bringing
mitigation services to bear against an attack. The introduction of
DOTS into these scenarios will reduce reaction times and the risks
associated with manual processes, simplify the use of multiple types
of DDoS mitigation systems and services as required, and make
practical the simultaneous use multiple DDoS mitigation systems and
services as circumstances warrant.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="terms" title="Terminology and Acronyms">
<section title="Requirements Terminology">
<t>
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described
in <xref target="RFC2119">RFC 2119</xref>.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Acronyms">
<t>
This document makes use of the same terminology and definitions
as <xref target="I-D.ietf-dots-requirements" />, except where
noted.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Use Cases">
<t>
This section provides a high-level overview of likely use cases and
deployment scenarios for DOTS-enabled DDoS mitigation services. It
should be noted that DOTS servers may be standalone entities which,
upon receiving a DOTS mitigation service request from a DOTS
client, proceed to initiate DDoS mitigation service by
communicating directly or indirectly with DDoS mitigators, and
likewise terminate the service upon receipt of a DOTS service
termination request; conversely, the DDoS mitigators themselves may
incorporate DOTS servers and/or DOTS clients. The mechanisms by
which DOTS servers initiate and terminate DDoS mitigation service
with DDoS mitigators is beyond the scope of this document.
</t>
<t>
All of the primary use cases described in this section are derived
from current, real-world DDoS mitigation functionality,
capabilities, and operational models.
</t>
<t>
The posited ancillary use cases described in this section are
reasonable and highly desirable extrapolations of the functionality
of baseline DOTS capabilities, and are readily attainable in the
near term.
</t>
<t>
Each of the primary and ancillary use cases described in this
section may be read as involving one or more DDoS mitigation
service providers; DOTS makes multi-provider coordinated DDoS
defenses much more effective and practical due to abstraction of
the particulars of a given DDoS mitigation service/solution set.
</t>
<t>
Both the primary and ancillary use cases may be facilitated by
direct DOTS client - DOTS server communications or via DOTS relays
deployed in order to aggregate DOTS mitigation service
requests/responses, to mediate between stateless and stateful
underlying transport protocols, to aggregate multiple DOTS requests
and/or responses, to filter DOTS requests and/or responses via
configured policy mechanisms, or some combination of these
functions.
</t>
<t>
All DOTS messages exchanged between the DOTS clients and DOTS
servers in these use cases may be communicated directly between
DOTS clients and servers, or mediated by one or more DOTS relays
residing on the network of the originating network, the network
where upstream DDoS mitigation service takes place, an intervening
network or networks, or some combination of the above.
</t>
<t>
DOTS is intended to apply to both inter- and intra-domain DDoS
attack mitigation scenarios. The technical and operational
requirements for inter- and intra-domain DOTS communications are
identical. The main difference is administrative in nature;
although it should be noted that provisioning challenges which are
typically associated with inter- domain DOTS communications
relationships may also apply in intra- domain deployment scenarios,
based upon organizational factors. All of the same complexities
surrounding authentication and authorization can apply in both
contexts, including considerations such as network access policies
to allow DOTS communications, DOTS transport selection (including
considerations of the implications of link congestion if a stateful
DOTS transport option is selected), etc. Registration of
well-known ports for DOTS transports per <xref target="RFC6335"/>
should be considered in light of these challenges.
</t>
<t>
It should also be noted that DOTS does not directly ameliorate the
various administrative challenges required for successful DDoS
attack mitigation. Letters of authorization, RADB updates, DNS zone
delegations, alteration of network access policies, technical
configurations required to facilitate network traffic diversion and
re-injection, etc., are all outside the scope of DOTS. DOTS may,
however, prove useful in automating the registration of DOTS
clients with DOTS servers, as well as in the automatic provisioning
of situationally- appropriate DDoS defenses and countermeasures.
This ancillary DOTS functionality is described in <xref
target="Ancillary" />.
</t>
<t>
Many of the 'external' administrative challenges associated with
establishing workable DDoS attack mitigation service may be
addressed by work currently in progress in the I2RS and I2NSF WGs.
Interested parties may wish to consider tracking those efforts, and
coordination with both I2RS and I2NSF is highly desirable.
</t>
<t>
Note that all the use-cases in this document are universal in
nature. They apply equally to endpoint networks, transit backbone
providers, cloud providers, broadband access providers, ASPs, CDNs,
etc. They are not specific to particular business models,
topological models, or application types, and are deliberately
generalizable. Both networks targeted for attack as well as any
adjacent or topologically distant networks involved in a given
scenario may be either single- or multi-homed. In the
accompanying vector illustrations incorporated into
draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-01.pdf, specific business and topological
models are described in order to provide context.
</t>
<t>
Likewise, both DOTS itself and the use cases described in this
document are completely independent of technologies utilized for
the detection, classification, traceback, and mitigation of DDoS
attacks. Flow telemetry such as NetFlow and IPFIX, direct
full-packet analysis, log-file analysis, indirection manual
observation, etc. can and will be enablers for detection,
classification and traceback. Intelligent DDoS mitigation systems
(IDMSes), flowspec, S/RTBH, ACLs, and other network traffic
manipulation tools and techniques may be used for DDoS attack
mitigation. BGP, flowspec, DNS, inline deployment, and various
'NFV' technologies may be used for network traffic diversion into
mitigation centers or devices in applicable scenarios; GRE, MPLS,
'NFV', inline deployment and other techniques may be utilized for
'cleaned' traffic re-injection to its intended destination.
</t>
<t>
The scope, format, and content of all DOTS message types cited in
this document must be codified by the DOTS WG.
</t>
<t>
The following use cases are intended to inform the DOTS
requirements described in <xref target="I-D.ietf-dots-requirements"
/>.
</t>
<section title="Primary Use Cases">
<section title="Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Mitigators
Request Upstream DDoS Mitigation Services">
<t>
One or more CPE or PE mitigators with DOTS client capabilities may
be configured to signal to one or more DOTS servers in order to
request upstream DDoS mitigation service initiation during an
attack when DDoS attack volumes and/or attack characteristics
exceed the capabilities of such CPE mitigators. DDoS mitigation
service may be terminated either automatically or manually via a
DOTS mitigation service termination request initiated by the
mitigator when it has been determined that the DDoS attack has
ended.
<list style="format (%c)">
<t>
A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
organization which has deployed DOTS-client-capable DDoS
mitigators.
</t>
<t>
CPE or PE DDoS mitigators detect, classify, and begin
mitigating the DDoS attack.
</t>
<t>
CPE or PE DDoS mitigators determine that their capacity and/or
capability to mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and
utilize their DOTS client functionality to send a DOTS
mitigation service initiation request to one or more DOTS
servers residing on one or more upstream transit networks, peer
networks, or overlay MSSP networks. This DOTS mitigation
service initiation request may be automatically initiated by
the CPE or PE DDoS mitigators, or may be manually triggered by
personnel of the requesting organization in response to an
alert from the mitigators (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
initiation requests determine that they have been configured to
honor requests from the requesting CPE or PE mitigators, and
initiate situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation service on
their respective networks (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
requesting CPE or PE mitigators indicating that upstream DDoS
mitigation service has been initiated.
</t>
<t>
While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the
requesting CPE or PE mitigators.
</t>
<t>
While DDoS mitigation services are active, the CPE or PE
mitigators may optionally regularly transmit DOTS mitigation
efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS servers.
</t>
<t>
When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS
attack has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to
the CPE or PE mitigators indicating that the DDoS attack has
ceased.
</t>
<t>
The CPE or PE DDoS mitigators transmit a DOTS mitigation
service termination request to the DOTS servers. This DOTS
mitigation service termination request may be automatically
initiated by the CPE or PE DDoS mitigators, or may be manually
triggered by personnel of the requesting organization in
response to an alert from the mitigators or a management system
which monitors them (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to
the CPE or PE mitigators indicating that DDoS mitigation
services have been terminated.
</t>
<t>
The CPE or PE DDoS mitigators transmit a DOTS mitigation
termination status acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Network
Infrastructure Element Request to Upstream Mitigator">
<t>
CPE or PE network infrastructure elements such as routers,
switches, load-balancers, firewalls, 'IPSes', etc. which have the
capability to detect and classify DDoS attacks and which have DOTS
client capabilities may be configured to signal to one or more DOTS
servers in order to request upstream DDoS mitigation service
initiation during an attack. DDoS mitigation service may be
terminated either automatically or manually via a DOTS mitigation
service termination request initiated by the network element when
it has been determined that the DDoS attack has ended.
</t>
<t>
In this use-case, the network elements involved are not engaged in
mitigating DDoS attack traffic. They are signaling for upstream
attack mitigation assistance. This can be an inter- or intra-
domain use-case.
<list style="format (%c)">
<t>
A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
organization with DOTS-client-capable network infrastructure
elements deployed.
</t>
<t>
The network infrastructure elements utilize their DOTS client
functionality to send a DOTS mitigation service initiation
request to one or more DOTS servers residing on one or more
upstream transit networks, peer networks, or overlay MSSP
networks, either directly or via intermediate DOTS relays
residing upon the requesting organization's network, the
upstream mitigation provider's network, or both. The scope,
format, and content of these messages must be codified by the
DOTS WG. This DOTS mitigation service initiation request may
be automatically initiated by the network infrastructure
elements, or may be manually triggered by personnel of the
requesting organization in response to an alert from the
network elements or a management system which monitors them
(the mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the
scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
initiation requests determine that they have been configured to
honor requests from the requesting network infrastructure
elements, and initiate situationally-appropriate DDoS
mitigation service on their respective networks (the mechanism
by which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this
document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
requesting network infrastructure elements indicating that
upstream DDoS mitigation service has been initiated.
</t>
<t>
While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the
requesting requesting network infrastructure elements.
</t>
<t>
While DDoS mitigation services are active, the network
infrastructure elements may optionally regularly transmit DOTS
mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS servers.
</t>
<t>
When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS
attack has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to
the network infrastructure elements indicating that the DDoS
attack has ceased.
</t>
<t>
The network infrastructure elements transmit a DOTS mitigation
service termination request to the DOTS servers. This DOTS
mitigation service termination request may be automatically
initiated by the network infrastructure elements, or may be
manually triggered by personnel of the requesting organization
in response to an alert from the mitigators (the mechanism by
which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this
document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to
the network infrastructure elements indicating that DDoS
mitigation services have been terminated.
</t>
<t>
The network infrastructure elements transmit a DOTS mitigation
termination status acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Attack
Telemetry Detection/Classification System Request to Upstream
Mitigator">
<t>
CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems which
have DOTS client capabilities may be configured so that upon
detecting and classifying a DDoS attack, they signal one or more
DOTS servers in order to request upstream DDoS mitigation service
initiation. DDoS mitigation service may be terminated either
automatically or manually via a DOTS mitigation service termination
request initiated by the Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification
System when it has been determined that the DDoS attack has ended.
</t>
<t>
In this use-case, the Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification
does not possess any inherent capability to mitigate DDoS attack
traffic, and is signaling for upstream mitigation assistance. This
can be an inter- or intra-domain use-case.
<list style="format (%c)">
<t>
A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
organization with DOTS-client-capable CPE or PE Attack
Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems deployed.
</t>
<t>
The CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems
utilize their DOTS client functionality to send a DOTS
mitigation service initiation request to one or more DOTS
servers residing on one or more upstream transit networks, peer
networks, or overlay MSSP networks, either directly or via
intermediate DOTS relays residing upon the requesting
organization's network, the upstream mitigation provider's
network, or both. This DOTS mitigation service initiation
request may be automatically initiated by the CPE or PE Attack
Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems, or may be manually
triggered by personnel of the requesting organization in
response to an alert from the CPE or PE Attack Telemetry
Detection/Classification Systems (the mechanism by which this
process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
initiation requests determine that they have been configured to
honor requests from the requesting CPE or PE Attack Telemetry
Detection/Classification Systems, and initiate situationally-
appropriate DDoS mitigation service on their respective
networks (the mechanism by which this process takes place is
beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
requesting CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification
Systems indicating that upstream DDoS mitigation service has
been initiated.
</t>
<t>
While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the
requesting CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification
Systems.
</t>
<t>
While DDoS mitigation services are active, the CPE or PE Attack
Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems may optionally
regularly transmit DOTS mitigation efficacy updates to the
relevant DOTS servers.
</t>
<t>
When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS
attack has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems
indicating that the DDoS attack has ceased.
</t>
<t>
The CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems
transmit a DOTS mitigation service termination request to the
DOTS servers. This DOTS mitigation service termination
request may be automatically initiated by the CPE or PE Attack
Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems, or may be manually
triggered by personnel of the requesting organization in
response to an alert from the CPE or PE Attack Telemetry
Detection/Classification Systems (the mechanism by which this
process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to
the CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems
indicating that DDoS mitigation services have been terminated.
</t>
<t>
The CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems
transmit a DOTS mitigation termination status acknowledgement
to the DOTS servers.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Automatic or Operator-Assisted Targeted Service/
Application Request to Upstream Mitigator">
<t>
A service or application which is the target of a DDoS attack and
which has the capability to detect and classify DDoS attacks (i.e,
Apache mod_security <xref target="APACHE" />, BIND RRL <xref
target="RRL" />, etc.) as well as DOTS client functionality may be
configured so that upon detecting and classifying a DDoS attack, it
signals one or more DOTS servers in order to request upstream DDoS
mitigation service initiation. DDoS mitigation service may be
terminated either automatically or manually via a DOTS mitigation
service termination request initiated by the service/application
when it has been determined that the DDoS attack has ended.
</t>
<t>
In this use-case, the service/application does not possess inherent
DDoS attack mitigation capabilities, and is signaling for upstream
mitigation assistance. This can be an inter- or intra-domain
use-case.
<list style="format (%c)">
<t>
A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
organization which include DOTS-client-capable services or
applications that are the specific target(s) of the attack.
</t>
<t>
The targeted services or applications utilize their DOTS client
functionality to send a DOTS mitigation service initiation
request to one or more DOTS servers residing on the same
network as the services or applications, one or more upstream
transit networks, peer networks, or overlay MSSP networks,
either directly or via intermediate DOTS relays residing upon
the requesting organization's network, the upstream mitigation
provider's network, or both. This DOTS mitigation service
initiation request may be automatically initiated by the
targeted services or applications, or may be manually triggered
by personnel of the requesting organization in response to an
alert from the targeted services or applications or a system
which monitors them (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
initiation requests determine that they have been provisioned
to honor requests from the requesting services or applications,
and initiate situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation service
on their respective networks (the mechanism by which this
process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
services or applications indicating that upstream DDoS
mitigation service has been initiated
</t>
<t>
While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the
requesting services or applications.
</t>
<t>
While DDoS mitigation services are active, the requesting
services or applications may optionally regularly transmit DOTS
mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS servers.
</t>
<t>
When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS
attack has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to
the requesting services or applications indicating that the
DDoS attack has ceased.
</t>
<t>
The targeted services or applications transmit a DOTS
mitigation service termination request to the DOTS servers.
This DOTS mitigation service termination request may be
automatically initiated by the targeted services or
applications, or may be manually triggered by personnel of the
requesting organization in response to an alert from a system
which monitors them (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to
the targeted services or applications indicating that DDoS
mitigation services have been terminated.
</t>
<t>
The targeted services or applications transmit a DOTS
mitigation termination status acknowledgement to the DOTS
servers.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="Web-Portal" title="Manual Web Portal Request to
Upstream Mitigator">
<t>
A Web portal which has DOTS client capabilities has been configured
in order to allow authorized personnel of organizations which are
targeted by DDoS attacks to manually request upstream DDoS
mitigation service initiation from a DOTS server. When an
organization has reason to believe that it is under active attack,
authorized personnel may utilize the Web portal to manually
initiate a DOTS client mitigation request to one or more DOTS
servers. DDoS mitigation service may be terminated manually via a
DOTS mitigation service termination request through the Web portal
when it has been determined that the DDoS attack has ended.
</t>
<t>
In this use-case, the organization targeted for attack does not
possess any automated or operator-assisted mechanisms for DDoS
attack detection, classification, traceback, or mitigation; the
existence of an attack has been inferred manually, and the
organization is requesting upstream mitigation assistance. This
can theoretically be an inter- or intra-domain use-case, but is
more typically an inter-domain scenario.
<list style="format (%c)">
<t>
A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
organization have access to a Web portal which incorporates
DOTS client functionality and can generate DOTS mitigation
service requests upon demand.
</t>
<t>
Authorized personnel utilize the Web portal to send a DOTS
mitigation service initiation request to one or more upstream
transit networks, peer networks, or overlay MSSP networks,
either directly or via intermediate DOTS relays residing upon
the requesting organization's network, the upstream mitigation
provider's network, or both. This DOTS mitigation service
initiation request is manually triggered by personnel of the
requesting organization when it is judged that the organization
is under DDoS attack (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
initiation requests determine that they have been provisioned
to honor requests from the Web portal, and initiate
situationally- appropriate DDoS mitigation service on their
respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
Web portal indicating that upstream DDoS mitigation service has
been initiated.
</t>
<t>
While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the Web
portal.
</t>
<t>
While DDoS mitigation services are active, the Web portal may
optionally regularly transmit manually-triggered DOTS
mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS servers.
</t>
<t>
When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS
attack has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to
the Web portal indicating that the DDoS attack has ceased.
</t>
<t>
The Web portal transmits a manually-triggered DOTS mitigation
service termination request to the DOTS servers (the mechanism
by which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this
document).
</t>
<t>
The Web portal transmits a manually-triggered DOTS mitigation
service termination request to the DOTS servers (the mechanism
by which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this
document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to
the Web portal indicating that DDoS mitigation services have
been terminated.
</t>
<t>
The Web portal transmits a DOTS mitigation termination status
acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Manual Mobile Device Application Request to
Upstream Mitigator">
<t>
An application for mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets
which incorporates DOTS client capabilities has been made available
to authorized personnel of an organization. When the organization
has reason to believe that it is under active DDoS attack,
authorized personnel may utilize the mobile device application to
manually initiate a DOTS client mitigation request to one or more
DOTS servers in order to initiate upstream DDoS mitigation
services. DDoS mitigation service may be terminated manually via a
DOTS mitigation service termination request initiated through the
mobile device application when it has been determined that the DDoS
attack has ended.
</t>
<t>
This use-case is similar to the one described in <xref
target="Web-Portal" />; the difference is that a mobile application
provided by the DDoS mitigation service provider is used to request
upstream attack mitigation assistance. This can theoretically be an
inter- or intra-domain use-case, but is more typically an
inter-domain scenario.
<list style="format (%c)">
<t>
A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
organization have access to a Web portal which incorporates
DOTS client functionality and can generate DOTS mitigation
service requests upon demand.
</t>
<t>
Authorized personnel utilize the mobile application to send a
DOTS mitigation service initiation request to one or more DOTS
servers residing on the same network as the targeted Internet
properties, one or more upstream transit networks, peer
networks, or overlay MSSP networks, either directly or via
intermediate DOTS relays residing upon the requesting
organization's network, the upstream mitigation provider's
network, or both. This DOTS mitigation service initiation
request is manually triggered by personnel of the requesting
organization when it is judged that the organization is under
DDoS attack (the mechanism by which this process takes place is
beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
initiation requests determine that they have been provisioned
to honor requests from the mobile application, and initiate
situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation service on their
respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
mobile application indicating that upstream DDoS mitigation
service has been initiated.
</t>
<t>
While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the mobile
application.
</t>
<t>
While DDoS mitigation services are active, the mobile
application may optionally regularly transmit
manually-triggered DOTS mitigation efficacy updates to the
relevant DOTS servers.
</t>
<t>
When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS
attack has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to
the mobile application indicating that the DDoS attack has
ceased.
</t>
<t>
The mobile application transmits a manually-triggered DOTS
mitigation service termination request to the DOTS servers (the
mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the scope
of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to
the mobile application indicating that DDoS mitigation services
have been terminated.
</t>
<t>
The mobile application transmits a DOTS mitigation termination
status acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
<section title="Unsuccessful Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or
PE Mitigators Request Upstream DDoS Mitigation Services">
<t>
One or more CPE or PE mitigators with DOTS client capabilities may
be configured to signal to one or more DOTS servers in order to
request upstream DDoS mitigation service initiation during an
attack when DDoS attack volumes and/or attack characteristics
exceed the capabilities of such CPE mitigators. DDoS mitigation
service may be terminated either automatically or manually via a
DOTS mitigation service termination request initiated by the
mitigator when it has been determined that the DDoS attack has
ended.
</t>
<t>
This can theoretically be an inter- or intra-domain use-case, but
is more typically an inter-domain scenario.
<list style="format (%c)">
<t>
A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
organization which has deployed DOTS-client-capable DDoS
mitigators.
</t>
<t>
CPE or PE DDoS mitigators detect, classify, and begin
mitigating the DDoS attack.
</t>
<t>
CPE or PE DDoS mitigators determine that their capacity and/or
capability to mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and
utilize their DOTS client functionality to send a DOTS
mitigation service initiation request to one or more DOTS
servers residing on one or more upstream transit networks, peer
networks, or overlay MSSP networks. This DOTS mitigation
service initiation request may be automatically initiated by
the CPE or PE DDoS mitigators, or may be manually triggered by
personnel of the requesting organization in response to an
alert from the mitigators (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
initiation requests determine that they have been configured to
honor requests from the requesting CPE or PE mitigators, and
attempt to initiate situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation
service on their respective networks (the mechanism by which
this process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DDoS mitigators on the upstream network report back to the
DOTS servers that they are unable to initiate DDoS mitigation
service for the requesting organization due to mitigation
capacity constraints, bandwidth constraints, functionality
constraints, hardware casualties, or other impediments (the
mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the scope
of this document).
</t>
<t>
The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
requesting CPE or PE mitigators indicating that upstream DDoS
mitigation service cannot be initiated as requested.
</t>
<t>
The CPE or PE mitigators may optionally regularly re-transmit
DOTS mitigation status request messages to the relevant DOTS
servers until acknowledgement that mitigation services have
been initiated.
</t>
<t>
The CPE or PE mitigators may optionally transmit a DOTS
mitigation service initiation request to DOTS servers
associated with a configured fallback upstream DDoS mitigation
service. Multiple fallback DDoS mitigation services may
optionally be configured.
</t>
<t>
The process describe above cyclically continues until the DDoS
mitigation service request is fulfilled; the CPE or PE
mitigators determine that the DDoS attack volume has decreased
to a level and/or complexity which they themselves can
successfully mitigate; the DDoS attack has ceased; or manual
intervention by personnel of the requesting organization has
taken place.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="Ancillary" title="Ancillary Use Cases">
<section title="Auto-registration of DOTS clients with DOTS
servers">
<t>
An additional benefit of DOTS is that by utilizing agreed-upon
authentication mechanisms, DOTS clients can automatically register
for DDoS mitigation service with one or more upstream DOTS servers.
The details of such registration are beyond the scope of this
document.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Auto-provisioning of DDoS countermeasures">
<t>
The largely manual tasks associated with provisioning effective,
situationally-appropriate DDoS countermeasures is a significant
barrier to providing/obtaining DDoS mitigation services for both
mitigation providers and mitigation recipients. Due to the 'self-
descriptive' nature of DOTS registration messages and mitigation
requests, the implementation and deployment of DOTS has the
potential to automate countermeasure selection and configuration
for DDoS mitigators. The details of such provisioning are beyond
the scope of this document.
</t>
<t>
This can theoretically be an inter- or intra-domain use-case, but
is more typically an inter-domain scenario.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Informational DDoS attack notification to
interested and authorized third parties">
<t>
In addition to its primary role of providing a standardized,
programmatic approach to the automated and/or operator-assisted
request of DDoS mitigation services and providing status updates of
those mitigations to requesters, DOTS may be utilized to notify
security researchers, law enforcement agencies, regulatory bodies,
etc. of DDoS attacks against attack targets, assuming that
organizations making use of DOTS choose to share such third-party
notifications, in keeping with all applicable laws, regulations,
privacy and confidentiality considerations, and contractual
agreements between DOTS users and said third parties.
</t>
<t>
This is an inter-domain scenario.
</t>
</section>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Security Considerations">
<t>
DOTS is at risk from three primary attacks: DOTS agent
impersonation, traffic injection, and signaling blocking. The DOTS
protocol MUST be designed for minimal data transfer to address the
blocking risk.
</t>
<t>
Impersonation and traffic injection mitigation can be managed
through current secure communications best practices. DOTS is not
subject to anything new in this area. One consideration could be
to minimize the security technologies in use at any one time. The
more needed, the greater the risk of failures coming from
assumptions on one technology providing protection that it does not
in the presence of another technology.
</t>
<t>
Additional details of DOTS security requirements may be found in
<xref target="I-D.ietf-dots-requirements" />.
</t>
</section>
<section title="IANA Considerations">
<t>
No IANA considerations exist for this document at this time.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Acknowledgments">
<t>
TBD
</t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2119.xml"?>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<?rfc include="reference.I-D.ietf-dots-requirements.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6335.xml"?>
<reference anchor="APACHE" target="https://www.modsecurity.org">
<front>
<title>Apache mod_security</title>
<author>
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RRL" target="https://deepthought.isc.org/article/AA-00994/0/Using-the-Response-Rate-Limiting-Feature-in-BIND-9.10.html">
<front>
<title>BIND RRL</title>
<author>
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date/>
</front>
</reference>
</references>
</back>
</rfc>
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-24 02:39:59 |