One document matched: draft-barnes-atoca-escape-00.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="US-ASCII"?>
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<rfc category="info" docName="draft-barnes-atoca-escape-00.txt"
ipr="trust200902">
<!-- category values: std, bcp, info, exp, and historic
ipr values: full3667, noModification3667, noDerivatives3667
you can add the attributes updates="NNNN" and obsoletes="NNNN"
they will automatically be output with "(if approved)" -->
<!-- ***** FRONT MATTER ***** -->
<front>
<!-- The abbreviated title is used in the page header - it is only necessary if the
full title is longer than 39 characters -->
<title abbrev="ESCAPE">Encoding of Secure Common Alert Protocol Entities
(ESCAPE)</title>
<!-- add 'role="editor"' below for the editors if appropriate -->
<author fullname="Richard Barnes" initials="R.L." surname="Barnes">
<organization>BBN Technologies</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>9861 Broken Land Parkway</street>
<city>Columbia</city>
<region>MD</region>
<code>21046</code>
<country>US</country>
</postal>
<phone>+1 410 290 6169</phone>
</address>
</author>
<date month="October" year="2011" />
<!-- If the month and year are both specified and are the current ones, xml2rfc will fill
in the current day for you. If only the current year is specified, xml2rfc will fill
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necessary to specify at least a month (xml2rfc assumes day="1" if not specified for the
purpose of calculating the expiry date). With drafts it is normally sufficient to
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<area>RAI</area>
<workgroup>ATOCA</workgroup>
<!-- WG name at the upperleft corner of the doc,
IETF is fine for individual submissions.
If this element is not present, the default is "Network Working Group",
which is used by the RFC Editor as a nod to the history of the IETF. -->
<keyword>atoca, alert, emergency, s/mime</keyword>
<!-- Keywords will be incorporated into HTML output
files in a meta tag but they have no effect on text or nroff
output. If you submit your draft to the RFC Editor, the
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<abstract>
<t>Recipients of emergency alerts need to be able to verify that an
alert they receive was issued by an authorized source. The Common
Alerting Protocol (CAP) provides a standard way of encoding alert
information, but does not provide any security features that would
support authentication of alert originators. This document describes a
security wrapper for Common Alerting Protocol objects to allow alerts to
be signed by alert originators.</t>
<t>Please send feedback to the atoca@ietf.org mailing list.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
<middle>
<section anchor="intro-sec" title="Introduction">
<t>Emergency alerting is an increasingly important function of
telecommunications networks, allowing authorities to distribute warnings
of impending danger to large numbers of end users in a short period of
time. However, because emergency alerts are such important messages to
users, there is much more potential for abuse of alerting than other
messaging systems. If an attacker can introduce a false emergency alert,
he may be able to cause mass action, such as the evacuation of a
building or city.</t>
<t>Traditionally, the security of alerting systems has been based mainly
on the security of the system by which authorities provide alerts to
broadcast points, and on the link-layer security of broadcast media that
deliver alerts to end users. In the context of the Internet, it is
impossible to rely on link-layer security because IP runs over many
types of link that have no analogous access control. While it is still
important for the "staging" or "distribution" step be secure, the
alerting system would be more robust if security were provided
end-to-end, from the original authority to the end recipient.</t>
<t>This document describes ESCAPE, a secure container format for the
Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) <xref target="CAP"></xref>. CAP documents
provide information about an emergency alert; ESCAPE-wrapped CAP
documents also provide security information that can authenticate the
originator of the alert. Using this additional information, end alert
recipients can verify that ESCAPE-wrapped alerts were originated by
entities they trust, and reject false alerts from untrusted
entities.</t>
<t>The ESCAPE format defines only a mechanism for signing alerts. It
does not define how an alert recipient discovers public keys for
entities that it should trust to originate alerts, such as local network
operators or local alert authorities. This document assumes that
cryptographic parameters such as public keys and "alert tokens" have
been provisioned through some other mechanism, e.g.,
[ATOCA-DOC-TBD].</t>
<section title="Open Questions">
<t>Should we always apply GZIP to the entire encoded message? Pro:
Slightly smaller message size. Con: Will need to require GZIP for all
messages or add content indication.</t>
<t>Should we allow DER-encoded CAP as well as XML-encoded CAP? Pro:
Smaller message size. Con: Clients need to support two encodings.</t>
<t>Should we constrain crypto algorithms. Pro: Marginally simpler
implementation. Con: Need to maintain a list of supported
algorithms.</t>
<t>Should we require a public-key signature, or allow reliance on
token checks alone? Pro: Enables cases with no public-key operations.
Con: Risk of replay attacks using old tokens.</t>
<t>Should we move the Alert-Token field from the inner (signed) MIME
entity to the outer (unsigned) MIME entity? Pro: Allows relays to add
tokens. Con: Allows relays and attackers to remove or change
tokens.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="def-sec" title="Definitions">
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in <xref
target="RFC2119">RFC 2119</xref>.</t>
</section>
<section title="new section">
<t>The ESCAPE format encapsulates a CAP document as an S/MIME object
<xref target="RFC5751"></xref>. First, the CAP document is encoded as a
MIME entity <xref target="RFC2045"></xref>, then the MIME entity is
signed using S/MIME.</t>
<section title="Basic MIME encoding">
<t>CAP XML documents have MIME type "application/cap+xml". An alert
originator may choose to apply the gzip compression scheme to the
alert before sending it. If the alert is compressed, the originator
must encode the compressed alert using the base64 encoding scheme
before transmitting it <xref target="RFC1952"></xref><xref
target="RFC4648"></xref>. A CAP MIME body thus has the following
properties:<list style="symbols">
<t>A "Content-Type" header field MUST be present, with the single
value "application/cap+xml".</t>
<t>A "Content-Encoding" header field MAY be present. If present,
it MUST have the value "gzip", and there MUST be a
"Content-Transfer-Encoding" header with the value "base64".</t>
<t>The body of the MIME entity MUST be a CAP document, either
directly, or processed through the gzip and base64 encodings.</t>
</list></t>
</section>
<section title="Alert Tokens">
<t>ESCAPE introduces a new MIME header, Alert-Token, which provides a
rough form of authentication. If alert recipients are configured with
a list of valid tokens (or an algorithm for checkign the validity of a
token), the recipient of an alert message can check the validity of
the value in the Alert-Token field before performing full S/MIME
validation on the ESCAPE object. The Alert-Token field contains a
single opaque binary string, encoded in base64. The ABNF syntax for
the field is as follows, where "base64" is as defined in <xref
target="RFC4566">RFC 4566</xref><xref target="RFC2234"></xref>. (Here
we also follow the usual conventions with regard to whitespace in MIME
headers.)</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[Alert-Token = "Alert-Token" ":" base64
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>An ESCAPE MIME entity MAY contain one or more Alert-Token header
fields. Any header fields other than "Content-Type",
"Content-Encoding", "Content-Transfer-Encoding", and "Alert-Token" MAY
be ignored by alert recipients.</t>
</section>
<section title="S/MIME Encapsulation">
<t>After a CAP message has been encoded into a MIME entity, an S/MIME
signature is applied, following the S/MIME procedures for constructing
a signed message of type "multipart/signed" (Section 3.4 of <xref
target="RFC5751">RFC 5751</xref>). The following constraints apply to
the S/MIME encoding used in ESCAPE messages.<list style="symbols">
<t>The ESCAPE message MUST have type "multipart/signed".</t>
<t>If the ESCAPE message contains header fields other than
"Content-Type", then they MAY be ignored.</t>
<t>The S/MIME body part SHOULD NOT include certificates for
signers, in order to minimize message size.</t>
<t>The S/MIME body part SHOULD identify signers by subject key
identifier rather than by subject name, in order to allow for both
certified and uncertified public keys <xref
target="RFC5652"></xref>.</t>
</list>Except the constraints above, software to verify ESCAPE
alerts MUST include full S/MIME support, including all defined
cryptographic algorithms <xref target="RFC3370"></xref><xref
target="RFC5754"></xref>. Implementations MAY include additional
algorithms, but alert signers SHOULD NOT sign alerts with non-standard
algorithms, since some recipients may not be able to process them.</t>
</section>
<section title="Validity">
<t>An ESCAPE object is valid if and only if all of the following
conditions are true: <list style="symbols">
<t>If the verifying entity is configured with valid tokens, then
there must be at least one Alert-Token header field containing a
valid token.</t>
<t>If the verifying entity is configured with trusted public keys,
then the S/MIME signature on the object must be valid, and must be
verified using a trusted public key.</t>
</list>An entity verifying an ESCAPE object MUST verify both of
these criteria, but MAY check them in either order and omit further
checks after the object fails one check. In particular, performing the
token check before decoding and verifying the CMS signature may avoid
the work of signature verification. A verifying entity SHOULD NOT
accept ESCAPE objects if it is configured with neither trusted public
keys nor valid tokens.</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Processing Rules">
<t>There are three main phases in the life-cycle of an ESCAPE object.
First, it is created and signed by an alert originator. Second, it may
pass through an alert relay that adds a signature under its key.
Finally, it is received and verified by an end recipient. This section
describes the steps that each type of entity follows to sign, re-sign or
verify an ESCAPE object.</t>
<section title="Alert Originator (Signer)">
<t>Inputs:<list style="symbols">
<t>CAP document</t>
<t>Private key for signing and corresponding subject key ID</t>
<t>gzip flag</t>
<t>List of tokens (possibly empty)</t>
</list></t>
<t>Processing steps:<list style="numbers">
<t>Encode the CAP document as a MIME entity.<list style="letters">
<t>Add a "Content-Type" header field with value
"application/common-application-protocol+xml".</t>
<t>If the gzip flag is set, add a "Content-Encoding" header
field with value "gzip" and a "Content-Transfer-Encoding"
header field with value "base64".</t>
<t>Add an "Access-Token" header field for each token in the
list.</t>
<t>If the gzip flag is set, gzip the CAP document, then gzip
and base64-encode the CAP document and set it as the message
body.</t>
<t>If the gzip flag is not set, set the CAP document as the
message body.</t>
</list></t>
<t>Compute the signature over the MIME entity using the signing
key and create a CMS SignedData structure that identifies the
signer using the corresponding subject key ID.</t>
<t>Combine the CAP MIME entity and the computed CMS SignedData
structure into a "multipart/signed" S/MIME object.</t>
</list></t>
<t>Output: ESCAPE message</t>
</section>
<section title="Alert Relay (Re-signer)">
<t>Inputs:<list style="symbols">
<t>ESCAPE object</t>
<t>Private key for signing and corresponding subject key ID</t>
</list></t>
<t>Processing steps:<list style="numbers">
<t>Extract the CAP MIME entity and CMS SignedData object from the
ESCAPE message.</t>
<t>Compute the signature over the CAP MIME entity using the
signing key.</t>
<t>Append the signature value and subject key ID to the CMS
SignedData object as a new SignerInfo.</t>
<t>Combine the CAP MIME entity and the computed CMS SignedData
structure into a "multipart/signed" S/MIME object.</t>
</list></t>
<t>Output: ESCAPE message</t>
</section>
<section title="Alert Recipient (Verifier)">
<t>Inputs:<list style="symbols">
<t>ESCAPE object</t>
<t>Set of trusted public keys (possibly empty)</t>
<t>Set of valid tokens (possibly empty)</t>
</list></t>
<t>Processing steps:<list style="numbers">
<t></t>
<t>Extract the CAP MIME entity and the CMS SignedData object from
the ESCAPE message.</t>
<t>Check that the MIME headers for the CAP MIME entity have the
correct values. <list style="symbols">
<t>Content-Type must be
"application/common-alerting-protocol+xml"</t>
<t>Content-Encoding must be "gzip" or absent</t>
<t>Content-Transfer-Encoding must be present and equal to
"base64" if Content-Encoding is present, otherwise absent.</t>
</list>If any of these headers are invalid, then return the CAP
message is malformed. Return FALSE.</t>
<t>Extract the CAP entity body. If the Content-Encoding is "gzip",
then base64-decode and un-gzip the CAP entity body.</t>
<t>If the set of valid tokens is non-empty, then verify that at
least one of the Alert-Token values in the CAP MIME entity is
contained within the set of valid tokens. If no Alert-Token value
is valid, then return FALSE.</t>
<t>If the set of trusted public keys is non-empty, then verify
that at least one of the SignerInfos within the CMS SignedData
object contains a valid signature under a trusted key. If no
valid, trusted signature is found, then return FALSE.</t>
<t>Return TRUE.</t>
</list></t>
<t>Output: Verification status</t>
</section>
</section>
<section title="Examples">
<t>Consider the following CAP message:</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
<?xml version = "1.0" encoding = "UTF-8"?>
<alert xmlns = "urn:oasis:names:tc:emergency:cap:1.1">
<identifier>43b080713727</identifier>
<sender>hsas@dhs.gov</sender>
<sent>2003-04-02T14:39:01-05:00</sent>
<status>Actual</status>
<msgType>Alert</msgType>
<scope>Public</scope>
<info>
<category>Security</category>
<event>Homeland Security Advisory System Update</event>
<urgency>Immediate</urgency>
<severity>Severe</severity>
<certainty>Likely</certainty>
<senderName>U.S. Government,
Department of Homeland Security</senderName>
<headline>Homeland Security Sets Code ORANGE</headline>
<description>The Department of Homeland Security has
elevated the Homeland Security Advisory System threat level
to ORANGE / High in response to intelligence which may
indicate a heightened threat of terrorism.</description>
<instruction> A High Condition is declared when there is a
high risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the
Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions,
Federal departments and agencies should consider agency-
specific Protective Measures in accordance with their
existing plans.</instruction>
<web>http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=29</web>
<parameter>
<valueName>HSAS</valueName>
<value>ORANGE</value>
</parameter>
<resource>
<resourceDesc>Image file (GIF)</resourceDesc>
<uri>http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/getAdvisoryImage</uri>
</resource>
<area>
<areaDesc>U.S. nationwide and interests worldwide</areaDesc>
</area>
</info>
</alert>
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>Suppose an alert signer has the following RSA key pair, encoded as a
PEM-encoded private key and self-signed certificate <xref
target="RFC1421"></xref>:</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>Then if the signer signs the alert with the above private key and the
token "foobar", he will create the following ESCAPE message:</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
Content-Type: multipart/signed;
protocol="application/pkcs7-signature";
micalg="sha1";
boundary="----C16CFF6F1CB606631B8BBD4B5B43051F"
------C16CFF6F1CB606631B8BBD4B5B43051F
Alert-Token: asdfasdfasdf
Content-Type: application/cap+xml
<?xml version = "1.0" encoding = "UTF-8"?>
<alert xmlns = "urn:oasis:names:tc:emergency:cap:1.1">
<identifier>43b080713727</identifier>
<sender>hsas@dhs.gov</sender>
<sent>2003-04-02T14:39:01-05:00</sent>
<status>Actual</status>
<msgType>Alert</msgType>
<scope>Public</scope>
<info>
<category>Security</category>
<event>Homeland Security Advisory System Update</event>
<urgency>Immediate</urgency>
<severity>Severe</severity>
<certainty>Likely</certainty>
<senderName>U.S. Government,
Department of Homeland Security</senderName>
<headline>Homeland Security Sets Code ORANGE</headline>
<description>The Department of Homeland Security has
elevated the Homeland Security Advisory System threat level
to ORANGE / High in response to intelligence which may
indicate a heightened threat of terrorism.</description>
<instruction> A High Condition is declared when there is a
high risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the
Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions,
Federal departments and agencies should consider agency-
specific Protective Measures in accordance with their
existing plans.</instruction>
<web>http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=29</web>
<parameter>
<valueName>HSAS</valueName>
<value>ORANGE</value>
</parameter>
<resource>
<resourceDesc>Image file (GIF)</resourceDesc>
<uri>http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/getAdvisoryImage</uri>
</resource>
<area>
<areaDesc>U.S. nationwide and interests worldwide</areaDesc>
</area>
</info>
</alert>
------C16CFF6F1CB606631B8BBD4B5B43051F
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s"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------C16CFF6F1CB606631B8BBD4B5B43051F--]]></artwork>
</figure>
<t>If the signer also applies the GZIP encoding and attaches the token,
he will create the following ESCAPE message:</t>
<figure>
<artwork><![CDATA[
Content-Type: multipart/signed;
protocol="application/pkcs7-signature";
micalg="sha1";
boundary="----C6A0932DF53B0609D38DC49A7E492DB3"
------C6A0932DF53B0609D38DC49A7E492DB3
Alert-Token: foobar
Content-Type: application/cap+xml
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Encoding: gzip
H4sIADZhik4AA4VUW27bMBD8L5A7LPzVArUpJynSCopSI2keQF+onQMw5NoiQpE
CSdnx7bukJFtBi/ZL4nBn9sktrl5qDVt0XlkDlzCZz7IJoBFWKrOJwOPqdvpxcl
XCyZuCa3QBiGF8vGqdyS33yueG1+jzIHKs0W2Ivs8Fb/L5bD6JRCiURBPUWqErz
8+eso/Zxfzs4vSiYKMLgGTq0Ug6VZ77z7Lys43dFqwHjyahPM2ys2l2Ps1OV/Pz
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]]></artwork>
</figure>
</section>
<section anchor="iana-sec" title="IANA Considerations">
<t>This document requires no action by IANA.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="sec-cons-sec" title="Security Considerations">
<t>[TODO]</t>
<t>[Dependency on external configuration of keys/TAs and (optionally)
tokens]</t>
</section>
<section anchor="ack-sec" title="Acknowledgements">
<t>[TODO]</t>
</section>
</middle>
<!-- *****BACK MATTER ***** -->
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<reference anchor="CAP">
<front>
<title>Common Alerting Protocol v1.1</title>
<author fullname="" initials="A" surname="Botterell">
<organization></organization>
</author>
<author initials="E." surname="Jones">
<organization>J</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street></street>
<city></city>
<region></region>
<code></code>
<country></country>
</postal>
<phone></phone>
<facsimile></facsimile>
<email></email>
<uri></uri>
</address>
</author>
<date month="October" year="2005" />
</front>
</reference>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.1421.xml"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.1952.xml"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2045.xml"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2234.xml"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3370.xml"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4566.xml"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4648.xml"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5652.xml"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5751.xml"?>
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5754.xml"?>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<?rfc include="http://xml.resource.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-atoca-requirements"?>
</references>
</back>
</rfc>
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