One document matched: draft-carpenter-6man-why64-01.xml


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]>
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<rfc category="info" docName="draft-carpenter-6man-why64-01" ipr="trust200902">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="Why 64">Analysis of the 64-bit Boundary in IPv6
    Addressing</title>

    <author fullname="Brian Carpenter" initials="B. E." role="editor"
            surname="Carpenter">
      <organization abbrev="Univ. of Auckland"></organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>Department of Computer Science</street>
          <street>University of Auckland</street>
          <street>PB 92019</street>
          <city>Auckland</city>
          <region></region>
          <code>1142</code>
          <country>New Zealand</country>
        </postal>
        <email>brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <author fullname="Tim Chown" initials="T. J." surname="Chown">
      <organization abbrev="Univ. of Southampton"></organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>University of Southampton</street>
          <city>Southampton</city>
          <region>Hampshire</region>
          <code>SO17 1BJ</code>
          <country>United Kingdom</country>
        </postal>
        <email>tjc@ecs.soton.ac.uk</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <author fullname="Fernando Gont" initials="F." surname="Gont">
      <organization>SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>Evaristo Carriego 2644</street>
          <city>Haedo</city>
          <region>Provincia de Buenos Aires</region>
          <code>1706</code>
          <country>Argentina</country>
        </postal>
        <email>fgont@si6networks.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <author fullname="Sheng Jiang" initials="S." surname="Jiang">
      <organization>Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>Q14, Huawei Campus</street>
          <street>No.156 Beiqing Road</street>
          <city>Hai-Dian District, Beijing</city>
          <code>100095</code>
          <country>P.R. China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>jiangsheng@huawei.com</email>
      </address>
    </author> 

    <author fullname="Alexandru Petrescu" initials="A." surname="Petrescu">
      <organization abbrev="CEA, LIST">CEA, LIST</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>CEA Saclay</street>
          <city>Gif-sur-Yvette</city>
          <region>Ile-de-France</region>
          <code>91190</code>
          <country>France</country>
        </postal>
        <email>Alexandru.Petrescu@cea.fr</email>
      </address>
    </author>

<author fullname="Andrew Yourtchenko" initials="A" surname="Yourtchenko">
      <organization>cisco</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
      <street>7a de Kleetlaan</street>
      <city>Diegem</city>
      <code>1830</code>
      <country>Belgium</country>
        </postal>
            <email>ayourtch@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date day="6" month="February" year="2014" />

    <area>Internet</area>

    <workgroup>6MAN</workgroup>

    <abstract>
      <t>The IPv6 unicast addressing format includes a separation between the
      prefix used to route packets to a subnet and the interface identifier
      used to specify a given interface connected to that subnet. Historically
      the interface identifier has been defined as 64 bits long, leaving 64
      bits for the prefix. This document discusses the reasons for this fixed
      boundary and the issues involved in treating it as a variable
      boundary.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>

  <middle>
    <section anchor="intro" title="Introduction">
      <t>IPv6 addresses were originally chosen to be 128 bits long
      to provide flexibility and new possibilities,
      rather than simply relieving the IPv4 address shortage
      by doubling the address size to 64 bits.
      The notion of a 64-bit boundary in the address was introduced after the
      initial design was done. There were two motivations for introducing it.
      One was the original "8+8" proposal <xref target="DRAFT-odell"/> that eventually led to ILNP
      <xref target="RFC6741"/>, which required a fixed point for the split between
      local and wide-area parts of the address. The other was the expectation that EUI-64
      MAC addresses would become widespread in place of 48-bit addresses, coupled
      with the plan at that time that auto-configured addresses would normally be
      based on interface identifiers derived from MAC addresses. </t>

      <t>The IPv6 addressing architecture <xref target="RFC4291"></xref>
      specifies that a unicast address is divided into n bits of subnet prefix
      followed by (128-n) bits of interface identifier (IID). Since IPv6 routing is
      entirely based on variable length subnet masks, there is no
      architectural assumption that n has any particular fixed value. However,
      RFC 4291 also describes a method of forming interface identifiers from
      IEEE EUI-64 hardware addresses <xref target="IEEE802"></xref> and this
      does specify that such interface identifiers are 64 bits long. Various
      other methods of forming interface identifiers also specify a length of
      64 bits. This has therefore become the de facto length of almost all
      IPv6 interface identifiers. One exception is documented in <xref
      target="RFC6164"></xref>, which standardises 127-bit prefixes for
      inter-router links. </t>

      <t>Recently it has been clarified that the bits in an IPv6 interface
      identifier have no particular meaning and should be treated as 
      opaque values <xref target="I-D.ietf-6man-ug"/>. Therefore, there are
      no bit positions in the currently used 64 bits that need to be
      preserved. The addressing architecture as modified by
      <xref target="I-D.ietf-6man-ug"/> now states that
      "For all unicast addresses, except those that start with the binary
      value 000, Interface IDs are required to be 64 bits long. If derived
      from an IEEE MAC-layer address, they must be constructed in Modified
      EUI-64 format."</t>

      <t>The question is often asked why the boundary is set rigidly at /64.
      This limits the length of a routing prefix to 64 bits, whereas
      architecturally, and from the point of view of routing protocols, it
      could be anything (in theory) between /1 and /128 inclusive. Here, we
      only discuss the question of a shorter IID, allowing a longer routing
      prefix. </t>

      <t>The purpose of this document is to analyse the issues around this
      question. We make no proposal for change, but we do analyse the possible
      effects of a change. </t>


    </section> <!-- intro -->

    <section anchor="scenarios" title="Scenarios for prefixes longer than /64">
      <t>In this section we describe existing scenarios where prefixes longer than /64 have been used
         or proposed. </t>
      <section anchor="insuff" title="Insufficient address space delegated">
        <t>A site may not be delegated a sufficiently large prefix from which to allocate a /64 prefix to
           all of its internal subnets. In this case the site may either determine that it does not have
           enough address space to number all its network elements and thus, at the very best, be only
           partially operational, or it may choose to use internal prefixes longer than /64 to allow
           multiple subnets and the hosts within them to be configured with addresses. </t>

        <t>In this case, the site might choose, for example, to use a /80 per subnet, in combination
           with hosts using either manually configured addressing or DHCPv6. </t>

        <t>Scenarios that have been suggested where an insufficient prefix might be delegated
           include home or small office networks, vehicles, building services and transportation
           services (road signs, etc.). It should be noted that the homenet architecture text
           <xref target="I-D.ietf-homenet-arch"/>
           states that a CPE should consider the lack of sufficient address space to be an error
           condition, rather than using prefixes longer than /64 internally. </t>

       <t>Another scenario occasionally suggested is one where the Internet address registries
          actually begin to run out of IPv6 prefix space, such that operators can no longer
          assign reasonable prefixes to users in accordance with <xref target="RFC6177"/>.
          We mention this scenario here for completeness,
          and we briefly analyze it in <xref target="impl"/>. </t>
          

      </section>

      <section anchor="cacheattack" title="Concerns over ND cache exhaustion">

        <t>A site may be concerned that it is open to neighbour discovery (ND) cache exhaustion
           attacks, whereby an attacker sends a large number of messages in rapid succession to
           a series of (most likely inactive) host addresses within a specific subnet, in an attempt
           to fill a router's ND cache with ND requests pending completion, in so doing denying
           correct operation to active devices on the network. </t>

        <t>An example would be to use a /120 prefix, limiting the number of addresses in the subnet
           to be similar to an IPv4 /24 prefix, which should not cause any concerns for ND cache
           exhaustion. Note that the prefix does need to be quite long for this scenario to
           be valid. The number of theoretically possible ND cache slots on the segment needs to
           be of the same order of magnitude as the actual number of hosts. Thus small increases
           from the /64 prefix length do not have a noticeable impact: even 2^32 potential entries,
           a factor of two billion decrease compared to 2^64, is still more than enough to
           exhaust the memory on current routers. </t>
           
        <t>As in the previous scenario, hosts would likely be manually configured with addresses, or use DHCPv6. </t>

        <t>It should be noted that several other mitigations of the ND cache attack
           are described in <xref target="RFC6583"/>, and that limiting the size of the cache and 
           the number of incomplete entries allowed would also defeat the attack. </t>
        
      </section>
    </section> <!-- scenarios -->


    <section anchor="standards" title="Interaction with IPv6 specifications">
      <t>
    The precise 64-bit length of the Interface ID is widely mentioned
    in numerous RFCs describing various aspects of IPv6. It is not straightforward
    to distinguish cases where this has normative impact or affects interoperability.
    This section aims to identify specifications that contain an explicit reference
    to the 64-bit size. Regardless of implementation issues, the RFCs themselves would
    all need to be updated if the 64-bit rule was changed, even if the updates were small. 
      </t>

      <t>
    First and foremost, the RFCs describing the architectural
    aspects of IPv6 addressing explicitly state, refer and repeat
    this apparently immutable value: Addressing Architecture <xref target="RFC4291"/>, Reserved Interface
    Identifiers <xref target="RFC5453"/>, ILNP <xref target="RFC6741"/>. Customer Edge routers impose /64 for
    their interfaces <xref target="RFC7084"/>. Only the IPv6 Subnet Model <xref target="RFC5942"/>
    refers to the assumption of /64 prefix length as a potential implementation error.
      </t>
      <t>
    Numerous IPv6-over-foo documents make mandatory statements with
    respect to the 64-bit length of the Interface ID to be used
    during the Stateless Autoconfiguration.  These
    documents include <xref target="RFC2464"/> (Ethernet), <xref target="RFC2467"/> (FDDI),
    <xref target="RFC2470"/> (Token Ring), <xref target="RFC2492"/> (ATM), <xref target="RFC2497"/> (ARCnet),
    <xref target="RFC2590"/> (Frame Relay), 
    <xref target="RFC3146"/> (IEEE 1394), <xref target="RFC4338"/> (Fibre Channel), 
    <xref target="RFC4944"/> (IEEE 802.15.4), <xref target="RFC5072"/> (PPP), <xref target="RFC5121"/>
    <xref target="RFC5692"/> (IEEE 802.16),
    <xref target="RFC2529"/> (6over4),
    <xref target="RFC5214"/> (ISATAP), <xref target="I-D.templin-aerolink"/> (AERO),
    <xref target="I-D.ietf-6lowpan-btle"/>, <xref target="I-D.ietf-6man-6lobac"/>,
    <xref target="I-D.brandt-6man-lowpanz"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
    To a lesser extent, the address configuration RFCs
    themselves may in some way assume the 64-bit length of an
    Interface ID (SLAAC for the link-local addresses, DHCPv6 for
    the potentially assigned EUI-64-based IP addresses, Default Router Preferences
    <xref target="RFC4191"/>
    for its impossibility of Prefix Length 4, Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection <xref target="RFC4429"/>
    which computes 64-bit-based collision probabilities).
      </t>

      <t>
    The MLDv2 protocol <xref target="RFC3810"/> mandates all queries be sent with
    the fe80::/64 link-local source address prefix and
    subsequently bases the querier election algorithm on the
    link-local subnet prefix length of length /64.
      </t>
      <t>
    The IPv6 Flow Label Specification <xref target="RFC6437"/> gives an example of
    a 20-bit hash function generation which relies on splitting an
    IPv6 address in two equally-sized 64bit-length parts.
      </t>
      <t>
    The basic transition mechanisms <xref target="RFC4213"/> refer to IIDs of length
    64 for link-local addresses, and other transition mechanisms such as 
    Teredo <xref target="RFC4380"/> assume the use of IIDs of length 64.
    Similar assumptions are found in 6to4 <xref target="RFC3056"/> and 6rd <xref target="RFC5969"/>.
    Translation-based transition mechanisms such as NAT64 and NPTv6 have some dependency
    on prefix length, discussed below. 
      </t>
      <t>
    The proposed method <xref target="I-D.ietf-v6ops-64share"/> of extending an assigned /64 prefix from a
    smartphone's cellular interface to its WiFi link relies on
    prefix length, and implicitely on the length of the Interface
    ID, to be valued at 64.
      </t>
      <t>
    The CGA and HBA specifications rely on the 64-bit identifier
    length (see below), as do the Privacy extensions <xref target="RFC4941"/> and some examples in
    IKEv2bis <xref target="RFC5996"/>. </t>
    <t>
    464XLAT <xref target="RFC6877"/> explicitly mentions acquiring /64 prefixes. However, it also discusses
    the possibility of using the interface address on the device as the endpoint for the
    traffic, thus potentially removing this dependency. </t>

    <t><xref target="RFC2526"/> reserves a number of subnet anycast addresses by
    reserving some anycast IIDs.  An anycast IID so reserved cannot be less than 7 bits long.
    This means that a subnet prefix length longer than /121 is not possible, and 
    a subnet of exactly /121 would be useless since all its identifiers are reserved.
    It also means that half of a /120 is reserved for anycast. This could of course
    be fixed in the way described for /127 in <xref target="RFC6164"/>, i.e.,
    avoiding the use of anycast within a /120 subnet. </t>

   
    <t>While preparing this document, it was noted that many other IPv6 specifications
    refer to mandatory alignment on 64-bit boundaries, 64-bit data structures, 64-bit
    counters in MIBs, 64-bit sequence numbers and cookies in security, etc.  Finally,
    the number "64" may be considered "magic" in some RFCs, e.g., 64k limits in DNS
    and Base64 encodings in MIME. None of this has any influence on the length of
    the IID, but might confuse a careless reader. </t>

 </section> <!-- standards -->

    <section anchor="breakage" title="Possible areas of breakage">
      <t>This section discusses several specific aspects of IPv6 where we
         can expect operational breakage with subnet prefixes other than /64. </t>
      <t><list style="symbols">
          <t>Multicast: <xref target="RFC3306"/> defines a method for generating 
          IPv6 multicast group addresses based on unicast prefixes.
          This method assumes a longest network prefix of 64 bits.
          If a longer prefix is used, there is no way to generate a specific multicast group address
          using this method.  In such cases the administrator would need to use an "artificial" prefix from
          within their allocation (a /64 or shorter) from which to generate the group address. This
          prefix would not correspond to a real subnet.
          <vspace blankLines="1"/>
          Similarly <xref target="RFC3956"/>, which specifies Embedded-RP, allowing IPv6 multicast 
          rendezvous point addresses to be embedded in the multicast group address,
          would also fail, as the scheme assumes a maximum prefix length of 64 bits.</t>

          <t>CGA: The Cryptographically Generated Address format (CGA, <xref
          target="RFC3972"></xref>) is heavily based on a /64 interface
          identifier. <xref target="RFC3972"></xref> has defined a detailed
          algorithm how to generate 64-bit interface identifier from a public
          key and a 64-bit subnet prefix. Breaking the /64 boundary would
          certainly break the current CGA definition. However, CGA might
          benefit in a redefined version if more bits are used for interface
          identifier (which means shorter prefix length). For now, 
          59 bits are used for cryptographic purposes. The more bits are
          available, the stronger CGA could be. Conversely, longer prefixes
          would weaken CGA.  </t>

          <t>NAT64: Both stateless <xref target="RFC6052"></xref> NAT64 and
          stateful NAT64 <xref target="RFC6146"></xref> are flexible for the
          prefix length. <xref target="RFC6052"> </xref> has defined multiple
          address formats for NAT64. In Section 2 "IPv4-Embedded IPv6 Prefix
          and Format" of <xref target="RFC6052"></xref>, the network-specific
          prefix could be one of /32, /40, /48, /56, /64 and /96. The remaining
          part of the IPv6 address is constructed by a 32-bit IPv4 address, a
          8-bit u byte and a variable length suffix (there is no u byte and
          suffix in the case of 96-bit Well-Known Prefix). NAT64 is therefore
          OK with a boundary out to /96, but not longer.</t>

          <t>NPTv6: IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix Translation <xref
          target="RFC6296"></xref> is also bound to /64 boundary. NPTv6 maps a
          /64 prefix with other /64 prefix. When the NPTv6 Translator is
          configured with a /48 or shorter prefix, the 64-bit interface
          identifier is kept unmodified during translation. However, the /64
          boundary might be broken as long as the "inside" and "outside"
          prefix has the same length.</t>

          <t>ILNP: Identifier-Locator Network Protocol (ILNP) <xref target="RFC6741"/> is designed
          around the /64 boundary, since it relies on locally unique 64-bit interface identifiers.
          While a re-design to use longer prefixes is not inconceivable, this would need
          major changes to the existing specification for the IPv6 version of ILNP. </t>

          <t>shim6: The Multihoming Shim Protocol for IPv6 (shim6) <xref target="RFC5533"/>
          in its insecure form treats IPv6 address as opaque 128-bit objects. However, to secure
          the protocol against spoofing, it is essential to either use CGAs (see above) or Hash-Based
          Addresses (HBA) <xref target="RFC5535"/>. Like CGAs, HBAs are generated using a procedure
          that assumes a 64-bit identifier. Therefore, in effect, secure shim6 is affected by
          the /64 boundary exactly like CGAs.          
          </t>

          <t>others?</t>
        </list></t>

    <t>It goes without saying that if prefixes longer than /64 are to be used, all hosts must be
       capable of generating IIDs shorter than 64 bits, in order to follow the auto-configuration
       procedure correctly <xref target="RFC4862"/>. There is however the rather special case of
       the link-local prefix. While RFC 4862 is careful not to define any specific length
       of link-local prefix within fe80::/10, operationally there would be a problem unless all
       hosts on a link use IIDs of the same length to configure a link-local address during reboot. 
       Typically today the choice of 64 bits for the link-local IID length is hard-coded per interface.
       There might be no way to change this except conceivably by manual configuration, which will be
       impossible if the host concerned has no local user interface. </t>

     </section> <!-- breakage -->

    <section anchor="expt" title="Experimental observations">

    <section title="Survey of the processing of Neighbor Discovery options with prefixes other than /64" anchor="survey">
<t>This section provides a survey of the processing of Neighbor Discovery options which include prefixes that are different than /64.</t>

<t>The behavior of nodes was assessed with respect to the following options:</t>

<t> <list style="symbols">
<t>PIO-A: Prefix Information Option (PIO) <xref target="RFC4861"/> with the A bit set.</t>
<t>PIO-L: Prefix Information Option (PIO) <xref target="RFC4861"/> with the L bit set.</t>
<t>PIO-AL: Prefix Information Option (PIO) <xref target="RFC4861"/> with both the A and L bits set.</t>
<t>RIO: Route Information Option (RIO) <xref target="RFC4191"/>.</t>
</list> </t>


<t>In the tables below, the following notation is used:</t>

<t> <list style="hanging">
<t hangText="NOT-SUP:">
<vspace blankLines="0" />This option is not supported (i.e., it is ignored no matter the prefix length used).</t>
<t hangText="LOCAL:">
<vspace blankLines="0" />The corresponding prefix is considered "on-link".</t>
<t hangText="ROUTE">
<vspace blankLines="0" />The corresponding route is added to the IPv6 routing table.</t>
<t hangText="IGNORE:">
<vspace blankLines="0" />The Option is ignored as an error.</t>
<!--
<t hangText="DROP:">
<vspace blankLines="0" />The whole packet is treated as bogus, and thus dropped/ignored</t>

<t hangText="FAIL:">
<vspace blankLines="0" />The receiving node crashes or exhibits some other misbehavior</t>
-->
</list> </t>


<texttable title="Processing of ND options with prefixes longer than /64" style="all" anchor="survey-long-prefix">
        <ttcol align="center">Operating System</ttcol>
        <ttcol align="center">PIO-A</ttcol><ttcol align="center">PIO-L</ttcol><ttcol align="center">PIO-AL</ttcol><ttcol align="center">RIO</ttcol>

        <c>FreeBSD 9.0</c>       <c>IGNORE</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>NOT-SUP</c>

        <c>Linux 3.0.0-15</c>    <c>IGNORE</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>NOT-SUP</c>

        <c>Linux-current</c>     <c>IGNORE</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>NOT-SUP</c>


        <c>NetBSD 5.1</c>        <c>IGNORE</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>NOT-SUP</c>

        <c>OpenBSD-current</c>   <c>IGNORE</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>NOT-SUP</c>
<!--
        <c>Solaris 10</c>        <c>PIO-A</c><c>PIO-L</c><c>PIO-AL</c><c>RIO</c>
-->
        <c>Win XP SP2</c>       <c>IGNORE</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>ROUTE</c>

<!--
        <c>Win Vista (Build 6000)</c>  <c>PIO-A</c><c>PIO-L</c><c>PIO-AL</c><c>RIO</c>
-->
        <c>Win 7 Home Premium</c>  <c>IGNORE</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>ROUTE</c>

<!--
        <c>Win 8 Home Premium</c>      <c>PIO-A</c><c>PIO-L</c><c>PIO-AL</c><c>RIO</c>

-->
    </texttable>

<t></t>

<texttable title="Processing of ND options with prefixes shorter than /64" style="all" anchor="survey-short-prefix">
        <ttcol align="center">Operating System</ttcol>
        <ttcol align="center">PIO-A</ttcol><ttcol align="center">PIO-L</ttcol><ttcol align="center">PIO-AL</ttcol><ttcol align="center">RIO</ttcol>

        <c>FreeBSD 9.0</c>       <c>IGNORE</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>NOT-SUP</c>

        <c>Linux 3.0.0-15</c>    <c>IGNORE</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>NOT-SUP</c>

        <c>Linux-current</c>     <c>IGNORE</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>NOT-SUP</c>


        <c>NetBSD 5.1</c>        <c>IGNORE</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>NOT-SUP</c>

        <c>OpenBSD-current</c>   <c>IGNORE</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>NOT-SUP</c>
<!--
        <c>Solaris 10</c>        <c></c><c>PIO-L</c><c>PIO-AL</c><c>RIO</c>
-->
        <c>Win XP SP2</c>       <c>IGNORE</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>ROUTE</c>
<!--
        <c>Win Vista (Build 6000)</c>  <ttcol align="center">PIO-A</c><ttcol align="center">PIO-L</c><ttcol align="center">PIO-AL</c><ttcol align="center">RIO</c>
-->
        <c>Win 7 Home Premium</c>    <c>IGNORE</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>LOCAL</c><c>ROUTE</c>

<!--
        <c>Win 8 Home Premium</c>      <c>PIO-A</c><c>PIO-L</c><c>PIO-AL</c><c>RIO</c>

-->
    </texttable>

<t>The results obtained can be summarized as follows:</t>
<t><list style="symbols">
<t>the "A" bit in the Prefix Information Options is honored only if the prefix length is 64.</t>
<t>the "L bit in the Prefix Information Options is honored for any arbitrary prefix length (whether shorter or longer than /64).</t>
<t>nodes that support the Route Information Option, allow such routes to be specified with prefixes of any arbitrary length (whether shorter or longer than /64)</t>
</list></t>

</section> <!-- survey -->

      <section title="Other Observations">
      <t>Participants in the V6OPS working group have indicated that some forwarding devices have been
      shown to work correctly with long prefix masks such as /80 or /96. Indeed, it is to be expected
      that longest prefix match based forwarding will work for any prefix length, and no reports
      of this failing have been noted. Also, DHCPv6 is in widespread use without any dependency
      on the /64 boundary. Reportedly, there are deployments of /120 subnets configured using
      DHCPv6. </t>

      <t>It has been reported that at least one type of switch has a content-addressable memory limited
      to 144 bits. This means that filters cannot be defined based on 128-bit addresses
      and two 16-bit port numbers; the longest prefix that could be used in such a filter is /112. </t>

      <t>There have been unconfirmed assertions that some routers have a performance drop-off for
      prefixes longer than /64, due to design issues. </t>

      <t>More input with practical observations is welcomed. </t>
      </section>

</section> <!-- expt -->


    <section anchor="privacy" title="Privacy issues">
      <t>The length of the interface identifier has implications for privacy
      <xref target="I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy"/>. In any case in
      which the value of the identifier is intended to be hard to guess, whether or
      not it is cryptographically generated, it is apparent that more bits are
      better. For example, if there are only 20 bits to be guessed, at most just over
      a million guesses are needed, today well within the capacity of a low
      cost attack mechanism. It is hard to state in general how many bits are enough
      to protect privacy, since this depends on the resources available to the attacker,
      but it seems clear that a privacy solution needs to resist an attack requiring billions
      rather than millions of guesses. Trillions would be better, suggesting that at least 40
      bits should be available. Thus we can argue that subnet prefixes longer than say
      /80 might raise privacy concerns by making the IID guessable. </t>

      <t>A prefix long enough to limit the number of addresses comparably to an IPv4 subnet,
      such as /120, would create exactly the same situation for privacy as IPv4. 
      In particular, a host would be forced to pick a new IID when roaming to a
      new network, to avoid collisions. An argument could be made that since this reduces
      traceability, it is a good thing from a privacy point of view. </t>

    </section> <!-- privacy -->

    <section anchor="impl" title="Implementation and deployment issues">

      <t>From an early stage, implementations and deployments of IPv6 assumed the /64
      subnet size, even though routing was based on variable-length subnet masks of any length. 
      As shown above, this became anchored in many specifications (<xref target="standards"/>)
      and in important aspects of implementations commonly used in local area networks
      (<xref target="expt"/>). In fact, a programmer might be lulled into assuming a comfortable
      rule of thumb that subnet prefixes are always /64 and an IID is always of length 64.
      Apart from the limited evidence in <xref target="survey"/>, we cannot tell without code
      inspections or tests whether existing stacks are able to handle a flexible IID length, or
      whether they would require modification to do so. </t>

      <t>The main practical consequence of the existing specifications is that deployments in
      which longer subnet prefixes are used cannot make use of SLAAC-configured addresses, and
      require either statically configured addresses or DHCPv6. To reverse this argument,
      if it was considered desirable to allow auto-configured addresses with subnet
      prefixes longer than /64, all of the specifications identified above as
      depending on /64 would have to be modified, with due regard to interoperability
      with unmodified stacks. In fact <xref target="I-D.ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses"/>
      allows for this possibility. Then modified stacks would have to be developed
      and deployed. It might be the case that some stacks contain dependencies
      on the /64 boundary which are not directly implied by the specifications,
      and any such hidden dependencies would also need to be found and removed. </t>

      <t>Typical IP Address Management (IPAM) tools treat /64 as the default subnet
      size, but allow users to specify longer subnet prefixes if desired. Clearly,
      all IPAM tools and network management systems would need to be checked
      in detail. </t>

      <t>Some implementation issues concerning prefix assignment are worth mentioning.</t>
      <t><list style="numbers">
        <t>It is sometimes suggested that assigning a prefix such as /48 or /56 to every
        user site (including the smallest) as recommended by <xref target="RFC6177"/>
        is wasteful. In fact, the currently 
        released unicast address space, 2000::/3, contains 35 trillion /48 prefixes
        ((2**45 = 35,184,372,088,832). With 2000::/3 and 0::/3 currently
        committed, we still have 75% of the address space in reserve. Thus there
        is no objective risk of prefix depletion by assigning /48 or /56 prefixes.
        This should be considered when evaluating the scenario of <xref target="insuff"/>. </t>

        <t>Some have argued that more prefix bits are needed to allow a
        hierarchical addressing scheme within a campus or corporate network.
        However, flat routing is widely and successfully used within rather
        large networks, with hundreds of routers and thousands of end systems.
        Therefore there is no objective need for additional prefix bits
        to support hierarchy and aggregation.
        </t>   
   
        <t>Some network operators wish to know and audit which nodes are active on a network,
        especially those that are allowed to communicate off link or off site. They may also
        wish to limit the total number of active addresses and sessions that can be sourced from a
        particular host, LAN or site, in order to prevent potential resource depletion attacks
        or other problems spreading beyond a certain scope of control. It has been argued that
        this type of control would be easier if only long network prefixes with relatively
        small numbers of possible hosts per network were used, reducing the discovery problem. </t>
      </list></t>  

      <t>We now list some practical effects of the fixed /64 boundary.</t>
      <t><list style="symbols">
         <t>Everything is the same. Compared to IPv4, there is no more calculating (leaf) subnet sizes, no
         more juggling between subnets, fewer errors.</t>

         <t>There are always enough addresses in any subnet to add one or
         more devices. There might be other limits, but addressing will never get in the way.</t>

         <t>Adding a subnet is easy - just take the next /64. No estimates,
         calculations, consideration or judgment is needed. </t>

         <t>Router configurations are easier to understand. </t>

         <t>Documentation is easier to write and easier to read; training is easier. </t>
       </list></t>


    </section> <!-- impl -->

    <section anchor="conclusion" title="Conclusion">
      <t>Summary of pros and cons; risks (write this bit last!)</t>
    </section> <!-- conclusion -->

    <section anchor="security" title="Security Considerations">
      <t>In addition to the privacy issues mentioned in <xref target="privacy"/>, and the issues mentioned
      with CGAs and HBAs in <xref target="breakage"/>, the length of the subnet prefix affects the
      matter of defence against scanning attacks <xref target="I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning"/>.
      Assuming the attacker has
      discovered or guessed the prefix length, a longer prefix reduces the space that the attacker
      needs to scan, e.g., to only 256 addresses if the prefix is /120. On the other hand,
      if the attacker has not discovered the prefix length and assumes it to be /64,
      routers can trivially discard attack packets that do not fall within an actual
      subnet. </t>

      <t>However, assume that an attacker finds one valid address A and then starts a scanning
      attack by scanning "outwards" from A, by trying A+1, A-1, A+2, A-2, etc. This attacker will
      easily find all hosts in any subnet with a long prefix, because they will have addresses close
      to A. We therefore conclude that any prefix containing densely packed valid addresses is vulnerable
      to a scanning attack, without the attacker needing to guess the prefix length. Therefore,
      to preserve IPv6's advantage over IPv4 in resisting scanning attacks, it is important that
      subnet prefixes are short enough to allow sparse allocation of identifiers within
      each subnet. The considerations are similar to those for privacy, and we can again
      argue that prefixes longer than say /80 might significantly increase vulnerability.
      Ironically, this argument is exactly converse to the argument for longer prefixes to resist
      an ND cache attack, as described in <xref target="cacheattack"/>. </t>

      <t>Denial of service attacks related to Neighbor Discovery are discussed in <xref target="RFC6583"/>.
      One of the mitigations suggested by that document is "sizing subnets to reflect the number of
      addresses actually in use", but the fact that this greatly simplifies scanning attacks is
      not noted. For further discussion of scanning attacks, see <xref target="I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning"/>.</t>

      <t>Note that, although not known at the time of writing, there might be other resource
      exhaustion attacks available, similar in nature to the ND cache attack. We cannot
      exclude that such attacks might be exacerbated by sparsely populated subnets
      such as a /64. It should also be noted that this analysis assumes a conventional
      deployment model with a significant number of end-systems located in a single LAN broadcast
      domain. Other deployment models might lead to different conclusions. </t>
   
    </section> <!-- security -->

    <section anchor="iana" title="IANA Considerations">
      <t>This document requests no action by IANA.</t>
    </section> <!-- iana -->

    <section anchor="ack" title="Acknowledgements">
      <t>This document was inspired by a vigorous discussion on the V6OPS working group
      mailing list with at least 20 participants. Later, valuable comments were received from
      Lorenzo Colitti,
      David Farmer,
      Ray Hunter,
      Mark Smith,
      Fred Templin,
      Stig Venaas,
      and other participants in the IETF.</t>

      <t>This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool <xref
      target="RFC2629"></xref>.</t>
    </section> <!-- ack -->

    <section anchor="changes" title="Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]">
      <t>draft-carpenter-6man-why64-01: WG comments, added experimental results, implementation/deployment text,
         2014-02-06.</t>
      <t>draft-carpenter-6man-why64-00: original version, 2014-01-06.</t>
    </section> <!-- changes -->

  </middle>

  <back>
    <references title="Normative References">
      
      &RFC3972;
      &RFC4291;
      &RFC4861;
      &RFC5533;
      &RFC5535; 
      &RFC6052;
 <!-- &RFC5157; -->
      &RFC6146;
      &RFC6164;
      &RFC6296;
      &RFC6741;
      &RFC5453;
      &RFC7084;
      &RFC5942;
      &RFC2464;
      &RFC2467;
      &RFC2470;
      &RFC2492;
      &RFC2497;
      &RFC2590;
      &RFC3146;
      &RFC4338;
      &RFC4944;
      &RFC5072;
      &RFC5121;
      &RFC5692;
      &RFC4191;
      &RFC4429;
      &RFC3810;
      &RFC6437;
      &RFC3306;
      &RFC3956;
      &RFC4862; 
      &RFC2526;  
      &RFC5214;   
      &RFC4213;
      &RFC4380;
      &RFC2529;
      &RFC3056;
      &RFC5969;
      &RFC4941;
      &RFC5996;
      &RFC6177;

      &DRAFT-ug;
      &DRAFT-scan;

    </references>

    <references title="Informative References">
      &RFC2629;
      &RFC6741;
      &RFC6877;
      &RFC6583;
      &DRAFT-privacy;
      &DRAFT-homenet;
      &DRAFT-btle; 
      &DRAFT-6lobac;
      &DRAFT-lowpanz;
      &DRAFT-64share;
      &DRAFT-aero;
      &DRAFT-stable;
 <!-- &DRAFT-odell; -->

<reference anchor='DRAFT-odell'>
<front>
<title>8+8 - An Alternate Addressing Architecture for IPv6</title>
<author initials="M. " surname="O'Dell" fullname="Mike O'Dell"/>
<date month='October' year='1996'/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="draft-odell-8+8.00" value='(work in progress)' />
</reference>

      <reference anchor="IEEE802">
        <front>
          <title>IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks:
          Overview and Architecture</title>
          <author><organization>IEEE</organization></author>
          <date year="2007" />
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="IEEE Std 802-2001" value="(R2007)" />
      </reference>
    </references>
  </back>
</rfc>

PAFTECH AB 2003-20262026-04-23 19:36:24