One document matched: draft-green-bmwg-seceff-bench-meth-00.txt

 



INTERNET-DRAFT                                    T. Alexander, K. Green
Intended Status: Informational                                    (Ixia)
Expires: April 1, 2012                                      October 2011

   Benchmarking Methodology for Evaluating the Security Effectiveness
                        of Content Aware Devices
                 draft-green-bmwg-seceff-bench-meth-00


Abstract

   This document defines a methodology for evaluating the ability of
   content-aware network devices to correctly detect and block malicious
   or administratively disallowed traffic flows. This benchmark
   addresses the issue of classification accuracy under well defined
   conditions. It is not concerned with measuring forwarding performance
   which is covered by other BMWG documents.


Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 1, 2012.


Copyright and License Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 


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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1  Existing Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2  New Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.2.1  Good Traffic  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.2.2  Evil Traffic  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3  Test Setup  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.1  Application Traffic Mix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4  Benchmarking Tests  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     4.1  Maximum Attack Blocking Rate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     4.2  Useful Attack Blocking Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     4.3  Attack Blocking Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   5  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   6  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   7  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   8  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     8.1  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     8.2  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6





















 


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1  Introduction

   Networks of the 21st century exist in an environment flooded with
   complex and highly sophisticated security threats. There is an
   intense and enduring arms race under way between those developing and
   distributing attack technology and those developing and supplying
   defense technology.

   In addition there is a growing need to limit access from users inside
   private or corporate networks to Internet sites or services deemed
   undesirable and to ensure that intellectual property and other
   private information is not allowed to pass freely from inside the
   protected network to the outside world.

   In response to the this dynamic and constantly expanding range of
   security threats and privacy requirements there is a growing
   diversity of network devices that provide a variety of defensive
   services including but not limited to firewall, intrusion detection,
   intrusion prevention, anti-virus, anti-malware, anti-spam, anti-dos,
   anti-ddos, unified threat management, data leakage prevention and
   more. These content-aware devices use a mixture of stateless and
   stateful L3 to L7 technologies, including deep packet inspection
   (DPI) to categorize traffic flows.

   What all of these defensive solutions have in common is the
   requirement that they reliably and accurately distinguish between
   evil (malicious or disallowed) traffic and good traffic.

   Categorization of traffic as either good or evil is fundamental to
   the operation of these devices since it is a prerequisite to all
   security functions.

   Security Effectiveness is a measure of how accurately the device
   under test (DUT) categorizes traffic:

      o No false negatives = correctly blocks all evil traffic

      o No false positives = never blocks good traffic

   In contrast, Security Performance is the characterization of the
   DUT's forwarding performance while under attack. Security Performance
   measures how well the device forwards good traffic with security
   features enabled and in the presence of evil traffic. This is
   addressed in [HAMILTON].

   Security Effectiveness is orthogonal to Security Performance.

1.1  Requirements Language
 


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   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].



2  Terminology

2.1  Existing Terminology

2.2  New Terminology

2.2.1  Good Traffic

   Good traffic is any traffic flow which is benign and should not be
   blocked by the DUT.

2.2.2  Evil Traffic

   Evil traffic is any illicit traffic flow which should be blocked by
   the DUT. Evil traffic is either malicious (i.e. part of a deliberate
   attack) or administratively banned (i.e. disallowed from passing in
   to or out of the protected network due to its content and/or
   destination).


3  Test Setup

3.1  Application Traffic Mix

   Some test cases require the test equipment to inject good traffic
   mixed with the evil traffic. The purpose of the good traffic is to
   force the DUT to distinguish between good and evil traffic and it is
   not used to quantify the forwarding performance of the DUT from an
   application perspective.

   Given this purpose, in order to protect the integrity and
   repeatability of the benchmark, a single fixed definition of the good
   traffic application mix is provided. No attempt is made to accurately
   model any particular mix of application traffic such as might be seen
   in an operational network.

   Rather, the traffic mix includes an appropriate mix of traffic types
   to ensure that the security engine cannot blindly assume that every
   packet is either good or evil and so deliver unrealistically high
   performance or otherwise undermine the benchmark.

   In those test scenarios where application traffic is specified, the
 


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   following mix MUST be used:

   *** TBD but likely to include at least UDP, TCP, HTTP ***


4  Benchmarking Tests

4.1  Maximum Attack Blocking Rate

   Maximum Attack Blocking Rate (attacks/second) is defined as the
   largest number of attacks per second where 100% of attacks are
   blocked with no application traffic present.

4.2  Useful Attack Blocking Rate

   Useful Attack Blocking Rate (attacks/second) is defined as the
   largest number of attacks per second where 100% of attacks are
   blocked in the presence of good traffic and 0% of the good traffic is
   blocked or dropped.

4.3  Attack Blocking Effectiveness

   Attack Blocking Effectiveness (percentage) is the ratio of blocked
   attacks/attempted attacks counted over the total number of different
   types of attack in the presence of good traffic and where 0% of the
   good traffic is dropped or blocked.


5  Security Considerations

   Benchmarking activities as described in this memo are limited to
   technology characterization using controlled stimuli in a laboratory
   environment, with dedicated address space and the other constraints
   defined in [RFC2544].

   The benchmarking network topology will be an independent test setup
   and MUST NOT be connected to devices that may forward the test
   traffic into a production network, or misroute traffic to the test
   management network.

   Further, benchmarking is performed on a "black-box" basis, relying
   solely on measurements observable external to the DUT/SUT.

   Special capabilities SHOULD NOT exist in the DUT/SUT specifically for
   benchmarking purposes.  Any implications for network security arising
   from the DUT/SUT SHOULD be identical in the lab and in production
   networks.

 


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6  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.


7  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to X, Y & Z for their review and comments.


8  References

8.1  Normative References

   [RFC1242]  Bradner, S., "Benchmarking Terminology for Network
              Interconnection Devices", RFC 1242, July 1991.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.


8.2  Informative References

   [RFC2544]  Bradner, S. and J. McQuaid, "Benchmarking Methodology for
              Network Interconnect Devices", RFC 2544, March 1999.

   [RFC3511]  Hickman, B., Newman, D., Tadjudin, S., and T. Martin,
              "Benchmarking Methodology for Firewall Performance",
              RFC 3511, April 2003.

   [HAMILTON] "Benchmarking Methodology for Content Aware Network
              Devices", draft-hamilton-bmwg-ca-bench-07.txt


Authors' Addresses


   Kenneth Green
   Ixia
   Australia

   EMail: kgreen@ixiacom.com

   Tom Alexander
   Ixia
   USA

   EMail: talexander@ixiacom.com
 


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