One document matched: draft-ersue-opsawg-management-fw-00.txt
Network Working Group M. Ersue
Internet-Draft Nokia Siemens Networks
Intended status: Informational October 18, 2010
Expires: April 21, 2011
An Overview of the IETF Network Management Framework and Standards
draft-ersue-opsawg-management-fw-00
Abstract
This document gives an overview of the IETF standard management
framework and summarizes existing and ongoing development of IETF
standards-track network management protocols and data models. The
purpose of this document is on the one hand to help system developers
and users to select appropriate standard management protocols and
data models to address relevant management needs. On the other hand
the document can be used as an overview and guideline by other SDOs
or bodies planning to use IETF management technologies and data
models.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. IETF Standard Management Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and its
Architectural Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. SNMP and its Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. SNMP Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.1. Security Requirements on the SNMP Management
Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.2. User-Based Security Model (USM) . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.3. View-Based Access Control Model (VACM) . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.4. SNMP Transport Subsystem and Transport Security
Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.5. RADIUS Authentication and Authorization with SNMP
Transport Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4. Supplementary Components of the IETF Management
Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.1. NETCONF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.2. SYSLOG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.3. IPFIX/PSAMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3. Management Protocols and Mechanisms with specific Focus . . . 20
3.1. IP Address Management and Server Discovery with DHCP . . . 21
3.2. IPv6 Network Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3. SNMP Agent Extensibility (AgentX) Protocol . . . . . . . . 22
3.4. Radius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5. Diameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.6. CAPWAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.7. EPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.8. Access Node Control Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.9. Ad-Hoc Network Autoconfiguration (autoconf) . . . . . . . 25
3.10. Policy-based Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.10.1. IETF Policy Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.10.2. COPS-PR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.11. Network Performance Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.11.1. IP Performance Metrics (IPPM) . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.11.2. Real-time Flow Measurement (RTFM) . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.12. Application Management Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.12.1. ACAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.12.2. XCAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4. Proposed, Draft and Standard Level Data Models . . . . . . . . 29
4.1. Fault Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
4.2. Configuration Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3. Accounting Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4. Performance Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.5. Security Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Appendix A. New Work related to IETF Management Framework . . . . 52
A.1. Energy Management (eman) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Appendix B. Open issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
1. Introduction
This document gives an overview of the IETF standard management
framework and summarizes existing and ongoing development of IETF
standards-track network management protocols and data models. The
purpose of this document is on the one hand to help system developers
and users to select appropriate standard management protocols and
data models to address relevant management needs. On the other hand
the document can be used as an overview and guideline by other SDOs
or bodies planning to use IETF management technologies and data
models. The document can be also used to initiate a discussion
between the bodies with the goal to gather new management
requirements and to detect possible gaps.
[I-D.baker-ietf-core] identifies the key protocols of the Internet
Protocol Suite for use in the Smart Grid. The target audience is
those people seeking guidance on how to construct an appropriate
Internet Protocol Suite profile for the Smart Grid. In analogy to
[I-D.baker-ietf-core] this document gives an overview on the IETF
management framework and technologies and will show usage scenarios
addressing the Smart Grid environment.
The Overview of the 2002 IAB Network Management Workshop [RFC3535]
documented strengths and weaknesses of some IETF management
protocols. In choosing existing protocol solutions to meet the
management requirements, it is recommended that these strengths and
weaknesses be considered. Some of the recommendations from the 2002
IAB workshop have become outdated, some have been standardized, and
some are being worked on at the IETF.
Guidelines for Considering Operations and Management of New Protocols
and Extensions [RFC5706] recommends working groups to consider
operations and management needs, and then select appropriate
management protocols and data models. This document can be used to
ease surveying the IETF standards-track network management protocols
and management data models.
Section 2 gives an overview of the IETF standard management framework
with a special focus on Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and
supplementary components of the IETF management framework such as
NETCONF, SYSLOG and IPFIX. Section 3 discusses IETF management
protocols and mechanisms with a specific focus and their use cases.
Section 4 discusses Proposed, Draft and Standard Level data models,
such as MIBs designed to address specific set of issues and maps them
to different management tasks.
IETF specifications must have "multiple, independent, and
interoperable implementations" before they can be advanced to Draft
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
Standard status. An Internet Standard, which may simply be referred
to as a Standard, is characterized by a high degree of technical
maturity and by a generally held belief that the specified protocol
or service provides significant benefit to the Internet community
[RFC2026].
This document mainly refers to Proposed, Draft or Full Standard
documents at IETF. As far as it is valuable standard track I-Ds just
before publication and Best Current Practice (BCP) documents are
referenced. In exceptional cases and if the document provides
substantial guideline for standard usage Informational RFCs are
noticed.
Note: This document uses the expired draft [I-D.ietf-opsawg-survey-
management] edited by Dave Harrington as a starting point and
enhances it with a special focus on the description of the IETF
Standard Management Framework and SNMP security as well as aims to
extend it with explanation of the standards, their usage scenarios
and new development at IETF.
Note: The document does not cover OAM technologies on the data-path,
e.g. OAM of tunnels, MPLS-TP OAM, Pseudowire, etc. [I-D.ietf-
opsawg-oam-overview] gives an overview on the OAM toolset for
detecting and reporting connection failures or measurement of
connection performance parameters. [I-D.ietf-mpls-tp-oam-framework]
describes the OAM Framework for MPLS-based Transport Networks.
1.1. Terminology
This document does not describe standard requirements. Therefore key
words from RFC2119 are not used in the document.
o CLI: Command Line Interface
o Data model: A mapping of the contents of an information model into
a form that is specific to a particular type of data store or
repository.
o Information model: An abstraction and representation of the
entities in a managed environment, their properties, attributes
and operations, and the way that they relate to each other. It is
independent of any specific repository, software usage, protocol,
or platform.
NOTE: To be filled out!
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
2. IETF Standard Management Framework
2.1. Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and its Architectural
Principles
As described in [RFC3410] the current version of the Internet
Standard Management Framework, the SNMPv3 Framework, builds upon both
the original SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 Management Framework. The basic
structure and components for the Internet Standard Management
Framework did not change between its versions and comprises following
components:
o managed nodes, each with an SNMP entity providing remote access to
management instrumentation (the agent),
o at least one SNMP entity with management applications (the
manager), and
o a management protocol used to convey management information
between the SNMP entities, and management information.
During its evolution, the fundamental architecture of the Internet
Standard Management Framework remained consistent based on a modular
architecture, which consists of:
o a generic protocol definition independent of the data it is
carrying, and
o a protocol-independent data definition language,
o a virtual database containing data sets of management information
definitions (the Management Information Base, or MIB), and
o security and administration.
o SNMPv3 protocol,
o the modeling language SMIv2, and
o MIBs for different management issues.
The SNMPv3 Framework extends the architectural principles of SNMPv1
and SNMPv2 by:
o building on these three basic architectural components, in some
cases incorporating them from the SNMPv2 Framework by reference,
and
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
o by using the same layering principles in the definition of new
capabilities in the security and administration portion of the
architecture.
NOTE: Add more.
2.2. SNMP and its Versions
SNMP is based on three conceptual entities: Manager, Agent, and the
Management Information Base (MIB). In any configuration, at least
one manager node runs SNMP management software. Network devices such
as bridges, routers, and servers are equipped with an agent. The
agent is responsible for providing access to a local MIB of objects
that reflects the resources and activity at its node. Following the
manager-agent paradigm, an agent can generate notifications and send
them as unsolicited messages to the management application.
To enhance this basic functionality, a new version of SNMP has been
introduced in 1993. SNMPv2 added bulk transfer capability and other
functional extensions like an administrative model for access
control, security extensions, and Manager-to-Manager communication.
SNMPv2 entities can have a dual role as manager and agent. However,
neither SNMPv1 nor SNMPv2 offers sufficient security features. To
address the security deficiencies of SNMPv1/v2, SNMPv3 was issued as
a set of Proposed Standards in January 1998 (see [STD62]).
The BCP document [BCP0074] "Coexistence between Version 1, Version 2,
and Version 3 of the Internet-standard Network Management Framework"
gives an overview of the relevant standard documents on the three
SNMP versions. The BCP document furthermore describes how to convert
MIB modules from SMIv1 format to SMIv2 format and how to translate
notification parameters as well as describes the mapping between the
message processing and security models (see [RFC3584]).
SNMP utilizes the Management Information Base, a virtual information
store of modules of managed objects. MIB module support is uneven
across vendors, and even within devices. The lack of standard MIB
module support for all functionality in a device forces operators to
use other protocols such as a command line interface (CLI) to do
configuration of some aspects of their managed devices. Many
operators have found it easier to use one protocol for all
configurations rather than to split the task across multiple
protocols.
SNMP is good at determining the operational state of specific
functionality, but not necessarily for the complete operational state
of a managed device. SNMP is also good for statistics gathering for
specific functionality. The widespread use of counters in standard
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
MIB modules permits the interoperable comparison of statistics across
devices from different vendors. Counters have been especially useful
in monitoring bytes and packets going in and out over various
protocol interfaces. SNMP is often used to poll a device for
sysUpTime, which serves to report the time since the last
reinitialization of the device, to check for operational liveness,
and to detect discontinuities in some counters.
SNMP traps and informs can alert an operator or an application when
some aspect of a protocol fails or encounters an error condition, and
the contents of a notification can be used to guide subsequent SNMP
polling to gather additional information about an event.
SNMP is widely used for monitoring fault and performance data. Some
operators use SNMP for configuration in various environments, while
others find SNMP an inappropriate choice for configuration in their
environments. During the IAB Network Management Workshop the
attendees expected that the so-called evolutionary approaches would
fail and more focus should be put on new approaches, such as XML-
based configuration management.
SNMPv1 [RFC1157] is a Full Standard that the IETF has declared
Historic and it is not recommended due to its lack of security
features. SNMPv2c [RFC1901] is an Experimental specification (not a
standard of any kind) that the IETF has declared Historic and it is
not recommended due to its lack of security features.
SNMPv3 [STD62] is a Full Standard that is recommended due to its
security features, including support for authentication, encryption,
timeliness and integrity checking, and fine-grained data access
controls. An overview of the SNMPv3 document set is in [RFC3410].
Standards exist to use SNMP over multiple network protocols,
including TCP, UDP, Ethernet, OSI, and others.
2.3. SNMP Security
2.3.1. Security Requirements on the SNMP Management Framework
Several of the classical threats to network protocols are applicable
to management problem space and therefore applicable to any security
model used in an SNMP Management Framework. This section lists
principal threats, secondary threats, and threats which are of lesser
importance as defined in [RFC3411].
The principal threats against which SNMP Security Models should
provide protection are:
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
Modification of Information:
Information might be altered by an unauthorized entity, e.g. in-
transit SNMP messages can be generated to effect unauthorized
management operations, including falsifying the value of an
object.
Masquerade:
The masquerade threat is the danger that management operations not
authorized for some principal may be attempted by assuming the
identity of another principal that has the appropriate
authorizations.
Secondary threats against which any Security Model used within this
architecture should provide protection are:
Message Stream Modification:
The SNMP protocol is typically based upon a connectionless
transport service which may operate over any subnetwork service.
The re-ordering, delay or replay of messages can and does occur
through the natural operation of many such subnetwork services.
The message stream modification threat is the danger that messages
may be maliciously re-ordered, delayed or replayed to an extent
which is greater than what can occur through the natural operation
of a subnetwork service, in order to effect unauthorized
management operations.
Disclosure:
The disclosure threat is the danger of eavesdropping on the
exchanges between SNMP engines. Protecting against this threat
may be required as a matter of local policy.
There are at least two threats against which a Security Model within
this architecture need not protect, since they are deemed to be of
lesser importance in this context:
Denial of Service:
A Security Model need not attempt to address the broad range of
attacks by which service on behalf of authorized users is denied.
Indeed, such denial-of-service attacks are in many cases
indistinguishable from the type of network failures with which any
viable management protocol must cope as a matter of course.
Traffic Analysis:
A Security Model need not attempt to address traffic analysis
attacks. Many traffic patterns are predictable - entities may be
managed on a regular basis by a relatively small number of
management stations - and therefore there is no significant
advantage afforded by protecting against traffic analysis.
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
NOTE: Other requirements to mention from ISMS WG?
2.3.2. User-Based Security Model (USM)
The User Security Model (USM) provides authentication and privacy
services for SNMP (RFC3414). Specifically, USM is designed to secure
against the following principal threats:
o Modification of Information: Alteration of an in-transit message
generated by an authorized entity in such a way as to effect
unauthorized management operations, including the setting of
object values.
o Masquerade: Management operations that are not authorized for some
entity may be attempted by that entity by assuming the identity of
an authorized entity.
o Message Stream Modification: SNMP messages (transported over a
connectionless protocol) could be reordered, delayed, or replayed
(duplicated) to affect unauthorized management operations.
o Disclosure: An entity could observe exchanges between a manager
and an agent and thereby learn the values of managed objects, and
learn of notification events.
USM does not secure against Denial of Service and attacks based on
Traffic Analysis.
The security services the SNMP Security Model supports are:
o Data Integrity is the provision of the property that data has not
been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner, nor have data
sequences been altered to an extent greater than can occur non-
maliciously.
o Data Origin Authentication is the provision of the property that
the claimed identity of the user on whose behalf received data was
originated is supported.
o Data Confidentiality is the provision of the property that
information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized
individuals, entities, or processes.
o Message timeliness and limited replay protection is the provision
of the property that a message whose generation time is outside of
a specified time window is not accepted.
See [RFC3414] in [STD62] for a detailed description of SNMPv3 USM.
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
2.3.3. View-Based Access Control Model (VACM)
The View-Based Access Control facility of SNMP enables the
configuration of agents to provide different levels of access to the
agent's MIB. An agent entity can restrict access to its MIB for a
particular manager entity in two ways:
o It can restrict access to a certain portion of its MIB, e.g., an
agent may restrict most manager principals to viewing performance-
related statistics and allow only a single designated manager
principal to view and update configuration parameters.
o The agent can limit the operations that a principal can use on
that portion of the MIB. E.g., a particular manager principal
could be limited to read-only access to a portion of an agent's
MIB.
The access control policy to be used by an agent must be pre-
configured for each manager. The policy is based on a table that
details the access privileges of the various authorized managers.
VACM defines five elements that make up the Access Control Model:
groups, security level, contexts, MIB views, and access policy.
See [RFC3415] in [STD62] for a detailed description of SNMPv3 VACM.
2.3.4. SNMP Transport Subsystem and Transport Security Model
The User-based Security Model (USM) was designed to be independent of
other existing security infrastructures to ensure it could function
when third-party authentication services were not available. As a
result, USM utilizes a separate user and key-management
infrastructure. Operators have reported that having to deploy
another user and key-management infrastructure in order to use SNMPv3
is costly and hinders the deployment of SNMPv3.
SNMP Transport Subsystem [RFC5590] extends the existing SNMP
framework and transport model and enables the use of transport
protocols to provide message security unifying the administrative
security management for SNMP, and other management interfaces.
Transport Models are tied into the SNMP framework through the
Transport Subsystem. The Transport Security Model has been designed
to work on top of lower-layer, secure Transport Models. The
Transport Security Model [RFC5591] and the Secure Shell Transport
Model [RFC5592] utilize the Transport Subsystem.
The Transport Security Model is an alternative to the existing SNMPv1
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
Security Model [RFC3584], the SNMPv2c Security Model [RFC3584], and
the User-based Security Model [RFC3414]. The Secure Shell Transport
Model defines furthermore an alternative to existing transport
mappings as described in [RFC3417].
The new SNMP Transport Subsystem modifies the Abstract Service
Interfaces to pass transport-specific security parameters to other
subsystems. This includes transport-specific security parameters
that are translated into the transport-independent parameters such as
securityName and securityLevel.
The SNMP Transport Subsystem utilizes one or more lower-layer
security mechanisms to provide message-oriented security services.
These include authentication of the sender, encryption, timeliness
checking, and data integrity checking.
A secure Transport Model establishes an authenticated and possibly
encrypted link between the Transport Models of two SNMP engines.
After a transport-layer tunnel is established, SNMP messages can be
sent through this tunnel from one SNMP engine to the other. The new
Transport Model supports sending multiple SNMP messages through the
same tunnel to amortize the costs of establishing a security
association.
The Transport Model on top of a secure transport protocol performs
security functions within the Transport Subsystem, including the
translation of transport-security parameters to/from Security-Model-
independent parameters. To accommodate this, an implementation-
specific cache of transport-specific information is introduced and
the data flows on this path are extended to pass Security-Model-
independent values. For this purpose, the Transport Subsystem
extends SNMPv3 Abstract Service Interfaces (ASI). New Security
Models can be defined using the modified ASIs and the transport-
information cache.
[RFC5592] introduces a Transport Model (Secure Shell Transport
Model), which makes use of the commonly deployed Secure Shell
security infrastructure establishing a channel between itself and the
SSH Transport Model of another SNMP engine.
Different IETF standards use security layers at the transport or
application layer to address security threads (e.g. TLS [RFC5246],
Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) [RFC4422], and SSH
[RFC4251]). Different management interfaces, e.g. CLI, SYSLOG
[RFC5424] and NETCONF [RFC4741], use a secure transport layer to
provide secure information and message exchange to build management
applications.
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
Detailed description of the Transport Subsystem for SNMP and
Transport Security Model for SNMP can be found in [RFC5590] and
[RFC5591]. Secure Shell Transport Model for SNMP is specified in
[RFC5592] and Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Model for SNMP
is described in [RFC5953].
2.3.5. RADIUS Authentication and Authorization with SNMP Transport
Models
[RFC5608] describes the use of a RADIUS (Remote Authentication
Dial-In User Service) authentication and authorization service by
SNMP secure Transport Models for authentication of users and
authorization of secure transport session creation.
The secure transport protocols selected for use with RADIUS and SNMP
need to support user authentication methods that are compatible with
those that exist in RADIUS. Transport Models rely upon the
underlying secure transport for user authentication services. The
SSH protocol provides a secure transport channel with support for
channel authentication via local accounts and integration with
various external authentication and authorization services such as
RADIUS, Kerberos, etc. SSH Server integration with RADIUS
traditionally uses the username and password mechanism.
There are two use cases for RADIUS support of management access via
SNMP: service authorization and access control authorization, where
user authentication needs to be done prior to each of the use cases.
Service authorization allows a RADIUS server to authorize an
authenticated principal to use SNMP, optionally over a secure
transport, typically using an SNMP Transport Model (see [RFC5608]).
Access control authorization, i.e. how RADIUS attributes and messages
are applied to the specific application area of SNMP Access Control
Models, and VACM in particular is currently being specified in the
ISMS (Integrated Security Model for SNMP) WG [I-D.ietf-isms-radius-
vacm].
2.4. Supplementary Components of the IETF Management Framework
2.4.1. NETCONF
SNMP works well for device monitoring and with its stateless nature
SNMP is also useful for statistics and status polling but SNMP has
limited configuration management support.
o There is a semantic mismatch between the task-oriented view
preferred by operators and the data-centric view provided by SNMP,
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
o SNMP does not separate clearly between configuration data and
operational state,
o Implementing SNMP transactional model and the protocol constraints
is complex, and
o SNMP modeling language has limited support for structured data
types and relationships among managed objects.
The IAB workshop on Network Management determined advanced
requirements for configuration management [IAB2002]:
o Robustness: Minimizing disruptions and maximizing stability,
o Support of task-oriented view,
o Extensible for new operations,
o Standardized error handling,
o Clear distinction between configuration data and operational
state,
o Distribution of configurations to devices under transactional
constraints,
o Single and multi-system transactions and scalability in the number
of transactions and managed devices,
o Operations on selected subsets of management data,
o Dump and reload a device configuration in a textual format in a
standard manner across multiple vendors and device types,
o Support a human interface and a programmatic interface,
o Data modeling language with a human friendly syntax,
o Easy conflict detection and configuration validation, and
o Secure transport, authentication, and robust access control.
The NETCONF protocol [RFC4741] is a Proposed Standard that provides
mechanisms to install, manipulate, and delete the configuration of
network devices and aims to address the advanced configuration
management requirements pointed in the IAB workshop. It uses an
Extensible Markup Language (XML)-based data encoding for the
configuration data as well as the protocol messages. The NETCONF
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
protocol operations are realized on top of a simple and reliable
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) layer.
A key aspect of NETCONF is that it allows the functionality of the
management protocol to closely mirror the native command line
interface of the device. This reduces implementation costs and
allows timely access to new features. In addition, applications can
access both the syntactic and semantic content of the device's native
user interface.
Additionally NETCONF WG developed the NETCONF Event Notifications
Mechanism as an optional capability, which provides an asynchronous
message notification delivery service for NETCONF [RFC5277]. NETCONF
notification mechanism enables using general purpose notification
streams, which can not only transport NETCONF notifications but also
alarms from other sources, where the originator of the NETCONF
notification stream can be any managed device (e.g. SNMP alarms).
NETCONF Partial Locking introduces fine-grained locking of the
configuration datastore to enhance NETCONF for fine-grained
transactions on parts of the datastore [RFC5717].
NETCONF WG also defined the necessary data model to monitor the
NETCONF protocol by using YANG. The monitoring data model includes
information about NETCONF datastores, sessions, locks, and
statistics, which facilitate the management of a NETCONF server.
NETCONF monitoring document also defines methods for NETCONF clients
to discover data models supported by a NETCONF server and defines a
new operation to retrieve them [RFC6022].
ADD: Describe how an SNMP agent and a NETCONF server may co-exist on
the same managed device using the same datastore for the management
data model.
NETCONF defined SSH transport binding as the mandatory secure
transport of its RPC messages [RFC4742]. Other optional secure
transport bindings are available for TLS [RFC5539], BEEP (over TLS)
[RFC4744], and SOAP (over HTTP over TLS) [RFC4743]. There is an
implementation available using NETCONF over SOAP as a Web Service
[RFC5381].
Currently NETCONF workgroup is focusing on bug fixing of the NETCONF
base protocol standard [4741bis] and the SSH transport protocol
mapping [4742bis] as well as the specification of the NETCONF Access
Control Model (NACM). NACM is going to provide a secure operating
environment for NETCONF and proposes standard mechanisms to restrict
protocol access to particular users with a pre-configured subset of
operations and content.
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
NETMOD WG developed YANG as the normative modeling language for the
modeling of configuration data for usage with NETCONF. YANG follows
following design goals addressing specific requirements on a modeling
language for configuration management:
o Allow modeling of standard and vendor defined modules for multi-
vendor interoperability,
o Define semantics and data organization, i.e. models operational
and configuration data, notifications, and operations,
o "human-readable", easy to use and text-based,
o Enable addition of new content to existing data models and can be
extended at IETF as necessary,
o Map directly to XML content (on the wire), and
o Basic types compatible with SMIv2 and preserves therefore
investments in SNMP MIBs.
NETMOD WG furthermore developed Common YANG Data Types to be used
with YANG [RFC6021] and a guidelines document for authors and
reviewers of YANG Data Model Documents [I-D
draft-ietf-netmod-yang-usage] as well as the mapping rules for
translating YANG data models into Document Schema Definition
Languages (DSDL) [I-D.ietf-netmod-dsdl-map]. The architecture
document "An Architecture for Network Management using NETCONF and
YANG" describes how NETCONF and YANG can help to build network
management applications that meet the needs of network operators
[I-D.draft-ietf-netmod-arch].
IPFIX WG prepared the normative IPFIX/PSAMP configuration model for
configuring and monitoring IPFIX and PSAMP compliant Monitoring
Devices with the YANG modeling language and is proposing to use
NETCONF for the configuration of these entities [I-D.ietf-ipfix-
configuration-model].
At the time of this writing, the rechartering discussion of the
NETMOD WG is ongoing. NETMOD WG aims to focus in its second phase on
the development of core system and core interface data models. The
WG will not develop models for specific topic areas or workgroups at
IETF. Such modeling work will be done in corresponding WGs, e.g.
DNSOP WG will develop the DNS configuration model using YANG.
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
2.4.1.1. YANG - NETCONF Modeling Language
Following the guideline and requests of the IAB management workshop
the NETMOD workgroup developed a "human-friendly" modeling language
defining the semantics of operational data, configuration data,
notifications, and operations [RFC6020]. The new modeling language
focuses on readability and ease of use and will serve as the
normative description of NETCONF data models.
ADD: Input from YANG team?
2.4.2. SYSLOG
The SYSLOG protocol [RFC5424] allows a machine to send system log
messages across networks to event message collectors. The protocol
is simply designed to transport these event messages. No
acknowledgement of the receipt is made. One of the fundamental
tenets of the SYSLOG protocol and process is its simplicity. No
stringent coordination is required between the transmitters and the
receivers. Indeed, the transmission of SYSLOG messages may be
started on a device without a receiver being configured, or even
actually physically present. Conversely, many devices will most
likely be able to receive messages without explicit configuration or
definitions. This simplicity has greatly aided the acceptance and
deployment of SYSLOG.
Since each process, application and operating system was written
somewhat independently, there has been little uniformity to the
message format or content of SYSLOG messages.
The IETF has developed a new Proposed Standard version of the
protocol that allows the use of any number of transport protocols
including reliable transports and secure transports [RFC5424]. The
IETF has also standardized the application of message security for
SYSLOG messages using TLS [RFC5425], and has defined a mechanism to
digitally sign log data to ensure its integrity as log data is moved
across the network and/or copied to different data stores [RFC5848].
The IETF has standardized a new message header format, including
timestamp, hostname, application, and message ID, to improve
filtering, interoperability and correlation between compliant
implementations.
SYSLOG message content has traditionally been unstructured natural
language text. This content is human-friendly, but difficult for
applications to parse and correlate across vendors, or correlate with
other event reporting such as SNMP traps. The IETF syslog protocol
includes structured data elements to aid application-parsing. The
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
structured data element design allows vendors to define their own
structured data elements to supplement standardized elements.
[RFC5675] defines a mapping from SNMP notifications to SYSLOG
messages and [RFC5676] defines the corresponding managed objects for
this purpose. And [RFC5674] defines the way alarms are send in
Syslog, which includes the mapping of ITU perceived severities onto
syslog message fields and a number of alarm-specific definitions from
ITU-T X.733 and the IETF Alarm MIB.
The IETF has standardized MIB Textual-Conventions for facility and
severity labels and codes to encourage consistency between syslog and
MIB representations of these event properties. The intent is that
these textual conventions will be imported and used in MIB modules
that would otherwise define their own representations. [RFC5427]
[RFC5848] "Signed Syslog Messages" defines a mechanism to add origin
authentication, message integrity, replay resistance, message
sequencing, and detection of missing messages to the transmitted
syslog messages to be used in conjunction with the Syslog protocol.
The Syslog protocol layered architecture provides for support of any
number of transport mappings. However, for interoperability
purposes, syslog protocol implementers are required to support the
transmission of Syslog Messages over UDP as defined in [RFC5426].
IETF furthermore defined the TLS transport mapping for Syslog in
[RFC5425], which provides a secure connection for the transport of
syslog messages and describes the security threats to syslog and how
TLS can be used to counter such threats. Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) Transport Mapping for Syslog is defined in [RFC6012],
which can be used in cases where a connection-less transport is
desired.
IETF working groups are encouraged to standardize structured data
elements, extensible human-friendly text, and consistent facility/
severity values for SYSLOG to report events specific to their
protocol.
2.4.3. IPFIX/PSAMP
IPFIX [RFC5101] is a Proposed Standard, which defines a push-based
data export mechanism for formatting and transferring IP flow
information from an exporter to a collector. PSAMP defines a
standard set of capabilities for network elements to sample subsets
of packets by statistical and other methods.
The IPFIX working group has specified the Information Model (to
describe IP flows) and the IPFIX protocol for the export of flow
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
information from routers or measurement probes to external systems
[RFC5101], [RFC5102]. IPFIX protocol exports flow data e.g. from
routers and probes (IPv4, IPv6) and works on top of UDP, TCP or SCTP.
Several applications using the IPFIX protocol are available.
IPFIX [RFC5101] is a Proposed Standard approach for transmitting IP
traffic flow information over the network from an exporting process
to an information collecting process. IPFIX defines a common
representation of flow data and a standard means of communicating the
data over a number of transport protocols.
[RFC3917] specifies the observation point, flows, exporting and the
collecting process as well as a metering process that consists of a
packet header capturing, time stamping, classifying, sampling, and
maintaining flow records.
IPFIX Information Model defines Information Elements (IEs) for
distinguishing flows and for reporting flow characteristics
[RFC5102]. Information Model for PSAMP extends the IPFIX information
model by IEs for packet header and payload information [RFC5477] and
defines packet selection methods for filtering and sampling of such
data. IPFIX and PSAMP packet sampling use the same packet processing
(aka. packet mediation). PSAMP packet information is exported with
the IPFIX protocol based on a shared information model.
The IPFIX WG has developed an XML-based configuration data model in
close collaboration with the NETMOD WG and uses YANG as modeling
language [I-D.ietf-ipfix-configuration-model]. The model specifies
the necessary data for configuring and monitoring selection
processes, caches, exporting processes, and collecting processes of
IPFIX and PSAMP compliant monitoring devices.
At the time of this writing a framework for IPFIX flow mediation is
in preparation, which addresses the need for mediation of flow
information in IPFIX applications in large operator networks, e.g.
for aggregating huge amounts of flow data and for anonymization of
flow information. IPFIX Mediation Framework defines the intermediate
device between Exporters and Collectors, which provides an IPFIX
Mediation by receiving a record stream from e.g. a Collecting
Process, hosting one or more Intermediate Processes to transform this
stream, and exporting the transformed record stream into IPFIX
Messages via an Exporting Process [I-D.ietf-ipfix-mediators-
framework].
The work on IP Flow Anonymization Support describes anonymization
techniques for IP flow data and the export of anonymized data
[I-D.ietf-ipfix-anon].
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
The document 'IPFIX Export per SCTP Stream' [I-D.ietf-ipfix-export-
per-sctp-stream] specifies a reliability extension based on a method
for exporting a Template Record and its associated Data Sets in a
single SCTP stream, for limiting each Template ID to a single SCTP
stream and imposing in-order transmission.
[I-D.ietf-ipfix-structured-data] proposes an extension to the IPFIX
protocol to support the export of hierarchically structured data and
lists (sequences) of Information Elements in data records. The
document describes how to distribute structured data with an abstract
data type and a new Information Element, e.g. for the distribution of
security keys or performance measures. This application can also be
used for the distribution of logging information if standard SYSLOG
based logging is not available.
There are several applications such as usage-based accounting,
traffic profiling, traffic engineering, intrusion detection, and QoS
monitoring, that require flow-based traffic measurements, which can
be realized on top of IPFIX. IPFIX can also be used e.g. for the
monitoring of the protocols like SIP and the related media transfer,
which is indeed based on flows on application layer. The
requirements to such a monitoring application are e.g. measuring
signaling quality (e.g., session request delay, session completion
ratio, or hops for request), media QoS (e.g., jitter, delay or bit
rate), and user experience (e.g., Mean Opinion Score).
Several applications require sampling packets from specific data
flows, or across multiple data flows, and reporting information about
the packets. Measurement-based network management is a prime
example. The PSAMP WG developed the protocol for reporting observed
packets by extending the IPFIX protocol. In order to reduce the
amount of data to be processed for selecting observed IP packets,
packet selection methods have been defined.
PSAMP standardizes sampling, selection, metering, and reporting
strategies for different purposes and includes support for packet
sampling in IPv4, IPv6, and MPLS-based networks. To simplify the
solution, the IPFIX protocol is used for the export of the PSAMP
reports to collector applications.
ADD: Input from IPFIX persons?
NOTE: It would be good if an IPFIX person edits this chapter.
3. Management Protocols and Mechanisms with specific Focus
This section reviews additional protocols IETF offers for management
and discusses for which applications they were designed and/or
already successfully deployed. These are protocols that have mostly
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
reached or short before Proposed Standard status or higher within the
IETF.
3.1. IP Address Management and Server Discovery with DHCP
BOOTP (Bootstrap Protocol), originally defined in [RFC951], has been
used by network clients during the bootstrap process to obtain an IP
address from a configuration server. BOOTP requires manual
intervention to add configuration information for each client, and
does not provide a mechanism for reclaiming disused IP addresses.
The Draft Standard Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
[RFC2131] was defined as an extension to BOOTP. DHCP provides a
framework for passing configuration information to hosts on a TCP/IP
network and does as such enable autoconfiguration in IP networks. In
addition to IP address management, DHCP can also provide other
configuration information, particularly the IP addresses of local
caching DNS resolvers or servers providing servers. As described in
[I-D.baker-ietf-core] DHCP can be used for IPv4 and IPv6 Address
Allocation and Assignment as well as Service Discovery.
There are two versions of DHCP, one for IPv4 [RFC2131] and one for
IPv6 [RFC3315]. While both versions bear the same name and perform
much the same purpose, the details of the protocol for IPv4 and IPv6
are sufficiently different that they can be considered separate
protocols.
Following are examples, where DHCP options have been used to provide
configuration information or access to specific servers.
o [RFC3646] describes two DHCPv6 options for passing a list of
available DNS recursive name servers and a domain search list to a
client.
o [RFC2610] describes how entities using the Service Location
Protocol can find out the address of Directory Agents in order to
transact messages and how the assignment of scope for
configuration of SLP User and Service Agents can be achieved.
o [RFC3319] specifies two DHCPv6 options that allow SIP clients to
locate a local SIP server that is to be used for all outbound SIP
requests, a so-called outbound proxy server.
o [RFC4280] defines new options to discover the Broadcast and
Multicast Service (BCMCS) controller in an IP network.
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
3.2. IPv6 Network Operations
The IPv6 Operations Working Group (v6ops) develops guidelines for the
operation of a shared IPv4/IPv6 Internet and provides operational
guidance on how to deploy IPv6 into existing IPv4-only networks, as
well as into new network installations.
NOTE: Input planned from V6ops Workgroup
3.3. SNMP Agent Extensibility (AgentX) Protocol
The Draft Standard [RFC2741] "Agent Extensibility (AgentX) Protocol"
defines a framework for extensible SNMP agents including master
agents and subagents, the AgentX protocol used to communicate between
them, and how the extensible agent processes SNMP protocol messages.
Within the SNMP framework, a managed node contains a processing
entity called agent, which has access to management information.
Within the AgentX framework, an agent is further defined to consist
of:
o a single processing entity called the master agent, which sends
and receives SNMP protocol messages in an agent role (as specified
by the SNMP framework documents) but typically has little or no
direct access to management information, and
o zero or more processing entities called subagents, which are
"shielded" from the SNMP protocol messages processed by the master
agent, but which have access to management information.
The internal operations of AgentX are invisible to an SNMP entity
operating in a manager role. From a manager's point of view, an
extensible agent behaves exactly as would a non-extensible
(monolithic) agent that has access to the same management
instrumentation.
[RFC2741] specifies furthermore a TCP binding for the AgentX
protocol.
The Draft Standard [RFC2742] "Definitions of Managed Objects for
Extensible SNMP Agents" describes objects managing SNMP agents that
use the AgentX Protocol and specifies a MIB module, which is
compliant to the SMIv2, and semantically identical to the peer SMIv1
definitions.
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
3.4. Radius
Radius [RFC2865], the remote Authentication Dial In User Service, is
a Draft Standard that describes a protocol for carrying
authentication, authorization, and configuration information between
a Network Access Server which desires to authenticate its links and a
shared Authentication Server.
This protocol is widely implemented and is used in environments like
enterprise networks, where a single administrative authority manages
the network, and protects the privacy of user information.
NOTE: Need more text and discussion of Radius RFCs.
3.5. Diameter
Diameter [RFC3588] is a Proposed Standard that provides an
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) framework for
applications such as network access or IP mobility. Diameter is also
intended to work in local Authentication, Authorization, Accounting
situations and in roaming situations.
Diameter is designed to resolve a number of known problems with
RADIUS. Diameter supports server failover, transmission-level
security, reliable transport over TCP, agents for proxy and redirect
and relay, server-initiated messages, auditability, capability
negotiation, peer discovery and configuration, and roaming support.
Diameter also provides a larger attribute space than Radius.
Diameter features make it especially appropriate for environments
where the providers of services are in different administrative
domains than the maintainer (protector) of confidential user
information.
NOTE: Need more text and discussion of Diameter RFCs.
3.6. CAPWAP
Wireless LAN product architectures have evolved from single
autonomous access points to systems consisting of a centralized
Access Controller (AC) and Wireless Termination Points (WTPs). The
general goal of centralized control architectures is to move access
control, including user authentication and authorization, mobility
management, and radio management from the single access point to a
centralized controller.
Based on the CAPWAP Architecture Taxonomy work [RFC4118] CAPWAP
workgroup developed the CAPWAP protocol to facilitate control,
management and provisioning of WLAN Termination Points (WTPs)
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
specifying the services, functions and resources relating to 802.11
WLAN Termination Points in order to allow for interoperable
implementations of WTPs and ACs. The protocol defines the CAPWAP
control plane including the primitives to control data access. The
protocol document also defines how configuration management of WTPs
can be done and defines CAPWAP operations responsible for debugging,
gathering statistics, logging, and firmware management as well as
discusses operational and transport considerations.
CAPWAP protocol is defined to be independent of Layer 2 technologies,
and meets the objectives in "Objectives for Control and Provisioning
of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP)" [RFC4564]. Separate binding
extensions enable the use with additional wireless technologies.
[RFC5416] defines CAPWAP Protocol Binding for IEEE 802.11.
CAPWAP Base MIB [RFC5833] describes managed objects for modeling the
CAPWAP Protocol and provides configuration and WTP status-monitoring
aspects of CAPWAP, where CAPWAP Binding MIB [RFC5834] describes
managed objects for modeling of CAPWAP protocol for IEEE 802.11
wireless binding.
(RFC 5833 and RFC 5834 have been published as Informational RFCs to
provide the basis for future work on a SNMP management of the CAPWAP
protocol.)
NOTE: More to add?
3.7. EPP
The Extensible Provision Protocol [RFC5730] is an Internet Standard
[STD69] that describes an application layer client-server protocol
for the provisioning and management of objects stored in a shared
central repository. EPP permits multiple service providers to
perform object provisioning operations using a shared central object
repository, and addresses the requirements for a generic registry
registrar protocol.
EPP is specified in XML and defines generic object management
operations and an extensible framework that maps protocol operations
to objects. EPP is a stateful XML protocol that can be layered over
multiple transport protocols. Protected using lower-layer security
protocols, clients exchange identification, authentication, and
option information, and then engage in a series of client-initiated
command-response exchanges.
EPP has been adopted by numerous domain name registries mainly for
the communication between domain name registries and domain name
registrars and for allocating objects within registries over the
Internet.
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
NOTE: Is EPP important for the management framework?
3.8. Access Node Control Protocol
The Access Node Control Protocol (ANCP) [I-D.ietf-ancp-protocol]
realizes a control plane between a service-oriented layer 3 edge
device (the Network Access Server, NAS) and a layer 2 Access Node
(e.g., Digital Subscriber Line Access Module, DSLAM). As such ANCP
operates in a multi-service reference architecture and communicates
QoS-, service- and subscriber-related configurations and operations
between a NAS and an Access Node.
The main goal of this protocol is to configure and manage access
equipments and allow them to report information to the NAS in order
to enable and optimize configuration.
Framework and Requirements for an Access Node Control Mechanism and
the use cases for ANCP are documented in [RFC5851]. Security Threats
and Security Requirements for ANCP are discussed in [RFC5713].
3.9. Ad-Hoc Network Autoconfiguration (autoconf)
Ad-hoc nodes need to configure their network interfaces with locally
unique addresses as well as globally routable IPv6 addresses, in
order to communicate with devices on the Internet. AUTOCONF WG
developed [RFC5889], which describes the addressing model for ad-hoc
networks and how nodes in these networks configure their addresses.
The ad-hoc nodes under consideration are expected to be able to
support multi-hop communication by running MANET routing protocols as
developed by the IETF MANET WG.
From the IP layer perspective, an ad hoc network presents itself as a
layer 3 multi-hop network formed over a collection of links. The
addressing model aims to avoid problems for ad-hoc-unaware parts of
the system, such as standard applications running on an ad-hoc node
or regular Internet nodes attached to the ad-hoc nodes.
3.10. Policy-based Management
3.10.1. IETF Policy Framework
IETF specified a general framework for managing, sharing, and reusing
policies in a vendor independent, interoperable, and scalable manner
as well as defining an extensible information model for representing
policies. The policy framework is based on a policy-based admission
control specifying the two main architectural elements the Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) and the Policy Decision Point (PDP).
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
For the purposes of network management, policies allow an operator to
specify how the network is to be configured and monitored through a
descriptive language. Furthermore, it allows the automation of a
number of management tasks, according to the requirements set out in
the policy module.
IETF Policy Framework [RFC2753] has been accepted by the industry as
a standard-based policy approach and has been adopted by different
SDOs e.g. 3GGP charging standards.
ADD: More to mention?
3.10.2. COPS-PR
[RFC3159] defines the Structure of Policy Provisioning Information
(SPPI), an extension to the SMI modeling language used to write
Policy Information Base (PIB) modules. COPS-PR [RFC3084] uses the
Common Open Policy Service (COPS) protocol for support of policy
provisioning. COPS-PR and the Structure of Policy Provisioning
Information (SPPI) have been approved as Proposed Standards.
The COPS-PR specification is independent of the type of policy being
provisioned (QoS, Security, etc.) but focuses on the mechanisms and
conventions used to communicate provisioned information between
policy-decision-points (PDPs) and policy enforcement points (PEPs).
COPS-PR does not make any assumptions about the policy data model
being communicated, but describes the message formats and objects
that carry the modeled policy data. Policy data is modeled using
Policy Information Base modules (PIB modules).
COPS-PR has not had wide deployment, and operators have stated that
its use of binary encoding (BER) for management data makes it
difficult to develop automated scripts for simple configuration
management tasks in most text-based scripting languages. In an IAB
Workshop on Network Management [RFC3535], the consensus of operators
and protocol developers indicated a lack of interest in PIB modules
for use with COPS-PR.
As a result, the IESG has not approved any policy models (PIB
modules) as IETF standard, and the use of COPS-PR is not recommended.
3.11. Network Performance Management
3.11.1. IP Performance Metrics (IPPM)
The IPPM WG has defined metrics for accurately measuring and
reporting the quality, performance, and reliability of Internet data
delivery services. The metrics include connectivity, one-way delay
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
and loss, round-trip delay and loss, delay variation, loss patterns,
packet reordering, bulk transport capacity, and link bandwidth
capacity.
These metrics are designed for network operator use and provide
unbiased quantitative measures of performance.
The main properties of individual IPPM performance and reliability
metrics are that the metrics should be well-defined and concrete thus
implementable, and they should exhibit no bias for IP clouds
implemented with identical technology. In addition, the methodology
used to implement a metric should have the property of being
repeatable with consistent measurements.
IETF IP Performance Metrics have been introduced widely in the
industry and adopted by different SDOs such as ITU-T.
Following are examples of essential IPPM documents published as
Proposed Standard:
o IPPM Framework document [RFC2330] defines a general framework for
particular metrics developed by IPPM WG and defines the
fundamental concepts of 'metric' and 'measurement methodology' and
discusses the issue of measurement uncertainties and errors as
well as introduces the notion of empirically defined metrics and
how metrics can be composed.
o One-way Delay Metric for IPPM [RFC2679] defines a metric for one-
way delay of packets across Internet paths. It builds on notions
introduced in the IPPM Framework document.
o Round-trip Delay Metric for IPPM [RFC2681] defines a metric for
round-trip delay of packets across network paths and follows
closely the corresponding metric for One-way Delay.
o IP Packet Delay Variation Metric [RFC3393] refers to a metric for
variation in delay of packets across network paths and is based on
the difference in the One-Way-Delay of selected packets called "IP
Packet Delay Variation (ipdv)".
o One-way Packet Loss Metric for IPPM [RFC2680] defines a metric for
one-way packet loss across Internet paths.
o One-Way Packet Duplication Metric [RFC5560] defines a metric for
the case, where multiple copies of a packet are received and
discusses methods to summarize the results of streams.
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
o Packet Reordering Metrics [RFC4737] defines metrics to evaluate
whether a network has maintained packet order on a packet-by-
packet basis and discusses the measurement issues, including the
context information required for all metrics.
o IPPM Metrics for Measuring Connectivity [RFC2678] defines a series
of metrics for connectivity between a pair of Internet hosts.
o Framework for Metric Composition [RFC5835] describes a detailed
framework for composing and aggregating metrics.
o A One-way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) [RFC4656] measures
unidirectional characteristics such as one-way delay and one-way
loss between network devices and enables the interoperability of
these measurements.
o A Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) [RFC5357] adds
round-trip or two-way measurement capabilities to OWAMP.
For the "Information Model and XML Data Model for Traceroute
Measurements [RFC5388] and the BCP document [BCP108] "IP Performance
Metrics (IPPM) Metrics Registry" see section 4.4 'Performance
Management'.
3.11.2. Real-time Flow Measurement (RTFM)
(Real-Time) Traffic Flow Measurement: Architecture [RFC2722]
specifies the general framework for describing network traffic flows,
an architecture for traffic flow measurement and reporting, and
indicates how it can be used within the Internet. As such RTFM is a
mechanism for configuring meters and meter readers, and for
collecting the flow data from remote meters.
RTFM is e.g. used for the measurement of DNS performance.
NOTE: Is RTFM really important?
ADD: Anything to add to Network Performance Management?
3.12. Application Management Protocols
3.12.1. ACAP
The Application Configuration Access Protocol (ACAP) [RFC2244] is
designed to support remote storage and access of program option,
configuration and preference information. The data store model is
designed to allow a client relatively simple access to interesting
data, to allow new information to be easily added without server re-
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
configuration, and to promote the use of both standardized data and
custom or proprietary data. Key features include "inheritance" which
can be used to manage default values for configuration settings and
access control lists which allow interesting personal information to
be shared and group information to be restricted.
ACAP's primary purpose is to allow users access to their
configuration data from multiple network-connected computers. Users
can then sit down in front of any network-connected computer, run any
ACAP-enabled application and have access to their own configuration
data. Because it is hoped that many applications will become ACAP-
enabled, client simplicity was preferred to server or protocol
simplicity whenever reasonable.
3.12.2. XCAP
XCAP [RFC4825] is a Proposed Standard protocol that allows a client
to read, write, and modify application configuration data stored in
XML format on a server.
XCAP is a protocol that can be used to manipulate per-user data.
XCAP is a set of conventions for mapping XML documents and document
components into HTTP URIs, rules for how the modification of one
resource affects another, data validation constraints, and
authorization policies associated with access to those resources.
Because of this structure, normal HTTP primitives can be used to
manipulate the data. XCAP is meant to support the configuration
needs for a multiplicity of applications, rather than just a single
one.
XCAP was not designed as a general purpose XML search protocol, XML
database update protocol, nor a general purpose, XML-based
configuration protocol for network elements.
4. Proposed, Draft and Standard Level Data Models
This section lists solutions for which information or data models
have been standardized at the IETF, so that existing solutions can be
reused and the data models can be applied to new solutions.
Management data models have a slightly different interpretation for
interoperability. This is discussed in detail in [BCP27]
"Advancement of MIB specifications on the IETF Standards Track"
[RFC2438] with special considerations about the advancement process
for management data models. However most IETF management data models
never advance beyond Proposed Standard.
This section discusses management data models that have reached at
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
least Proposed Standard status in the IETF.
4.1. Fault Management
Draft Standards:
[RFC3418], part of SNMPv3 standard [STD62], contains objects in the
system group that are often polled to determine if a device is still
operating, and sysUpTime can be used to detect if a system has
rebooted, and counters have been reinitialized.
[RFC3413], part of SNMPv3 standard [STD62], includes objects designed
for managing notifications, including tables for addressing, retry
parameters, security, lists of targets for notifications, and user
customization filters.
An RMON monitor [RFC2819] can be configured to recognize conditions,
most notably error conditions, and continuously to check for them.
When one of these conditions occurs, the event may be logged, and
management stations may be notified in a number of ways (for further
discussion on RMON see section 4.4 'Performance Management').
Proposed Standards:
The IETF SYSLOG protocol [RFC5424] is a Proposed Standard that
includes a mechanism for defining Structured Data Elements (SDEs).
The SYSLOG protocol document defines an initial set of SDEs that
relate to content time quality, content origin, and meta-information
about the message, such as language. Proprietary SDEs can be used to
supplement the IETF-defined SDEs.
DISMAN-EVENT-MIB in [RFC2981] and DISMAN-EXPRESSION-MIB in [RFC2982]
provide a superset of the capabilities of the RMON alarm and event
groups. These modules provide mechanisms for thresholding and
reporting anomalous events to management applications.
The ALARM MIB in [RFC3877] and the Alarm Reporting Control MIB in
[RFC3878] specify mechanisms for expressing state transition models
for persistent problem states.
ALARM MIB defines:
- a mechanisms for expressing state transition models for persistent
problem states,
- a mechanism to correlate a notification with subsequent state
transition notifications about the same entity/object, and
- a generic alarm reporting mechanism (extends ITU-T work X.733 [ITU-
X733).
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
[RFC3878] in particular defines objects for controlling the reporting
of alarm conditions and extends ITU-T work M.3100 Amendment 3 [ITU-
M3100].
Other MIB modules that may be applied to Fault Management include:
o NOTIFICATION-LOG-MIB [RFC3014] describes managed objects used for
logging SNMP Notifications.
o ENTITY-STATE-MIB [RFC4268] describes extensions to the Entity MIB
to provide information about the state of physical entities.
o ENTITY-SENSOR-MIB [RFC3433] describes managed objects for
extending the Entity MIB to provide generalized access to
information related to physical sensors, which are often found in
networking equipment (such as chassis temperature, fan RPM, power
supply voltage).
4.2. Configuration Management
Draft standards:
It is expected that standard XML-based data models will be developed
for use with NETCONF, and working groups might identify specific
NETCONF data models that would be applicable to the new protocol.
Note: At the time of this writing, only the YANG module for the
monitoring of the NETCONF protocol exists as proposed standard.
NETMOD WG is going to be rechartered to develop core system models in
YANG.
MIB modules for monitoring of network configuration (e.g. for
physical and logical network topologies) already exist and provide
some of the desired capabilities. New MIB modules might be developed
for the target functionality to allow operators to monitor and modify
the operational parameters, such as timer granularity, event
reporting thresholds, target addresses, and so on.
[RFC3418], part of SNMPv3 standard [STD62], contains objects in the
system group that are often polled to determine if a device is still
operating, and sysUpTime can be used to detect if a system has
rebooted and caused potential discontinuity in counters. Other
objects in the system MIB are useful for identifying the type of
device, the location of the device, the person responsible for the
device, etc.
[RFC3413], part of STD 62 SNMPv3, includes objects designed for
configuring notification destinations, and for configuring proxy-
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
forwarding SNMP agents, which can be used to forward messages through
firewalls and NAT devices.
The Interfaces MIB [RFC2863] is used for managing Network Interfaces.
This includes the 'interfaces' group of MIB-II and discusses the
experience gained from the definition of numerous media-specific MIB
modules for use in conjunction with the 'interfaces' group for
managing various sub-layers beneath the internetwork-layer.
Proposed standards:
The Entity MIB [RFC4133] is used for managing multiple logical and
physical entities managed by a single SNMP agent. This module
provides a useful mechanism for identifying the entities comprising a
system. There are also event notifications defined for configuration
changes that may be useful to management applications.
[RFC3165] supports the use of user-written scripts to delegate
management functionality.
Policy Based Management MIB [RFC4011] defines objects that enable
policy-based monitoring using SNMP, using a scripting language, and a
script execution environment.
Few vendors have implemented MIB modules that support scripting.
Some vendors consider running user-developed scripts within the
managed device as a violation of support agreements.
4.3. Accounting Management
DIAMETER [RFC3588] and RADIUS [RFC2866] can be used to exchange
accounting related information.
IETF so far did only develop Informational RFCs as data model for
accounting. RADIUS Accounting Client MIB for IPv6 [RFC4670] and
RADIUS Accounting Server MIB for IPv6 [RFC4671] allow the gathering
of accounting data.
4.4. Performance Management
MIB modules typically contain counters to determine the frequency and
rate of an occurrence.
RMON [RFC2819] has the full standard status [STD59] and defines
objects for managing remote network monitoring devices. An
organization may employ many remote management probes, one per
network segment, to manage its internet. These devices may be used
for a network management service provider to access a client network,
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
often geographically remote. Most of the objects in the RMON MIB
module are suitable for the management of any type of network, where
some of them are specific to management of Ethernet networks.
RMON allows a probe to be configured to perform diagnostics and to
collect statistics continuously, even when communication with the
management station may not be possible or efficient. The alarm group
periodically takes statistical samples from variables in the probe
and compares them to previously configured thresholds. If the
monitored variable crosses a threshold, an event is generated.
The RMON host group discovers hosts on the network by keeping a list
of source and destination MAC Addresses seen in good packets
promiscuously received from the network, and contains statistics
associated with each host. The hostTopN group is used to prepare
reports that describe the hosts that top a list ordered by one of
their statistics. The available statistics are samples of one of
their base statistics over an interval specified by the management
station. Thus, these statistics are rate based. The management
station also selects how many such hosts are reported.
The RMON matrix group stores statistics for conversations between
sets of two addresses. The filter group allows packets to be matched
by a filter equation. These matched packets form a data stream that
may be captured or may generate events. The Packet Capture group
allows packets to be captured after they flow through a channel. The
event group controls the generation and notification of events from
this device.
Draft standards:
The RMON-2 MIB [RFC4502] extends RMON by providing RMON analysis up
to the application layer. The SMON MIB [RFC2613] extends RMON by
providing RMON analysis for switched networks.
Proposed standards:
RMON MIB Extensions for High Capacity Alarms [RFC3434] describes
managed objects for extending the alarm thresholding capabilities
found in the RMON MIB and provides similar threshold monitoring of
objects based on the Counter64 data type.
RMON MIB Extensions for High Capacity Networks [RFC3273] defines
objects for managing RMON devices for use on high-speed networks.
RMON MIB Extensions for Interface Parameters Monitoring [RFC3144]
describes an extension to the RMON MIB with a method of sorting the
interfaces of a monitored device according to values of parameters
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
specific to this interface.
[RFC4710] describes Real-Time Application Quality of Service
Monitoring. RAQMON is part of the RMON protocol family, and supports
end-2-end QoS monitoring for multiple concurrent applications and
does not relate to a specific application transport. RAQMON is
scalable and works well with encrypted payload and signaling. RAQMON
uses TCP to transport RAQMON PDUs.
[RFC4711] proposes an extension to the Remote Monitoring MIB
[RFC2819] and describes managed objects used for real-time
application Quality of Service (QoS) monitoring. [RFC4712] specifies
two transport mappings for the RAQMON information model using TCP as
a native transport and SNMP to carry the RAQMON information from a
RAQMON Data Source (RDS) to a RAQMON Report Collector (RRC).
Application Performance Measurement MIB [RFC3729] uses the
architecture created in the RMON MIB and defines objects by providing
measurement and analysis of the application performance as
experienced by end-users. Application performance measurement
measures the quality of service delivered to end-users by
applications.
TODO: Check whether RFC3729 is widely deployed??
Transport Performance Metrics MIB [RFC4150] describes managed objects
used for monitoring selectable performance metrics and statistics
derived from the monitoring of network packets and sub-application
level transactions. The metrics can be defined through reference to
existing IETF, ITU, and other standards organizations' documents.
IPPM WG defined an Information Model and XML Data Model for
Traceroute Measurements [RFC5388], which defines a common information
model dividing the information elements into two semantically
separated groups (configuration elements and results elements) with
an additional element to relate configuration elements and results
elements by means of a common unique identifier. Based on the
information model, an XML data model is provided to store the results
of traceroute measurements.
IPPM WG has furthermore defined the BCP document [BCP108] "IP
Performance Metrics (IPPM) Metrics Registry", which defines a
registry for IP Performance Metrics [RFC4148]. The IANA-assigned
registry contains an initial set of OBJECT IDENTITIES to currently
defined metrics in the IETF as well as defines the rules for adding
IP Performance Metrics that are defined in the future.
SIP Package for Voice Quality Reporting [I-D.ietf-sipping-rtcp-
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
summary] defines a SIP event package that enables the collection and
reporting of metrics that measure the quality for Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) sessions.
Traffic Flow Measurement: Meter MIB [RFC2720] defines a MIB for use
in controlling an RTFM Traffic Meter, in particular for specifying
the flows to be measured and provides a mechanism for retrieving flow
data from the meter using SNMP.
4.5. Security Management
Proposed standards:
RADIUS Authentication Server MIB for IPv6 [RFC4669] defines a set of
extensions that instrument RADIUS authentication server functions and
RADIUS Authentication Client MIB for IPv6 [RFC4668] defines a set of
extensions for RADIUS authentication client functions. Both RFCs add
support for version-neutral IP address formats. Using these
extensions, IP-based management stations can manage RADIUS
authentication clients and servers.
Informational RFCs:
RADIUS Dynamic Authorization Client MIB [RFC4672] describes the
Dynamic Authorization Client (DAC) functions that support the dynamic
authorization extensions defined in [RFC5176].
RADIUS Dynamic Authorization Server MIB [RFC4673] describes the
Dynamic Authorization Server (DAS) functions that support the dynamic
authorization extensions defined in [RFC5176].
5. IANA Considerations
This document does not introduce any new codepoints or name spaces
for registration with IANA.
Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
RFC.
6. Security Considerations
This document introduces no new security concerns.
7. Contributors
This document uses the expired draft [I-D.ietf-opsawg-survey-
management] edited by Dave Harrington as a starting point.
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank to ...
9. Informative References
[I-D.baker-ietf-core] Baker, F. and D. Meyer,
"Internet Protocols for the
Smart Grid",
draft-baker-ietf-core-08
(work in progress),
September 2010.
[I-D.ietf-ancp-protocol] Wadhwa, S., Moisand, J.,
Haag, T., Voigt, N., and T.
Taylor, "Protocol for Access
Node Control Mechanism in
Broadband Networks",
draft-ietf-ancp-protocol-12
(work in progress),
August 2010.
[I-D.ietf-ipfix-anon] Boschi, E. and B. Trammell,
"IP Flow Anonymisation
Support",
draft-ietf-ipfix-anon-04
(work in progress),
October 2010.
[I-D.ietf-ipfix-configuration-model] Muenz, G., Claise, B., and
P. Aitken, "Configuration
Data Model for IPFIX and
PSAMP", draft-ietf-ipfix-
configuration-model-07 (work
in progress), August 2010.
[I-D.ietf-ipfix-export-per-sctp-stream] Claise, B., Aitken, P.,
Johnson, A., and G. Muenz,
"IPFIX Export per SCTP
Stream", draft-ietf-ipfix-
export-per-sctp-stream-08
(work in progress),
May 2010.
[I-D.ietf-ipfix-mediators-framework] Kobayashi, A., Claise, B.,
Muenz, G., and K. Ishibashi,
"IPFIX Mediation:
Framework", draft-ietf-
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
ipfix-mediators-framework-08
(work in progress),
August 2010.
[I-D.ietf-ipfix-structured-data] Yates, S., "Export of
Structured Data in IPFIX", d
raft-ietf-ipfix-structured-
data-03 (work in progress),
October 2010.
[I-D.ietf-isms-radius-vacm] Narayan, K., Nelson, D., and
R. Presuhn, "Using
Authentication,
Authorization, and
Accounting services to
Dynamically Provision View-
based Access Control Model
User-to-Group Mappings", dra
ft-ietf-isms-radius-vacm-11
(work in progress),
September 2010.
[I-D.ietf-mpls-tp-oam-framework] Allan, D., Busi, I., Niven-
Jenkins, B., Fulignoli, A.,
Hernandez-Valencia, E.,
Levrau, L., Sestito, V.,
Sprecher, N., Helvoort, H.,
Vigoureux, M., Weingarten,
Y., and R. Winter,
"Operations, Administration
and Maintenance Framework
for MPLS- based Transport
Networks", draft-ietf-mpls-
tp-oam-framework-09 (work in
progress), October 2010.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-dsdl-map] Lhotka, L., "Mapping YANG to
Document Schema Definition
Languages and Validating
NETCONF Content", draft-
ietf-netmod-dsdl-map-08
(work in progress),
September 2010.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-usage] Bierman, A., "Guidelines for
Authors and Reviewers of
YANG Data Model Documents",
draft-ietf-netmod-yang-
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
usage-11 (work in progress),
October 2010.
[I-D.ietf-opsawg-oam-overview] Mizrahi, T., Sprecher, N.,
Bellagamba, E., and Y.
Weingarten, "An Overview of
Operations, Administration,
and Maintenance (OAM)
Mechanisms", draft-ietf-
opsawg-oam-overview-02 (work
in progress), October 2010.
[I-D.ietf-opsawg-survey-management] Harrington, D., "Survey of
IETF Network Management
Standards", draft-ietf-
opsawg-survey-management-00
(work in progress),
March 2009.
[I-D.ietf-sipping-rtcp-summary] Pendleton, A., Clark, A.,
Johnston, A., and H.
Sinnreich, "Session
Initiation Protocol Event
Package for Voice Quality
Reporting", draft-ietf-
sipping-rtcp-summary-13
(work in progress),
August 2010.
[RFC0951] Croft, B. and J. Gilmore,
"Bootstrap Protocol",
RFC 951, September 1985.
[RFC1157] Case, J., Fedor, M.,
Schoffstall, M., and J.
Davin, "Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)",
STD 15, RFC 1157, May 1990.
[RFC1901] Case, J., McCloghrie, K.,
McCloghrie, K., Rose, M.,
and S. Waldbusser,
"Introduction to Community-
based SNMPv2", RFC 1901,
January 1996.
[RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet
Standards Process --
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
Revision 3", BCP 9,
RFC 2026, October 1996.
[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol",
RFC 2131, March 1997.
[RFC2244] Newman, C. and J. Myers,
"ACAP -- Application
Configuration Access
Protocol", RFC 2244,
November 1997.
[RFC2330] Paxson, V., Almes, G.,
Mahdavi, J., and M. Mathis,
"Framework for IP
Performance Metrics",
RFC 2330, May 1998.
[RFC2438] O'Dell, M., Alvestrand, H.,
Wijnen, B., and S. Bradner,
"Advancement of MIB
specifications on the IETF
Standards Track", BCP 27,
RFC 2438, October 1998.
[RFC2613] Waterman, R., Lahaye, B.,
Romascanu, D., and S.
Waldbusser, "Remote Network
Monitoring MIB Extensions
for Switched Networks
Version 1.0", RFC 2613,
June 1999.
[RFC2678] Mahdavi, J. and V. Paxson,
"IPPM Metrics for Measuring
Connectivity", RFC 2678,
September 1999.
[RFC2679] Almes, G., Kalidindi, S.,
and M. Zekauskas, "A One-way
Delay Metric for IPPM",
RFC 2679, September 1999.
[RFC2680] Almes, G., Kalidindi, S.,
and M. Zekauskas, "A One-way
Packet Loss Metric for
IPPM", RFC 2680,
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
September 1999.
[RFC2681] Almes, G., Kalidindi, S.,
and M. Zekauskas, "A Round-
trip Delay Metric for IPPM",
RFC 2681, September 1999.
[RFC2720] Brownlee, N., "Traffic Flow
Measurement: Meter MIB",
RFC 2720, October 1999.
[RFC2722] Brownlee, N., Mills, C., and
G. Ruth, "Traffic Flow
Measurement: Architecture",
RFC 2722, October 1999.
[RFC2741] Daniele, M., Wijnen, B.,
Ellison, M., and D.
Francisco, "Agent
Extensibility (AgentX)
Protocol Version 1",
RFC 2741, January 2000.
[RFC2753] Yavatkar, R., Pendarakis,
D., and R. Guerin, "A
Framework for Policy-based
Admission Control",
RFC 2753, January 2000.
[RFC2819] Waldbusser, S., "Remote
Network Monitoring
Management Information
Base", STD 59, RFC 2819,
May 2000.
[RFC2863] McCloghrie, K. and F.
Kastenholz, "The Interfaces
Group MIB", RFC 2863,
June 2000.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S.,
Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial
In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, June 2000.
[RFC2866] Rigney, C., "RADIUS
Accounting", RFC 2866,
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 40]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
June 2000.
[RFC2981] Kavasseri, R., "Event MIB",
RFC 2981, October 2000.
[RFC2982] Kavasseri, R., "Distributed
Management Expression MIB",
RFC 2982, October 2000.
[RFC3014] Kavasseri, R., "Notification
Log MIB", RFC 3014,
November 2000.
[RFC3084] Chan, K., Seligson, J.,
Durham, D., Gai, S.,
McCloghrie, K., Herzog, S.,
Reichmeyer, F., Yavatkar,
R., and A. Smith, "COPS
Usage for Policy
Provisioning (COPS-PR)",
RFC 3084, March 2001.
[RFC3144] Romascanu, D., "Remote
Monitoring MIB Extensions
for Interface Parameters
Monitoring", RFC 3144,
August 2001.
[RFC3165] Levi, D. and J.
Schoenwaelder, "Definitions
of Managed Objects for the
Delegation of Management
Scripts", RFC 3165,
August 2001.
[RFC3273] Waldbusser, S., "Remote
Network Monitoring
Management Information Base
for High Capacity Networks",
RFC 3273, July 2002.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz,
B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol for
IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315,
July 2003.
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 41]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
[RFC3393] Demichelis, C. and P.
Chimento, "IP Packet Delay
Variation Metric for IP
Performance Metrics (IPPM)",
RFC 3393, November 2002.
[RFC3410] Case, J., Mundy, R.,
Partain, D., and B. Stewart,
"Introduction and
Applicability Statements for
Internet-Standard Management
Framework", RFC 3410,
December 2002.
[RFC3411] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R.,
and B. Wijnen, "An
Architecture for Describing
Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) Management
Frameworks", STD 62,
RFC 3411, December 2002.
[RFC3413] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B.
Stewart, "Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)
Applications", STD 62,
RFC 3413, December 2002.
[RFC3414] Blumenthal, U. and B.
Wijnen, "User-based Security
Model (USM) for version 3 of
the Simple Network
Management Protocol
(SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414,
December 2002.
[RFC3415] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and
K. McCloghrie, "View-based
Access Control Model (VACM)
for the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)",
STD 62, RFC 3415,
December 2002.
[RFC3417] Presuhn, R., "Transport
Mappings for the Simple
Network Management Protocol
(SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3417,
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 42]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
December 2002.
[RFC3418] Presuhn, R., "Management
Information Base (MIB) for
the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)",
STD 62, RFC 3418,
December 2002.
[RFC3433] Bierman, A., Romascanu, D.,
and K. Norseth, "Entity
Sensor Management
Information Base", RFC 3433,
December 2002.
[RFC3434] Bierman, A. and K.
McCloghrie, "Remote
Monitoring MIB Extensions
for High Capacity Alarms",
RFC 3434, December 2002.
[RFC3535] Schoenwaelder, J., "Overview
of the 2002 IAB Network
Management Workshop",
RFC 3535, May 2003.
[RFC3584] Frye, R., Levi, D.,
Routhier, S., and B. Wijnen,
"Coexistence between Version
1, Version 2, and Version 3
of the Internet-standard
Network Management
Framework", BCP 74,
RFC 3584, August 2003.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J.,
Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and
J. Arkko, "Diameter Base
Protocol", RFC 3588,
September 2003.
[RFC3729] Waldbusser, S., "Application
Performance Measurement
MIB", RFC 3729, March 2004.
[RFC3877] Chisholm, S. and D.
Romascanu, "Alarm Management
Information Base (MIB)",
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 43]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
RFC 3877, September 2004.
[RFC3878] Lam, H., Huynh, A., and D.
Perkins, "Alarm Reporting
Control Management
Information Base (MIB)",
RFC 3878, September 2004.
[RFC3917] Quittek, J., Zseby, T.,
Claise, B., and S. Zander,
"Requirements for IP Flow
Information Export (IPFIX)",
RFC 3917, October 2004.
[RFC4011] Waldbusser, S., Saperia, J.,
and T. Hongal, "Policy Based
Management MIB", RFC 4011,
March 2005.
[RFC4118] Yang, L., Zerfos, P., and E.
Sadot, "Architecture
Taxonomy for Control and
Provisioning of Wireless
Access Points (CAPWAP)",
RFC 4118, June 2005.
[RFC4133] Bierman, A. and K.
McCloghrie, "Entity MIB
(Version 3)", RFC 4133,
August 2005.
[RFC4148] Stephan, E., "IP Performance
Metrics (IPPM) Metrics
Registry", BCP 108,
RFC 4148, August 2005.
[RFC4150] Dietz, R. and R. Cole,
"Transport Performance
Metrics MIB", RFC 4150,
August 2005.
[RFC4251] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick,
"The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Architecture",
RFC 4251, January 2006.
[RFC4268] Chisholm, S. and D. Perkins,
"Entity State MIB",
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 44]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
RFC 4268, November 2005.
[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K.
Zeilenga, "Simple
Authentication and Security
Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422,
June 2006.
[RFC4502] Waldbusser, S., "Remote
Network Monitoring
Management Information Base
Version 2", RFC 4502,
May 2006.
[RFC4564] Govindan, S., Cheng, H.,
Yao, ZH., Zhou, WH., and L.
Yang, "Objectives for
Control and Provisioning of
Wireless Access Points
(CAPWAP)", RFC 4564,
July 2006.
[RFC4656] Shalunov, S., Teitelbaum,
B., Karp, A., Boote, J., and
M. Zekauskas, "A One-way
Active Measurement Protocol
(OWAMP)", RFC 4656,
September 2006.
[RFC4668] Nelson, D., "RADIUS
Authentication Client MIB
for IPv6", RFC 4668,
August 2006.
[RFC4669] Nelson, D., "RADIUS
Authentication Server MIB
for IPv6", RFC 4669,
August 2006.
[RFC4670] Nelson, D., "RADIUS
Accounting Client MIB for
IPv6", RFC 4670,
August 2006.
[RFC4671] Nelson, D., "RADIUS
Accounting Server MIB for
IPv6", RFC 4671,
August 2006.
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 45]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
[RFC4672] De Cnodder, S., Jonnala, N.,
and M. Chiba, "RADIUS
Dynamic Authorization Client
MIB", RFC 4672,
September 2006.
[RFC4673] De Cnodder, S., Jonnala, N.,
and M. Chiba, "RADIUS
Dynamic Authorization Server
MIB", RFC 4673,
September 2006.
[RFC4710] Siddiqui, A., Romascanu, D.,
and E. Golovinsky, "Real-
time Application Quality-of-
Service Monitoring (RAQMON)
Framework", RFC 4710,
October 2006.
[RFC4711] Siddiqui, A., Romascanu, D.,
and E. Golovinsky, "Real-
time Application Quality-of-
Service Monitoring (RAQMON)
MIB", RFC 4711,
October 2006.
[RFC4712] Siddiqui, A., Romascanu, D.,
Golovinsky, E., Rahman, M.,
and Y. Kim, "Transport
Mappings for Real-time
Application Quality-of-
Service Monitoring (RAQMON)
Protocol Data Unit (PDU)",
RFC 4712, October 2006.
[RFC4737] Morton, A., Ciavattone, L.,
Ramachandran, G., Shalunov,
S., and J. Perser, "Packet
Reordering Metrics",
RFC 4737, November 2006.
[RFC4741] Enns, R., "NETCONF
Configuration Protocol",
RFC 4741, December 2006.
[RFC4742] Wasserman, M. and T.
Goddard, "Using the NETCONF
Configuration Protocol over
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 46]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
Secure SHell (SSH)",
RFC 4742, December 2006.
[RFC4743] Goddard, T., "Using NETCONF
over the Simple Object
Access Protocol (SOAP)",
RFC 4743, December 2006.
[RFC4744] Lear, E. and K. Crozier,
"Using the NETCONF Protocol
over the Blocks Extensible
Exchange Protocol (BEEP)",
RFC 4744, December 2006.
[RFC4825] Rosenberg, J., "The
Extensible Markup Language
(XML) Configuration Access
Protocol (XCAP)", RFC 4825,
May 2007.
[RFC5101] Claise, B., "Specification
of the IP Flow Information
Export (IPFIX) Protocol for
the Exchange of IP Traffic
Flow Information", RFC 5101,
January 2008.
[RFC5102] Quittek, J., Bryant, S.,
Claise, B., Aitken, P., and
J. Meyer, "Information Model
for IP Flow Information
Export", RFC 5102,
January 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla,
"The Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
August 2008.
[RFC5277] Chisholm, S. and H. Trevino,
"NETCONF Event
Notifications", RFC 5277,
July 2008.
[RFC5357] Hedayat, K., Krzanowski, R.,
Morton, A., Yum, K., and J.
Babiarz, "A Two-Way Active
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 47]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
Measurement Protocol
(TWAMP)", RFC 5357,
October 2008.
[RFC5381] Iijima, T., Atarashi, Y.,
Kimura, H., Kitani, M., and
H. Okita, "Experience of
Implementing NETCONF over
SOAP", RFC 5381,
October 2008.
[RFC5388] Niccolini, S., Tartarelli,
S., Quittek, J., Dietz, T.,
and M. Swany, "Information
Model and XML Data Model for
Traceroute Measurements",
RFC 5388, December 2008.
[RFC5416] Calhoun, P., Montemurro, M.,
and D. Stanley, "Control and
Provisioning of Wireless
Access Points (CAPWAP)
Protocol Binding for IEEE
802.11", RFC 5416,
March 2009.
[RFC5424] Gerhards, R., "The Syslog
Protocol", RFC 5424,
March 2009.
[RFC5425] Miao, F., Ma, Y., and J.
Salowey, "Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Transport
Mapping for Syslog",
RFC 5425, March 2009.
[RFC5426] Okmianski, A., "Transmission
of Syslog Messages over
UDP", RFC 5426, March 2009.
[RFC5427] Keeni, G., "Textual
Conventions for Syslog
Management", RFC 5427,
March 2009.
[RFC5477] Dietz, T., Claise, B.,
Aitken, P., Dressler, F.,
and G. Carle, "Information
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 48]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
Model for Packet Sampling
Exports", RFC 5477,
March 2009.
[RFC5539] Badra, M., "NETCONF over
Transport Layer Security
(TLS)", RFC 5539, May 2009.
[RFC5560] Uijterwaal, H., "A One-Way
Packet Duplication Metric",
RFC 5560, May 2009.
[RFC5590] Harrington, D. and J.
Schoenwaelder, "Transport
Subsystem for the Simple
Network Management Protocol
(SNMP)", RFC 5590,
June 2009.
[RFC5591] Harrington, D. and W.
Hardaker, "Transport
Security Model for the
Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 5591,
June 2009.
[RFC5592] Harrington, D., Salowey, J.,
and W. Hardaker, "Secure
Shell Transport Model for
the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)",
RFC 5592, June 2009.
[RFC5608] Narayan, K. and D. Nelson,
"Remote Authentication
Dial-In User Service
(RADIUS) Usage for Simple
Network Management Protocol
(SNMP) Transport Models",
RFC 5608, August 2009.
[RFC5674] Chisholm, S. and R.
Gerhards, "Alarms in
Syslog", RFC 5674,
October 2009.
[RFC5675] Marinov, V. and J.
Schoenwaelder, "Mapping
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 49]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP)
Notifications to SYSLOG
Messages", RFC 5675,
October 2009.
[RFC5676] Schoenwaelder, J., Clemm,
A., and A. Karmakar,
"Definitions of Managed
Objects for Mapping SYSLOG
Messages to Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)
Notifications", RFC 5676,
October 2009.
[RFC5706] Harrington, D., "Guidelines
for Considering Operations
and Management of New
Protocols and Protocol
Extensions", RFC 5706,
November 2009.
[RFC5713] Moustafa, H., Tschofenig,
H., and S. De Cnodder,
"Security Threats and
Security Requirements for
the Access Node Control
Protocol (ANCP)", RFC 5713,
January 2010.
[RFC5717] Lengyel, B. and M.
Bjorklund, "Partial Lock
Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
for NETCONF", RFC 5717,
December 2009.
[RFC5833] Shi, Y., Perkins, D.,
Elliott, C., and Y. Zhang,
"Control and Provisioning of
Wireless Access Points
(CAPWAP) Protocol Base MIB",
RFC 5833, May 2010.
[RFC5834] Shi, Y., Perkins, D.,
Elliott, C., and Y. Zhang,
"Control and Provisioning of
Wireless Access Points
(CAPWAP) Protocol Binding
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 50]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
MIB for IEEE 802.11",
RFC 5834, May 2010.
[RFC5835] Morton, A. and S. Van den
Berghe, "Framework for
Metric Composition",
RFC 5835, April 2010.
[RFC5848] Kelsey, J., Callas, J., and
A. Clemm, "Signed Syslog
Messages", RFC 5848,
May 2010.
[RFC5851] Ooghe, S., Voigt, N.,
Platnic, M., Haag, T., and
S. Wadhwa, "Framework and
Requirements for an Access
Node Control Mechanism in
Broadband Multi-Service
Networks", RFC 5851,
May 2010.
[RFC5889] Baccelli, E. and M.
Townsley, "IP Addressing
Model in Ad Hoc Networks",
RFC 5889, September 2010.
[RFC5953] Hardaker, W., "Transport
Layer Security (TLS)
Transport Model for the
Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 5953,
August 2010.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A
Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration
Protocol (NETCONF)",
RFC 6020, October 2010.
[RFC6021] Schoenwaelder, J., "Common
YANG Data Types", RFC 6021,
October 2010.
[RFC6022] Scott, M. and M. Bjorklund,
"YANG Module for NETCONF
Monitoring", RFC 6022,
October 2010.
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 51]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
Appendix A. New Work related to IETF Management Framework
A.1. Energy Management (eman)
Energy management (eman) is a new workgroup at IETF and will develop
an energy management framework and standard track MIB documents,
which are potentially relevant for the Smart Grid environment.
Energy management is already an additional requirement for network
management systems due to several factors including the rising energy
costs, the increased awareness of the ecological impact of operating
networks and devices, and the regulation of governments. The basic
objective of energy management is operating communication networks
and other equipments with a minimal amount of energy while still
providing sufficient performance to meet service level objectives.
There are very few IETF documents on energy management discussing the
areas of power monitoring, energy monitoring, and power state
control. IETF started working on MIB modules for monitoring energy
consumption and power states of energy-aware devices. However, it
has been found that a new framework for energy management is
necessary to address known issues sufficiently.
A concrete issue, which needs to be addressed, is the differentiation
between devices reporting energy consumption and remote devices for
which monitoring information is provided. One usage scenario is
power state control of remote devices, for example, at a PoE sourcing
device that switches on and off power at its ports. Another example
scenario for energy management is a gateway to low resourced and
lossy network devices in a wireless building network.
The EMAN workgroup will work on the management of energy-aware
devices covering following standard track WG items:
Energy-aware Networks and Devices MIB document:
Focus on monitoring energy-aware networks and devices addressing
device identification, context information, and potential
relationship between reporting devices, remote devices, and
monitoring probes.
Power and Energy Monitoring MIB document:
Managed objects for monitoring of power states and energy
consumption/production including retrieving of power states,
properties of power states, current power state, power state
transitions, and power state statistics.
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 52]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
Battery MIB document:
Managed objects for battery monitoring, which will provide means
for reporting detailed properties of the actual charge, age, and
state of a battery and of battery statistics.
The WG will furthermore provide following RFCs as a guidance for the
development of standard track documents:
Requirements for energy management:
Specification of energy management properties that will allow
networks and devices to become energy aware.
Energy management framework:
Extensions to current management framework required for energy
management of IP-based network equipment including power and
energy monitoring, power states, power state control, and
potential power state transitions.
Applicability statement:
Description of applications that can use the energy framework and
associated MIB modules and the discussion of relationships of the
framework to other frameworks like Smart Grid and existing
standards such as those from the IEC, ANSI, DMTF, and others.
NOTE: This is mainly based on eman charter text. It would be
interesting if an eman expert edits the text and adds use cases.
Appendix B. Open issues
o Some chapters (e.g. Radius, Diameter) are a bit bare and need a
discussion of standard documents in this area.
o Usage scenarios need to be added and discussed for different RFCs.
o Co-existence and inter-operation of SNMP and NETCONF e.g. for
joint monitoring via the same manager needs to be discussed.
o Is Experimental RFC3179 "Script MIB Extensibility Protocol Version
1.1" worth to discuss?
o Relevance to Smart Grid environment needs to be discussed in an
appendix.
o An appendix is needed to discuss management in Smart Grid
environment with a hierarchical architecture with different proxy
entities with possible involvement of SNMP master-agent and sub-
agent.
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 53]
Internet-Draft IETF Management Framework October 2010
o Management of constrained devices needs a discussion. New work is
available e.g. for optimized SNMP in 6LowPAN environment
(draft-hamid-6lowpan-snmp-optimizations-02.txt).
o Discuss the potential gap for an optimized NETCONF for constrained
devices.
Author's Address
Mehmet Ersue
Nokia Siemens Networks
St.-Martin-Strasse 53
Munich 81541
Germany
EMail: mehmet.ersue@nsn.com
Ersue Expires April 21, 2011 [Page 54]
| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-23 11:45:12 |