One document matched: draft-ietf-bfd-generic-crypto-auth-00.xml
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<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ietf-bfd-generic-crypto-auth-00"
ipr="trust200902">
<front>
<title abbrev="BFD Generic Authentication">BFD Generic Cryptographic
Authentication</title>
<author fullname="Manav Bhatia " initials="M." surname="Bhatia ">
<organization>Alcatel-Lucent</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city>Bangalore</city>
<country>India</country>
</postal>
<email>manav.bhatia@alcatel-lucent.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Vishwas Manral " initials="V. " surname="Manral ">
<organization>Hewlett-Packard Co.</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>19111 Pruneridge Ave.</street>
<city>Cupertino</city>
<region>CA</region>
<code>95014</code>
<country>USA</country>
</postal>
<email>vishwas.manral@hp.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Dacheng Zhang" initials="D." surname="Zhang">
<organization>Huawei</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city>Beijing</city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country>China</country>
</postal>
<email>zhangdacheng@huawei.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date day="8" month="October" year="2011" />
<abstract>
<t>This document proposes an extension to Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD) to allow the use of any cryptographic authentication
algorithm in addition to the already-documented authentication schemes
described in the base specification. This document adds the basic
infrastructure thats required for supporting algorithm and key agility
for BFD.</t>
</abstract>
<note title="Requirements Language">
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in <xref
target="RFC2119">RFC 2119</xref>.</t>
</note>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction">
<t>The base specification of bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
[RFC5880] defines five authentication schemes: Simple Password, Keyed
MD5 , Meticulous Keyed MD5, Keyed SHA-1 and Meticulous SHA-1. In Simple
Password, passwords are transferred in plaintext. An attacker with
physical access to the network can easily eavesdrop on the password and
compromise the security of the BFD packet exchanges. In Keyed MD5 and
Meticulous Keyed MD5, the BFD devices on the both sides of a BFD session
share a secret key which is used to generate a keyed MD5 digest for each
packet, and a monotonically increasing sequence number scheme is used to
prevent replay attacks. Keyed SHA-1 and Meticulous SHA-1 modes are
similar to MD5, and it uses SHA-1 instead of an MD5 digest for each
packet.</t>
<t>A concern with existing authentication schemes of BFD is that the
security strength of the cryptographic algorithms adopted in the schemes
is relatively weak. Both the MD5 algorithm and the SHA-1 algorithm are
known to be vulnerable to collision attacks. In [MD5-attack] and
[Dobb96a, Dobb96b], several methods of generating hash collisions for
some applications of MD5 are proposed. Similar security vulnerabilities
of SHA-1 are introduced in [SHA-1-attack1] and [SHA-1-attack2]. It is
therefore desired that BFD must support newer algorithms that have not
yet been broken. Additionally, the transition mechanism from one
algorithm to the other must be seamless.</t>
<t>The other issue with the existing authentication schemes is that
those are subject to replay attacks. In non-meticulous authentication
schemes, sequence numbers are only increased occasionally. This behavior
can be taken advantage of by an attacker to perform intra-session replay
attacks. In meticulous authentication schemes, sequence numbers are
required to monotonically increase with each successive packet, which
eliminates the possibility of intra-session replay attacks. </t>
<t>BFD session timers are often defined with the granularity of
microseconds. Although in practice BFD devices send packets at
millisecond intervals, they can potentially, send packets at a much
higher rate. Since the cryptographic sequence number space is only 32
bits, when using Meticulous Authentication, a sequence number used in a
BFD session can reach its maximum value and roll over within a short
period. For instance, if the value of a sequence number is increased by
one every millisecond, then it will reach its maximum in less than 8
weeks. This can potentially be exploited to launch inter-session replay
attacks.</t>
<t>In order to address the issues mentioned above, this document
proposes two new authentication types that can be used to secure the BFD
packets. The two authentication types are - Cryptographic Authentication
(CRYPTO_AUTH) and Meticulous Cryptographic Authentication (MET_
CRYPTO_AUTH). Unlike earlier authentication types that were defined in
BFD, the proposed authentication types are not tied to any particular
authentication algorithm or a construct. These can use different
authentication algorithms and constructs like MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2,
HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2, etc. to provide authentication and data integrity
protection for BFD control packets. </t>
<t>The packet replay mechanism has also been modified to improve its
capability in handling inter and intra-session replay attacks.</t>
<t>It should be noted that this document attempts to fix the manual key
management procedure that currently exists within BFD, as part of the
Phase One described in KARP-design-guide [add a reference here]. We
therefore only consider pre-shared keys being used. However, the
solution described in this document is generic and does not preclude the
possibility of supporting keys derived from an automated key management
protocol.</t>
</section>
<section title="BFD Security Association ">
<t>The BFD protocol does not include an in-band mechanism to create or
manage BFD Security Associations (BFD SA). A BFD SA contains a set of
shared parameters between any two legitimate BFD devices.</t>
<t>Parameters associated with a BFD SA:</t>
<t>o Authentication Algorithm : This indicates the authentication
algorithm to be used with the BFD SA. This information SHOULD never be
sent in plaintext over the wire.</t>
<t>o Authentication Key : This indicates the cryptographic key
associated with this BFD SA. The length of this key is variable and
depends upon the authentication algorithm specified by the BFD SA.
Operators MUST ensure that this is never sent over the network in
clear-text via any protocol. Care should also be taken to ensure that
the selected key is unpredictable, avoiding any keys known to be weak
for the algorithm in use. <xref target="RFC4086"></xref> contains
helpful information on both key generation techniques and cryptographic
randomness. </t>
<t>o Authentication Key Identifier (Key ID) : This is a two octet
unsigned integer used to uniquely identify the BFD SA, as manually
configured by the network operator (or, in the future, possibly by some
key management protocol specified by the IETF). The receiver determines
the active SA by looking at this field in the incoming packet. The
sender puts this Key ID in the BFD packet based on the active
configuration. Using Key IDs makes changing keys while maintaining
protocol operation convenient. Normally, an implementation would allow
the network operator to configure a set of keys in a key chain, with
each key in the chain having fixed lifetime. The actual operation of
these mechanisms is outside the scope of this document.</t>
<t>A key ID indicates a tuple of an authentication key and an associated
authentication algorithm. If a key is expected to be applied with
different algorithms, different Key IDs must be used to identify the
associations of the key with its authentication algorithms respectively.
However, the application of a key for different purposes must be very
careful, since it may make an adversary easier to collect more material
to compromise the key.</t>
<t>o Not Before Time : The time point before which the key should not be
used.</t>
<t>o Not After Time : The time point after which the key should not be
used.</t>
</section>
<section title="Authentication Procedures ">
<t>In the proposed authentication extension, an optional authentication
section (Generic Authentication Section) and two authentication types
(Generic Cryptographic Authentication and Generic Meticulous
Cryptographic Authentication) are specified.</t>
<section title="Authentication Types">
<t>The Authentication section is only present in a BFD packet if the
Authentication Present (A) bit is set in the packet header. The Auth
Type in the Authentication section is set to 6 when Generic
Cryptographic Authentication is in use, while it is set to 7 when
Generic Meticulous Cryptographic Authentication is in use.</t>
<t>Both the authentication types use a monotonically increasing
sequence number to protect the BFD session against reply attacks. The
only difference between the two types is that the sequence number is
occasionally incremented in the Cryptographic Authentication mode, as
against the Meticulous Cryptographic Authentication mode, where it is
incremented on every packet.</t>
<t>As a result of this, in the Cryptographic Authentication scheme, a
replay attack is possible till the next sequence number is sent
out.</t>
</section>
<section title="Authentication Section Format">
<t>A new authentication type, 6 or 7, indicating the generic
cryptographic authentication mechanism in use, is inserted in the
first octet of Authentication Section of the BFD control packet.</t>
<t>For a BFD packet, if the Authentication Present (A) bit is set in
the header, and the Authentication Type field if 6 (Generic
Cryptographic Authentication) or 7 (Generic Meticulous Cryptographic
Authentication), the Authentication Section has the following format:
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[ 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Auth Type | Auth Len | Auth Key ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number (High Order 32 Bits) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number (Low Order 32 Bits) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Authentication Data (Variable) |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork>
</figure><list style="symbols">
<t>Auth Type: The Authentication Type, which in this case is 6
(Cryptographic Authentication) or 7 (Meticulous Cryptographic
Authentication).</t>
<t>Auth Len: Length of the Authentication Section.</t>
<t>Auth Key ID: The Key ID of the authentication key used for this
packet, enabling multiple keys to be active simultaneously.</t>
<t>Sequence Number: A 64-bit sequence number that is used to
prevent replay attacks. For Cryptographic Authentication this
value is incremented occasionally. For Meticulous Cryptographic
Authentication, this value is incremented for each successive
packet transmitted for a session.</t>
<t>Authentication Data: This field carries the digest computed by
whatever Cryptographic Authentication algorithm is being used to
authenticate the BFD control packet.</t>
</list></t>
</section>
<section title="Procedures at the Sending Side ">
<t>Before a BFD device sends a BFD packet out, the device needs to
select an appropriate BFD SA from its local key table if a keyed
digest for the packet is required. If no appropriate SA is available,
the BFD packet MUST be discarded.</t>
<t>If an appropriate SA is available, the device then derives the key
and the associated authentication algorithm from the SA.</t>
<t>The device sets the Authentication Present (A) bit in the packet
header.</t>
<t>The device MUST fill the Auth Type and the Auth length before the
authentication data is computed. The Sequence Number field MUST be set
to bfd.XmitAuthSeq.</t>
<t>The Auth length in the Authentication section is set as per the
authentication algorithm that is being used.</t>
<t>The Key ID is filled.</t>
<t>The computation of the digest is performed. The computing process
can be various when different algorithms are adopted and is out of the
scope of this document.</t>
<t>The generated digest is placed in the Authentication data,
following the Key ID.</t>
</section>
<section title="Procedure at the Receiving Side ">
<t>When a BFD Control packet is received, the following procedure MUST
be followed, in the order specified.</t>
<t>If the Authentication Present (A) bit is set in the packet header
and the receiver will try to find a appropriate BFD SA in its local
key table to process the packet. The BFD SA is identified by the Key
ID in the Authentication Section of the incoming BFD packet.</t>
<t>If the Auth Key ID field does not match the ID of any configured
authentication key or the associated key is not in its valid period,
the received packet MUST be discarded.</t>
<t>If bfd.AuthSeqKnown is 1, examine the Sequence Number field. For
Cryptographic Authentication, if the Sequence Number lies outside of
the range of bfd.RcvAuthSeq to bfd.RcvAuthSeq+(3*Detect Mult)
inclusive (when treated as an unsigned 32 bit circular number space),
the received packet MUST be discarded. For Meticulous Cryptographic
Authentication, if the Sequence Number lies outside of the range of
bfd.RcvAuthSeq+1 to bfd.RcvAuthSeq+(3*Detect Mult) inclusive (when
treated as an unsigned 32 bit circular number space, the received
packet MUST be discarded.</t>
<t>The device then prepares for generating a digest of the packet.
First of all, the authentication data in the Authentication Value
field needs to be saved somewhere else. Then the Authentication Value
field is set with a certain value (which may be various in different
security algorithms) according the authentication algorithm indicated
in the SA. After this, the device starts performing the digest
generating operations. The work of defining actual digest generating
operations is out of the scope of this document.</t>
<t>The calculated data is compared with the received authentication
data in the packet and the packet MUST be discarded if the two do not
match. In such a case, an error event SHOULD be logged.</t>
<t>An implementation MAY have a transition mode where it includes
CRYPTO_AUTH or the MET_CRYPTO_AUTH information in the packets but does
not verify this information. This is provided as a transition aid for
networks in the process of migrating to the new CRYPTO_AUTH and
MET_CRYPTO_AUTH based authentication schemes.</t>
</section>
<section title="Key Selection for BFD Packet Transmission ">
<t>This section describes how the proposed security solution selects
long-lived keys from key tables <xref
target="I-D.ietf-karp-crypto-key-table"></xref>. Generally, a key used
for BFD packet authentication should satisfy the following
requirements: <list style="symbols">
<t>The key time period as defined by Not Before Time and Not After
Time must include the current time.</t>
<t>The key can be used for the desired security algorithm.</t>
</list></t>
<t>In the remainder of this section, additional requirements for keys
are enumerated. Assume that a device R1 tries to send a unicast BFD
packet from its interface I1 to the interface R2 of a remote device R2
at time T. Because the key should be shared by the by both R1 and R2
to protect the communication between I1 and I2, the key should satisfy
the following requirements:</t>
<t><list style="symbols">
<t>The Peer field includes the device ID of R2.</t>
<t>The PeerKeyID field is not "unknown".</t>
<t>The Interfaces field includes I1.</t>
<t>The Direction field is either "out" or "both".</t>
</list></t>
</section>
<section title="Replay Protection using Extended Sequence Numbers ">
<t>As described in Section 1, if the BFD packets in a session are
transferred with a high frequency, a 32-bit sequence number may reach
its maximum and have to roll back before the session finishes. A
attacker thus can replay the packets intercepted before the sequence
number wrapped without being detected. To address this problem, the
length of the sequence number in the proposed authentication section
has been extended to 64 bits. After the extension, the sequence number
space of a device will not be exhausted within half of a million years
even if the device sends out a BFD packet in every micro-second.
Therefore, the replay attack risks caused by the limited sequence
number space can be largely addressed. However, in Generic
Cryptographic Authentication, the sequence number is only required to
increase occasionally. Therefore, a replayed packet may be regarded as
a legal one until the packet with a larger sequence number is
received. This type of intra-session replay attack cannot be addressed
only by extending the length of sequence numbers.</t>
<t>An anti-replay solution for BFD also needs to consider the
scenarios where a BFD device loses its prior sequence number state
(e.g., system crash, loss of power). In such cases, a BFD device has
to re-initialize its sequence number. Taking this opportunity, an
attacker may be able to replay the antique packets intercepted in
previous sessions without being detected.</t>
<t>To address this problem, in the proposed solution, the most
significant 32-bit value of the sequence number is used to contain a
boot count, and the remainder 32-bit value is used as an ordinary
32-bit monotonically increasing sequence number. In Generic
Cryptographic Authentication, the remainder 32-bit value is required
to increase occasionally, while in Generic Meticulous Cryptographic
Authentication, the lower order 32-bit sequence number MUST be
incremented for every BFD packet sent by a BFD device. The BFD
implementations are required to retain the boot count in non-volatile
storage for the deployment life the BFD device. The boot count
increases each time when the BFD device loses its prior sequence
number state. The SNMPv3 snmpEngineBoots variable <xref
target="RFC4222"></xref> MAY be used for this purpose. However,
maintaining a separate boot count solely for BFD sequence numbers has
the advantage of decoupling SNMP re-initialization and BFD
re-initialization. Also, in the rare event that the lower order 32-
bit sequence number wraps, the boot count can be incremented to
preserve the strictly increasing property of the aggregate sequence
number. Hence, a separate BFD boot count is RECOMMENDED.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="IANA" title="IANA Considerations">
<t>This document currently defines a value of 6 to be used to denote
Cryptographic Authentication mechanism for authenticating BFD control
packets and 7 for Meticulous Cryptographic Authentication.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="Security" title="Security Considerations">
<t>The proposed sequence number extension offers most of the benefits of
of more complicated mechanisms involving challenges. There are, however,
a couple drawbacks to this approach. First, it requires the BFD
implementation to be able to save its boot count in non-volatile
storage. If the non-volatile storage is ever repaired or upgraded such
that the contents are lost or the BFD device is replaced with a model,
the keys MUST be changed to prevent replay attacks. Second, if a device
is taken out of service completely (either intentionally or due to a
persistent failure), the potential exists for reestablishment of a BFD
adjacency by replaying the entire BFD session establishment. This
scenario is however, extremely unlikely and can be easily avoided. For
instance, after recovering from a system failure, a BFD device has to
re-establish BFD sessions. At this stage, if the device randomly selects
its discriminators to identify new BFD sessions, the possibility of
reestablishing a BFD session by replaying the entire BFD session
establishment will be eliminated. For the implementations in which
discriminators are not randomly selected, this issue can be addressed by
integrating the boot count of the remote BFD router in the generation of
the authentication data for outgoing BFD packets. Of course, this attack
could also be thwarted by changing the relevant manual keys.</t>
<t>There is a transition mode suggested where devices can ignore the
CRYPTO_AUTH or the MET_CRYPTO_AUTH information carried in the packets.
The operator must ensure that this mode is only used when migrating to
the new CRYPTO_AUTH/MET_CRYPTO_AUTH based authentication scheme as this
leaves the device vulnerable to an attack.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="Acknowledgements" title="Acknowledgements">
<t></t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2119"?>
</references>
<references>
<reference anchor="MD5-attack">
<front>
<title>Collisions for Hash Functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and
RIPEMD</title>
<author initials="X" surname="Wang">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author fullname="" initials="D." surname="Feng">
<organization></organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="X." surname="Lai">
<organization></organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="H." surname="Yu">
<organization></organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<date month="August" year="2004" />
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Dobb96a">
<front>
<title>Cryptanalysis of MD5 Compress</title>
<author initials="H." surname="Dobbertin">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date month="May" year="1996" />
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="Dobb96b">
<front>
<title>The Status of MD5 After a Recent Attack", CryptoBytes</title>
<author initials="H." surname="Dobbertin">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date year="1996" />
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="SHA-1-attack1">
<front>
<title>Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1</title>
<author initials="X." surname="Wang">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="Y." surname="Yin">
<organization></organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="H." surname="Yu">
<organization></organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<date year="2005" />
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="SHA-1-attack2">
<front>
<title>New Collision Search for SHA-1</title>
<author initials="X." surname="Wang">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="A." surname="Yao">
<organization></organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<author initials="F." surname="Yao">
<organization></organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<date year="2005" />
</front>
</reference>
<?rfc include='reference.I-D.ietf-karp-crypto-key-table'?>
<?rfc include='reference.RFC.5880'?>
<?rfc include='reference.RFC.1321'?>
<?rfc include='reference.RFC.4086'?>
<?rfc include='reference.RFC.4222'?>
</references>
</back>
</rfc>
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