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Network Working Group Camilo Cardona
Internet-Draft Pierre Francois
Intended status: Informational IMDEA Networks
Expires: August 25, 2013 February 21, 2013
Making BGP filtering a habit: Impact on policies
draft-cardona-filtering-threats-01
Abstract
This draft describes threats to the Internet routing policies of an
autonomous system due to filtering of more specific BGP prefixes by
its neighboring domains.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Filtering overlapping prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Local filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Remotely triggered filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Uses of overlapping prefix filtering that violate policies . . 6
3.1. Violation caused by local filtering . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.1. Initial setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.2. Violation of Policy - Case 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.3. Violation of Policy - Case 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Violation caused by remotely triggered filtering . . . . . 10
3.2.1. Initial setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.2. Injection of an overlapping prefix . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.3. Violation of policy by limiting the scope of the
overlapping prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Techniques to detect policy violations . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1. Being the victim of the policy violation . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2. Being a contributor to the policy violation . . . . . . . 14
5. Techniques to counter policy violations . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Reactive counter-measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. Anticipant counter-measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2.1. Access lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2.2. Automatic filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2.3. Neighbor-specific forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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1. Introduction
It is common practice for network operators to propagate overlapping
prefixes along with the prefixes that they originate. It is also
possible for some Autonomous Systems (ASes) to apply different
policies to the overlapping (more specific) and the covering (less
specific) prefix. Some ASes could even benefit from filtering the
overlapping prefixes.
BGP makes independent, policy driven decisions for the selection of
the best path to be used for a given IP prefix. However, routers
must forward packets using the longest-prefix-match rule, which
"precedes" any BGP policy (RFC1812 [4]). Indeed, the existence of a
prefix p' that is more specific than a prefix p in the Forwarding
Information Base (FIB) will let packets whose destination matches p'
be forwarded according to the next hop selected as best for p' (the
overlapping prefix). This process takes place by disregarding the
policies applied in the control plane for the selection of the best
next-hop for p (the covering prefix). When overlapping prefixes are
filtered and packets are forwarded according to the covering prefix,
the discrepancy in the routing policies applied to covering and
overlapping prefixes can lead to a violation of policies of Internet
Service Providing (ISPs) still holding a path towards the overlapping
prefix.
This document presents examples of such threats and discusses
solutions to the problem. The objective of this draft is to shed
light on the use of prefix filtering by making the routing community
aware of the cases where the effects of filtering might turn to be
negative for the business of ISPs.
The rest of the document is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
some cases in which it is favorable for an AS to filter overlapping
prefixes. In Section 3, we provide some scenarios in which the
filtering of overlapping prefixes lead to policy violations of other
ASes. Section 4 and Section 5 discuss some techniques that ASes can
use for, respectively, detect and react to policy violations.
2. Filtering overlapping prefixes
There are several scenarios where filtering an overlapping prefix is
relevant to the operations of an AS. In this section, we provide
examples of these scenarios. We differentiate cases in which the
filtering is performed locally from those where the filtering is
triggered remotely. These scenarios will be used as a base in
Section 3 for describing side effects bound with such practices,
notably policy violations in the ASes surrounding the AS applying the
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procedure.
2.1. Local filtering
Let us first analyze the scenario depicted in Figure 1. AS1 and AS2
are two large autonomous systems spanning a large geographical area
and peering in 3 different physical locations. Let AS1 announce
prefix 10.0.0.0/22 through the sessions established between the two
ASes over all peering links. Additionally, let us define that there
is part of AS1's network which exclusively uses prefix 10.0.0.0/24
and which is closer to a peering point than to others.
To receive the traffic from AS2 to prefix 10.0.0.0/24 on the closer
link, AS1 could announce the overlapping prefix only over this
specific session. At the time of the establishment of the peering,
it can be defined by both ASes that hot potato routing would happen
in both directions of traffic. In other words, it was agreed that
each AS will deliver the traffic to the other AS on the nearest
peering link. In this scenario, it becomes relevant to AS2 to
enforce such practice by detecting the described situations and
automatically issuing the appropriate filtering. In this case, by
implementing these automatic procedures, AS2 would detect and filter
prefix 10.0.0.0/24.
___....-----------....___
,.--' AS2 `--..
,' `.
| |
`._ _.'
`--..__ _,,.--'
. `'''-----------'''' |
| | |
| | |
10.0.0.0/22| 10.0.0.0/22| |10.0.0.0/22
| ___....-----------....___ |10.0.0.0/24
,.--'AS1 `--..
,' ...........`.
| |10.0.0.0/24 |
`._ |........._.'
`--..__ _,,.--'
`'''-----------''''
Figure 1: Basic scenario of local filtering - 1
There are other cases in which there could exist a need for local
filtering. For example, a dual homed AS receiving an overlapping
prefix from only one of its providers. Figure 2 depicts a simple
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example of this case.
_..._
,' `.
/ AS4 \
| |
\ /
,`-...-'.
/ '.
10.0.0.0/22 ,' \
10.0.0.0/24 / \ 10.0.0.0/22
..:_ >..._
,' `. ,' `.
/ AS2 \ / AS3 \
| | | |
\ / \ /
`-...-', `-...-'
\ /
\ /
10.0.0.0/22 \_..._ '10.0.0.0/22
10.0.0.0/24,' `.
/ AS1 \
| |
\ /
`-...-'
Figure 2: Basic scenario of local filtering - 2
In this scenario, prefix 10.0.0.0/22 is advertised by AS1 to AS2 and
AS3. Both ASes propagate the prefix to AS4. Additionally, AS1
advertises prefix 10.0.0.0/24 to AS2, which subsequently propagates
the prefix to AS4.
It is possible that AS4 resolves to filter the more specific prefix
10.0.0.0/24. One potential motivation could be the economical
preference of the path via AS2 over AS3. Another feasible reason is
the existence of a technical policy by AS4 of aggregating incoming
prefixes longer than /23.
The above examples illustrate two of the many motivations to
configure routing within an AS with the aim of ignoring more specific
routes. Operators have reported applying these filters in a manual
fashion [3]. The relevance of such practice led to investigate
automated filtering procedures in I-D.WHITE [5].
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2.2. Remotely triggered filtering
ISPs can tag the BGP paths that they propagate to neighboring ASes
with communities, in order to tweak the propagation behavior of the
ASes that handle these paths [1].
Some ISPs allow their direct and indirect customers to use such
communities to let the receiving AS not export the path to some
selected neighboring AS. By combining communities, the prefix could
be advertised only to a given peer of the AS providing this feature.
Figure 3 illustrates an example of this case.
10.0.0.0/22 ,' \
10.0.0.0/24 / \ 10.0.0.0/22
..:_ >..._
,' `. ,' `.
/ AS2 \________ / AS3 \
| |/22 /22| |
\ / \ /
`-...-', `-...-'
\ /
\ /
10.0.0.0/22 \_..._ '10.0.0.0/22
10.0.0.0/24,' `.
/ AS1 \
| |
\ /
`-...-'
Figure 3: Remote triggered filtering
AS2 and AS3 are peers. Both ASes are providers of AS1. For traffic
engineering purposes, AS1 could use communities to prevent AS2 from
announcing prefix 10.0.0.0/24 to AS3.
Such technique is useful for operators to tweak routing decisions in
order to align with complex transit policies. We will see in later
sections that by producing the same effect as filtering, they can
also lead to policy violations at other, distant, ASes.
3. Uses of overlapping prefix filtering that violate policies
In this section we describe three configuration scenarios that lead
to the violation of the policies of an AS. Note that these examples
do not capture all the cases where such policy violation can take
place. More examples will be provided in future revisions of this
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document.
3.1. Violation caused by local filtering
In this section we describe cases in which an AS locally filters an
overlapping prefix. We show that, depending on the BGP policies
applied by surrounding ASes, this decision can lead to a policy
violation.
3.1.1. Initial setup
We start by describing the basic scenario of this case in Figure 4.
____,,................______
_,.---'''' `''---..._
,-'' AS5 `-.
[ /
-.._ __.-'
. `'---....______ ______...---''
|/22 `''''''''''''''' |
|/24 |/22 |
| |/24 |
| | |
| |/22 |/22
| |/24 |/24
_,,---.:_ _,,---.._ _,,---.._
,' `. ,' `. ,' `.
/ AS4 \ / AS2 \ / AS3 \
| |_________| |________| |
| | /22 | |/22 /22| |
'. ,' /24 . ,'/24 /24 . ,'
`. ,' `. ,' `. ,'
``---'' ``---'' ``---''
| |
|10.0.0.0/24 |10.0.0.0/24
|10.0.0.0/22 |10.0.0.0/22
| _....---------...._|
,-'AS1 ``-.
/' `.
`. _,
`-.._ _,,,'
`''---------'''
Figure 4: Initial Setup Local
AS1 is a customer of AS2 and AS3. AS2, AS3 and AS4 are customers of
AS5. AS2 is establishing a peering with AS3 and AS4. AS1 is
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announcing a covering prefix, 10.0.0.0/22, and an overlapping prefix
10.0.0.0/24 to its providers. In the initial setup, AS2 and AS3 will
announce the two prefixes to their peers and transit providers. AS4
receives both prefixes from its peer (AS2) and transit provider
(AS5). We will consider that AS5 chooses the path through AS3 to
reach AS1.
3.1.2. Violation of Policy - Case 1
In the next scenarios, we show that if AS4 filters the incoming
overlapping prefix from AS5, there is a situation in which the
policies of other ASes are violated.
____,,................______
_,.---'''' `''---..._
,-'' AS5 `-.
[ /
-.._ __.-'
. `'---....______ ______...---''
|/22 `''''''''''''''' |
|/24 |/22 |
| |/24 |
| | |
| |/22 |/22
| | |/24
_,,---.:_ _,,---.._ _,,---.._
,' `. ,' `. ,' `.
/ AS4 \ / AS2 \ / AS3 \
| |_________| |________| |
| | /22 | |/22 /22| |
'. ,' . ,' /24 . ,'
`. ,' `. ,' `. ,'
``---'' ``---'' ``---''
| |
| |10.0.0.0/24
|10.0.0.0/22 |10.0.0.0/22
| _,,..---------...._|
,-'AS1 ``-.
/' `.
`. _,
`-.._ _,,,'
`''---------'''
Figure 5: Policy violation after local filtering - Case 1
Let us assume the scenario illustrated in Figure 5. For this case,
AS1 only propagates the overlapping prefix to AS3. AS4 receives the
overlapping prefix only from its transit provider, AS5.
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The described example places AS4 in a situation in which it would be
favorable for it to filter the announcement of prefix 10.0.0.0/24
from AS5. Subsequently, traffic from AS4 and heading to prefix
10.0.0.0/24 is forwarded towards AS2. Because AS2 receives the more
specific prefix from AS3, traffic from AS4 and heading to prefix
10.0.0.0/24 follows the path AS4-AS2-AS3-AS1. This violates the
policy of AS2, since it forwards traffic from a peer to a non-
customer neighbor.
3.1.3. Violation of Policy - Case 2
____,,................______
_,.---'''' `''---..._
,-'' AS5 `-.
[ /
-.._ __.-'
. `'---....______ ______...---''
|/22 `''''''''''''''' |
|/24 |/22 |
| |/24 |
| | |
| |/22 |/22
| | |/24
_,,---.:_ _,,---.._ _,,---.._
,' `. ,' `. ,' `.
/ AS4 \ / AS2 \ / AS3 \
| |_________| | | |
| | /22 | | | |
'. ,' . ,' . ,'
`. ,' `. ,' `. ,'
``---'' ``---'' ``---''
| |
| |10.0.0.0/24
|10.0.0.0/22 |10.0.0.0/22
_;,..---------...._|
,-'AS1 ``-.
/' `.
`. _,
`-.._ _,,,'
`''---------'''
Figure 6: Policy violation after local filtering - Case 2
Let us assume a second case where AS2 and AS3 are not peering and AS1
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only propagates the overlapping prefix to AS3. AS4 receives the
overlapping prefix only from its transit provider, AS5. This case is
illustrated in Figure 6.
Similar to the scenario described in Section 3.1.2, AS4 is in a
situation in which it would be favorable to filter the announcement
of prefix 10.0.0.0/24 from AS5. Subsequently, traffic from AS4 to
prefix 10.0.0.0/24 is forwarded towards AS2. Traffic from AS4 and
heading to prefix 10.0.0.0/24 follows the path AS4-AS2-AS5-AS3-AS1.
This path violates the policy of AS2, as this AS is forwarding
traffic from a peer to a transit network.
3.2. Violation caused by remotely triggered filtering
We present a configuration scenario in which an AS, using the
mechanism described in Section 2.2, informs its provider to
selectively announce an overlapping prefix, leading to the violation
of the policy of another AS.
3.2.1. Initial setup
Let AS1 be a customer of AS2 and AS3. AS1 owns 10.0.0.0/22, which it
advertises through AS2 and AS3. Additionally, AS2 and AS3 are peers.
Both AS2 and AS3 select their customer path as best, and propagate
that path to their customers, providers, and peers. Some remote ASes
will route traffic destined to 10.0.0.1 through AS2 while others will
route traffic through AS3.
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\ / \ /
/22 \ / /22 /22 \ / /22
,-----. ,-----.
,' `. ,' `.
/ AS2 \ /22 / AS3 \
( )-------------( )
\ / /22 \ /
`. ,' `. ,'
'-----; / '-----'
\ /
\ /
10.0.0.0/22\ /10.0.0.0/22
\ /
\ ,-----.'
,' `.
/ AS1 \
( )
\ /
`. ,'
'-----'
Figure 7: Example scenario
3.2.2. Injection of an overlapping prefix
Let AS1 advertise 10.0.0.0/24 over AS3 only. AS3 would propagate
this prefix to its customers, providers and peers, including AS2.
From AS2's point of view the path towards 10.0.0.0/24 is a "peer
path" and AS2 will only advertise it to its customers. ASes in the
customer branch of AS2 will receive a path to the /24 that contains
AS3 and AS2. Some multi-homed customers of AS2 may also receive a
path through AS3, but not through AS2, from other peering or provider
links. Any remote AS that is not lying in the customer branch of
AS2, will receive a path for 10.0.0.0/24 through AS3 and not through
AS2.
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\ / /22\ / /22
/22 \ / /22 /24 \ / /24
,-----. ,-----.
,' `. /22 ,' `.
/ AS2 \ /24 / AS3 \
( /22:AS1 )-------------( /22:AS1 )
\ /24:AS3 / /22 \ /24:AS1 /
/22 /`. ,' `. ,'
/24/ '-----; / '-----'
/ \ /
,---./ \ /
/ \ 10.0.0.0/22\ /10.0.0.0/22
| AS4 ) \ / 10.0.0.0/24
\ / \ ,-----.'
`---' ,' `.
/ AS1 \
( )
\ /
`. ,'
'-----'
Figure 8: Injection of overlapping prefix
AS2 only receives traffic destined to 10.0.0.0/24 from its customers,
which it forwards to its peer AS3. Routing is consistent with usual
Internet Routing Policies in this case. AS3 could receive traffic
destined to 10.0.0.0/24 from its customers, providers, and peers,
which it directly forwards to its customer AS1.
3.2.3. Violation of policy by limiting the scope of the overlapping
prefix
Now, let us assume that 10.0.0.0/24, which is propagated by AS1 to
AS3, is tagged to have AS3 only propagate that path to AS2, using the
techniques described in Section 2.2.
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,-------.
,' `.
/ AS5 \
( /22:AS2 )
\ /
`. ,'
'-------' \ / \ /
/22 \ //22 /22 \ //22
,-----. ,-----.
,' `. /22 ,' `.
/ AS2 \ /24 / AS3 \
( /22:AS1 )-------------( /22:AS1 )
\ /24:AS3 / /22 \ /24:AS1 /
/22 /`. ,' `. ,'
/24/ '-----; / '-----'
/ \ /
,---./ \ /
/ \ 10.0.0.0/22\ /10.0.0.0/22
( AS4 ) \ / 10.0.0.0/24
\ / \ ,-----.'
`---' ,' `.
/ AS1 \
( )
\ /
`. ,'
'-----'
Figure 9: More Specific Injection
From AS2's point of view such a path is a "peer path" and will only
be advertised by AS2 to its customers.
All ASes that are not customers of AS2 will not receive a path to
10.0.0.0/24. These ASes will forward packets destined to 10.0.0.0/24
according to their routing state for 10.0.0.0/22.
Let us assume that AS5 is such an AS, and that its best path towards
10.0.0.0/22 is through AS2. Then, packets sent towards 10.0.0.1 by
AS5 will eventually reach AS2. However, in the data-plane of the
nodes of AS2, the longest prefix match for 10.0.0.1 is 10.0.0.0/24,
which is reached through AS3, a peer of AS2. Since AS5 is not in the
customer branch of AS2, we are in a situation where AS2 is forwarding
non customer originated traffic along peering links, which violates
its policies.
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4. Techniques to detect policy violations
We differentiate the techniques available for detecting policy
violations from the cases in which the interested AS is the victim or
contributor of such operations.
4.1. Being the victim of the policy violation
To detect that its policies have been violated, an ISP can monitor
its traffic data and test if any flow entering the ISP network
through a non-customer link is forwarded to a non-customer next-hop.
In the control plane, it is possible for ISPs to identify threats
using BGP data. An ISP can seek for overlapping prefixes for which
the next-hop is through a provider (or peer), while the next-hop for
their covering prefix(es) is through a client. Direct communication
or looking glasses can be used to check whether non-customer
neighboring ASes are propagating a path towards the covering prefix
to their own customers, peers, or providers. This should trigger a
warning as this would mean that ASes in the surrounding area of the
current AS are forwarding packets based on the routing entry for the
less specific prefix only.
4.2. Being a contributor to the policy violation
It can be considered problematic to be a contributor of a policy
violation as it appears as an abuse to the network resources of other
ISPs.
There may be justifiable reasons for one ISP to perform filtering,
either to enforce established policies or to provide prefix
advertisement scoping features to its customers. These can vary from
trouble-shooting purposes to business relationships implementations.
Restricting such features for the sake of avoiding contributing to
potential policy violations is a bad option.
Traffic data does not help an ISP detect that it is acting as a
contributor of the policy violation. It is thus advisable to obtain
as much information as possible about the Internet environment of the
AS and assess the risks of filtering overlapping prefixes before
implementing them.
Monitoring the manipulation of the communities that implement the
scoping of prefixes is recommended to the ISPs that provide these
features. The monitored behavior should then be faced against their
terms of use.
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5. Techniques to counter policy violations
Network Operators can adopt different approaches with respect to
policy violation. We classify these actions according to whether
they are anticipant or reactive.
Reactive approaches are those in which the operator tries to detect
the situations and solves the policy violation, manually, on a case
by case basis.
Anticipant or preventive approaches are those in which the routing
system will not let the policy violation actually take place when the
configuration scenario is set up.
We will describe these two kind of approaches on the following part
of this Section. We will use the scenario depicted in Figure 10 to
provide examples for the different techniques.
____,,................______
_,.---'''' `''---..._
,-'' AS5 `-.
[ /
-.._ __.-'
. `'---....______ ______...---''
|/22 `''''''''''''''' |
|/24 |/22 |
| |/24 |
| | |
| |/22 |/22
| | |/24
_,,---.:_ _,,---.._ _,,---.._
,' `. ,' `. ,' `.
/ AS4 \ / AS2 \ / AS3 \
| |_________| | | |
| | /22 | | | |
'. ,' . ,' . ,'
`. ,' `. ,' `. ,'
``---'' ``---'' ``---''
| |
| |10.0.0.0/24
|10.0.0.0/22 |10.0.0.0/22
_;,..---------...._|
,-'AS1 ``-.
/' `.
`. _,
`-.._ _,,,'
`''---------'''
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Figure 10: Anticipant counter-measures - Base example
5.1. Reactive counter-measures
An operator who detects that its policies have been violated can
contact the ASes that are likely to have performed the propagation
tweaks so as to have them change their behavior.
An operator can account the amount of traffic that has been subject
to policy violation, and charge the peer that received the policy-
violating traffic. That is, the operator can claim that it has been
a provider of that peer for the traffic that transited between the
two ASes.
An operator can decide to filter-out the concerned overlapping prefix
at the peering session over which it was received. In the example of
Figure 10, AS2 would filter out the incoming prefix 10.0.0.0/24 from
the eBGP session with AS5. As a result, the traffic destined to that
/24 would be forwarded by AS2 along its link with AS1, despite the
actions performed by AS1 to have this traffic coming in through its
link with AS3.
5.2. Anticipant counter-measures
5.2.1. Access lists
An operator can configure its routers to dynamically install an
access-list made of the prefixes towards which the forwarding of
traffic from that interface would lead to a policy violation. Note
that this technique actually lets packets destined to a valid prefix
be dropped while they are sent from a neighboring AS that cannot know
about the policy violation and hence had no means to avoid the policy
violation.
In the example of Figure 10, AS2 would install an access-list denying
packets matching 10.0.0.0/24 associated with the interface connecting
to AS4. As a result, traffic destined to that prefix would be
dropped, despite the existence of a non policy-violating route
towards 10.0.0.0/22.
5.2.2. Automatic filtering
As described in Section 3, filtering of overlapping prefixes can in
some scenarios lead to policy violations. Nevertheless, depending on
the autonomous system implementing such practice, this operation can
prevent these cases. This can be illustrated using the example
described in Figure 10: if AS2 or AS3 filter prefix 10.0.0.0/24,
there would be no policy violation for AS2.
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5.2.3. Neighbor-specific forwarding
An operator can technically ensure that traffic destined to a given
prefix will be forwarded from an entry point of the network based
only on the set of paths that have been advertised over that entry
point.
As an example, let us analyze the scenario of Figure 10 from the
point of view of AS2. The edge router connecting to the AS4 forward
packets destined to prefix 10.0.0.0/24 towards AS5. Likewise, it
will forward packets destined to prefix 10.0.0.0/22 towards AS1. The
router, however, only propagates the path to the covering prefix
(10.0.0.0/22) to AS4. An operator could implement the necessary
techniques to force the edge router to forward packets coming from
AS4 based only on the paths propagated to AS4. Thus, the edge router
would forward packets destined to 10.0.0.0/24 towards AS1 in which
case no policy violation would occur. This functionality could be
implemented in different ways. Check [2] for one particular example
of it.
6. Conclusions
In this document we described threats to policies of autonomous
systems caused by the filtering of overlapping prefixes by external
networks. We provide examples of scenarios of policy violations
caused by these practices and introduce some techniques for their
detection and counter. We observe that there are reasonable
situations in which ASes could filter overlapping prefixes, however,
we encourage that network operators implement this type of filters
only after considering such threats.
7. References
[1] Donnet, B. and O. Bonaventure, "On BGP Communities", ACM SIGCOMM
Computer Communication Review vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 55-59,
April 2008.
[2] Vanbever, L., Francois, P., Bonaventure, O., and J. Rexford,
"Customized BGP Route Selection Using BGP/MPLS VPNs", Cisco
Systems, Routing
Symposium http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~jrex/talks/
cisconag09.pdf, October 2009.
[3] "INIT7-RIPE63", <http://ripe63.ripe.net/presentations/
48-How-more-specifics-increase-your-transit-bill-v0.2.pdf>.
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[4] <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1812.txt>
[5] <http://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-white-grow-overlapping-routes-00>
Authors' Addresses
Juan Camilo Cardona
IMDEA Networks
Avenida del Mar Mediterraneo
Leganes 28919
Spain
Email: juancamilo.cardona@imdea.org
Pierre Francois
IMDEA Networks
Avenida del Mar Mediterraneo
Leganes 28919
Spain
Email: pierre.francois@imdea.org
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