One document matched: draft-haddad-mipshop-hmipv6-security-00.txt
MIPSHOP Working Group W. Haddad
Internet-Draft S. Krishnan
Expires: April 19, 2006 Ericsson Research
October 16, 2005
Combining Cryptographically Generated Address and Crypto-Based
Identifiers to Secure HMIPv6
draft-haddad-mipshop-hmipv6-security-00
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
This memo describes a method for establishing a security association
between the mobile node and the selected mobility anchor point in an
hierarchical mobile IPv6 domain. The suggested solution is based on
combining the cryptographically generated address (CGA) and crypto-
based identifiers (CBID) technologies.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Proposed Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. New Messages and Options Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
The Hirarchical Mobile IPv6 Mobility Management [HMIPv6] did not
specify nor favor any particular mechanism for establishing a
Security Association (SA) between the Mobile Node (MN) and the
Mobility Anchor Point (MAP) located within an HMIPv6 domain.
This memo describes a method allowing to establish an SA between the
MN and the selected MAP. The suggested solution is based on
combining the Cyptographically Generated Addresses [CGA] and Crypto-
Based Identifiers [CBID].
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2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [TERM].
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3. Glossary
Access Router
The Access Router is the Mobile Node's default router. The AR
aggregates the outband traffic of mobile nodes.
Mobility Anchor Point (MAP)
A Mobility Anchor Point is a router located in a network visited by
the mobile node, which is used by the MN as a local Home Agent (HA).
Regional Care-of Address (RCoA)
A Regional Care-of Address is an address obtained by the MN from the
visited network. An RCoA is an address on the MAP's subnet and is
auto-configured by the MN when receiving the MAP option.
On-link Care-of Address (LCoA)
The LCoA is the on-link CoA configured on a mobile node's interface
based on the prefix advertised by its default router.
Local Binding Update (LBU) Message
The MN sends a Local Binding Update message to the MAP in order to
establish a binding between the RCoA and the LCoA.
Pre-Binding Update (PBU) Message
The MN's default router sends a Pre-Binding Update message to the MAP
upon receiving a valid CGA signature carried by the Route
Sollicitation message sent by the MN.
Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA)
A technique [CGA] whereby an IPv6 address of a node is
cryptographically generated by using a one-way hash function from the
node's public key and some other parameters.
Crypto-Based Identifier (CBID)
A technique [CBID] whereby a non-routable identifier is
cryptographically generated by using a one-way hash function from the
node's public key and an imprint.
Binding Acknowledgment (BA) Message
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The MAP sends a binding acknowledgment message to the MN in response
to an LBU message.
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4. Proposed Solution
We assume that the MN's LCoA is always computed based on the CGA
technology, in order to allow the MN to run the secure neighbor
discovery procedure described in [SEND]. Such assumption has also
been made to provide a security mechanism for the [FMIPv6]. Based on
that, the first MN's LCoA will always be a CGA address.
In addition, we assume that the MN can discover the presence of an
HMIPv6 domain before sending a RtSol message. One way to implement
such discovery mechanism is described in the [FRD] proposal. In the
following, we suppose that the FRD technology is implemented in all
Access Points (APs) (note that the solution is also applicable in
other scenarios).
The suggested solution introduces a new signaling message, i.e., Pre-
Binding Update (PBU) message, which is sent by the AR to the MAP, and
on using the Crypto-based ID (CBID) to provide the MAP with
sufficient proof of ownership of the suggested RCoA. The PBU message
is sent by the AR to the MAP upon receiving a valid RtSol message
from the MN and signed with its CGA public key. Finally, the
suggested solution is also applicable to the optimized micro-mobility
management proposal described in [OMM].
The suggested solution is described in the following steps:
o When the MN discovers that it has entered an HMIPv6 domain, it
computes an LCoA address by using its CGA key pair and a CBID by
hashing the CGA public key together with a 64-bit imprint.
o The MN inserts the CBID in the RtSol message, then signs the
message as described in SEND and sends it to the AR.
o Upon receiving a valid RtSol message carrying a CBID, the AR
replies immediately by sending a unicast RtAdv message to the MN
and in parallel, a PBT message to the MAP. For this purpose, the
AR MUST compute a secret (Ks), encrypts it with the MN's CGA
public key and sends it in the RtAdv message. The AR MUST send Ks
to the MAP in the PBT message, in addition to the MN's CGA public
key, its LCoA and CBID. Note that it is assumed that the PBT
messages are signed by the ARs.
o After receiving the PBT, the MAP creates a BCE for the MN, which
will contain all parameters sent by the AR. Once the BCE is
created, the MAP will wait for the owner of the LCoA to send the
LBU message.
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o When the MN gets a valid RtAdv message, it sends an LBU message to
request the MAP to bind its LCoA to its new RCoA. However, the MN
will configure its RCoA by using as interface identifier (iid),
the 64 bits, which have been used as imprint to generate the CBID.
o Upon receiving an LBU message, the MAP searches its BCEs table for
an LCoA, which matches the one sent in the LBU message. If the
same LCoA is found, then the MAP hashes the RCoA iid with the
stored CGA public key and compares it to the CBID. If, the two
hash values are the same, then the MAP generates a long term
shared secret, Km, encrypts it with Ks and inserts it in the BA
message.
o In addition, the MAP MUST insert in the BA message the result
obtained from hashing Ks (i.e., hash(Ks) = HKs). However, if the
two hash values are not equal then the MAP simply discards the LBU
message.
o When the MN gets a BA message, it searches first if it carries the
HKs. If HKs is correct, then the MN decrypts the shared secret
and establishes a bidirectional security association (SA) with the
MAP.
o Finally, both nodes MUST use Ks to authenticate all subsequent
LBU/BA messages exchanged between them.
Note that the SA lifetime is set to 24 hours, after which the MN has
to request the MAP to renew it.
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5. New Messages and Options Format
TBD
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6. IANA Considerations
TBD
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7. Security Considerations
This proposal suggests using the CBID and CGA technologies in order
to avoid increasing the number of messages that need to be signed
with an RSA key beyond the SEND procedure. This is recommended due
to the fact that public key signature is a computationally expensive
and lengthy procedure.
The suggested proposal does not create nor enhance any new and/or
existing threats. In particular, launching a man-in the middle
attack against the MN is not possible because the attacker is not
aware of the shared secret. In addition, launching a denial of
service attack against the MAP or the MN is not easy due to the fact
that both nodes can scan incoming messages for a partial authenticity
before validating the authenticity and decrypting the shared secret.
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8. Acknowledgments
Authors would like to thank James Kempf for constantly raising
security issues in HMIPv6.
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9. References
9.1. Normative References
[CGA] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
RFC 3792, March 2005.
[FMIPv6] Koodli, R., "Fast Handovers for Mobile IPv6", RFC 4068,
July 2005.
[HMIPv6] Soliman, H., Castelluccia, C., El Malki, K., and L.
Bellier, "Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6)", RFC 4140,
August 2005.
[SEND] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Nikander, P., and B. Zill, "Secure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[TERM] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP , March 1997.
9.2. Informative References
[CBID] Montenegro, G. and C. Castelluccia, "Crypto-Based Identifiers
(CBID): Concepts and Applications", ACM Transaction on
Information and System Security (TISSEC), February 2004.
[FRD] Choi, J., Chin, D., and W. Haddad, "Fast Router Discovery
with L2 Support", Internet Draft, draft-ietf-dna-frd-00.txt,
October 2005.
[OMM] Haddad, W., Krishnan, S., Soliman, H., Daley, G., and H.
Tschofenig, "Optimized Micro-Mobility Management (OMM)",
Internet Draft, draft-haddad-mipshop-omm-00.txt, July 2005.
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Authors' Addresses
Wassim Haddad
Ericsson Research
8400 Decarie Blvd.
Town of Mount Royal, QC
Canada
Phone: +1 514 345 7900 #2334
Email: Wassim.Haddad@ericsson.com
Suresh Krishnan
Ericsson Research
8400 Decarie Blvd.
Town of Mount Royal, QC
Canada
Phone: +1 514 345 7900
Email: Suresh.Krishnan@ericsson.com
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