One document matched: draft-ietf-dane-ops-06.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="US-ASCII"?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd" [
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<!ENTITY RFC4034 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4034.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC4035 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4035.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC5246 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5246.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC5280 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC6066 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6066.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC6125 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6125.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC6347 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6347.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC6698 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6698.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC6962 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6962.xml">
<!ENTITY RFC7218 SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7218.xml">
<!ENTITY I-D.ietf-tls-oob-pubkey SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-tls-oob-pubkey.xml">
<!ENTITY I-D.ietf-dane-srv SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-dane-srv.xml">
<!ENTITY I-D.ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane.xml">
<!ENTITY I-D.dukhovni-opportunistic-security SYSTEM "http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.dukhovni-opportunistic-security.xml">
]>
<?rfc strict="yes" ?>
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc tocdepth="2"?>
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc sortrefs="yes" ?>
<?rfc compact="yes" ?>
<?rfc subcompact="no" ?>
<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ietf-dane-ops-06" ipr="trust200902">
<front>
<title abbrev="DANE operations">Updates to and Operational Guidance for the DANE Protocol</title>
<author fullname="Viktor Dukhovni" initials="V." surname="Dukhovni">
<organization>Unaffiliated</organization>
<address>
<email>ietf-dane@dukhovni.org</email>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="W.H." surname="Hardaker" fullname="Wes Hardaker">
<organization>Parsons</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>P.O. Box 382</street>
<city>Davis</city>
<region>CA</region>
<code>95617</code>
<country>US</country>
</postal>
<email>ietf@hardakers.net</email>
</address>
</author>
<date/>
<area>sec</area>
<workgroup>DANE</workgroup>
<keyword>DANE</keyword>
<keyword>TLSA</keyword>
<abstract>
<t>
This memo clarifies and updates the DANE TLSA protocol based on
implementation experience since the publication of the original
DANE specification in <xref target="RFC6698"/>. It also contains
guidance for DANE implementers and operators.
</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction">
<t>
<xref target="RFC6698"/> specifies a new DNS resource record
"TLSA" that associates a public certificate or public key of a
trusted leaf or issuing authority with the corresponding TLS
transport endpoint. These DANE TLSA records, when validated by
DNSSEC, can be used to augment or replace the trust model of the
existing public Certification Authority (CA) Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI).
</t>
<t>
<xref target="RFC6698"/> defines three TLSA record fields with
respectively 4, 2 and 3 currently specified values. These yield
24 distinct combinations of TLSA record types. This many options
have lead to implementation and operational complexity. This
memo will recommend best-practice choices to help simplify
implementation and deployment given these plethora of choices.
</t>
<t>
Implementation complexity also arises from the fact that the
TLS transport endpoint is often specified indirectly via Service
Records (SRV), Mail Exchange (MX) records, CNAME records or
other mechanisms that map an abstract service domain to a
concrete server domain. With service indirection there are
multiple potential places for clients to find the relevant TLSA
records. Service indirection is often used to implement "virtual
hosting", where a single Service Provider transport endpoint
simultaneously supports multiple hosted domain names. With
services that employ TLS, such hosting arrangements may require
the Service Provider to deploy multiple pairs of private keys
and certificates with TLS clients signaling the desired domain
via the Server Name Indication (SNI) extension (<xref
target="RFC6066" />, section 3). This memo provides operational
guidelines intended to maximize interoperability between DANE
TLS clients and servers.
</t>
<t>
In the context of this memo, channel security is assumed to be
provided by TLS or DTLS. The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
<xref target="RFC5246" /> and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) <xref target="RFC6347" /> protocols provide secured TCP
and UDP communication over IP. By convention, "TLS" will be
used throughout this document and, unless otherwise specified,
the text applies equally well to the DTLS protocol. Used without
authentication, TLS provides protection only against eavesdropping
through its use of encryption. With authentication, TLS also
provides integrity protection and authentication, which protect
the transport against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
</t>
<t>
Other related documents that build on <xref target="RFC6698"/> are
<xref target="I-D.ietf-dane-srv"/> and <xref
target="I-D.ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane"/>. In <xref target="updates"/>
we summarize the updates this document makes to <xref
target="RFC6698"/>.
</t>
<section title="Terminology">
<t>
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted
as described in <xref target="RFC2119"/>.
</t>
<t>The following terms are used throughout this document:
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="Service Provider:">
A company or organization that offers to host a service on behalf
of a Customer Domain. The original domain name associated with the
service often remains under the control of the customer. Connecting
applications may be directed to the Service Provider via a redirection
resource record. Example redirection records include MX, SRV, and
CNAME. The Service Provider frequently provides services for
many customers and must carefully manage any TLS credentials
offered to connecting applications to ensure name matching is
handled easily by the applications.
</t>
<t hangText="Customer Domain:">
As described above, a client may be interacting with a
service that is hosted by a third party. We will refer to
the domain name used to locate the service prior to any
redirection, as the "Customer Domain".
</t>
<t hangText="TLSA Publisher:">
The entity responsible for publishing a TLSA record within a DNS
zone. This zone will be assumed DNSSEC-signed and validatable
to a trust anchor, unless otherwise specified. If the Customer
Domain is not outsourcing their DNS service, the TLSA Publisher
will be the customer themselves. Otherwise, the TLSA Publisher
is sometimes the operator of the outsourced DNS service.
</t>
<t hangText="public key:">
The term "public key" is short-hand for the
subjectPublicKeyInfo component of a PKIX <xref target="RFC5280" />
certificate.
</t>
<t hangText="SNI:">
The "Server Name Indication" (SNI) TLS protocol extension allows
a TLS client to request a connection to a
particular service name of a TLS server (<xref target="RFC6066"
/>, section 3). Without this TLS extension, a TLS server has no choice
but to offer a PKIX certificate with a default list of server
names, making it difficult to host multiple Customer Domains at
the same IP-addressed based TLS service endpoint (i.e., "secure virtual hosting").
</t>
<t hangText="TLSA parameters:">
In <xref target="RFC6698"/> the TLSA record is defined to
consist of four fields. The first three of these are numeric
parameters that specify the meaning of the data in fourth and final
field. To avoid language contortions when we need to distinguish
between the first three fields that together define a TLSA record
"type" and the fourth that provides a data value of that type,
we will call the first three fields "TLSA parameters", or sometimes
just "parameters" when obvious from context.
</t>
</list>
</t>
</section><!-- Terminology -->
</section><!-- Introduction -->
<section title="DANE TLSA Record Overview">
<t>
DANE TLSA <xref target="RFC6698"/> specifies a protocol for
publishing TLS server certificate associations via DNSSEC <xref
target="RFC4033" /> <xref target="RFC4034" /> <xref
target="RFC4035" />. The DANE TLSA specification defines multiple
TLSA RR types via combinations of numeric values of the first three
fields of the TLSA record (i.e. the "TLSA parameters"). The
numeric values of these parameters were later given symbolic names
in <xref target="RFC7218"/>. These parameters are:
</t>
<t>
<list style='hanging'>
<t hangText="The Certificate Usage field:"> Section 2.1.1
of <xref target="RFC6698"/> specifies 4 values: PKIX-TA(0),
PKIX-EE(1), DANE-TA(2), and DANE-EE(3). There is an additional
private-use value: PrivCert(255). All other values are reserved
for use by future specifications. </t>
<t hangText="The selector field:"> Section 2.1.2 of <xref
target="RFC6698"/> specifies 2 values: Cert(0), SPKI(1). There
is an additional private-use value: PrivSel(255). All other
values are reserved for use by future specifications. </t>
<t hangText="The matching type field:"> Section 2.1.3 of <xref
target="RFC6698"/> specifies 3 values: Full(0), SHA2-256(1),
SHA2-512(2). There is an additional private-use value:
PrivMatch(255). All other values are reserved for use by future
specifications. </t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
We may think of TLSA Certificate Usage values 0 through 3 as
a combination of two one-bit flags. The low-bit chooses between
trust anchor (TA) and end entity (EE) certificates. The high bit
chooses between PKIX, or public PKI issued, and DANE, or
domain-issued trust anchors:
</t>
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t> When the low bit is set (PKIX-EE(1) and DANE-EE(3)) the TLSA
record matches an EE certificate (also commonly referred to as a
leaf or server certificate.)</t>
<t> When the low bit is not set (PKIX-TA(0) and DANE-TA(2)) the
TLSA record matches a trust anchor (a Certification Authority)
that issued one of the certificates in the server certificate
chain. </t>
<t> When the high bit is set (DANE-TA(2) and DANE-EE(3)), the
server certificate chain is domain-issued and may be verified
without reference to any pre-existing public certification authority
PKI. Trust is entirely placed on the content of the TLSA records
obtained via DNSSEC. </t>
<t> When the high bit is not set (PKIX-TA(0) and PKIX-EE(1)),
the TLSA record publishes a server policy stating that its
certificate chain must pass PKIX validation <xref target="RFC5280"/>
and the DANE TLSA record is used to signal an additional
requirement that the PKIX validated server
certificate chain also contains the referenced CA or EE certificate.
</t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
The selector field specifies whether the TLSA RR matches the
whole certificate (Cert(0)) or just its subjectPublicKeyInfo
(SPKI(1)). The subjectPublicKeyInfo is an ASN.1 DER encoding
of the certificate's algorithm id, any parameters and the public
key data.
</t>
<t>
The matching type field specifies how the TLSA RR Certificate
Association Data field is to be compared with the certificate
or public key. A value of Full(0) means an exact match: the
full DER encoding of the certificate or public key is given in
the TLSA RR. A value of SHA2-256(1) means that the association
data matches the SHA2-256 digest of the certificate or public
key, and likewise SHA2-512(2) means a SHA2-512 digest is used.
Of the two digest algorithms, for now only SHA2-256(1) is mandatory
to implement. Clients SHOULD implement SHA2-512(2), but servers
SHOULD NOT exclusively publish SHA2-512(2) digests. The digest
algorithm agility protocol defined in <xref target="agility"/>
SHOULD be used by clients to decide how to process TLSA RRsets
that employ multiple digest algorithms. Server operators MUST
publish TLSA RRsets that are compatible with digest algorithm
agility.
</t>
<section title="Example TLSA record">
<t>
In the example TLSA record below:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
_25._tcp.mail.example.com. IN TLSA PKIX-TA Cert SHA2-256 (
E8B54E0B4BAA815B06D3462D65FBC7C0
CF556ECCF9F5303EBFBB77D022F834C0 )
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
The TLSA Certificate Usage is DANE-TA(2), the selector is
Cert(0) and the matching type is SHA2-256(1). The last field is
the Certificate Association Data Field, which in this case
contains the SHA2-256 digest of the server certificate.
</t>
</section><!-- Example TLSA record -->
</section><!-- DANE TLSA record overview -->
<section title="DANE TLS Requirements" anchor="tlsreq">
<t>
<xref target="RFC6698"/> does not discuss what versions of TLS are
required when using DANE records. This document specifies that
TLS clients that support DANE/TLSA MUST support at least TLS 1.0
and SHOULD support TLS 1.2. TLS clients and servers using DANE
SHOULD support the "Server Name Indication" (SNI) extension of
TLS.
</t>
</section><!-- TLS Requirements -->
<section title="Certificate-Usage-Specific DANE Updates and Guidelines">
<t>
The four Certificate Usage values from the TLSA record,
DANE-EE(3), DANE-TA(2), PKIX-EE(1) and PKIX-TA(0), are discussed
below.
</t>
<section title="Certificate Usage DANE-EE(3)" anchor="type3">
<t>
In this section the meaning of DANE-EE(3) is updated from <xref
target="RFC6698"/> to specify that peer identity matching and
that validity interval compliance is based solely on the TLSA
RRset properties. We also extend <xref target="RFC6698"/> to
cover the use of DANE authentication of raw public keys <xref
target="I-D.ietf-tls-oob-pubkey"/> via TLSA records with
Certificate Usage DANE-EE(3) and selector SPKI(1).
</t>
<t>
Authentication via certificate usage DANE-EE(3) TLSA records
involves simply checking that the server's leaf certificate
matches the TLSA record. In particular, the binding of the server
public key to its name is based entirely on the TLSA record
association. The server MUST be considered authenticated even
if none of the names in the certificate match the client's
reference identity for the server.
</t>
<t>
Similarly, with DANE-EE(3), the expiration date of the server
certificate MUST be ignored. The validity period of the TLSA
record key binding is determined by the validity interval of
the TLSA record DNSSEC signatures.
</t>
<t>
With DANE-EE(3) servers that know all the connecting clients are
making use of DANE, they need not employ SNI (i.e., the may
ignore the client's SNI message) even when the server is known
under multiple domain names that would otherwise require
separate certificates. It is instead sufficient for the TLSA
RRsets for all the domain names in question to match the
server's primary certificate. For application protocols where
the server name is obtained indirectly via SRV, MX or similar
records, it is simplest to publish a single hostname as the
target server name for all the hosted domains.
</t>
<t>
In organizations where it is practical to make coordinated
changes in DNS TLSA records before server key rotation, it is
generally best to publish end-entity DANE-EE(3) certificate
associations in preference to other choices of certificate
usage. DANE-EE(3) TLSA records support multiple server names
without SNI, don't suddenly stop working when leaf or intermediate
certificates expire, and don't fail when a server operator
neglects to include all the required issuer certificates in
the server certificate chain.
</t>
<t>
TLSA records published for DANE servers SHOULD, as a best
practice, be "DANE-EE(3) SPKI(1) SHA2-256(1)" records. Since
all DANE implementations are required to support SHA2-256, this
record type works for all clients and need not change across
certificate renewals with the same key. This TLSA record type
easily supports hosting arrangements with a single certificate
matching all hosted domains. It is also the easiest to implement
correctly in the client.
</t>
<t>
Another advantage of "DANE-EE(3) SPKI(1)" (with any suitable
matching type) TLSA records is that they are compatible with
the raw public key TLS extension specified in <xref
target="I-D.ietf-tls-oob-pubkey"/>. DANE clients that support
this extension can use the TLSA record to authenticate servers
that negotiate the use of raw public keys in place of X.509
certificate chains. Provided the server adheres to the
requirements of <xref target="rrreq"/>, the fact that raw
public keys are not compatible with any other TLSA record
types will not get in the way of successful authentication.
Clients that employ DANE to authenticate the peer server
SHOULD NOT negotiate the use of raw public keys unless
the server's TLSA RRset includes compatible TLSA records.
</t>
<t>
While it is, in principle, also possible to authenticate raw
public keys via "DANE-EE(3) Cert(0) Full(0)" records by
extracting the public key from the certificate in DNS, this
is in conflict <!-- XXX: state how; cause it doesn't require the
full comparison of the full value I assume? -->
with the indicated selector and requires extra
logic on clients that not all implementations are expected to
provide. Servers SHOULD NOT rely on "DANE-EE(3) Cert(0)
Full(0)" TLSA records to publish authentication data for raw
public keys.
</t>
</section><!-- DANE-EE(3) -->
<section title="Certificate Usage DANE-TA(2)" anchor="type2">
<t>
This section updates <xref target="RFC6698"/> by specifying
a new operational requirement for servers publishing TLSA
records with a usage of DANE-TA(2): such servers MUST include
the trust-anchor certificate in their TLS server certificate
message.
</t>
<t>
Some domains may prefer to avoid the operational complexity
of publishing unique TLSA RRs for each TLS service. If the
domain employs a common issuing Certification Authority to
create certificates for multiple TLS services, it may be
simpler to publish the issuing authority as a trust anchor
(TA) for the certificate chains of all relevant services.
The TLSA query domain (TLSA base domain with port and protocol
prefix labels) for each service issued by the same TA may
then be set to a CNAME alias that points to a common TLSA
RRset that matches the TA. For example:
<!-- XXXWJH: but this is possible for DANE-EE too... -->
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
www1.example.com. IN A 192.0.2.1
www2.example.com. IN A 192.0.2.2
_443._tcp.www1.example.com. IN CNAME tlsa201._dane.example.com.
_443._tcp.www2.example.com. IN CNAME tlsa201._dane.example.com.
tlsa201._dane.example.com. IN TLSA 2 0 1 e3b0c44298fc1c14...
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
With usage DANE-TA(2) the server certificates will need to
have names that match one of the client's reference identifiers
(see <xref target="RFC6125"/>). The server SHOULD employ SNI
to select the appropriate certificate to present to the client.
</t>
<section title="Recommended record combinations">
<t>
TLSA records with selector Full(0) are NOT RECOMMENDED. While
these potentially obviate the need to transmit the TA certificate
in the TLS server certificate message, client implementations
may not be able to augment the server certificate chain with
the data obtained from DNS, especially when the TLSA record
supplies a bare key (selector SPKI(1)). Since the server
will need to transmit the TA certificate in any case, server
operators SHOULD publish TLSA records with a selector other
than Full(0) and avoid potential DNS interoperability issues
with large TLSA records containing full certificates or keys
(see <xref target="sizeissues" />).
</t>
<t>
TLSA Publishers employing DANE-TA(2) records SHOULD publish
records with a selector of Cert(0). Such TLSA records are
associated with the whole trust anchor certificate, not just
with the trust anchor public key. In particular, the client
SHOULD then apply any relevant constraints from the trust
anchor certificate, such as, for example, path length
constraints.
</t>
<t>
While a selector of SPKI(1) may also be employed, the resulting
TLSA record will not specify the full trust anchor certificate
content, and elements of the trust anchor certificate other than
the public key become mutable. This may, for example, enable a
subsidiary CA to issue a chain that violates the trust anchor's
path length or name constraints.
</t>
</section><!-- Recommended record combinations -->
<section title="Trust anchor digests and server certificate chain">
<t>
With DANE-TA(2) (these TLSA records are expected to match
the digest of a TA certificate or public key), a complication
arises when the TA certificate is omitted from the server's
certificate chain, perhaps on the basis of Section 7.4.2
of <xref target="RFC5246"/>:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
The sender's certificate MUST come first in the list. Each
following certificate MUST directly certify the one preceding
it. Because certificate validation requires that root keys be
distributed independently, the self-signed certificate that
specifies the root certification authority MAY be omitted from
the chain, under the assumption that the remote end must
already possess it in order to validate it in any case.
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
With TLSA Certificate Usage DANE-TA(2), there is no expectation
that the client is pre-configured with the trust anchor
certificate. In fact, client implementations are free to ignore all
locally configured trust anchors when processing usage
DANE-TA(2) TLSA records and may rely exclusively on the
certificates provided in the server's certificate chain.
But, with a digest in the TLSA record, the TLSA record contains
neither the full trust anchor certificate nor the full public
key. If the TLS server's certificate chain does not contain
the trust anchor certificate, DANE clients will be unable to
authenticate the server.
</t>
<t>
TLSA Publishers that publish TLSA Certificate Usage DANE-TA(2)
associations with a selector of SPKI(1) or using a
digest-based matching type (not Full(0)) MUST ensure that the
corresponding server is configured to also include the trust
anchor certificate in its TLS handshake certificate chain,
even if that certificate is a self-signed root CA and would
have been optional in the context of the existing public CA
PKI.
</t>
</section><!-- "Trust anchor digests and server certificate chain" -->
<section title="Trust anchor public keys">
<!-- XXX: DANEbis: clarify "IN TLSA 2 1 0" requirements. -->
<t>
TLSA records with TLSA Certificate Usage DANE-TA(2), selector
SPKI(1) and a matching type of Full(0) will publish the full public
key of a trust anchor via DNS. In section 6.1.1 of <xref
target="RFC5280"/> the definition of a trust anchor consists
of the following four parts:
</t>
<t><list style="numbers">
<t>the trusted issuer name,</t>
<t>the trusted public key algorithm,</t>
<t>the trusted public key, and</t>
<t>optionally, the trusted public key parameters associated
with the public key.</t>
</list></t>
<t>
Items 2–4 are precisely the contents of the subjectPublicKeyInfo
published in the TLSA record. The issuer name is not included
in the subjectPublicKeyInfo.
</t>
<t>
With TLSA Certificate Usage DANE-TA(2), the client may not
have the associated trust anchor certificate, and cannot generally
verify whether a particular certificate chain is "issued by"
the trust anchor described in the TLSA record.
</t>
<t>
When the server certificate chain includes a CA certificate
whose public key matches the TLSA record, the client can
match that CA as the intended issuer. Otherwise, the client
can only check that the topmost certificate in the server's
chain is "signed by" the trust anchor's public key in the
TLSA record. Such a check may be difficult to implement,
and cannot be expected to be supported by all clients.
</t>
<t>
Thus, servers should not rely on "DANE-TA(2) SPKI(1) Full(0)"
TLSA records to be sufficient to authenticate chains issued
by the associated public key in the absence of a corresponding
certificate in the server's TLS certificate message. Servers
SHOULD include the TA certificate in their certificate chain.
</t>
<t>
If none of the server's certificate chain elements match a
public key specified in a TLSA record, and at least
one "DANE-TA(2) SPKI(1) Full(0)" TLSA record is available,
clients are encouraged
to check whether the topmost certificate in the chain is
signed by the provided public key and has not expired, and
in that case consider the server authenticated, provided
the rest of the chain passes validation including leaf
certificate name checks.
</t>
</section><!-- Trust anchor public keys -->
</section><!-- DANE-TA(2) -->
<section title="Certificate Usage PKIX-EE(1)" anchor="type1">
<t>
This Certificate Usage is similar to DANE-EE(3), but in
addition PKIX verification is required. Therefore, name
checks, certificate expiration, etc., apply as they would
without DANE. When, for a given application protocol, DANE
clients support both DANE-EE(3) and PKIX-EE(1) usages, it
should be noted that an attacker who can compromise DNSSEC
can replace these with usage DANE-EE(3) or DANE-TA(2) TLSA
records of their choosing, and thus bypass any PKIX verification
requirements.
</t>
<t>
Therefore, except when applications support only the PKIX
Certificate Usages (0 and 1), this Certificate Usage offers
only illusory incremental security over usage DANE-EE(3). It
provides lower operational reliability than DANE-EE(3) since
some clients may not be configured with the required root CA,
the server's chain may be incomplete or name checks may fail.
PKIX-EE(1) also requires more complex coordination between
the Customer Domain and the Service Provider in hosting
arrangements. This certificate usage is NOT RECOMMENDED.
</t>
</section><!-- PKIX-EE(1) -->
<section title="Certificate Usage PKIX-TA(0)" anchor="type0">
<t>
This section updates <xref target="RFC6698"/> by specifying
new client implementation requirements. Clients that trust
intermediate certificates MUST be prepared to construct longer
PKIX chains than would be required for PKIX alone.
</t>
<t>
TLSA Certificate Usage PKIX-TA(0) allows a domain to publish
constraints on the set of PKIX certification authorities trusted
to issue certificates for its TLS servers. This TLSA record
matches PKIX-verified trust chains which contain an issuer
certificate (root or intermediate) that matches its association
data field (typically a certificate or digest).
</t>
<t>
As with PKIX-EE(1) case, an attacker who can compromise DNSSEC
can replace these with usage DANE-EE(3) or DANE-TA(2) TLSA
records of his choosing and thus bypass the PKIX verification
requirements. Therefore, except when applications support
only the PKIX Certificate Usages (0 and 1), this Certificate
Usage offers only illusory incremental security over usage
DANE-TA(2). It provides lower operational reliability than
DANE-TA(2) since some clients may not be configured with the
required root CA. PKIX-TA(0) also requires more complex
coordination between the Customer Domain and the Service
Provider in hosting arrangements. This certificate usage is
NOT RECOMMENDED.
</t>
<t>
TLSA Publishers who publish TLSA records for a particular
public root CA, will expect that clients will then only accept
chains anchored at that root. It is possible, however, that
the client's trusted certificate store includes some intermediate
CAs, either with or without the corresponding root CA. When
a client constructs a trust chain leading from a trusted
intermediate CA to the server leaf certificate, such a
"truncated" chain might not contain the trusted root published
in the server's TLSA record.
</t>
<t>
If the omitted root is also trusted, the client may erroneously
reject the server chain if it fails to determine that the
shorter chain it constructed extends to a longer trusted chain
that matches the TLSA record. Thus, when matching
a usage PKIX-TA(0) TLSA record, a client SHOULD NOT always
stop extending the chain when the first locally trusted
certificate is found. If no TLSA records have matched any
of the elements of the chain, and the trusted certificate
found is not self-issued, the client MUST attempt to build a
longer chain in the hope that a certificate closer to the
root may in fact match the server's TLSA record.
</t>
</section><!-- PKIX-TA(0) -->
<section title="Opportunistic Security and PKIX usages">
<t>
When the client's protocol design is based on Opportunistic
Security (OS, <xref target="I-D.dukhovni-opportunistic-security"/>),
and authentication is opportunistically employed based on the
presence of server TLSA records, it is especially important
to avoid the PKIX-EE(1) and PKIX-TA(0) certificate usages.
This is because the client has no way to know in advance that
it and the server both trust the requisite root CA. Use of
authentication in OS needs to be employed only when the client
can be confident of success, absent an attack, or an operational
error on the server side.
</t>
</section><!-- Opportunistic Security considerations -->
</section><!-- Certificate-Usage-specific DANE updates and guidelines -->
<section title="Service Provider and TLSA Publisher Synchronization"
anchor="sync">
<t>
Complications arise when the TLSA Publisher is not the same
entity as the Service Provider. In this situation, the TLSA
Publisher and the Service Provider must cooperate to ensure that
TLSA records published by the TLSA Publisher don't fall out of
sync with the server certificate used by the
Service Provider.
</t>
<t>
<!-- XXX: DANEbis: Explain how DANE-EE(3) and DANE-TA(2) make it
it possible to avoid the need for service providers to obtain keys
from clients, or alternatively for clients to publish TLSA RRs
for provider generated keys. SNI is needed with DANE-TA(2), but
the key material and TLSA RRs are managed unilaterally by the
Service Provider. -->
Whenever possible, the TLSA Publisher and the Service Provider
should be the same entity. Otherwise, changes in the service
certificate chain must be carefully coordinated between the
parties involved. Such coordination is difficult and service
outages will result when coordination fails.
</t>
<t>
Having the master TLSA record in the Service Provider's zone
avoids the complexity of bilateral coordination of server
certificate configuration and TLSA record management. Even
when the TLSA RRset must be published in the Customer Domain's
DNS zone (perhaps the client application does not "chase" CNAMEs
to the TLSA base domain), it is possible to employ CNAME
records to delegate the content of the TLSA RRset to a domain
operated by the Service Provider. Certificate name checks
generally constrain the applicability of TLSA CNAMEs across
organizational boundaries to Certificate Usages DANE-EE(3) and
DANE-TA(2):
</t>
<t>
<list style="hanging">
<t hangText="Certificate Usage DANE-EE(3):"> In this case the
Service Provider can publish a single TLSA RRset that matches the
server certificate or public key digest. The same RRset works for
all Customer Domains because name checks do not apply with
DANE-EE(3) TLSA records (see <xref target="type3" />). A
Customer Domain can create a CNAME record pointing to the TLSA
RRset published by the Service Provider. </t>
<t hangText="Certificate Usage DANE-TA(2):"> When the Service
Provider operates a private certification authority, the Service
Provider is free to issue a certificate bearing any customer's
domain name. Without DANE, such a certificate would not pass
trust verification, but with DANE, the customer's TLSA RRset that
is aliased to the provider's TLSA RRset can delegate authority to
the provider's CA for the corresponding service. The Service
Provider can generate appropriate certificates for each customer
and use the SNI information provided by clients to select the
right certificate chain to present to each client. </t>
</list>
</t>
<t>
Below are example DNS records (assumed "secure" and shown without
the associated DNSSEC information, such as record signatures)
that illustrate both of of the above models in the case of an
HTTPS service whose clients all support DANE TLS. These examples
work even with clients that don't "chase" CNAMEs when constructing
the TLSA base domain (see <xref target="cname"/> below).
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
; The hosted web service is redirected via a CNAME alias.
; The associated TLSA RRset is also redirected via a CNAME alias.
;
; A single certificate at the provider works for all Customer
; Domains due to the use of the DANE-EE(3) Certificate Usage.
;
www1.example.com. IN CNAME w1.example.net.
_443._tcp.www1.example.com. IN CNAME _443._tcp.w1.example.net.
_443._tcp.w1.example.net. IN TLSA DANE-EE SPKI SHA2-256 (
8A9A70596E869BED72C69D97A8895DFA
D86F300A343FECEFF19E89C27C896BC9 )
;
; A CA at the provider can also issue certificates for each Customer
; Domain, and use the DANE-TA(2) Certificate Usage type to
; indicate a trust anchor.
;
www2.example.com. IN CNAME w2.example.net.
_443._tcp.www2.example.com. IN CNAME _443._tcp.w2.example.net.
_443._tcp.w2.example.net. IN TLSA DANE-TA Cert SHA2-256 (
C164B2C3F36D068D42A6138E446152F5
68615F28C69BD96A73E354CAC88ED00C )
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
<!-- XXX: DANEbis: Note redirection of TLSA base domain via MX, SRV
and related records -->
With protocols that support explicit transport redirection
via DNS MX records, SRV records, or other similar records,
the TLSA base domain is based on the redirected transport
end-point, rather than the origin domain. With SMTP, for
example, when an email service is hosted by a Service Provider,
the Customer Domain's MX hostnames will point at the Service
Provider's SMTP hosts. When the Customer Domain's DNS zone
is signed, the MX hostnames can be securely used as the base
domains for TLSA records that are published and managed by the
Service Provider. For example (without the required DNSSEC
information, such as record signatures):
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
; Hosted SMTP service
;
example.com. IN MX 0 mx1.example.net.
example.com. IN MX 0 mx2.example.net.
_25._tcp.mx1.example.net. IN TLSA DANE-EE SPKI SHA2-256 (
8A9A70596E869BED72C69D97A8895DFA
D86F300A343FECEFF19E89C27C896BC9 )
_25._tcp.mx2.example.net. IN TLSA DANE-EE SPKI SHA2-256 (
C164B2C3F36D068D42A6138E446152F5
68615F28C69BD96A73E354CAC88ED00C )
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
If redirection to the Service Provider's domain (via MX or SRV
records or any similar mechanism) is not possible, and aliasing
of the TLSA record is not an option, then more complex coordination
between the Customer Domain and Service Provider will be required.
Either the Customer Domain periodically provides private keys
and a corresponding certificate chain to the Provider (after
making appropriate changes in its TLSA records), or the Service
Provider periodically generates the keys and certificates and
must wait for matching TLSA records to be published by its
Customer Domains before deploying newly generated keys and
certificate chains. In <xref target="cname"/> below, we describe
an approach that employs CNAME "chasing" to avoid the difficulties
of coordinating key management across organization boundaries.
</t>
<t>
For further information about combining DANE and SRV, please
see <xref target="I-D.ietf-dane-srv" />.
</t>
</section><!-- Service Provider and TLSA Publisher Synchronization -->
<section title="TLSA Base Domain and CNAMEs" anchor="cname">
<t>
When the application protocol does not support service location
indirection via MX, SRV or similar DNS records, the service may be
redirected via a CNAME. A CNAME is a more blunt instrument
for this purpose, since unlike an MX or SRV record, it remaps
the entire origin domain to the target domain for all protocols.
</t>
<t>
<!-- XXX: DANEbis: Preferred TLSA base domain with CNAME expansion -->
The complexity of coordinating key management is largely
eliminated when DANE TLSA records are found in the Service
Provider's domain, as discussed in <xref target="sync" />.
Therefore, DANE TLS clients connecting to a server whose domain
name is a CNAME alias SHOULD follow the CNAME hop-by-hop to its
ultimate target host (noting at each step whether the CNAME is
DNSSEC-validated). If at each stage of CNAME expansion the
DNSSEC validation status is "secure", the final target name
SHOULD be the preferred base domain for TLSA lookups.
</t>
<t>
<!-- XXX: DANEbis: Fallback TLSA base domain with CNAME expansion -->
Implementations failing to find a TLSA record using a base
name of the final target of a CNAME expansion SHOULD issue a
TLSA query using the original destination name. That is, the
preferred TLSA base domain should be derived from the
fully expanded name, and failing that should be the initial
domain name.
</t>
<t>
When the TLSA base domain is the result of "secure" CNAME
expansion, the resulting domain name MUST be used as the HostName
in SNI, and MUST be the primary reference identifier for peer
certificate matching with certificate usages other than DANE-EE(3).
</t>
<t>
Protocol-specific TLSA specifications may provide additional
guidance or restrictions when following CNAME expansions.
</t>
<t>
Though CNAMEs are illegal on the right hand side of most
indirection records, such as MX and SRV records, they are
supported by some implementations. For example, if the MX or
SRV host is a CNAME alias, some implementations may "chase" the
CNAME. If they do, they SHOULD use the target hostname as the
preferred TLSA base domain as described above (and if the TLSA
records are found there, use the CNAME expanded domain also in
SNI and certificate name checks).
</t>
</section><!-- TLSA Base Domain and CNAMEs -->
<section title="TLSA Publisher Requirements" anchor="rrreq">
<t>
This section updates <xref target="RFC6698"/> by specifying a
requirement on the TLSA Publisher to ensure that each combination
of Certificate Usage, selector and matching type in the server's
TLSA RRset MUST include at least one record that matches the
server's current certificate chain. TLSA records that match
recently retired or yet to be deployed certificate chains will
be present during key rollover. Such past or future records
must never be the only records published for any given combination
of usage, selector and matching type. We describe a TLSA record
update algorithm that ensures this requirement is met.
</t>
<t>
While a server is to be considered authenticated when its
certificate chain is matched by any of the published TLSA
records, not all clients support all combinations of TLSA record
parameters. Some clients may not support some digest algorithms,
others may either not support, or may exclusively support, the
PKIX Certificate Usages. Some clients may prefer to negotiate
<xref target="I-D.ietf-tls-oob-pubkey"/> raw public keys, which
are only compatible with TLSA records whose Certificate Usage is
DANE-EE(3) with selector SPKI(1).
</t>
<t>
A consequence of the above uncertainty as to which TLSA parameters
are supported by any given client is that servers need to ensure that
each and every parameter combination that appears in the TLSA RRset
is, on its own, sufficient to match the server's current certificate
chain. In particular, when deploying new keys or new parameter
combinations some care is required to not generate parameter
combinations that only match past or future certificate chains
(or raw public keys). The rest of this section explains how to
update the TLSA RRset in a manner that ensures the above requirement
is met.
</t>
<section title="Key rollover with fixed TLSA Parameters" anchor="rollkey">
<t>
The simplest case is key rollover while retaining the same set
of published parameter combinations. In this case, TLSA records
matching the existing server certificate chain (or raw public
keys) are first augmented with corresponding records matching
the future keys, at least two TTLs or longer before
the the new chain is deployed. This allows the obsolete RRset
to age out of client caches before the new chain is used in
TLS handshakes. Once sufficient time has elapsed and all
clients performing DNS lookups are retrieving the updated TLSA records,
the server administrator may deploy the new certificate chain,
verify that it works, and then remove any obsolete
records matching the no longer active chain:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
; The initial TLSA RRset
;
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 3 1 1 01d09d19c2139a46...
; The transitional TLSA RRset published at least 2*TTL seconds
; before the actual key change
;
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 3 1 1 01d09d19c2139a46...
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 3 1 1 7aa7a5359173d05b...
; The final TLSA RRset after the key change
;
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 3 1 1 7aa7a5359173d05b...
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
The next case to consider is adding or switching to a new
combination of TLSA parameters. In this case publish the new
parameter combinations for the server's existing certificate
chain first, and only then deploy new keys if desired:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
; Initial TLSA RRset
;
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 1 1 1 01d09d19c2139a46...
; New TLSA RRset, same key re-published as DANE-EE(3)
;
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 3 1 1 01d09d19c2139a46...
</artwork>
</figure>
</section><!-- Rolling a Key Without Changing TLSA Parameters -->
<section title="Switching to DANE-TA from DANE-EE">
<t>
A more complex involves switching to a trust-anchor or PKIX
usage from a chain that is either self-signed, or issued by
a private CA and thus not compatible with PKIX. Here the
process is to first add TLSA records matching the future
chain that is issued by the desired future CA (private or
PKIX), but initially with the same parameters as the legacy
chain. Then, after deploying the new keys, switch to the
new TLSA parameter combination.
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
; The initial TLSA RRset
;
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 3 1 1 01d09d19c2139a46...
; A transitional TLSA RRset, published at least 2*TTL before the
; actual key change. The new keys are issued by a DANE-TA(2) CA,
; but for now specified via a DANE-EE(3) association.
;
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 3 1 1 01d09d19c2139a46...
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 3 1 1 7aa7a5359173d05b...
; The final TLSA RRset after the key change. Now that the old
; self-signed EE keys are not an impediment, specify the issuing
; TA of the new keys.
;
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 2 0 1 c57bce38455d9e3d...
</artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section title="Switching to New TLSA Parameters">
<t>
When employing a new digest algorithm in the TLSA RRset, for
compatibility with digest agility specified in <xref
target="agility"/> below, administrators should publish the new
digest algorithm with each combinations of Certificate Usage and
selector for each associated key or chain used with any other
digest algorithm. When removing an algorithm, remove it entirely.
Each digest algorithm employed should match the same set of chains
(or raw public keys).
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
; The initial TLSA RRset with EE SHA2-256 associations for two keys.
;
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 3 1 1 01d09d19c2139a46...
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 3 1 1 7aa7a5359173d05b...
; The new TLSA RRset also with SHA2-512 associations for each key
;
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 3 1 1 01d09d19c2139a46...
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 3 1 2 d9947c35089310bc...
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 3 1 1 7aa7a5359173d05b...
_443._tcp.www.example.org. IN TLSA 3 1 2 89a7486a4b6ae714...
</artwork>
</figure>
</section><!-- Switching to new TLSA Parameters -->
<section title="TLSA Publisher Requirements Summary">
<t>
In summary, server operators updating TLSA records should make
one change at a time. The individual safe changes are:
<list style="symbols">
<t> Pre-publish new certificate associations that employ the
same TLSA parameters (usage, selector and matching type) as
existing TLSA records, but match certificate chains that will
be deployed in the near future. Wait for stale TLSA RRsets
to expire from DNS caches before configuring servers to use
the new certificate chain. </t>
<t> Remove TLSA records matching no longer deployed certificate
chains. </t>
<t> Extend the TLSA RRset with a new combination of parameters
(usage, selector and matching type) that is used to generate
matching associations for all certificate chains that are
published with some other parameter combination. </t>
</list>
The above steps are intended to ensure that at all times and
for each combination of usage, selector and matching type at
least one TLSA record corresponds to the server's current
certificate chain. No combination of Certificate Usage, selector
and matching type in a server's TLSA RRset should ever match
only some combination of future or past certificate chains.
As a result, no matter what combinations of usage, selector
and matching type may be supported by a given client, they
will be sufficient to authenticate the server.
</t>
</section><!-- TLSA RRset Best Practice Summary -->
</section><!-- TLSA RRset best pracice -->
<section title="Digest Algorithm Agility" anchor="agility">
<t>
While <xref target="RFC6698"/> specifies multiple digest algorithms,
it does not specify a protocol by which the TLS client and TLSA
record publisher can agree on the strongest shared algorithm. Such
a protocol would allow the client and server to avoid exposure to
any deprecated weaker algorithms that are published for compatibility
with less capable clients, but should be ignored when possible. We
specify such a protocol below.
</t>
<t>
Suppose that a DANE TLS client authenticating a TLS server considers
digest algorithm "BetterAlg" stronger than digest algorithm "WorseAlg".
Suppose further that a server's TLSA RRset contains some records
with "BetterAlg" as the digest algorithm. Suppose also that the
server adheres to the requirements of <xref target="rrreq"/> and
ensures that each combination of TLSA parameters contains at least
one record that matches the server's current certificate chain (or
raw public keys). Under the above assumptions the client can safely
ignore TLSA records with the weaker algorithm "WorseAlg", because
it suffices to only check the records with the stronger algorithm
"BetterAlg".
</t>
<!-- XXXWJH: the problem is that rrreq isn't really structured in
terms of requirements as much as it examples. This should probably be
cleaned up to make it more normative in what you must do, rather than
simply show examples. Need to go back and see if there are proper
MUST/SHOULD/MAYs; maybe my memory of what I just read is bad. -->
<t>
To make digest algorithm agility possible, all published TLSA RRsets
for use with DANE TLS MUST conform to the requirements of <xref
target="rrreq"/>. With servers publishing compliant TLSA RRsets, TLS
clients can, for each combination of usage and selector, ignore all
digest records except those that employ their notion of the strongest
digest algorithm. (The server should only publish algorithms it deems
acceptable at all.) The ordering of digest algorithms by strength is
not specified in advance; it is entirely up to the TLS client. TLS
client implementations SHOULD make the digest algorithm preference
ordering a configurable option.
</t>
<t>
Note, TLSA records with a matching type of Full(0) that publish an
entire certificate or public key object play no role in digest
algorithm agility. They neither trump the processing of records
that employ digests, nor are they ignored in the presence of any
records with a digest (i.e. non-zero) matching type.
<!-- XXXWJH: sort of stops short of specifying what you should do when
you encounter both digest and full; this needs to be specified -->
</t>
<t>
TLS clients SHOULD use digest algorithm agility when processing
the DANE TLSA records of an TLS server. Algorithm agility is to
be applied after first discarding any unusable or malformed records
(unsupported digest algorithm, or incorrect digest length). Thus,
for each usage and selector, the client SHOULD process only any
usable records with a matching type of Full(0) and the usable records
whose digest algorithm is considered by the client to be the strongest
among usable records with the given usage and selector.
</t>
</section><!-- Digest algorithm agility -->
<section title="General DANE Guidelines">
<t>
These guidelines provide guidance for using or designing protocols
for DANE.
</t>
<section title="DANE DNS Record Size Guidelines" anchor="dns">
<t>
Selecting a combination of TLSA parameters to use requires
careful thought. One important consideration to take into
account is the size of the resulting TLSA record after its
parameters are selected.
</t>
<section title="UDP and TCP Considerations" anchor="sizeissues">
<t>
Deployments SHOULD avoid TLSA record sizes that cause UDP
fragmentation.
</t>
<t>
Although DNS over TCP would provide the ability to more easily
transfer larger DNS records between clients and servers, it is
not universally deployed and is still prohibited by some
firewalls. Clients that request DNS records via UDP typically
only use TCP upon receipt of a truncated response in the DNS
response message sent over UDP. Setting the TC bit alone will
be insufficient if the response containing the TC bit is
itself fragmented.
</t>
</section>
<!-- XXX: DANEbis: Discourage use of Full(0) -->
<section title= "Packet Size Considerations for TLSA Parameters">
<t>
Server operators SHOULD NOT publish TLSA records using both a
TLSA Selector of Cert(0) and a TLSA Matching Type of Full(0),
as even a single certificate is generally too large to be
reliably delivered via DNS over UDP. Furthermore, two TLSA
records containing full certificates will need to be published
simultaneously during a certificate rollover, as discussed in
<xref target="rollkey" />.
</t>
<t>
While TLSA records using a TLSA Selector of SPKI(1) and a TLSA
Matching Type of Full(0) (which publish the bare public keys without
the overhead of a containing X.509 certificate) are generally more
compact, these too should be used with caution as they are still
larger than necessary. Rather, servers SHOULD publish digest-based
TLSA Matching Types in their TLSA records.
The complete corresponding certificate should, instead, be
transmitted to the client in-band during the TLS handshake,
which can be easily verified using the digest value.
</t>
<t>
In summary, the use of a TLSA Matching Type of Full(0) is NOT
RECOMMENDED and the use of a digest-based matching type, such
as SHA2-256(1) SHOULD be used.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Certificate Name Check Conventions" anchor="namechecks">
<t>
Certificates presented by a TLS server will generally contain a
subjectAltName (SAN) extension or a Common Name (CN) element within
the subject distinguished name (DN). The TLS server's DNS domain name
is normally published within these elements, ideally within the
subjectAltName extension. (The use of the CN field for this purpose
is deprecated.)
</t>
<t>
<!-- XXX: DANEbis: Mandate use of SNI by clients -->
When a server hosts multiple domains at the same transport
endpoint, the server's ability to respond with the right
certificate chain is predicated on correct SNI information
from the client. DANE clients MUST send the SNI extension
with a HostName value of the base domain of the TLSA RRset.
<!-- XXXWJH: but if we select the base name as the original name
because of dnssec failures in the middle, then this won't
work. Consider a type 3 cert, where we fall back to the
initial name because of broken middle-ness. But the server
is still expecting the final name, and may return some
other random cert if it doesn't know the initial name. IE, The
client will send one of two SNI values and the server may
only understand one and may return a default cert that
matches neither. If they had requested the final name and
it worked, the type3 local tlsa could still match. This is
not really a suggested solution, just thinking outloud about
problems. -->
</t>
<t>
<!-- XXX: DANEbis: Specify name check requirements -->
Except with TLSA Certificate Usage DANE-EE(3), where name
checks are not applicable (see <xref target="type3" />), DANE
clients MUST verify that the client has reached the correct
server by checking that the server name is listed in the
server certificate's SAN or CN. The server name used for this comparison
SHOULD be the base domain of the TLSA RRset. Additional
acceptable names may be specified by protocol-specific DANE
standards. For example, with SMTP both the destination domain
name and the MX host name are acceptable names to be found
in the server certificate (see <xref
target="I-D.ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane"/>).
</t>
<t>
It is the responsibility of the service operator, in
coordination with the TLSA Publisher, to ensure that at least
one of the TLSA records published for the service will match the
server's certificate chain (either the default chain or the
certificate that was selected based on the SNI information
provided by the
client).
</t>
<t>
Given the DNSSEC validated DNS records below:
</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
example.com. IN MX 0 mail.example.com.
mail.example.com. IN A 192.0.2.1
_25._tcp.mail.example.com. IN TLSA DANE-TA Cert SHA2-256 (
E8B54E0B4BAA815B06D3462D65FBC7C0
CF556ECCF9F5303EBFBB77D022F834C0 )
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>
The TLSA base domain is "mail.example.com" and is required
to be the HostName in the client's SNI extension. The server
certificate chain is required to be be signed by a trust
anchor with the above certificate SHA2-256 digest. Finally,
one of the DNS names in the server certificate is required
to be be either "mail.example.com" or "example.com" (this
additional name is a concession to compatibility with prior
practice, see <xref target="I-D.ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane"/>
for details).
</t>
<t>
The semantics of wildcards in server certificates are left to
individual application protocol specifications.
<!-- seems like a cop-out without stating why -->
</t>
</section><!-- Certificate Name Check Conventions -->
<section title="Design Considerations for Protocols Using DANE">
<t>
When a TLS client goes to the trouble of authenticating a
certificate chain presented by a TLS server, it will typically
not continue to use that server in the event of authentication
failure, or else authentication serves no purpose. Some
clients may, at times, operate in an "audit" mode, where
authentication failure is reported to the user or in logs as
a potential problem, but the connection proceeds despite the
failure. Nevertheless servers publishing TLSA records MUST
be configured to allow correctly configured clients to
successfully authenticate their TLS certificate chains.
</t>
<!-- XXX: DANEbis: Opportunistic TLS discovery. -->
<t>
<!-- XXXWJH: Err.... I'm not sure we can say this generically;
smtp, sure, but I'm not sure the WG agreed to it completely -->
<!-- XXXWJH: this defines unusable to include broken hashes??? -->
A service with DNSSEC-validated TLSA records implicitly promises
TLS support. When all the TLSA records for a service are found
"unusable", due to unsupported parameter combinations or
malformed associated data, DANE clients cannot authenticate the
service certificate chain. When authenticated TLS is dictated
by the application, the client SHOULD NOT connect to the
associated server. If, on the other hand, the use of TLS is
"opportunistic", then the client SHOULD generally use the server
via an unauthenticated TLS connection, but if TLS encryption
cannot be established, the client MUST NOT use the server.
Standards for DANE specific to the particular application
protocol may modify the above requirements, as appropriate, to
specify whether the connection should be established anyway
without relying on TLS security, with only encryption but not
authentication, or whether to refuse to connect entirely.
Application protocols need to specify when to prioritize
security over the ability to connect under adverse conditions.
</t>
<section title="Design Considerations for non-PKIX Protocols" anchor="nopki">
<!-- XXX: DANEbis: App protocols may define non-usability of CU-[01]. -->
<t>
For some application protocols (such as SMTP to MX with
opportunistic TLS), the existing public CA PKI is not a
viable alternative to DANE. For these (non-PKIX) protocols,
new DANE standards SHOULD NOT suggest publishing TLSA records
with TLSA Certificate Usage PKIX-TA(0) or PKIX-EE(1), as
TLS clients cannot be expected to perform <xref target="RFC5280"/>
PKIX validation or <xref target="RFC6125"/> identity
verification.
</t>
<t>
Protocols designed for non-PKIX use SHOULD choose to treat any
TLSA records with TLSA Certificate Usage PKIX-TA(0) or
PKIX-EE(1) as unusable. After verifying that the only
available TLSA Certificate Usage types are PKIX-TA(0) or
PKIX-EE(1), protocol specifications MAY instruct clients to
either refuse to initiate a connection or to connect via
unauthenticated TLS if no alternative authentication
mechanisms are available.
</t>
</section><!-- Design Considerations for non-PKIX Protocols -->
</section><!-- Design Considerations for Protocols Using DANE -->
</section>
<section title="Interaction with Certificate Transparency">
<!-- XXX: DANEbis: CT interaction: No CT for DANE-TA/EE -->
<t>
Certificate Transparency (CT) <xref target="RFC6962"/> defines
an experimental approach to mitigate the risk of rogue or
compromised public CAs issuing unauthorized certificates. This
section clarifies the interaction of CT and DANE. CT is an
experimental protocol and auditing system that applies only to
public CAs, and only when they are free to issue unauthorized
certificates for a domain. If the CA is not a public CA, or a
DANE-EE(3) TLSA RR directly specifies the end entity
certificate, there is no role for CT, and clients need not apply
CT checks.
</t>
<t>
When a server is authenticated via a DANE TLSA RR with TLSA
Certificate Usage DANE-EE(3), the domain owner has directly
specified the certificate associated with the given service
without reference to any PKIX certification authority. Therefore,
when a TLS client authenticates the TLS server via a TLSA
certificate association with usage DANE-EE(3), CT checks SHOULD
NOT be performed. Publication of the server certificate or
public key (digest) in a TLSA record in a DNSSEC signed zone
by the domain owner assures the TLS client that the certificate
is not an unauthorized certificate issued by a rogue CA without
the domain owner's consent.
</t>
<t>
When a server is authenticated via a DANE TLSA RR with TLSA
usage DANE-TA(2) and the server certificate does not chain
to a known public root CA, CT cannot apply (CT logs only
accept chains that start with a known, public root). Since
TLSA Certificate Usage DANE-TA(2) is generally intended to
support non-PKIX trust anchors, TLS clients SHOULD NOT perform
CT checks with usage DANE-TA(2) using unknown root CAs.
</t>
<t>
A server operator who wants clients to perform CT checks
should publish TLSA RRs with usage PKIX-TA(0) or PKIX-EE(1).
</t>
</section>
<section title="Note on DNSSEC Security">
<t>
Clearly the security of the DANE TLSA PKI rests on the security
of the underlying DNSSEC infrastructure. While this memo is
not a guide to DNSSEC security, a few comments may be helpful
to TLSA implementers.
</t>
<t>
With the existing public CA PKI, name constraints are rarely used,
and a public root CA can issue certificates for any domain of its
choice. With DNSSEC, under the Registry/Registrar/Registrant
model, the situation is different: only the registrar of record
can update a domain's DS record in the registry parent zone (in
some cases, however, the registry is the sole registrar). With
many gTLDs, for which multiple registrars compete to provide
domains in a single registry, it is important to make sure that
rogue registrars cannot easily initiate an unauthorized domain
transfer, and thus take over DNSSEC for the domain. DNS Operators
SHOULD use a registrar lock of their domains to offer some
protection against this possibility.
</t>
<t>
When the registrar is also the DNS operator for the domain, one
needs to consider whether the registrar will allow orderly
migration of the domain to another registrar or DNS operator
in a way that will maintain DNSSEC integrity. TLSA Publishers
SHOULD ensure their registrar publishes a suitable domain
transfer policy.
</t>
<t>
DNSSEC signed RRsets cannot be securely revoked before they
expire. Operators should plan accordingly and not generate
signatures with excessively long duration periods. For domains publishing
high-value keys, a signature lifetime of a few days is reasonable,
and the zone should be resigned daily. For domains with
less critical data, a reasonable signature lifetime is a couple
of weeks to a month, and the zone should be resigned weekly.
Monitoring of the signature lifetime is important. If the zone
is not resigned in a timely manner, one risks a major outage
and the entire domain will become bogus.
</t>
</section>
<section title="Summary of Updates to RFC6698" anchor="updates">
<t>Authors note: is this section needed? Or is it sufficiently
clear above that we don't need to restate things here?</t>
<t>
<list style="symbols">
<t>In <xref target="tlsreq"/> we update <xref target="RFC6698"/>
to specify a requirement for clients to support at least TLS
1.0, and to support SNI. </t>
<t>In <xref target="type3"/> we update <xref target="RFC6698"/>
to specify peer identity matching and certificate validity
interval based solely on the basis of the TLSA RRset. We also
specify DANE authentication of raw public keys <xref
target="I-D.ietf-tls-oob-pubkey"/> via TLSA records with
Certificate Usage DANE-EE(3) and selector SPKI(1). </t>
<t>In <xref target="type2"/> we update <xref target="RFC6698"/>
to require that servers publishing digest TLSA records with a
usage of DANE-TA(2) MUST include the trust-anchor certificate
in their TLS server certificate message. This extends to the
case of "2 1 0" TLSA records which publish a full public key. </t>
<t>In <xref target="type1"/> and <xref target="type0"/>, we explain
that PKIX-EE(1) and PKIX-TA(0) are generally NOT RECOMMENDED.
With usage PKIX-TA(0) we note that clients may need to processes
extended trust chains beyond the first trusted issuer, when
that issuer is not self-signed. </t>
<t> In <xref target="cname"/>, we recommend that DANE application
protocols specify that when possible securely CNAME expanded names
be used to derive the TLSA base domain. </t>
<t> In <xref target="rrreq"/>, we specify a strategy for managing
TLSA records that interoperates with DANE clients regardless
of what subset of the possible TLSA record types (combinations
of TLSA parameters) is supported by the client. </t>
<t> In <xref target="agility"/>, we propose a digest algorithm
agility protocol. [Note: This section does not yet represent
the rough consensus of the DANE working group and requires further
discussion. Perhaps this belongs in a separate document.] </t>
<t> In <xref target="dns"/> we recommend against the use of
Full(0) TLSA records, as digest records are generally much more
compact. </t>
</list>
</t>
</section><!-- Summary of RFC6698 updates -->
<section anchor="Security" title="Security Considerations">
<!-- XXXWJH: this section seems a bit weak and short, considering
the security ramifications of everything being discussed -->
<t>
Application protocols that cannot make use of the existing public
CA PKI (so called non-PKIX protocols), may choose not to implement
certain PKIX-dependent TLSA record types defined in <xref
target="RFC6698"/>. If such records are published despite
not being supported by the application protocol, they are treated as
"unusable". When TLS is opportunistic, the client may proceed
to use the server with mandatory unauthenticated TLS. This is stronger
than opportunistic TLS without DANE, since in that case the client
may also proceed with a plaintext connection. When TLS is not
opportunistic, the client MUST NOT connect to the server.
</t>
<t>
Therefore, when TLSA records are used with protocols where PKIX
does not apply, the recommended policy is for servers to not
publish PKIX-dependent TLSA records, and for opportunistic TLS
clients to use them to enforce the use of (albeit unauthenticated)
TLS, but otherwise treat them as unusable. Of course, when PKIX
validation is supported by the application protocol, clients
SHOULD perform PKIX validation per <xref target="RFC6698"/>.
</t>
</section><!-- Security Considerations -->
<section title="IANA Considerations">
<t>This specification requires no support from IANA.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="Acknowledgements" title="Acknowledgements">
<t>
The authors would like to thank Phil Pennock for his comments and
advice on this document.
</t>
<t>
Acknowledgments from Viktor: Thanks to Tony Finch who finally
prodded me into participating in DANE working group discussions.
Thanks to Paul Hoffman who motivated me to produce this memo
and provided feedback on early drafts. Thanks also to Samuel
Dukhovni for editorial assistance.
</t>
</section><!-- Acknowledgements -->
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
&RFC2119;
&RFC4033;
&RFC4034;
&RFC4035;
&RFC5246;
&RFC5280;
&RFC6066;
&RFC6125;
&RFC6347;
&RFC6698;
&RFC7218;
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
&RFC6962;
&I-D.ietf-tls-oob-pubkey;
&I-D.ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane;
&I-D.ietf-dane-srv;
&I-D.dukhovni-opportunistic-security;
</references>
</back>
</rfc>
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-24 01:18:21 |