One document matched: draft-barnes-ecrit-rough-loc-02.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="US-ASCII"?>
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<rfc category="std" docName="draft-barnes-ecrit-rough-loc-02.txt"
ipr="trust200811">
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ipr values: full3667, noModification3667, noDerivatives3667
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<!-- ***** FRONT MATTER ***** -->
<front>
<!-- The abbreviated title is used in the page header - it is only necessary if the
full title is longer than 39 characters -->
<title abbrev="ECRIT with Rough Location">Using Imprecise Location for
Emergency Context Resolution</title>
<!--add 'role="editor"' below for the editors if appropriate -->
<!-- Another author who claims to be an editor -->
<author fullname="Richard Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes">
<organization>BBN Technologies</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>9861 Broken Land Pkwy, Suite 400</street>
<!-- Reorder these if your country does things differently -->
<city>Columbia</city>
<region>MD</region>
<code>21046</code>
<country>USA</country>
</postal>
<phone>+1 410 290 6169</phone>
<email>rbarnes@bbn.com</email>
<!-- uri and facsimile elements may also be added -->
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Matt Lepinski" initials="M." surname="Lepinski">
<organization>BBN Technologies</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>10 Moulton St</street>
<city>Cambridge</city>
<region>MA</region>
<code>02138</code>
<country>USA</country>
</postal>
<phone>+1 617 873 5939</phone>
<email>mlepinski@bbn.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date month="February" year="2009" />
<!-- If the month and year are both specified and are the current ones, xml2rfc will fill
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<area>General</area>
<workgroup>Internet Engineering Task Force</workgroup>
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<abstract>
<t>Emergency calling works best when precise location is available for
emergency call routing. However, there are situations in which a
location provider is unable or unwilling to provide precise location,
yet still wishes to enable subscribers to make emergency calls. This
document describes the level of location accuracy that providers must
provide to enable emergency call routing. In addition, we descibe how
emergency services and non-emergency services can be invoked by an
endpoint that does not have access to its precise location.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section title="Introduction">
<t>Information about the location of an emergency caller is a critical
input to the process of emergency call establshment. Endpoint
location is used to determine which Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP)
should be the destination of the call. (The entire emergency calling
process is described in detail in <xref
target="I.D-ietf-ecrit-framework"></xref> and <xref
target="I.D-ietf-ecrit-phonebcp"></xref>.) This process is most likely
to work properly when the endpoint is provided with the most accurate
precise information available about its location. Using location
information with maximal precision and accuracy minimizes the chance
that a call will be mis-routed. And when that location is provided to
the endpoint, the endpoint is able to verify that the location is
correct (to the extent of the endpoint's knowledge of its own location)
prior to an emergency call, and is able to perform emergency call
routing functions on its own, providing redundancy for network-provided
functions.</t>
<t>However, there may be situations in which it is not feasible for
endpoints to be provided with maximally precise and accurate location.
These cases may arise when computing precise location is an expensive or
time-consuming operation (e.g., in the case of wireless triangulation),
and location is needed quickly (as is often the case in emergency
situations). Or they may arise because the policy of the location
provider does not allow precise location to be provided to the endpoint
(e.g. due to privacy considerations). While it is undesirable to use
imprecise location for emergency call routing, the possibility that
precise location may not be available to the calling device must be
accomodated in order to make emergency calling possible in the largest
possible set of circumstances.</t>
<t>This document is concerned imprecise location only in the context of
routing emergency calls, i.e., for determining the correct PSAP to
receive a given call (e.g., via a LoST query <xref
target="I.D-ietf-ecrit-lost"></xref>). (More generally, the provided location information will be needed to route the call to an entity that is authorized to request precise location, e.g., an Emergency Services Routing Proxy.)
</t>
<t>Location information may also be
used in the emergency calling framework to direct the dispatch of
emergency responders. This usage is treated separately from call routing
for purposes of this document, and this document does not place
requirements on the location provided for dispatch (although it should
obviously be as precise as possible). The only provision for dispatch in
this document is a recommendation that the location provider supply
endpoints with a URI that can be used by a PSAP or other emergency
authority to obtain a different location for use in dispatch, hopefully
more precise than the one used for routing.</t>
<t>This document describes the use of imprecise location information in
the emergency call routing system. <xref target="det-section"></xref>
describes how location providers can determine the precision necessary
to support emergency call routing, and how they can use this information to optimize location delivery. <xref target="lbs-section"></xref>
describes how emergency calls are placed in such an environment, and how
non-emergency services can be invoked when precise location is not
available to the endpoint by value.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="term-section" title="Terminology">
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in <xref
target="RFC2119"></xref>.</t>
<t>We consider in this document patterns of interaction as described in
<xref target="I.D-ietf-ecrit-framework"></xref>. The two main parties of
interest are endpoints and location providers. Endpoints are hosts
connected to the Internet that originate emergency calls in the
emergency calling architecture, while location providers are entities
that supply location information that is used for emergency calling. In
addition, we will discuss how these parties interact with the LoST
mapping infrastructure <xref
target="I.D-ietf-ecrit-mapping-arch"></xref>, and with emergency and
non-emergency location-based service providers.</t>
<t>For convenience, we say that location information (either in LoST queries or in service boundaries) is provided "in geodetic form" if it is provided in the "geodetic-2d" location profile, and "in civic form" if it is provided in the "civic" profile.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="det-section"
title="Determining sufficient location precision">
<t>A location provider wishing to provide location information usable
for emergency call routing requires a mechanism for determining when a
description of location (e.g., a polygon) is precise enough to be used
for emergency call routing. This mechanism might be used to decide when
to terminate a positioning mechanism that converges over time, or to
choose a polygon larger than the known location of the endpoint (in
order to obscure the known location of the endpoint), while preserving
the utility of the location for emergency call routing.</t>
<t>There are two base requirements for a location to be usable for
emergency call routing: <list style="numbers">
<t>The location SHOULD be sufficiently precise that a LoST request
with the location and any service URN will return a unique URI
mapping value. This may not be possible in all cases, e.g., because
of overlapping service boundaries (leading to areas that do not have
a unique mapping) or positioning limitations (leading to
insufficient precision).</t>
<t>When the location of the endpoint is known by the provider to
greater precision than is being provided, the provided location MUST
return the same mappings from LoST (for all service URNs) as the
known location.</t>
<t>When the location of the endpoint is known by the provider to
greater precision than is being provided, the provided location MUST
contain the precise location (as a geographic subset).</t>
</list>In this section, we describe how to use a "location filter" to
determine whether a given location is usable for emergency call routing,
and how to construct and maintain such a filter.</t>
<section anchor="filter-use-section" title="Location filtering">
<t>With each service-to-URI mapping, a LoST query provides a service
boundary that represents the set of locations in which that mapping is
valid. A consequence of this is that given a set of service boundaries
for difference services (say, one mapping "urn:service:sos.fire" to
"sip:fire@example.com" and one mapping "urn:service:sos.police" to
"sip:police@example.com"), the intersection of those service
boundaries is the region in which two mappings are valid
("urn:service:sos.fire" maps to "sip:fire@example.com" and
"urn:service:sos.police" maps to "sip:police@example.com"). Outside
that area, one or more of the mappings is invalid. Said differently,
any region contained in an intersection uniquely determines mappings
for the services used in the intersection, and any two locations
within the same intersection are equivalent for the purpose of LoST
mapping (i.e., emergency call routing).</t>
<t>A location filter is thus a set of regions (optionally, each region
may be assigned a list of LoST mappings), as illustrated in <xref target="filter-fig"/>. Each
region is the intersection of the service boundaries for all services
available within the region, and the lists represent the mappings that
are valid within that region. A filter is used to determine whether a
location is useable for emergency call routing in the following
way:<list style="numbers">
<t>The location SHOULD be contained in exactly one of the regions
in the filter. This guarantees that LoST mappings are unique.</t>
<t>When the precise location of the endpoint is known, the provided
location MUST be contained in the same region(s) of the filter as
the known location. This guarantees that LoST queries with the
provided location return the same results as those done with the
known location.</t>
<t>When the precise location of the endpoint is known, the provided
location MUST contain the precise location (as a geographic subset).</t>
</list>When the regions are bound to lists of URN-URI mappings, the
resulting filter can also be used as a cache for LoST mappings; the
LoST mappings for a location are the mappings bound to the
region(s) containing it. </t>
<figure anchor="filter-fig"
title="Generating a filter from service boundaries">
<artwork>
Service boundaries for individual services
urn:service:sos.police urn:service:sos.fire
+-------+ +-------+
| A | | C |
| +---+ | +---+---+
| | | | | |
+---+---+ | +---+ |
| B | | D |
+-------+ +-------+
| |
| |
+-----------+------------+
|
V
+-------+
| A,C |
| +---+
| | +---+
+---+ |A,D| +---+
+---+ | |
+---+ |
| B,D |
+-------+
Resulting Location Filter Regions
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>When the location of the endpoint is known to more precision than
the location provided to the endpoint, although any location meeting
the two criteria above is equivalent to the known location for
purposes of LoST, the provided location MUST contain the known
location in order to avoid errors if the location is used for other
purposes in the course of an emergency (e.g., if the location is
provided to first responders for dispatch). This guarantee also allows
the endpoint to do some course verification that the provided location
is correct (in order to prevent very gross errors in routing).
Thus, any location that (1) contains the known location and (2)
is contained in the same filter region as the known location is
allowable. Locations that also are contained in only one filter region
are preferred. Adding randomness to the provided locations may have
privacy benefits in some cases, as discussed in the security
considerations below.</t>
</section>
<section title="Constructing location filters">
<t>For simplicity, we assume that the entity performing filtering will
only be using the filter to test locations contained within a
particular geographic "coverage area". (In principle, this coverage area
could be the entire world, but assuming a more limited coverage area allows
for a filter to be built more quickly) Given a coverage area and the ability
to act as a LoST client, a location service provider can autonomously compute a
location filter using the following algorithm:</t>
<t>First, the server must obtain mappings and service boundaries for all services and for all
points within the coverage area. For each emergency service URN, the server goes through the following process to build a service map: First, the server queries LoST for the complete coverage map for the desired service. This can be done with a LoST <findService> query of the following form:</t>
<figure>
<artwork>
<![CDATA[
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<findService
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:lost1"
serviceBoundary="value">
<location>
<!-- Coverage Area -->
</location>
<service>
<!-- Service URN -->
</service>
</findService>
]]>
</artwork>
</figure>
<t>If LoST returns a set of mappings whose service boundaries cover the coverage area (i.e., if LoST is configured to return all possible matches for the queried location), then the process termintes here. The coverage map for this service is the set of returned service boundaries.
</t>
<t>If service boundaries in the LoST response to the above query do not cover the location provider's coverage area, then the location server must perform further queries. The location included in each query is the difference between the coverage area and the current coverage map, that is, the coverage area with all currently-known service boundaries removed. The server repeats this process (query, then remove service boundaries from the query location, then query again) until either (1) the coverage area is covered by the collected service boundaries or (2) LoST returns a <notFound> error.
</t>
<t>After the location server has performed this procedure for each service, it will have a set of LoST mappings for each service, for every point in its coverage region where that service is offered.</t>
<t>The regions in the location filter are computed separately for service boundaries provided in civic form and in geodetic form. If all service boundaries are provided in one form (e.g., if all boundaries are provided in geodetic form, even if some are also provided in civic form), the server MAY perform the algorithm for that form. If both algorithms are being performed, and some mappings provide both civic and geodetic service boundaries, the server MUST input those mappings to both the civic and geodetic computations.</t>
<section title="Geodetic service boundaries">
<t>The regions in the location filter are computed from these mappings by iterating over URI
tuples: For each service URN, let uris(urn) be the set of PSAP URIs
for that service URN (collected from the mappings). The set of URI
tuples is then the cartesian product of these sets; if the set of
servuce URNs is {urn1,...,urnN}, then the set of URI tuples is
uris(urn1) x ... x uris(urnN). The server computes the regions in the
filter by iterating through the set of URI tuples, either by
constructing the set of URI tuples and directly iterating, or by using
nested iteration through all the sets uris(urn).</t>
<t>For each URI tuple, the server MUST compute the intersection of the
service boundaries for the URIs in the tuple. This becomes an entry in
the location filter: The stored region is the intersection of the
service boundaries, and the corresponding mapping table is the list of
(URN, URI) pairs, where the URIs are the URIs from the tuple and the
URNs are the services used to obtain them from LoST. (Empty filter regions, corresponding to URIs in a tuple with disjoint service boundaries, can of course be discarded.)</t>
</section>
<section title="Civic service boundaries">
<t>As in the case of geodetic location, regions of a civic address filter are computed based on URI-tuples. For tuples where all mappings have the same service boundary, that service boundary MUST be used as the filter region for that type. For all other cases (i.e., tuples with different civic locations), the regions of the filter must be computed as the intersections of the locations according to an algorithm that is determined by local addressing standards.</t>
<t>Note that the resulting filter regions MUST still cover the location server's coverage area. In particular, the server MUST NOT use a specific address a filter region: Such an address would not include many points in the service region (i.e., it would not meet the third rules from both lists of rules above). </t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Maintaining location filters">
<t>As the LoST mappings that underlie the filter change, the filter
will need to be updated. The entity maintaining the filter MUST obtain
a new mapping for a region when an existing mapping expires. The
service boundary from the new mapping is compared to the service
boundary from the old mapping: If they are the same, then the filter
need not be updated. If they differ, then regions in the filter that
intersect either the old service boundary or the new service
boundary will need to be recomputed. Note that since this operation
only requires the server to determine if two service boundaries are
identical, the server need only store a hash of the old boundary (to
which it can compare a hash of the new boundary).</t>
</section>
<section title="Applying location filters">
<t>
After constructing a location filter, a location server can use it to optimize how it delivers location. When the location server is using a positioning algorithm that grows more accurate with time, the filter tells it how long to run the algorithm. Namely, the algorithm can be terminated when the estimated location is within one of the regions in the filter.
</t>
<t>
When the location provider knows the precise location of the caller, a location filter can also be used as a "location cache". That is, the location provider can simply look up which of the filter regions contains the caller's precise location and return that region as the caller's location (or some subset that contains the precise location).
</t>
<t>
This allows an additional optimization in some cases: If the location server knows that the caller's precise location will be within the same region for a period of time, it can instruct the client not to re-query in that time. For instance, if the server is delivering location over HELD, then it can use the HTTP cache-control headers (e.g., Expires). However, the location server MUST NOT instruct the client to wait for longer than the current filter is valid; the expiry time of the location MUST be before the earliest expiry of a LoST mapping used in the filter.
</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="lbs-section" title="Requesting emergency and non-emergency services">
<t>When a location provider wishes to deliver endpoints location information that
is below its maximum available precision while still supporting emergency
calling, it MUST provide to the endpoint both a location (by value) that
is sufficient for emergency call routing (see above) and a location
reference (i.e., a URI) that can subsequently be used by authorized
parties to obtain more precise information about the location of the
endpoint. The endpoint then can then use both the location value and the
location reference to request location-based services (LBS) as described
below.</t>
<section title="Emergency calling">
<t>The procedure for placing an emergency call is indentical to that
described in <xref target="I.D-ietf-ecrit-framework"></xref>. In
particular, the endpoint requirements in Sections 8 and 9 of <xref
target="I.D-ietf-ecrit-phonebcp"></xref> still apply to an endpoint
that receives imprecise location.</t>
<t>In addition, an endpoint that receives
location both by value and by reference from its location provider
MUST include both the location value and the location reference in the
SIP INVITE message that initiates an emergency call, as specified in
<xref target="I.D-ietf-sip-location-conveyance"></xref>. When the
endpoint supports LoST, it SHOULD use the location value to obtain a
PSAP URI for LoST queries (as opposed to attempting to dereference the
location reference). Note that the caller would also have to add the "used-for-routing"
parameter to the geolocation header that points to the location value
as inserted into the INVITE message. Note that this process crucially
relies on the location value having sufficient precision for routing
emergency calls (see <xref target="det-section"></xref> for techniques
to ensure the location value is suitable for emergency call
routing).</t>
<t>When a PSAP receives a SIP INVITE that contains both a location
value and a location reference, if the value is too imprecise for use
in dispatch then the PSAP SHOULD dereference the LbyR to obtain more
precise information. In turn, the location provided by the location
provider MUST allow access by all PSAPs whose service boundaries
overlap with the region served by the location provider. This means
that either the provider must supply a reference that can be
dereferenced by any party, or else the provider must establish
explicit authentication and authorization relationships with all PSAPs
in its service area.</t>
</section>
<section title="Non-emergency services">
<t>Non-emergency LBSs will generally require more precise information
than is required for emergency call routing. Therefore, when
requesting a non-emergency LBS, the endpoint SHOULD include the
location reference provided by its location provider, and MAY
additionally provide the location value. If the provided location
value is not sufficiently precise to deliver the requested service, then
the LBS provider should then dereference the location value to request
location information of sufficient precision from the location
provider. If the dereference fails, then the request for service may
fail as well.</t>
<t>Note that when the location reference provided by the location
provider is access-controled, this dereference may require a
pre-existing authentication and authorization agreement between the
LBS provider and the location provider. In such a case, the endpoint
may not know whether a given non-emergency service is authorized to
obtain the endpoint's precise location using the location reference.
The endpoint is always capable of requesting services without knowing
whether they are authorized; in this way, the endpoint can discover
authorized services by trial and error. In order to simplify this
process, a location provider may supply the endpoint with references
to authorized service providers, although there is currently no
standard protocol for this transaction.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="Acknowledgements" title="Acknowledgements">
<t>This document generalizes the concept of "rough location" that was
originally discussed in the context of the location hiding problem. This
concept was put forward by Henning Schulzrinne and Andy Newton, among
many others, in a long-running ECRIT discussion. </t>
</section>
<section anchor="Security" title="Security Considerations">
<t>The use of rough location to support emergency calling enables a location
provider to provide low-precision location with low assurance (e.g., of requestor identity)
and high-precision location with higher assurance. The fact that lower-precision location
has lower value -- to location providers and LBS providers as a commercial asset, and to targets as
private information -- this trade-off allows a location provider to avoid the cost of protecting
location with high-assurance access controls when this location has low value. </t>
<t>However, in order to support emergency services, this expense cannot be avoided entirely.
Because PSAPs require high-precision location for emergency response planning, a location provider
that normally provides rough location MUST provide a location URI that a PSAP can use to obtain
high-precision location. This constraint means that the provided URI MUST have either no
access control at all or a policy that allows access by appropriate PSAPs (and other emergency
response systems, e.g., ESRPs). That is, if such a location URI is access controlled, then the
location provider MUST be able to authenticate requests from PSAPs.</t>
<t>One reason for an LIS to provide location information below its
maximum precision is to protect the privacy of the target. Some location
provisioning protocols do not enable the location provider to obtain
strong assurance of the identity of the location recipient; in
particular, the location provider may be unable to verify that the
recipient is the target of the location being provided. Therefore, there
is a risk that a sufisticated attacker might be able to spoof the
identifier (e.g. IP address) used by the location provider to identify
the target, and obtain the target's location in this way. One way to
mitigate this risk is to provide only imprecise location information to
the end-point (without authentication), and to provide precise
information only to trusted entities that can authenticate themselves to
the location provider. Additionally, in some deployment scenarios,
location providers have concerns about the comprimise of endpoint
devices. Providing only imprecise location to the endpoint, prevents
malware on a comprised device from obtaining the precise location of the
target.</t>
<t>As described in <xref target="filter-use-section"></xref> above, the
location provider choosing to provide a less precise location than a
known location has a significant amount of choice in deciding which
location to provide: Any location that contains the known location and
is in the same filter region will do. When the provider is reducing
precision for privacy purposes, there is a signficant benefit to
choosing a random location meeting these criteria. If a watcher is
interested in whether or not the endpoint is moving, an imprecise
location may still reveal that fact if it is constant when the endpoint
is at rest. If the provided location is randomized each time it is
provided, then the watcher is unable to obtain even this level of
information.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="IANA" title="IANA Considerations">
<t>This document makes no request of IANA.</t>
</section>
</middle>
<!-- *****BACK MATTER ***** -->
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<reference anchor="I.D-ietf-ecrit-framework">
<front>
<title>Framework for Emergency Calling using Internet
Multimedia</title>
<author fullname="Brian Rosen" initials="B." surname="Rosen">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author fullname="Henning Schulzrinne" initials="H."
surname="Schulzrinne">
<organization>S</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="James Polk" initials="J." surname="Polk">
<organization>P</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Andrew Newton" initials="A." surname="Newton">
<organization></organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<date month="September" year="2007" />
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="I.D-ietf-ecrit-phonebcp">
<front>
<title>Best Current Practice for Communications Services in support
of Emergency Calling</title>
<author fullname="Brian Rosen" initials="B." surname="Rosen">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author fullname="James Polk" initials="J." surname="Polk">
<organization></organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<date month="September" year="2007" />
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="I.D-ietf-ecrit-lost">
<front>
<title>LoST: A Location-to-Service Translation Protocol</title>
<author fullname="Ted Hardie" initials="T." surname="Hardie">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author fullname="Andrew Newton" initials="A." surname="Newton">
<organization></organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Henning Schulzrinne" initials="H."
surname="Schulzrinne">
<organization></organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H."
surname="Tschofenig">
<organization></organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<date month="September" year="2007" />
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="I.D-ietf-sip-location-conveyance">
<front>
<title>Location Conveyance for the Session Initiation
Protocol</title>
<author fullname="James Polk" initials="J." surname="Polk">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author fullname="Brian Rosen" initials="B." surname="Rosen">
<organization></organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<date month="July" year="2007" />
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2119">
<front>
<title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels</title>
<author fullname="Scott Bradner" initials="S" surname="Bradner">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date month="March" year="1997" />
</front>
</reference>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<reference anchor="I.D-ietf-ecrit-mapping-arch">
<front>
<title>Location-to-URI Mapping Architecture and Framework</title>
<author fullname="Henning Schulzrinne" initials="H."
surname="Schulzrinne">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<date month="September" year="2007" />
</front>
</reference>
</references>
</back>
</rfc>| PAFTECH AB 2003-2026 | 2026-04-23 09:26:57 |