One document matched: draft-dupont-mipv6-rrcookie-04.txt

Differences from draft-dupont-mipv6-rrcookie-03.txt

Network Working Group                                          F. Dupont
Internet-Draft                                                     CELAR
Expires: July 26, 2007                                       J-M. Combes
                                                     France Telecom DR&D
                                                        January 22, 2007


          Care-of Address Test for MIPv6 using a State Cookie
                   draft-dupont-mipv6-rrcookie-04.txt

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 26, 2007.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

Abstract

   This document defines a procedure which performs a "care-of address
   test" using a state cookie for routing optimization in Mobile IPv6
   not protected by the routing routability procedure, i.e., protected
   by some alternative mechanisms like pre-shared secret or pre-
   established IPsec security associations.





Dupont & Combes           Expires July 26, 2007                 [Page 1]

Internet-Draft               CoA Test Cookie                January 2007


1.  Introduction

   The Mobile IPv6 specifications [RFC3775] defines a default protection
   for routing optimization, the routing routability procedure, which
   includes an explicit "care-of address test".  Alternative protection
   mechanisms like pre-shared secret [RFC4449] or pre-established IPsec
   security associations [CNIPsec] are more efficient and secure but
   require in some cases a care-of address test to avoid a "3rd party
   bombing" vulnerability.

   This document proposes a care-of address test procedure at the
   initiative of the correspondent node using a state cookie as in SCTP
   [RFC2960] or IKEv2 [RFC4306].


2.  Keywords

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].


3.  A signaling extension for a care-of address test using a state
    cookie

3.1.  Applicability

   The care-of address test procedure defined by this document MAY be
   used in order to check whether the mobile node can really receive
   packets sent to the care-of address of a new binding update.  It
   SHOULD NOT be used for entry deletion, i.e., when the care-of address
   is the home address.  It MUST be used for real alternate care-of
   address, i.e., when the address carried by an alternate care-of
   address option is not the source address of the IP header nor the
   home address of the mobile node (following the recommendation of
   [bombing]).

3.2.  Protocol

   The procedure is based on the state cookie idea of SCTP [RFC2960]
   which can be found again in IKEv2 [RFC4306].  The binding update is
   in a first time (1) rejected by a binding acknowledgment with a
   transient error or a new dedicated status, and a cookie option sent
   to the tested care-of address.  Upon the reception (2) of this
   binding acknowledgment, the mobile node retransmits (3) the binding
   update with the exact received cookie placed in a cookie option.
   When the correspondent node receives (4) the augmented binding
   update, it can check by recomputing the cookie and comparing it to



Dupont & Combes           Expires July 26, 2007                 [Page 2]

Internet-Draft               CoA Test Cookie                January 2007


   the cookie option data that the binding update is from the same
   mobile node and for the same care-of address (so it can infer the
   mobile node is reachable at this care-of address, i.e., a "care-of
   address test" has been successfully performed).

   The cookie MUST reflect the mobile node identity or the binding cache
   entry or an equivalent, and MUST reflect the tested care-of address.
   It MUST NOT be easy to infer by the mobile node, including with the
   knowledge of previous cookies from the same node.

   The last point is what to do waiting the retransmitted and augmented
   binding update.  Possibilities are:
   -  apply the binding update with the new care-of address.  It defeats
      the purpose of the care-of address test so it SHOULD NOT be done,
      and it MUST NOT be done for a real alternate care-of address.
   -  keep the previous care-of address.  As it is not possible to know
      whether the previous care-of address is still usable, i.e.,
      whether the mobile node is still reachable at this previous
      care-of address, the default policy SHOULD NOT be to keep the
      previous care-of address.  The correspondent node MAY keep the
      previous care-of address in special cases where this is known to
      be the best solution.
   -  temporarily disable the binding cache entry, i.e., by using the
      home address for communication to the mobile node until another
      binding update is received.  This SHOULD be the default policy.

3.3.  Mobile Node Requirement

   There is only one requirement for mobile nodes: a mobile node MUST
   include in retries a copy of the cookie option carried by a binding
   acknowledgment signaling a transient error (examples of such a
   transient error is of course the new status or a sequence number out
   of window).

3.4.  Cookie Generation Example

   This method assumes a global secret key is available and uses in
   sequence:
   -  a 16 bit timestamp of when the cookie is created
   -  the tested care-of address
   -  the truncated HMAC [RFC2104], keyed by a secret key, of the
      preceding two fields, the home address and the correspondent
      address.
   The secret key SHOULD be random or pseudo-random and SHOULD be
   changed reasonably frequently.  The timestamp MAY be used to
   determine which key was used.  The HMAC has to be truncated in order
   to keep the cookie option length less than the maximum, the higher 96
   bits of the HMAC should be enough.



Dupont & Combes           Expires July 26, 2007                 [Page 3]

Internet-Draft               CoA Test Cookie                January 2007


4.  Acknowledgments

   This document was extracted from [CNIPsec] because what it provides
   is needed by any alternative to the return routability procedure
   which has no built-in care-of address test.


5.  Security Considerations

   Without a test of the care-of address or an other way to trust it,
   the care-of address presented by the mobile node can be a fake one
   and offers a 3rd party bombing attack.

   Binding updates and acknowledgments are validated using an
   alternative protection mechanisms so they can't be injected by third
   parties.  The cookie sub-option is small enough to make this
   procedure a poor candidate for a third party bombing mechanism.


6.  IANA Considerations

   This document requires:
   -  a new status for binding acknowledgment.
   -  a new option for mobility messages used in binding update and
      acknowledgment messages.


7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, March 1997.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.

   [RFC3775]  Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
              in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.

7.2.  Informative References

   [CNIPsec]  Dupont, F. and J-M. Combes, "Using IPsec between Mobile
              and Correspondent IPv6 Nodes",
              draft-ietf-mip6-cn-ipsec-04.txt (work in progress),
              January 2007.

   [RFC2960]  Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Morneault, K., Sharp, C.,



Dupont & Combes           Expires July 26, 2007                 [Page 4]

Internet-Draft               CoA Test Cookie                January 2007


              Schwarzbauer, H., Taylor, T., Rytina, I., Kalla, M.,
              Zhang, L., and V. Paxson, "Stream Control Transmission
              Protocol", RFC 2960, October 2000.

   [RFC4306]  Kaufman, C., Ed., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2)
              Protocol", RFC 4306, December 2005.

   [RFC4449]  Perkins, C., "Securing Mobile IPv6 Route Optimization
              Using a Static Shared Key", RFC 4449, June 2006.

   [bombing]  Dupont, F., "A note about 3rd party bombing in Mobile
              IPv6", draft-dupont-mipv6-3bombing-04.txt (work in
              progress), July 2006.


Authors' Addresses

   Francis Dupont
   CELAR

   Email: Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr


   Jean-Michel Combes
   France Telecom DR&D
   38/40 rue du General Leclerc
   92794 Issy-les-Moulineaux Cedex 9
   France

   Fax:   +33 1 45 29 65 19
   Email: jeanmichel.combes@gmail.com




















Dupont & Combes           Expires July 26, 2007                 [Page 5]

Internet-Draft               CoA Test Cookie                January 2007


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.


Intellectual Property

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.


Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).





Dupont & Combes           Expires July 26, 2007                 [Page 6]